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ABSTRACT 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to examine, through an analysis of relevant case 
law, the way in which the courts interpret and apply primary legislation pursuant to 
the interpretative obligation contained in section 2(1) and (4) of the European 
Communities Act 1972 and section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, and to assess 
current judicial attitudes to the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty in the 
light of the judicial perception of the interpretative obligation in the above-mentioned 
provisions. 
As an essential prelude to the examination of the case law on the judicial 
treatment of the interpretative obligation in the 1972 and 1998 Acts, chapter 2 of the 
thesis discusses the traditional, Diceyan concept of parliamentary sovereignty. This is 
considered without the effects of the 1972 and 1998 Acts. This chapter demonstrates 
that the courts perceived it as their constitutional duty to obey and apply the latest will 
of Parliament without question. It is observed that no legal grounds could exist for 
challenging the validity or enforceability of primary legislation. 
Chapter 3 discusses conventional methods of statutory interpretation. It is 
observed that conventionally, the principal aim of statutory interpretation is the 
ascertainment of parliamentary intention in the statute under consideration. Where the 
intention of Parliament is clear and unambiguous and is not absurd in any way, the 
courts feel duty-bound to carry out the identified parliamentary intention in line with 
the rule, demanded by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, that courts obey 
without question the latest will of Parliament. 
The rest of the thesis is devoted to an examination of the way in which the 
courts use their interpretative powers under section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and 
section 3(1) of the 1998 Act when interpreting and applying primary legislation 
coming within the purview of these enactments. 
It is argued that while the courts appear to continue to acknowledge the 
sovereignty or supremacy of Parliament, the case law reveals that in appropriate 
cases, section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of the 1998 Act has 
enabled judges to interpret and apply primary legislation in a way that substantially 
challenges the traditional, Diceyan concept of parliamentary sovereignty. They feel 
able to ignore or otherwise modify the legal effects of unambiguous primary 
legislation in appropriate cases. 
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TERMINOLOGY ADOPTED IN THE THESIS 
 
The statutes primarily dealt with in this thesis are the European Communities Act 
1972 and the Human Rights Act 1998. To avoid clumsy repetitions, throughout the 
thesis, these statutes have simply been referred to as the 1972 Act and the 1998 Act 
respectively.  
 
The term, ―Community law‖ flexibly refers to the body of rules and regulations, 
including treaty provisions, emanating from the Communities referred to in section 
1(1) of the 1972 Act, namely, the European Economic Community, the European 
Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. However, 
this study has been concentrated on the law emanating from the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the predominant Community amongst the three. Thus, except the 
context indicates otherwise, ―the Community‖ refers to the European Economic 
Community, and ―Community law‖, ―Community legislation‖ and ―Community 
right‖ are to be read accordingly. ―EEC Treaty‖ has been used interchangeably with 
―Rome Treaty‖ as both refer to the Treaty establishing the EEC signed at Rome on the 
25
th
 of March 1957. 
 
Except otherwise indicated in the thesis, ―the Convention‖ refers to the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, agreed by the 
Council of Europe on 04 November 1950, and incorporated into United Kingdom 
domestic law by the 1998 Act. ―The Convention rights‖ refer to the rights guaranteed 
by the Convention. 
 
viii 
 
―European Court‖ as used in chapter 4 or in relation to Community law issues in the 
thesis refers to the European Court of Justice. However, the same when used in 
chapters 5 and 6 or in relation to Convention right issues in the thesis refers to the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I. Background to the Research 
 
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, according to Dicey, is the ―dominant 
characteristic‖ of the English Constitution.1It is the bedrock of the unwritten Constitution of 
the country. It defines the relationship between Parliament and the courts. 
 
The traditional account of the doctrine is to be found in Dicey‘s classic work. He says: 
 
―The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, 
namely, that Parliament… has, under the English constitution, the right to make or 
unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by 
the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament.‖ 2 
  
As far as the relationship between Parliament and the courts is concerned, the sum-total of the 
doctrine is that British courts are bound to obey and apply the will of Parliament as expressed 
in its latest Act, and that no legal grounds could exist for challenging the validity or 
enforceability of an Act of Parliament. The doctrine requires absolute judicial obedience to 
primary legislation.  
 
As a corollary to the doctrine, whenever a court finds that there is a conflict between two 
Acts of Parliament on the same subject matter, the court must obey the later Act in preference 
                                                 
1
 Dicey, A. V. (1959). Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. London, The MacMillan Press 
Limited, at  p. 39. 
  
2
 Ibid, at p. 39-40. The doctrine appears to have been originally stated in Sir Edward Coke‘s Fourth Institute, re-
stated in Blackstone‘s Commentaries and popularised by Dicey. See Chapter 2 below for an overview of the 
traditional concept of the doctrine. 
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to the earlier Act. It does so by way of application of the principle of implied repeal. This 
principle means that in such a case, the earlier Act of Parliament must be taken as impliedly 
repealed by the later Act to the extent of the inconsistency between them. In this way, the 
requirement of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, that the court must obey the will of 
Parliament expressed in the latest Act on any given subject, is fulfilled.
3
  
 
Dicey‘s account of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty has received criticisms4 from 
both judges
5
 and academic commentators. To his critics, the idea that Parliament is absolutely 
sovereign, and that there could be no legal restraints whatsoever upon its legislative power, 
could not be correct. 
 
For example, Lord Woolf
6
 has contended that ultimately, the rule of law could validly limit 
the so-called absolute power of Parliament to legislate as it pleases. According to his 
Lordship: 
 
―Our parliamentary democracy is based on the rule of law. One of the twin principles 
upon which the rule of law depends is the supremacy of Parliament in its legislative 
capacity. The other is that the courts are the final arbiters as to the interpretation and 
application of the law. As both Parliament and the courts derive their authority from 
the rule of law so both are subject to it and can not act in manner which involves its 
repudiation. The respective roles do not give rise to conflict because the courts and 
Parliament each respects the role of the other. For example, Parliament is meticulous 
in upholding the sub judice rule so as to avoid interfering with the role of the courts. 
Equally, the courts also respect the privileges of Parliament and will not become 
involved with the internal workings of Parliament. In addition the courts will seek to 
give effect wherever possible to both primary and subordinate legislation. The courts 
will for example where there is a conflict between Community and domestic 
                                                 
3
 See the judgments of Scrutton and Maugham, LLJ, in Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health [1934] All 
ER 385, [1934] 1 KB 590 
 
4
 While it is considered important to outline the major criticisms, a full analysis of the criticisms is not intended 
here as it is beyond the scope of the thesis.  
5
 Mainly in their extra-judicial capacities. 
6
 Writing extra-judicially in 1995. See Woolf (1995). "Droit Public - English Style." Public Law: 57-71. 
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legislation uphold the domestic legislation as far as possible. The courts will also 
readily accept legislation which controls how it exercises its jurisdiction or which 
confers or modifies its existing statutory jurisdiction. I however, see a distinction 
between such legislative action and that which seeks to undermine in a fundamental 
way the rule of law on which our unwritten constitution depends by removing or 
substantially impairing the entire reviewing role of the High Court on judicial review, 
a role which in its origin is as ancient as the common law, predates our present form 
of parliamentary democracy and the Bill of Rights.‖7 
 
His Lordship went on to say that 
 
―… if Parliament did the unthinkable,8 then I would say that the courts would also be 
required to act in a manner which would be without precedent.  Some judges might 
chose to do so by saying that it was an unrebuttable presumption that Parliament 
could never intend such a result. I myself would consider there were advantages in 
making it clear that ultimately there are even limits on the supremacy of Parliament 
which it is the courts‘ inalienable responsibility to identify and uphold.‖9   
 
 
All that can be said of Lord Woolf‘s criticism of the Diceyan view of parliamentary 
sovereignty is that it is based on an unrealistic scenario
10
 and is thus unhelpful. It would seem 
that the criticism has more to do with political constraints on the power of Parliament to 
legislate as it pleases and less to do with legal limitations to Parliament‘s legislative 
authority.
11
  In any case, his Lordship himself indicated that in refusing to obey an Act of 
Parliament on grounds of the rule of law, the courts would be acting without precedent. 
 
In a similar vein, Sir Stephen Sedley has also written of  
 
―a new and still emerging constitutional paradigm, no longer of Dicey‘s supreme 
Parliament to whose will the rule of law must finally bend, but of a bi-polar 
sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament and the Crown in its courts, to each of which 
                                                 
7
 Ibid, at p. 68 
8
 That is, fundamentally undermine the rule of law. See quotation above, note 8.  
9
 Op. cit., supra, note 7, at p. 69. 
10
 That is, ―the unthinkable.‖ 
11
 Dicey himself conceded that there were ―actual limitations‖ to Parliament‘s legislative power. These he 
classified as external and internal limits, both of which were essentially political in nature, and not legal. See op. 
cit., supra, note 1, at pp. 76 – 85. 
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the Crown‘s ministers are answerable – politically to Parliament, legally to the 
courts‖12 
 
 
Further, writing on the need for a guaranteed set of fundamental rights, Sir John Laws 
criticised what was apparently Dicey‘s view of parliamentary sovereignty as ―out-dated.‖13 
He advocated for ―a higher-order law: a law which cannot be abrogated by a government 
with the necessary majority in Parliament.‖14 It would seem that for Sir John, this ―higher-
order law‖ would be one beyond the reach of Parliament and within the protective cover of 
the courts. 
 
In the twentieth century, a growing number of academic commentators have also challenged 
Dicey‘s view that Parliament‘s power to legislate as it please could not be subject to any legal 
control, and have put forth an alternative view. Essentially, these commentators contend that 
while Parliament could enact whatever legislation it wishes to enact, it must do so in 
accordance with the manner and form prescribed by existing law.
15
 
 
Sir Ivor Jennings appeared to have laid the groundwork for the manner and form argument. 
He likened the United Kingdom Parliament to a prince and stated: 
 
―If a prince has supreme power, and continues to have supreme power, he can do 
anything, even to the extent of undoing the things which he had previously done. If he 
grants a constitution, binding himself not to make laws except with the consent of an 
elected legislature, he has power immediately afterwards to abolish the legislature 
without its consent and to continue legislating by his personal decree. 
 
                                                 
12
 Sedley, S. (1995). "Human Rights: a Twenty-First Century Agenda." Public Law: 386 - 400  
  
13
 Laws, J. Ibid."Law and Democracy." 72-93. 
  
14
 Ibid, at p. 84 
15
 This is the so-called  ―manner and form‖ argument. 
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―But if the prince has not supreme power, but the rule is that the courts accept as law 
that which is made in the proper legal form, the result is different. For when the prince 
enacts that henceforth no rule shall be law unless it is enacted by him with the consent 
of the legislature, the law has been altered, and the courts will not admit as law any 
rule which is not made in that form. Consequently a rule subsequently made by the 
prince alone abolishing the legislature is not law, for the legislature has not consented 
to it, and the rule has not been enacted according to the manner and form required by 
the law for the time being.‖16 
 
 
Clearly, two notions of parliamentary sovereignty are discernable from the above statement. 
The first is that Parliament enjoys absolute supremacy and that its legislative power could not 
be fettered in any manner and form by any law whatsoever. By this notion, the courts are 
duty bound to obey and apply the latest Act of Parliament irrespective of any default in the 
law-making procedure prescribed by existing legislation. Thus, any attempt by Parliament to 
fetter the law-making powers of its successor Parliaments would be futile. This is Dicey‘s 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
The second notion is that the courts would obey an Act of Parliament only if it was enacted in 
accordance with the procedure prescribed by existing legislation. Thus, Parliament could bind 
itself and its successor Parliaments as to the manner and form future Acts of Parliament must 
be enacted, and the courts would enforce this. Sir Ivor‘s inclination seemed to be towards this 
second notion. Nevertheless, he declared that the legal position was unclear because of lack 
of judicial authorities clearly establishing the correctness of either notion.
17
 
H.L.A. Hart wrote in a similar vein. He said: 
 
                                                 
16
 Jennings (1959). The Law and the Constitution. 
  
17
 Clearly, Sir Ivor did not regard Vauxhall Estates Ltd. V Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 K.B. 733 and Ellen 
Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health [1934] 1 K.B. 590 as judicial authority for the proposition that 
Parliament could not bind itself or its successors as to the manner and form of subsequent legislation. These 
cases are discussed in chapter 2.  But Professor H.W.R. Wade apparently contends that these two decisions 
constituted authorities for the proposition ―that the law-making process was not at the mercy of Parliament for 
the time being, but was guarded by the courts in order that future Parliaments might be unfettered.‖ See Wade, 
H. W. R. (1955). "The Basis of Legal Sovereignty." Cambridge Law Journal: 177-197. 
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―[O]lder constitutional theorists18 wrote as if it was a logical necessity that there 
should be a legislature which was sovereign, in the sense that it is free, at every 
moment of its existence as a continuing body, not only from legal limitations imposed 
ab extra, but also from its own prior legislation… [A]nother principle … might 
equally well, perhaps better, deserve the name of ‗sovereignty‘. This is the principle 
that Parliament should not be incapable of limiting irrevocably the legislative 
competence of its successors but, on the contrary, should have this wider self-limiting 
power. Parliament would at least once in its history be capable of exercising an even 
larger sphere of legislative competence than the accepted established doctrine allows 
to it.‖19  
It is apparent that even though Hart believes that parliamentary sovereignty is open to the 
alternative view stated by him, the ―presently accepted‖20 view is that popularised by Dicey. 
 
Professor R.F.V. Heuston
21
 has been more emphatic in propagating the manner and form 
argument, stating that while the courts could not question the area of power (or the subject-
matter of legislation) of Parliament, they have jurisdiction to determine the validity of 
legislation on grounds either that Parliament was not properly composed as required by 
existing law, or that the procedure prescribed by law was not followed. 
 
On the other hand, Professor Wade
22
 has argued that the rule that future Parliaments could 
not be bound as to the manner and form of legislation, or that the courts would obey every 
Act of Parliament is a rule of the common law;
23
 however, unlike other common law rules, 
this rule could not be altered by Parliament. His argument is that the rule is the source of 
Parliament‘s legislative authority, and not the other way round. Therefore, no statute could 
alter or abolish the rule. He says: 
                                                 
18
 Probably referring to Coke, Blackstone and Dicey, op. cit., supra, notes 1 and 2 
19
 Hart, H. L. A. (1994). The Concept of Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
 quoted at p. 436, McLean, I. and A. McMillan (2007). "Professor Dicey's Contradictions." Public 
Law(Autumn): 435 - 443. 
  
20
 Per Hart, op. cit., supra, note 20.  
21
 Heuston, R. F. V. (1964). Essays in Constitutional Law. London, Stevens & Sons. 
  
22
 Wade, H. W. R. (1955). "The Basis of Legal Sovereignty." Cambridge Law Journal: 177-197. 
  
23
 Sir Ivor Jennings seemed to have been of the same view, stating that the matter of the sovereignty of 
Parliament ―is a matter of common law.‖ Op. cit., supra, note 17, at pp. 145-146.  
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―The rule is above and beyond the reach of statute… because it is the source of the 
authority of statute. This puts it into a class by itself among rules of common law, and 
the apparent paradox that it is unalterable by Parliament turns out to be a truism. The 
rule of judicial obedience is in one sense a rule of common law, but in another sense – 
which applies to no other rule of common – it is the ultimate political fact upon which 
the whole system of legislation hangs. Legislation owes its authority to the rule; the 
rule does not owe its authority to legislation. To say that Parliament can change the 
rule, merely because it can change any other rule, is to put the cart before the horse.‖24 
 
Wade argued further that the rule, ―being simply a political fact‖ could only be changed by 
revolution, by which the courts, in whose protection the rule ultimately lies, decide who they 
obey in the new political reality. This the courts would do without a purely legal 
justification.
25
 
 
In addition to the above criticisms, there have also been claims by some commentators that in 
later writing, Dicey repudiated his views on the traditional concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty. For example, Ian McLean and Alistair McMillan, referring to Dicey‘s writings 
on the question of Irish Home Rule, stated: 
 
―Under continuing omnipotence, the Act of Union 1800 had no entrenched status. 
Therefore Parliament had the unfettered power to pass a Government of Ireland Act, 
as it finally did in 1914. Dicey very badly wanted Parliament not to pass a 
Government of Ireland Act, so he repudiated continuing omnipotence.‖26 
Despite all these criticisms of the traditional concept, it is observed that by and large, there 
have been profound judicial acknowledgement and acceptance of the traditional concept of 
                                                 
24
 op. cit., supra, note 23, at pp. 187-188 
25
 Ibid, see p. 189 
26
 McLean, I. and A. McMillan (2007). "Professor Dicey's Contradictions." Public Law(Autumn): 435 - 443, at 
p. 437. 
 However, Bogdanor has argued that in the Law of the Constitution, (see op. cit., supra, note 1) Dicey 
only wrote about Parliament being supreme in a legal sense, and that he never abandoned this view at any time. 
Bogdanor further contended that Dicey‘s writings on the Irish Home Rule were not works of law, but of politics. 
See Bogdanor, V. (2008). "The Consistency of Dicey: a reply to McLean and MacMillan." Public Law(Spring): 
19 - 20. 
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parliamentary sovereignty.
27
 The case law discussed in chapter two below demonstrates that 
the judges have often been resolute in adhering to the demands of the doctrine. 
 
While Parliament has the undoubted power to enact legislation, it is the duty of the courts to 
interpret and apply what Parliament has enacted. As will be shown in chapter three of this 
thesis, the principal judicial aim of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intention of 
Parliament as expressed in an enactment so that the enactment can be applied in accordance 
with the expressed parliamentary intention. This approach to interpretation serves to fulfil the 
demands of the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
However, relatively recent constitutional developments seem to have brought about changes 
to the way in which the courts approach their interpretative duties in relation to certain 
classes of primary legislation. The first constitutional development relevant to this thesis is 
the enactment of the European Communities Act of 1972. Section 2(1) and (4) of the Act 
imposes an obligation on the courts to construe all legislation in a manner that accords 
priority to directly effective Community law over any inconsistent provision of national law.  
 
The second development is the enactment of the Human Rights Act of 1998, which gives 
effect to the rights guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
28
 Section 3(1) of the Act imposes an obligation on the 
courts to construe and give effect to all legislation in a manner that complies with the 
Convention rights, ―so far as it is possible to do so.‖  
It is observed that each of the above statutory provisions imposes interpretative obligations 
on the courts, requiring them to construe primary legislation in a manner significantly 
                                                 
27
 The case law on this point is discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
28
 Agreed by the Council of Europe at Rome on the 4
th
 day of November 1950. 
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different from the conventional methods of statutory interpretation. They each introduce a 
new and powerful statutory rule of interpretation of primary legislation with the potential of 
affecting the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty one way or another.  
 
Recent judicial dicta emanating from some members of the House of Lords have raised 
questions about the possible impact of the interpretative obligation under the provisions 
mentioned above on the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. In Jackson v Her 
Majesty’s Attorney General,29 a number of their Lordships questioned the continued 
relevance of the traditional concept in light of the 1972 Act and 1998 Act. According to Lord 
Steyn, ―The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, 
pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the modern United 
Kingdom.‖30 Lord Hope seemed to express agreement with Lord Steyn‘s statement above 
when he stated that ―the English principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of 
Parliament which Dicey derived from Coke and Blackstone is being qualified.‖31 
 
These pronouncements appear to suggest that judicial attitudes to the traditional concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty has changed, or is changing, as a consequence of the interpretative 
obligation imposed on the courts by section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of 
the 1998 Act. The dicta tend to suggest that the rule of absolute judicial obedience to an Act 
of Parliament no longer applies.  
 
As will be seen in chapter two, the case law, at least from the 20
th
 century, has amply 
indicated an overwhelming judicial adherence to the Diceyan concept of parliamentary 
                                                 
29
 [2005] UKHL 56 
30
 Ibid. See paragraph 102 of the judgment.  
31
 Ibid. See paragraph 104 of the judgment.  
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sovereignty. Thus conventional judicial approach to statutory interpretation has generally 
been guided by the need to adhere to the demands of parliamentary sovereignty.   
 
Against this background, it has been necessary in this study to examine the interpretative 
approaches adopted by the courts pursuant to the interpretative obligations contained in the 
1972 Act and the 1998 Act, to examine how the new approaches differ from conventional 
ways
32
 of statutory interpretation, and to attempt an assessment of current judicial attitudes to 
the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty in the light of their interpretative powers 
under the above-mentioned statutes. Are the courts, pursuant to their interpretative 
obligations above mentioned, shifting from a position of absolute judicial obedience to 
primary legislation as demanded by the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty, to a 
position that appears to challenge the concept? It is intended that these issues will be 
investigated in the thesis. 
 
II. Aims of the Research 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to examine how the courts have approached their 
interpretative obligation under section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of the 
1998 Act in the interpretation and application of primary legislation. This aim is intended to 
be achieved through an analysis of relevant case law.   
 
As has been noted above, the thesis also seeks to assess current judicial attitudes to the 
traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty in the light of their approach to statutory 
interpretation under the statutes mentioned above.  
                                                 
32
 See chapter 3 below.  
11 
 
 
The thesis also seeks to demonstrate that judicial attitudes to the traditional concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty (absenting the effects of the 1972 Act and the 1998 Act) have 
tended to be one of almost unreserved acceptance. The thesis will further discuss 
conventional approaches to statutory interpretation and will seek to demonstrate that judicial 
loyalty to the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty is usually at the heart of the 
interpretative process.  
 
It is hoped that at the end of the study, after an analysis of the relevant case law and a 
synthesis of relevant academic literature, conclusions could be drawn as to:  
(1) whether the interpretative approaches adopted by the courts pursuant to the 
interpretative obligation under the 1972 Act and the 1998 Act are indeed significantly 
different from the conventional ways of statutory interpretation; 
(2) whether, and to what extent, the interpretative approaches under the relevant statutes 
mentioned above impact on judicial attitudes to parliamentary sovereignty?   
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Scope of the Research 
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The scope of the research has been guided by the aims set out above. Every effort has been 
made to keep the research focused on the aims and the ultimate objective of the research, 
which is to examine the way the courts have utilised their interpretative powers under the 
1972 and 1998 Acts, and to evaluate current judicial attitudes to the traditional concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty in light of the mentioned interpretative powers. 
 
To begin with, the study discusses the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. The 
discussion here has been limited mainly to outlining what the traditional concept means, and 
examining judicial attitudes to the concept, absenting the effects of the 1972 and 1998 Acts 
respectively. The discussion of the traditional concept has enabled a better evaluation to be 
made of current judicial attitudes in light of the courts‘ interpretative obligation under the 
1972 and 1998 Acts respectively.  
 
Since one of the aims of the research has been to examine how the interpretative obligation 
under the 1972 and 1998 Acts differs from conventional methods of statutory interpretation, 
it has been necessary to discuss some of those relevant methods. The principal focus here has 
been twofold: (1) to draw attention to the fact that the principal judicial aim of statutory 
interpretation is the ascertainment of parliamentary intention expressed in the statute under 
consideration, and (2) to highlight common law powers of the court to depart from what 
appears to be the natural and ordinary meaning of statutory words, to examine the limits of 
those powers, and to compare this with what obtains under the 1972 and 1998 Acts.  
 
The rest of the research is devoted to an examination of how the courts have approached the 
interpretative obligation contained in section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of 
13 
 
the 1998 Act. The focus here has been mainly to examine judicial reaction to primary 
legislation in the light of the relevant provisions of the two statutes mentioned above.  
 
IV. Research Methodology   
 
A. Selection of Cases 
 
This research has been based mainly on an analysis of relevant case law. The huge body of 
cases ranging across the entire spectrum of the research meant that care had to be taken to 
select leading cases in each subject area. The hope has been that this would enable a more 
compact and manageable study of the specific research questions.  
 
The cases come in four major groups. The first group had to do with the traditional concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The principal guidance has been to select cases that illustrate 
judicial acknowledgement and acceptance of the principal feature of the traditional concept, 
which is the rule of unqualified judicial obedience to primary legislation. These cases are 
mainly to be found in chapter 2 of the study. The context in which this group of cases was 
decided has to be noted. They had no connection to the 1972 and 1998 Acts. The aim here 
has been to use these cases as a helpful background material in assessing current judicial 
attitudes to the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty in the light of the 
interpretative obligations contained in the mentioned statutes. 
 
The next group of cases is that highlighting conventional methods of statutory interpretation. 
The focal point pursued here is that judicial interpretation is usually guided by the need to 
ascertain and carry out the intention of Parliament as expressed in the statute under 
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consideration, in fulfillment of the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. Of 
particular interest in this group of cases are those illustrating the power (and the limits of the 
power) of the court to depart from what appears to be the plain meaning of statutory 
provisions. It will be shown that the judicial aim in such cases is not to challenge the will of 
Parliament in enacting the statute under consideration, but to discover or clarify 
parliamentary intention so that it can be applied accordingly. On the whole, this group of 
cases will enable proper assessments to be made of how the interpretative principles adopted 
pursuant to the interpretative obligations under the 1972 and 1998 Acts differ from the 
principles enunciated in this group of cases. 
 
The third group deals with the interpretative obligation under section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 
Act. This is one of the core aspects of the research. There are hundreds of cases dealing with 
Community law and its effect on United Kingdom domestic law. This is particularly so in the 
area of employment law and competition law. Therefore, even more care had to be taken in 
the selection of cases. The principal focus has been on cases where the courts have applied or 
considered the interpretative obligation under section 2(4) of the Act in the interpretation and 
application of primary legislation. The aim here is to examine judicial reaction to primary 
legislation thought to breach applicable Community law, and to attempt to locate the 
principle upon which the resulting decisions are based. 
 
The fourth and last of the major groups of cases deals with the interpretative obligation under 
section 3(1) of the 1998 Act. Here again, the cases are numerous. Effort has been made to 
select only those cases where the courts have either used or considered the use of section 3(1) 
interpretation in construing and applying primary legislation. This of course includes both 
cases where they have applied section 3(1) interpretation as well as cases where they have 
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refrained from applying it. The key guidance is that the section 3(1) point must be an issue, 
either raised by the parties themselves, or by the court suo moto. Therefore, cases where the 
courts have made declarations of incompatibility without section 3(1) being in issue have 
generally been left out of the study.
33
 The reason for this is that the research focuses on how 
the courts have approached the interpretative obligation in section 3(1), and whether their 
approach has had any impact on judicial attitudes to the traditional concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
 
In general, effort has been made to select only the leading cases on the topics researched, 
especially as regards the interpretative obligations under the 1972 and 1998 Acts. Most of 
them are decisions of the House of Lords. Preference has been given to these decisions, 
wherever possible. The reason is that being the highest court of appeal, its decisions are the 
most authoritative and they constitute precedent to be followed in subsequent cases. A case 
that applies or adopts principles already enunciated in a leading case is in general not 
extensively discussed unless it introduces a new dimension, or contains notable judicial 
pronouncements.  
 
In addition to the major groups of cases indicated above, it has been necessary to discuss 
some leading European cases. Of particular relevance are the leading cases establishing the 
twin European principles of direct applicability and supremacy of Community law. This has 
been necessary to throw light on the background to the enactment of section 2(1) and (4) of 
the 1972 Act. 
 
B. Approach to Case Analysis    
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 An example of such cases can be found in the co-joined appeals: A and others v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department; X and another v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 
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The selected cases have been examined taking into consideration the peculiar facts and 
circumstances of each case, including social and political backgrounds and such other extra-
legal factors that may have influenced the outcome of the decision.  
 
The statutory context in each case is particularly examined. This is of vital importance in the 
study. The legislative history of relevant statutory provisions are explored to determine 
parliamentary intention, and to assess whether that intention has in any way been departed 
from as a consequence of the application of the interpretative obligation under the 1972 and 
1998 Acts.  
 
It was found that judicial approaches to the interpretative obligation under the Acts have not 
been completely uniform. As a result, a comparative approach has been adopted in part in the 
analysis of the various judicial approaches to the interpretative obligation. 
 
On the whole, the case law is the centre around which the thesis revolves and from which the 
general conclusions are drawn.  
 
 
 
 
C. Journal Articles 
 
Use has been made of journal articles dealing with various aspects of the research. However, 
care has been taken to restrict treatment of relevant articles mainly to a brief statement or 
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analysis of the argument or viewpoint of the authors on a controversial issue, or to compare 
or contrast various viewpoints articulated by authors on a given topic. It has been necessary 
sometimes, either to criticise or to support the viewpoints expressed in various journal 
articles. 
 
D. Research Facilities Utilised 
 
The research was mostly internet-based and almost entirely conducted by use of Northumbria 
University‘s electronic resources. Through NORA, the University‘s gateway to an array of 
electronic resources, it was possible to find virtually all of the selected cases examined in the 
research, and also many of the journal articles. The legal databases of Lexis-Nexis 
Professional and Westlaw proved to be particularly invaluable. 
 
Apart from Northumbria University‘s electronic resources, use was also made of the 
Parliamentary web site at www.parliament.uk/ from which detailed official reports of 
relevant debates in the House of Lords and House of Commons as well as some of the most 
recent reports of House of Lords decisions were obtained. The web site of the Office of 
Public Sector Information (www.opsi.gov.uk) was also helpful, particularly in obtaining full 
texts of statutes. Research material was also obtained from the web site of the National 
Archives at www.nationalarchives.gov.uk. 
 
Relevant books, journal articles, law reports and official reports of Parliamentary proceedings 
which were not available online were found in the University library. The library‘s Inter-
Library Loan Service was very helpful in securing material that was not available in the 
library.  
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V. Structure of the Thesis 
 
Since the ultimate aim of the research is to assess the impact of the interpretative obligations 
contained in section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of the 1998 Act on the 
traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty, it was both necessary and expedient that the 
main body of the thesis began with an overview of the traditional doctrine without reference 
to the potential effects of the interpretative obligations contained in the Acts. This has been 
done in chapter 2 of the thesis. Chapter 2 explains what the traditional concept of the doctrine 
entails. Further, the chapter reviews the case law and examines judicial attitudes to the 
traditional concept. 
 
The traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty requires the courts to obey and apply 
without question the intention of Parliament as manifest in primary legislation. However, the 
intention of Parliament can only be determined by the courts by means of application of 
principles and rules of statutory interpretation. These are common law principles. As a 
general rule, the courts accept that clear and unambiguous words used in a statutory provision 
are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning as this best indicates the intention of 
Parliament. However, there are instances where the courts feel able to change what appears to 
be the ordinary meaning and effect of plain words used in statutory provisions with the result 
of seeming to depart from the intention of Parliament. Chapter 3 mainly discusses relevant 
principles that enable the courts to do so. The limits of the power of the courts to depart from 
the meaning of plain words have been of particular interest. It will be shown that the power is 
used, not as a means of challenging parliamentary intention, but as a means of effectively 
determining parliamentary intention, thus enabling the court to apply Parliament‘s intention 
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in accordance with the demands of the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Chapter 3 enables comparison to be made of this common law power with the interpretative 
powers under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, which seem to 
enable courts to depart from the enacted intention of Parliament.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the interpretative obligation under section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act. 
First, it explores the legal and constitutional background to the enactment of the above-
mentioned provisions. This enables an appreciation of the legislative rationale behind the 
provisions, which in turn enables a better understanding of the effects of the interpretative 
obligation on the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. Secondly, the chapter 
examines judicial approaches to section 2(4) interpretation. The main focus is an examination 
of the judicial reaction to primary legislation found to violate directly effective Community 
law. This has been done through an analysis of relevant case law. An attempt is made in 
chapter 4 to locate the possible premise upon which the judicial treatment of the legal and 
constitutional relationship between United Kingdom primary legislation on the one hand, and 
directly effective Community law on the other hand, is based. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the general scheme and essential provisions of the 1998 Act. In 
particular, the chapter highlights the fact that parliamentary sovereignty is preserved. This 
chapter is meant to serve as background material to chapter 6, which examines the case law 
on the interpretative obligation contained in section 3(1) of the 1998 Act. 
Chapter 6 examines the interpretative obligation under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act. The 
chapter identifies two distinctive judicial approaches to statutory interpretation pursuant to 
the interpretative obligation under section 3(1). The first approach tends toward a very 
creative or radical use of the interpretative obligation, sometimes posing considerable 
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questions as to whether the courts are thereby challenging parliamentary sovereignty. The 
second approach tends towards a high degree of deference to the concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty, sometimes raising questions as to the effectiveness of the 1998 Act. These two 
approaches are examined in the chapter. It is found that on balance, judicial use of section 
3(1) interpretation appears to be tilting towards a more rights-oriented interpretation and 
application of statutes such that increasingly, the courts appear not to be bothered with 
concerns about parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Chapter 7 of the thesis contains the conclusion. This chapter reviews the evidence distillable 
from the cases analysed and attempts to draw general conclusions. It will be argued that the 
interpretative obligations contained in the 1972 and 1998 Acts have given the courts greater 
powers of interpretation never before available to them under the conventional methods of 
interpretation. There appears to be evidence that so far as the interpretative obligations 
contained in the relevant statutes remain unaltered, their increased use may lead, in the future, 
to a situation where the courts might be completely uninhibited by concerns about 
parliamentary sovereignty, at least with respect to cases where the interpretative obligations 
are applicable.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF PARLIAMENTARY 
SOVEREIGNTY 
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―… an Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things 
that look pretty odd…‖34  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter is intended to take an overview of the traditional Diceyan concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The primary aim is to examine the case law and discover judicial 
attitudes to this traditional concept. The chapter will demonstrate that there is an 
overwhelming judicial inclination towards unreserved respect for the traditional concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty.   
 
It has to be noted that this chapter examines judicial attitudes to the traditional concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty without consideration of the effects of the interpretative obligation 
contained in the 1972 and 1998 Acts. The purpose is to enable comparison to be made of the 
courts‘ attitude to the concept before and after the enactment of the Acts mentioned. 
 
II. Judicial Attitudes to the Traditional Concept 
 
As a legal concept, parliamentary sovereignty defines the constitutional relationship between 
Parliament and the courts. The concept means that Parliament has the legal power to make 
any law it deems fit, and that whatever it enacts will be obeyed and applied by the courts 
without question. There can be no legal grounds whatsoever for challenging the validity or 
enforceability of an Act of Parliament.  
 
According to Dicey,  
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 Per Holt, CJ, in City of London v Wood [1701] 12 Mod. Rep 669, 687-688 
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―The principle … of Parliamentary sovereignty may, looked at from its positive side, 
be thus described: Any Act of Parliament, or any part of an Act of Parliament, which 
makes a new law, or repeals or modifies an existing law, will be obeyed by the courts. 
The same principle, looked from its negative side, may be thus stated: there is no 
person or body of persons who can, under the English constitution, make rules which 
override or derogate from an Act of Parliament, or which (to express the same thing in 
other words) will be enforced by the courts in contravention of an Act of Parliament.
35
 
 
Dicey‘s view of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty can be dissolved into three basic 
elements. The first element of the doctrine is that no court of law can disobey or render 
ineffective the provisions of an Act of Parliament. There can be no legal grounds upon which 
a court may rely in invalidating an Act. An Act that has been passed by both Houses of 
Parliament and has received the Royal Assent commands the unquestioned obedience of the 
courts.  
 
In the past, there have been a number of attempts challenging the validity or enforceability of 
Acts of Parliament on grounds of procedural irregularity in the Parliamentary process leading 
up to the enactment of an Act of Parliament. However, the courts have in general, been 
inclined to the view that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, together with the 
constitutional principles of the separation of powers and parliamentary privilege, require 
them to obey and apply all Acts of Parliament irrespective of any such irregularity.  
Thus, courts generally obey and apply an Act of Parliament notwithstanding any failure to 
comply with the standing orders of either Houses of Parliament. In other words, once a Bill 
has been passed and has received the Royal assent, the law requires absolute judicial 
obedience of the terms of the Act irrespective of any defect in the process by which it became 
an Act.  
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 Dicey, op. cit., supra, note 1, at p. 40. 
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In Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co. v Wauchope
36
 the Respondent had claimed against 
the Appellant certain rights under a private Act of Parliament enacted in 1826.
37
 The 
Appellant Company opposed the claim, contending amongst others that the right supposedly 
conferred by the 1826 private Act relied upon by the Respondent had been repealed by a 
subsequent private Act of Parliament.
38
 The Respondent countered this contention by arguing 
that the latter Act of Parliament, being a private Act affecting his vested rights conferred by 
the previous Act, could not apply to him because it was introduced in Parliament and passed 
without due Parliamentary notice served on him. 
 
Before the Lord Ordinary, the case was decided on other grounds. However, the Lord 
Ordinary seemed to agree, obiter, with the contention of the Respondent, that the latter Act of 
Parliament could not be applied to take away the Respondent‘s vested rights granted by the 
earlier Act because due notice was not given to him as an interested party. 
 
On appeal, Lord Brougham, Lord Cottenham and Lord Campbell all criticised this view. 
According to Lord Campbell,  
―There is no foundation whatever for it. All that a Court of Justice can do is look to 
the Parliamentary roll: if from that it should appear that a bill has passed both Houses 
and received the Royal Assent, no Court of Justice can inquire into what was done 
previous to its introduction, or what passed in Parliament during its progress in its 
various stages through both Houses. I trust, therefore, that no such inquiry will again 
be entered upon in any Court in Scotland, but that due effect will be given to every 
Act of Parliament, private as well as public, upon what appears to be the proper 
construction of its existing provisions.‖39 
 
Lord Campbell‘s pronouncement is significant in two respects. First, it indicated what the 
courts would recognise as an Act of Parliament and how the courts would react to every Act 
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 [1842] VII Clark & Finnelly, 710 
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 7 Geo, 4, c. xcviii.  
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 4 and 5 W. 4, c. Ixxi. 
39
 [1842] VII Clark & Finnelly, 710 at p. 725 
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properly recognised as such. An Act appearing on the Parliamentary roll, and which, on the 
face of it, appeared to have been passed by the Commons as well as the Lords, and had 
received the Royal assent, was automatically given due legal recognition as an Act of the 
sovereign Parliament. This has been referred to as the ―enrolled Act‖ rule.40 Once the court 
identifies an instrument as an enrolled Act of the sovereign Parliament, no grounds could 
exist for challenging its enforceability. The court cannot carry out any investigation aimed at 
determining whether it should or should not apply an Act of Parliament on the ground that 
irregularities were committed in the process of the passage of the Act.  
 
The second significant thing about Lord Campbell‘s statement is that it seemed to indicate 
that there could be no distinction between private and public Acts of Parliament. The same 
―enrolled Act‖ rule applied to both. A public Act of Parliament, just like a private Act, could 
not be challenged on grounds of defect in legislative procedure. Both of them required 
absolute judicial obedience.  
 
Willes, J in Lee and Another v The Bude & Torrington Junction Railway Company, Ex parte 
Stevens, Ex parte Fisher,
41
 reiterated this view that the court is bound to obey and apply an 
Act of Parliament notwithstanding any defect in the process by which it was enacted. In the 
case, Stevens and Fisher, who were judgment debtors, had claimed that certain Acts of 
Parliament upon which the plaintiffs relied in pursuing the judgment debt against them, 
contained false recitals fraudulently introduced by the plaintiffs for the purpose of furthering 
their own interests. They contended in effect that it would be inequitable in the circumstances 
                                                 
40
 Admittedly, Bills are no longer entered on the ―Roll‖, but are published in accordance with parliamentary 
procedure. However, it is submitted that this should not affect the continued relevance of the ―enrolled Act ― 
rule. 
41
 [Court of Common Pleas] [1871]  [L R] 6 C P 576 
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to enforce the provisions of the Acts and issue execution based on those provisions. Wille, J, 
had this to say: 
 
―I would observe, as to these Acts of Parliament, that they are the law of this land; 
and we do not sit here as a court of appeal from Parliament…. We sit here as servants 
of the Queen and the legislature. Are we to act as regents over what is done by 
Parliament with the consent of the Queen, lords and commons? I deny that any such 
authority exists. If an Act of Parliament has been obtained improperly, it is for the 
legislature to correct it by repealing it: but, so long as it exists as law, the Courts are 
bound to obey it.‖42  
 
Wille‘s statement indicates a total absence in the United Kingdom, of judicial power to 
review legislative action. This seems to be due to the fact that the courts regard an Act of 
Parliament to be the highest form of law. That being so, there could be no other rule of law 
by which the courts could determine the validity of an Act. In Wille‘s view, a judicial 
challenge to the validity of an Act of Parliament is inconceivable. 
 
The issue as to whether a court is entitled to disregard a provision in an Act of Parliament on 
the ground that it was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation was specifically argued in the 
House of Lords and determined by their Lordships in the case of British Railways Board v 
Pickin.
43
  
 
The case concerned the validity of section 18 of the British Railways Act 1968. Section 259 
of a private Act of Parliament enacted in 1836 that had set up the Bristol to Exeter railway 
provided that the land upon which the railway was built would revert to the owners for the 
time being of the adjacent land in the event that the railway was abandoned. Many years later, 
the British Railways Board promoted and subsequently secured the enactment of another 
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private Act of Parliament, that is, the British Railways Act of 1968. The Act authorised the 
compulsory acquisition, amongst others, of the railway set up by the 1836 Act. Further, 
section 18 of the 1968 Act provided in effect that the provisions of section 259 of the 1836 
Act (and similar provisions in other Acts) shall not apply to any lands vested in the British 
Railways Board. This meant that even if the railway were to be abandoned, the land upon 
which it was built would not revert to the owners of the adjacent land, but would continue to 
be vested in the Board.  
 
The preamble to the 1968 Act had contained a recital to the effect that plans of the lands to be 
acquired as well as a book of reference to the plans containing the names of the persons to be 
affected by the acquisition had been deposited with the clerk of the council of the county in 
which the lands were situated.  
 
The respondent in the appeal, (Mr. Pickin) who had purchased a portion of land adjacent to 
the railway in dispute, instituted proceedings claiming that the railway had been abandoned 
and that by virtue of section 259 of the 1836 Act, he was entitled to a portion of the 
abandoned railway. The appellant opposed the claim and relied in particular on section 18 of 
the 1968 Act, which nullified the effect of section 259 of the 1836 Act. 
 
The respondent then filed a reply where, by paragraphs 3 and 4, he contended that section 18 
of the 1968 Act was ineffective to deprive him of his interest in the abandoned railway on the 
ground that Parliament was fraudulently misled into passing the Act. He claimed that the 
recital contained in the Act as to the depositing of the plans of the lands was false, and that 
the appellant Board, for its own benefit, fraudulently inserted the recital. 
 
27 
 
The appellant applied to have paragraphs 3 and 4 of the respondent‘s reply struck out for 
abuse of the process of the court. The Master accordingly struck them out. On appeal, 
Chapman, J, affirmed the Master‘s decision principally on the ground that the court could not 
go behind the Act and investigate the processes leading up to the passing of the Act. 
 
On further appeal to the Court of Appeal
44
, the appellate judges
45
 decided that the issue 
whether the 1968 Act was obtained by fraud was a triable issue; accordingly paragraphs 3 
and 4, which raised the issue, were ordered to be restored. The reasoning of the Court in 
declaring the issue of fraud a triable one in the context of the case can be gleaned from the 
statement of Lord Denning: 
 
―We should let it go trial on the ... issue whether this Act of Parliament was 
fraudulently obtained. That is a triable issue. It is deserving of investigation by the 
court. As I have said in the course of the argument, supposed the court were satisfied 
that this private Act was improperly obtained, it might well be the duty of the court to 
report that finding to Parliament, so that Parliament itself could take cognisance of it. 
Parliament could put the matter right, if it thought fit, by passing another Act. In my 
opinion it is the function of the court to see that the procedure of Parliament itself is 
not abused and that undue advantage is not taken of it. In so doing the court is not 
trespassing on the jurisdiction of Parliament itself. It is acting in aid of Parliament, 
and , I might add, in aid of justice. If it is proved that Parliament was misled, the court 
can, and should, draw it to the attention of Parliament.‖46   
 
There was no clear indication that that the Court of Appeal was persuaded by the manner and 
form argument, or even that they were making a statement of principle that a private Act of 
Parliament obtained improperly was liable to be invalidated or ignored by the court. As a 
matter of fact, the Court indicated that the case before them has not has not presented the 
proper occasion to make a final pronouncement on the matter. The decision the Court was 
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 Lord Denning, M.R., Edmund Davies and John Stephenson, LLJ. 
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 Op cit, supra, note 45, at p. 831, paragraphs E – H. 
28 
 
making was that the facts alleged in support of the allegation of fraud be tried. Seen in this 
light, one might say that the matter did not involve any conflict with Parliament. 
 
However, it is difficult to envisage how such an allegation could be investigated without 
investigating the parliamentary process by which the Act in question was enacted. Secondly, 
assuming the facts alleged were found to be proved, there is the question of what should 
happen in the interim, pending Parliament‘s decision to take corrective legislative measures. 
For example, could the court suspend the operation of the Act pending Parliament‘s decision? 
 
 Further, the decision of the Court of Appeal raised a real possibility that the court could 
decide the enforceability of section 18 of the 1968 Act one way or the other. If the court were 
to decide that the section in question was not enforceable against the respondent, it would 
mean that the court would have to disregard the provisions of the section as far as it affected 
the interests of the respondent. 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal appeared to have been influenced by the fact that the 
case involved a private Act alleged to have been obtained by fraud. The primary focus 
appeared to be on the conduct of the party that obtained the Act. The reasoning is that persons 
must not be allowed to use the Parliamentary process fraudulently and take undue advantage 
of it. However, as have been stated above, an investigation of such an allegation would 
necessarily involve investigating the internal processes of Parliament, a judicial act that 
would certainly breach the principle of parliamentary privilege embodied in Article IX of the 
Bill of Rights 1689. 
On appeal to the House of Lords, their Lordships made it clear that the Court of Appeal was 
wrong. According to Lord Reid, 
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―The idea that a court is entitled to disregard a provision in an Act of Parliament on 
any ground
47
 must seem strange and startling to anyone with any knowledge of the 
history and law of our constitution…. In earlier times many learned lawyers seem to 
have believed that an Act of Parliament could be disregarded in so far as it was 
contrary to the law of God or the law of nature or natural justice, but since the 
supremacy of Parliament was finally demonstrated by the revolution of 1688 any such 
idea has become obsolete.‖48 
 
 
Accordingly, the question whether Parliament was fraudulently misled into passing the 1968 
Act was immaterial. The court could not, under any guise, ignore the clear provisions of the 
Act. It could not grant any relief contrary to the terms of the Act. All it can do is to interpret 
the provisions in a manner that fulfils the will of the sovereign Parliament.
49
 This is what the 
traditional concept of Parliamentary sovereignty demands.  
 
Lord Reid‘s mention of the revolution of 1688 was significant. Although as early as 1485, the 
law-making authority of Parliament had been accepted,
50
 very serious disputes remained as to 
the position of Parliament as the supreme law-making body of England. By the 17
th
 century, 
there were three groups of political theorists each of which sought to locate ultimate 
sovereign power in three different entities. These groups were the royalist theorists, the 
parliamentarian theorists and the common law theorists.  
 
The royalist theorists believed that the King (or Queen) was God‘s representative on earth. 
God bestowed absolute sovereign powers on the King. Therefore, the King was absolutely 
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supreme and was not accountable to any human institution or body. That meant that the King 
was unaccountable both to Parliament and to the courts.
51
 Perhaps the most significant 
element of royalist theories was the assertion that the King had certain absolute prerogative 
powers which were inseparable from the Crown and which he could exercise outside of 
Parliament. The most significant of these asserted prerogatives was the King‘s power to 
suspend, or dispense with, statutes enacted by Parliament. 
 
On the other hand, parliamentarian theorists argued that political power was given by God to 
the community as a whole. For purposes of effectiveness of governance, the community had 
to delegate governmental powers to the King. However, the King‘s exercise of governmental 
powers was subject to the common law, and more importantly, to laws enacted by 
Parliament, which represented the community. Consequently, the King‘s prerogative powers 
could be exercised only as far as Parliament allowed.
52
 
 
For the common law theorists, it was believed that both Parliament and the King owed their 
respective authorities to the common law. Therefore, both were subject to the common law. 
However, common law theorists were not absolutely clear as to whether judges were 
empowered to review the validity of legislative enactments made by Parliament for being 
contrary to the common law. As observed by Professor Jeffrey Goldsworthy, writing in the 
context of 17
th
 century England, 
 
―It is clear that some lawyers did advocate some kind of judicial review of the validity 
of statute. But disapproval of the idea was much more common, because it was 
inconsistent with the prevailing hierarchy of political authority, and the principal 
theories – royalist as well as parliamentarian – that sought to justify that hierarchy.‖53 
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By the 17
th
 century, the two dominant groups of political theorists in England were the 
royalists and the parliamentarians. Although their differences were deep-rooted, there was a 
meeting point between the two groups. They both agreed that the King-in-Parliament had 
absolute law-making power in the sense that the courts could not review the validity of 
enactments emanating from that body.
54
 The conflict between the two groups related in the 
main to the disputed exercise of the King‘s prerogative powers outside of Parliament and 
without the consent of Parliament. The King‘s prerogative powers to legislate and govern 
outside of Parliament, and without the consent of Parliament, was held by royalists to be 
untouchable even by the King-in-Parliament. The King‘s exercise of legislative powers in 
three specific areas appeared to be most contentious. First was the King‘s power to legislate 
by way of proclamation. The Statute of Proclamations 1539 had enabled Henry VIII to 
exercise wide legislative powers without recourse to Parliament. Although in the Case of 
Proclamations
55
, this prerogative power was held to be subject to statute, it appeared that the 
Stuart Kings continued to make maximal use of it.  
 
The second area concerned the imposition of indirect taxes on foreign trade and defence of 
the realm. The King asserted a prerogative power to impose taxes on foreign trade
56
 and for 
purposes of the defence of the realm
57
 without recourse to Parliament, and it would appear, 
even contrary to statute.  
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The third area concerned the Crown‘s asserted prerogative power to dispense with, or 
suspend, the operation of statutes enacted by Parliament.  
 
The struggle between the royalists and the parliamentarians came to a head during the reign 
of Charles I. The struggle led in large measure to the civil war and the eventual defeat and 
execution of Charles I in 1646 and the abolition of the monarchy during the period of Oliver 
Cromwell‘s Republican Protectorate. After Cromwell‘s death, the monarchy was restored in 
1660 and the reign of the Stuart Kings resumed. 
 
As it turned out, the struggle for supremacy between Parliament and the Crown did not end 
with the civil war and the restoration of the monarchy. James II‘s ascension of the throne 
marked a resurgence of Catholicism. The King asserted the long-disputed royal prerogative 
power to dispense with provisions of the Test Act, which prevented Catholics from holding 
public offices.
 58
 Catholics were appointed into state offices, and correspondingly, Protestants 
were increasingly being removed from offices.
59
 The birth of a male heir to James II amid 
fears that Catholicism would in time be firmly rooted in the Kingdom made it imperative for 
his opponents to act. Seven peers invited James‘ son-in-law, William of Orange to intervene. 
By the end of 1688, James II had been defeated and had fled to France. William and his wife 
Mary were offered the Crown conditional upon respecting the Declaration of Rights the terms 
of which were eventually incorporated into the Bill of Rights 1689. Clearly, the Bill of Rights 
was meant to tilt the balance of power between the Crown and Parliament in favour of the 
latter. 
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The Bill of Rights is a major constitutional document as far as the constitutional relationship 
between Parliament and the Crown is concerned. Its principal provisions finally settled the 
long-running conflicts between Parliament and the Crown concerning the latter‘s absolute use 
of the prerogative powers, especially as they concerned the power to dispense with or 
suspend the operation of statutes, and the power to impose taxes without parliamentary 
consent.  
 
As can be seen from the foregoing sections, before the revolution of 1688, absolute use of the 
prerogative powers was pervasive. The Crown‘s legislative powers competed with that of the 
King-in-Parliament and were indeed regarded by royalists as in some way superior to 
statutes. In this situation, Parliament could not be regarded as sovereign and truly supreme. 
The Bill of Rights made it absolutely clear that Parliament was supreme in every sense of the 
word. Henceforth, no authority outside of Parliament could compete with it. Article I of the 
Bill of Rights outlawed the royal prerogative to dispense with or suspend laws without 
parliamentary consent. Likewise, the imposition of taxes under the prerogative was 
prohibited by Article IV.  Thus, the superiority of the law-making powers of Parliament over 
the royal prerogative was affirmed. Since the Bill of Rights, it would appear that no 
prerogative has been held by the courts to be untouchable by Parliament.  
 
In addition to settling the issue of superiority between Parliament and the Crown, the Bill of 
Rights also defined the constitutional relationship between Parliament and the courts when it 
established the principle of parliamentary privilege. By Article IX of the Bill of Rights, 
―freedom of speech and debates in proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.‖ This effectively barred the courts from 
questioning proceedings in Parliament. Thus, the courts could not entertain any action that 
34 
 
might involve an investigation into matters that occurred in the course of parliamentary 
proceedings. This was no doubt the basis of the various judicial decisions in which judges 
have refrained from questioning the validity of parliamentary enactments challenged on 
grounds of procedural irregularity in the parliamentary process leading up to the enactment of 
an Act of Parliament.
60
In particular, the decision of the House of Lords in Pickin’s case was 
informed by the House‘s desire not to interfere with the internal workings of Parliament. An 
investigation of the sort suggested by the Court of Appeal would necessarily have fallen fowl 
of the principle of parliamentary privilege embodied in the provisions of Article IX of the 
Bill of Rights.  
 
However, it is submitted that the House of Lords‘ decision in Pickin’s case simultaneously 
demonstrated the readiness of the courts to obey every Act of Parliament, public as well as 
private, irrespective of alleged irregularities. This is essentially what the traditional concept 
of parliamentary sovereignty demands. 
The second essential element of the Diceyan view of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty is that the British constitution recognises no form of law that can override an Act 
of Parliament, or that can be enforced by the courts in contravention of an Act of Parliament. 
An Act of Parliament is the highest form of law. The application of an Act cannot therefore, 
be subject to any other form of law, whether common law, previous statute, fundamental 
rights or principles of international law. 
 
However, views have been expressed in the past, which tended to challenge Dicey‘s assertion 
above. In Dr Bonham’s Case61, Chief Justice Coke reportedly asserted the existence of 
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judicial power, under the common law, to review, and in appropriate cases, nullify an Act of 
Parliament found to be against common right and reason: 
 
―And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul Acts 
of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of 
Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.‖62  
 
This of course, would mean that there are certain rules against which the validity of an Act of 
Parliament could be determined. This in turn means that courts are imbued with power to 
judicially review an Act of Parliament and nullify it if found to be inconsistent with norms 
determined by the courts to be beyond the reach of Parliament. This idea is clearly 
inconsistent with the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
It would appear that the idea that judges could invalidate an Act of Parliament for being 
contrary to some ―higher‖ law enjoyed some support in ancient times. For instance, 
Blackstone had also commented that the 
 
―… law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of 
course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all 
countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and 
such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or 
immediately, from this original.‖63  
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However, in modern times, courts have been generally consistent in holding that an Act of 
Parliament supersedes all other forms of law, and that the courts would obey and apply every 
Act of Parliament irrespective of any violation of any other form of law.
64
 
 
Accordingly, the courts will obey and apply the provisions of an Act of Parliament 
notwithstanding any conflict with principles of international law or obligations undertaken 
under an international treaty or convention. With respect to obligations under an international 
treaty, it is immaterial that they are incorporated in an Act of Parliament. The courts 
recognise the right of Parliament to alter the provisions of such an Act even if the resultant 
effect is a unilateral variation of the terms of the international treaty. A number of cases 
illustrate this point. 
 
In Collco Dealings Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners,
65
 certain bilateral agreements were 
entered into between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland providing for 
reciprocal tax exemptions in respect of persons and corporate bodies resident in either of the 
two countries, but not in both countries. These agreements were subject to ratification by 
legislation in both countries. The United Kingdom incorporated the terms of the agreement in 
the Income Tax Act of 1952.  Paragraph 4 of Schedule 18 to the Act allowed qualified 
persons claiming tax exemption on the ground of residency in the Republic of Ireland to 
submit such claims to the Inland Revenue Commissioners. 
 
The appellant, a company registered and resident in the Republic of Ireland, submitted a 
claim pursuant to the tax exemption provisions contained in the 1952 Act, asking for a refund 
of tax paid in respect of certain dividends it received for shares held in two British 
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companies. The Inland Revenue Commissioners rejected the claim on the ground that a later 
Act of Parliament, the Finance Act (No. 2) of 1955, had, by section 4 (2) thereof, taken away 
the exemption relied on by the appellant. The company appealed to the Commissioners for 
the Special Purposes of the Income Tax Acts, which allowed the appeal. However, on appeal 
to the High Court, the decision of the Inland Revenue Commissioners was restored. The 
Court of Appeal in turn upheld the High Court‘s decision. 
 
On further appeal to the House of Lords, it was argued on behalf of the appellant company 
that applying section 4(2) of the Finance Act 1955 in a manner that removed the appellant‘s 
right to tax exemption would amount to a breach of the international agreements between the 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, and that this would be inconsistent with the 
comity of nations and rules of international law. The House was therefore urged to construe 
the subsection in a way that avoided this result and preserved the terms of the international 
agreements.  
The House of Lords rejected the argument, stating that as the subsection was clear and 
unambiguous, it could not be disregarded notwithstanding any inconsistency with the 
international agreements incorporated in the 1952 Act. This meant that inconsistency with 
international treaty obligations (even if incorporated in a domestic Act) could not be a ground 
for disregarding the clear terms of a later Act of Parliament. 
 
In Cheney v Conn (Inspector of Taxes)
66
 the appellant, a taxpayer, challenged the validity of 
assessments to income tax and surtax made against him under provisions of the Finance Act 
of 1964 on the ground that a substantial part of the tax raised under the Act had been 
allocated to the production of nuclear weapons contrary to international law, in particular, the 
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Geneva Convention incorporated into United Kingdom law by the Geneva Convention Act of 
1957. The Commissioners for the Special Purposes of the Income Tax Acts rejected his 
argument. 
 
The appellant‘s appeal to the High Court was dismissed. Ungoed-Thomas, J, held that the 
assessments having been authorised by statute, agreeing with the argument of the appellant 
would amount to overruling the supremacy of Parliament. According to him, 
 
―What the statute itself enacts cannot be unlawful, because what the statute says and 
provides is itself the law, and the highest form of law that is known to this country. It 
is the law which prevails over every other form of law, and it is not for the court to 
say that a parliamentary enactment, the highest law in this country, is illegal.‖67 
 
 
Clearly therefore, Parliament‘s legislative power overrides any provision in an international 
convention entered into by the United Kingdom. So far as an Act of Parliament is clear and 
unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to obey and apply its provisions irrespective of any 
inconsistency with such an international convention. As Lord Diplock, LJ
68
 put it in Salomon 
v Commissioners of Customs and Excise,
69
 ―the sovereign power of the Queen in Parliament 
extends to breaking treaties… and any remedy for a breach of an international obligation lies 
in a forum other than Her Majesty‘s own courts.‖70 
 
Again, in accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, a court must apply an 
Act of Parliament that clearly extends to foreigners and covers acts allegedly committed 
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outside the territory of the United Kingdom.
71
 Ordinarily, this would be against principles of 
international law. Nevertheless, a foreigner adversely affected by such an Act cannot plead 
principles of international law as a legal defence if proceeded against in a court having 
jurisdiction in the United Kingdom. Certainly, practical considerations may restrain 
Parliament from enacting a law extending to foreigners living outside the United Kingdom 
and in respect of acts committed outside the United Kingdom. Enacting such a law may not 
be in tune with good politics and international relations. Also, there may be practical 
difficulties in enforcing the law against a foreigner resident outside the country. However, 
were Parliament to legislate notwithstanding these considerations, the courts would be bound 
to obey and apply the will of Parliament as contained in the Act.    
 
Even if an international convention were one that protected human rights, the courts would 
nevertheless obey and apply any statute enacted in clear violation of such a convention.    
 
In Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Brind and others,
72
 a case 
decided prior to the enactment of the 1998 Act, the applicants challenged the lawfulness of a 
directive issued by the Secretary of State forbidding the Independent Broadcasting Authority 
and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) respectively from broadcasting the direct 
speeches of persons representing certain specified organisations, or persons calling for 
support for such organisations.  
 
With respect to the Independent Broadcasting Authority, the Secretary of State acted pursuant 
to section 29(3) of the Broadcasting Act 1981 which provided that ―the Secretary of State 
may at any time by notice in writing require the Authority to refrain from broadcasting any 
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matter or classes of matter specified in the notice; and it shall be the duty of the Authority to 
comply with the notice.‖  
 
And with respect to the BBC, he relied on clause 13(4) of the licence and agreement made 
with the BBC which provided that ―The Secretary of State may from time to time require the 
Corporation to refrain at any specified time or at all times from sending any matter or matters 
of any class specified in such notice; . . .‖ 
 
Counsel to the applicants relied inter alia, on Article 10
73
 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and argued that in determining the 
scope of the powers granted to the Secretary of State by the relevant section of the 
Broadcasting Act, the court must ensure that Convention rights were not breached. 
Parliament must be presumed not to have intended the Secretary of State to act in breach of 
United Kingdom obligations under the Convention. 
However, the House of Lords held that the authority conferred on the Secretary of State both 
by section 29(3) of the Broadcasting Act and by clause 13(4) of the licence and agreement 
with the BBC were clear and unambiguous. Since an Act of Parliament had not domesticated 
the Convention (at that time), it formed no part of the law of the United Kingdom. No 
intention could therefore be imputed to Parliament that in the exercise of his authority 
pursuant to the Broadcasting Act, the Secretary of State must have regard to the Convention 
and ensure that Convention rights were not breached.  
 
The only issue to be determined was whether the Secretary of State acted within the authority 
conferred on him by the Broadcasting Act and the licence and agreement. In deciding to act, 
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the Secretary of State could take account of Convention rights. However, he was not bound 
by law to do so. If the Secretary of State‘s action was within the purview of the enabling 
provisions of the Act and the licence and agreement, that would be the end of the matter. The 
Convention was irrelevant. It had no force of law and could not be resorted to in the 
determination of the scope of authority of the Secretary of State. As Lord Donaldson of 
Lymington, M.R. stated: 
 
―…the duty of the English courts is to decide disputes in accordance with English 
domestic law as it is, and not as it would be if full effect were given to this country's 
obligations under the Treaty, assuming that there is any difference between the 
two.‖74 
 
Ralph Gibson, LJ, amplified the above when he said: 
 
―An international treaty such as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms is made by the executive government. It does not directly 
affect the domestic law of this country, which can be changed only by Parliament. It 
is not within the powers of the court, by application of a rule of statutory construction, 
to import into the laws of this country provisions of a treaty for direct application by 
the court. Only Parliament can do that. It would be usurpation of the legislative power 
of Parliament for the court to do more than to construe the legislation which 
Parliament has passed in order to establish its meaning.‖75 
 
This case illustrates the point that where wide powers are granted the executive by the 
provisions of an Act of Parliament clear and unambiguous in their terms, the fact that no 
precise limits are indicated such that the exercise of the powers granted might infringe on 
Convention rights is no justification for importing the terms of the Convention in order to 
restrict the exercise of the powers for the purpose of preventing a possible infringement of 
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Convention rights. In such circumstances, the beneficiary of the power granted must be 
allowed (subject to scrutiny under English law) the full exercise of his discretionary powers 
whether such exercise infringes on Convention rights or not.
76
 
 
The decision in Regina v Lyons and others,
77
 further demonstrated that the courts would obey 
an Act of Parliament notwithstanding a clear violation of Convention rights. There, the 
defendants/appellants had been convicted of various criminal charges. The convictions were 
based substantially on their own statements obtained by statutory compulsion by inspectors 
from the Department of Trade and Industry. The statements were admitted in evidence by 
authority of section 434(5) of the Companies Act 1985. 
 
Subsequently, the appellants each obtained a ruling from the European Court of Human 
Rights at Strasbourg to the effect that the admission in evidence of the statements obtained 
under compulsion contravened the appellants‘ right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the 
Convention. 
 
Following these rulings of the European Court, the Attorney General issued a directive 
barring prosecutors from tendering in evidence statements compulsively obtained pursuant to 
section 434(5) of the Companies Act. Parliament subsequently amended section 434 to 
satisfy the decision of the European Court. 
 
As a result of the rulings of the European Court, the Criminal Cases Review Commission 
referred the appellants‘ case to the Court of Appeal to determine the safety of the convictions. 
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The Court of Appeal had no difficulty in refusing to quash the convictions. It held that since 
an Act of Parliament had expressly authorised the admission of the compulsively obtained 
statements, the admission was therefore legal and could not be questioned on grounds of 
incompatibility with the provisions of the Convention that had no force of law domestically. 
 
On appeal, the House of Lords sustained the decision of the Court of Appeal. It held that 
section 434(5) of the Companies Act, which authorised the admission in evidence of the 
statements, was unambiguous. The intention of Parliament was quite clear. It intended such 
statements to be admissible. The duty of the courts in these circumstances is to apply the law 
in a way that complies with the intention of Parliament. This is irrespective of whether 
Convention provisions are infringed. ―The will of Parliament as expressed in section 434 
trumps any international obligation.‖78 
 
As can be seen from the above, the case law showed that the courts recognised the power of 
Parliament to legislate in breach of the Convention rights. This was the result of demands 
both of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the principle that international treaties 
do not have the force of law except to the extent incorporated by an Act of Parliament.   
 
The third element of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as expounded by Dicey is that 
Parliament can always alter an existing Act by the ordinary means of legislation irrespective 
of any provision in that Act purporting to restrict the power of future Parliaments in effecting 
any alteration. In other words, it is impossible for one Parliament to enact legislation 
restricting the power of its successor Parliament from repealing or amending the Act. Were it 
                                                 
78
 Ibid, per Rose LJ., in the Court of Appeal; [2002] 2 Cr App R 210, quoted by Lord Bingham of Cornhill at 
paragraph 10 of the judgment. 
44 
 
to do so, there would be nothing preventing future Parliaments from legislating in breach of 
the restrictions contained in the Act in question. 
 
Dicey cited a number of historical instances where Parliament had attempted to protect 
legislative enactments from being altered by succeeding Parliaments. He mentioned in 
particular, the language used in the Union with Scotland Act 1706 (Act of Union with 
Scotland) and the Union with Ireland 1800 (Act of Union with Ireland). The language 
indicated that certain aspects of the Acts were intended to be unalterable. For instance, the 
Act of Union with Scotland provided for the preservation of the Presbyterian Church in 
Scotland and required all Scottish professors to subscribe to the Confession of Faith. These 
provisions amongst others were to be ―held and observed in all time coming as a fundamental 
and essential condition of any treaty or union to be concluded betwixt the two Kingdoms 
without any alteration thereof or derogation thereto in any sort for ever.‖79 
 
It seemed clear that the Parliament that passed the provisions of the Act of Union with 
Scotland actually intended those parts of it deemed to be ―fundamental and essential‖ to the 
Union to be untouchable by future Parliaments.
80
 However, later events proved that this was 
incapable of preventing a future Parliament from altering the provisions by the ordinary 
means of legislation. The requirement that all Scottish professors must subscribe to the 
Confession of faith was repealed by the Universities (Scotland) Act of 1853. The Church 
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Patronage (Scotland) Act of 1711, which restored lay patronage in Scotland was also, 
according to Dicey, ―a direct infringement upon the Treaty of Union.‖81 
 
Similarly, Article 5 of the Act of Union with Ireland had contained the following: 
 
―That it be the fifth article of Union, that the Churches of England and Ireland as now 
by law established, be united into one Protestant Episcopal Church, to be called the 
United Church of England and Ireland; and that the doctrine, worship, discipline, and 
government of the said United Church shall be and shall remain in full force for 
ever,
82
 as the same are now by law established for the Church of England; and that 
the continuance and preservation of the said United Church, as the established Church 
of England and Ireland, shall be deemed and be taken to be an essential part of the 
Union.‖  
 
Here again, the attempt to make the ―essential‖ provisions of the Act unalterable is 
unmistakable. Again, the attempt was futile as the Irish Church Act of 1869 separated the 
Irish Church from the Church of England. 
 
It must be noted that neither of the instances concerning the alteration of the provisions of the 
Act of Union with Scotland and Act of Union with Ireland was challenged and tested in 
court. However, in more recent times, the validity of an Act of the British Parliament has 
been challenged in court on the ground that it contravened provisions of the Act of Union 
with Scotland.  
 
In MacCormick v Lord Advocate,
83
 the petitioners had argued before the Lord Ordinary (at 
first instance) that if the Royal Titles Act 1953 purported to authorise the Queen to adopt the 
title ―Queen Elizabeth the Second‖, the Act would contravene the provisions of Article 1 of 
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the Treaty of Union between Scotland and England (ratified by the Act of Union with 
Scotland 1706 and Act of Union with England 1707, separately passed by the Parliaments of 
England and Scotland); consequently, the 1953 Act was ultra vires the legislative powers of 
Parliament. Article 1 of the Treaty of Union provided as follows:  
 
―That the two Kingdoms of Scotland and England shall upon the first day of May next 
ensuing the date hereof and forever after be united into one Kingdom by the name of 
Great Britain and that the ensigns armorial of the said United Kingdom be such as Her 
Majesty shall appoint and the crosses of St. Andrew and St. George be conjoined in 
such manner as Her Majesty shall think fit and used in all flags, banners, standards 
and ensigns both at sea and land.‖ 
The petitioners‘ argument was that since by Article 1 above, the United Kingdom came into 
being on the date appointed in Article 1, and no Queen of the name of Elizabeth had reigned 
in the new, United Kingdom, until the incumbent, it would be historically wrong to use ―the 
Second‖ as part of the official title of Her Majesty, and consequently ultra vires of Parliament 
to authorise the use of it.  
 
The Lord Ordinary, Lord Guthrie, promptly dismissed the petitioners‘ argument. His 
Lordship held that section 1 of the Royal Titles Act 1953 authorised the use of such style and 
titles as Her Majesty may think fit. That being so, the court could not interfere with the will 
of Parliament: ―In my opinion, the petitioners‘ propositions in law are unsound and indeed 
extravagant. No Scottish Court has ever held an Act of Parliament to be ultra vires, and it has 
never been suggested that it could do so.‖84 While His Lordship appeared to admit that the 
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doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty was based on English law, he asserted that the doctrine 
was ―recognised in Scotland as a basic principle of constitutional law.‖85   
 
On appeal to the Court of Session,
86
 it was held (amongst others) that the Treaty of Union did 
not prohibit the use of the numeral, ―II‖ as part of the title of Her Majesty. The appeal was 
consequently dismissed. However, the Lord President, Lord Cooper, criticised Lord Guthrie‘s 
view
87
 of the application of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in Scotland. According 
to him: 
 
―The principle of the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a distinctively English 
principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law…. Considering that 
the Union legislation extinguished the Parliaments of Scotland and England and 
replaced them by a new Parliament, I have difficulty in seeing why it should have 
been supposed that the new Parliament of Great Britain must inherit all the peculiar 
characteristics of the English Parliament but none of the Scottish Parliament, as if all 
that happened in 1707 was that Scottish representatives were admitted to the 
Parliament of England. That is not what was done. Further, the Treaty and the 
associated legislation, by which the Parliament of Great Britain was brought into 
being as the successor of the separate Parliaments of Scotland and England, contain 
some clauses which expressly reserve to the Parliament of Great Britain powers of 
subsequent modification, and other clauses which either contain no such power or 
emphatically exclude subsequent alteration by declarations of a like effect. I have 
never been able to understand how it is possible to reconcile with elementary canons 
of construction the adoption by the English constitutional theorists of the same 
attitude to these markedly different types of provisions.
88
  
 
 
Similar sentiment, such as appears in the dictum of Lord Cooper above
89
 could be found in 
the dictum of Lord Keith in Gibson v Lord Advocate,
90
 another Scottish case in which the 
validity of an Act of the British Parliament was challenged on the ground that it contravened 
the provisions of Article XVIII (18) of the 1707 Act of Union (with England). The plaintiff, 
                                                 
85
 Ibid. 
86
 Before the First Division 
87
 Expressed at first instance 
88
 [1953] S.C. 396, at p. 411 
89
 Op. cit., supra, note 78. 
90
 [1975] S.C. 136 
48 
 
who was Scottish, and skipper and part-owner of a fishing vessel operating in Scottish coastal 
waters, sought a declaration that in so far as section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 
1972 purports to incorporate Article 2 of the European Communities Regulations of 1970 
(E.E.C. No. 2141/70) as part of the law of Scotland, the 1972 Act was contrary to the 
provisions of Article XVIII (18) of the Act of Union 1707, and was therefore null and of no 
effect. 
 
Article 2 of the 1970 E.E.C. Regulation had required each Member State of the European 
Communities to ensure that in respect of fishing within its maritime waters, all Member 
States were afforded equal fishing rights. That meant for example, that any fishing vessel 
flying the Spanish flag and registered within the European Community must be given equal 
rights to fish within the maritime waters of every other Member State of the Community as if 
they were vessels of nationals of those Member States.  
 
Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome provided that ―A regulation shall have general application. 
It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.‖ What this 
means is that regulations are to be given legal effect in the Member States without the need 
for domestic legislation. The domestic courts of Member States could give effect to the 
provisions of a regulation merely by authority of the regulation itself. This therefore imbued 
the 1970 E.E.C. Regulation above with direct effects in all Member States.  
 
Section 2(1) of the 1972 Act enacted that: 
 
―All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time 
created or arising by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are 
49 
 
without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall 
be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed 
accordingly….‖  
 
Accordingly, the rights conferred on non-United Kingdom fishing vessels by the 1970 E.E.C. 
Regulation with respect to fishing within the maritime waters of the United Kingdom, by 
virtue of their being vessels flying the flags of other Member States of the Community, was 
statutorily recognised. In other words, section 2(1) of the 1972 Act gave legal effect within 
the United Kingdom of the provisions of the 1970 E.E.C. Regulation requiring fishing vessels 
of Member States of the Community to be afforded equal fishing rights within the maritime 
waters of the United Kingdom. 
Article XVIII (18) of the 1707 Act of Union had provided as follows: 
―That the laws concerning regulation of trade customs and such excises to which 
Scotland is by virtue of this treaty to be liable be the same in Scotland from and after 
the union as in England and that all other laws in use within the Kingdom of Scotland 
do after the union and notwithstanding thereof remain the same as before (except such 
as are contrary to or inconsistent with this treaty) but alterable by the Parliament of 
Great Britain with this difference betwixt the laws concerning publick right policy and 
civil government and those which concern private right that the laws which concern 
publick right policy and civil government may be made the same throughout the 
whole United Kingdom but that no alteration may be made in laws which concern 
private right except for the evident utility of the subjects within Scotland.‖91  
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Clearly, the makers of the provision set out above intended that as far as the then existing 
laws relating to private rights of Scottish subjects were concerned, they would remain 
unalterable, either by way of amendment or repeal, by the Parliament of Great Britain, unless 
it could be proved that the alteration was for the benefit of Scottish subjects. 
 
The plaintiff‘s case was that prior to the 1707 Act of Union, fishing rights within Scottish 
maritime waters were exclusive to Scottish subjects only. These rights, he argued, were rights 
conferred by laws concerning private rights within the meaning of Article XVIII (18) of the 
1707 Act; as such the British Parliament could not alter them unless it could be shown that 
the alteration was for the benefit of Scottish subjects. The resultant effect of section 2(1) of 
the 1972 Act was that it incorporated the 1970 E.E.C. Regulation, which in turn altered the 
private rights of Scottish subjects to fish exclusively in Scottish maritime waters. He 
contended that allowing foreign vessels to fish in Scottish maritime waters would be to the 
detriment of Scottish subjects, in particular, Scottish fishermen; therefore, the alteration was 
not for ―the evident utility of the subjects within Scotland.‖ To that extent, section 2(1) of the 
1972 Act was contrary to Article XVIII (18) of the 1707 Act of Union and was therefore null 
and void. 
 
Lord Keith, delivering the judgment of the Court of Session, ruled that control of fishing 
rights in the maritime waters of Scotland were matters within the purview of public, and not 
private law as contended by the plaintiff.
92
 Accordingly, the provisions of Article XVIII (18) 
of the 1707 Act of Union could not apply to section 2(1). He further ruled that ―the question 
whether a particular Act of the United Kingdom Parliament altering a particular aspect of 
Scots private law is or is not ‗for the evident utility‘ of the subjects within Scotland is not a 
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justiciable issue in this Court.‖93 He predicated his ruling on the ground that the question was 
political and the Court would not get involved in political matters.  
 
However, Lord Keith was not prepared to express an opinion on the validity of an Act of 
Parliament abolishing the Court of Session itself, or the Church of Scotland, or supplanting 
the entirety of Scottish private law with English law. While expressly reserving his opinion, 
the tone of his statement appeared to suggest that, with respect to the above matters, the Court 
may not give effect to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty merely as a matter of course.  
 
These judicial pronouncements bring to the fore the vexed issue of whether the Parliament of 
Great Britain which came to life by virtue of the Acts of Union was ―born free‖94 in the sense 
that it continued to have all the characteristics of a sovereign Parliament unfettered by any 
legal restrictions in its capacity to make and unmake any laws as it deemed fit, characteristics 
which were generally accepted to have been enjoyed by the defunct English Parliament 
immediately before the legal Union of the two Kingdoms. 
 
That a new state had been created out of the Acts of Union can hardly be arguable. One could 
no longer speak of England and Scotland as separate, independent states having their own 
Parliaments. In other words, both the English Parliament and the Scottish Parliament ceased 
to exist as a consequence of the Acts of Union. An entirely new Parliament, the Parliament of 
Great Britain, came into existence. 
 
There seems to be general agreement amongst writers that the framers of the Treaty and Acts 
of Union intended certain provisions of the Treaty and the Acts to be fundamental and 
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unalterable.
95
 Both the wording of the Acts of Union, as well as the fact that the authority of 
the emergent Parliament of Great Britain, at least with respect to its powers to make laws for 
England and Scotland as a whole, was derived from the Acts, clearly indicated that the Acts 
were meant to take precedence over ordinary legislation. It would seem that the Acts of 
Union created some sort of hierarchy of laws in the new United Kingdom, with the 
fundamental provisions of the Acts of Union being at the very top of the hierarchy.  However, 
there is far less agreement on the question whether those supposedly alterable provisions in 
the Acts of Union had the effect of limiting the law-making powers of the emergent 
Parliament of Great Britain such that it could not validly legislate contrary to those 
fundamental provisions.  
 
Elizabeth Wicks has been quoted as stating the view that the present day Parliament of the 
United Kingdom is ―the direct heir of the 1707 legislature‖ and ―therefore empowered and 
limited by its statutory source.‖96 Michael Upton holds a similar view, arguing that ―the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom is a creation of statute, and, like any other statutory body, 
is bound by its constituent charters.‖97 This analysis of the effect of the Acts of Union on the 
law-making capacity of the Parliament of the United Kingdom seems to suggest that the Acts 
of Union can be regarded, at least with respect to its fundamental elements, as a supreme 
constitution having binding force over Parliament. Further, it suggests that an attendant 
consequence of the Acts of Union was that the English doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
automatically ceased to apply in relation to the new Parliament of the United Kingdom. 
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Dicey and Rait chose to see the declaration that the fundamental elements of the Acts of 
Union are unalterable as a warning only that Parliament could not alter them ―without grave 
danger to the Constitution of the country‖, rather than as a legal impediment to the capacity 
of Parliament to repeal or amend them.
98
 As a matter of fact, Dicey had always been of the 
view that ―neither the Act of Union with Scotland nor the Dentist Act 1878 has more claim 
than the other to be considered a supreme law‖.99 For Dicey, the argument has always been 
that Parliament could not bind it itself, and any attempt to do so would fail as a future 
Parliament is empowered to alter any supposedly unalterable statutory provision in a previous 
Act of Parliament by the ordinary means of legislation. Scottish lawyers would disagree. 
 
Synthesising earlier arguments developed by Professors T.B. Smith
100
, J.D.B. Mitchell
101
 and 
D.N. MacCormick
102
, Michael Upton argues strongly that the Acts of Union are the sources 
of legislative authority of the new Parliament of the United Kingdom, and that they bind 
Parliament such that Parliament‘s legislative authority is subject to restrictions imposed by 
the Acts.
103
 The argument is that being a creature of statute, the new Parliament of Great 
Britain could exercise no legislative powers outside of what is granted to it by its constituent 
statute. Therefore, clear and unambiguous provisions which were clearly intended to limit the 
power of the new Parliament to legislate must be binding. Upton seems to equate the 
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constituent nature of the Acts of Union with the idea of a supreme constitution the provisions 
of which govern the law-making capacity of the new Parliament. 
 
It is submitted that the above analysis of the nature of the Acts of Union fails to take into 
consideration the context in which they were enacted by the separate Parliaments of England 
and Scotland. First, it has to be noted that the major consideration in the making of the Acts 
of Union was not to set out a Constitution (in the ordinary sense of the word), setting out the 
legal framework by which the main institutions of State (i.e. Parliament, Executive and 
Judiciary) were to exercise their respective authority; the major aim was simply to legally 
unite the two Kingdoms which had already been politically united in the Crown. Perhaps, this 
might explain the difference between the Acts of Union and the Constitution of the United 
States on the question of the supremacy of their respective provisions over ordinary statutes. 
The controversy concerning the supremacy of the provisions of the Acts of Union over other 
statutes suggests that it is difficult to regard the Acts of Union the same way one would 
regard the Constitution of the United States as being supreme over inconsistent laws passed 
by Congress. This is in spite of the fact that the Constitution of the United States, like the 
Acts of Union, has no special provision authorising the courts to invalidate Acts of the 
Congress of the United States which are determined to be contrary to the Constitution. The 
fact that there is far less controversy concerning the idea that the Constitution of the United 
States enjoys supremacy over ordinary statutes might be explained by the nature of the 
Constitution. The framers set out not merely to create a Union of States, but also to spell out 
specifically the scope of authority of the main institutions of the Union, that is, the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary. 
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Secondly, before the Acts of Union were enacted, Parliament‘s legislative authority seems to 
have been derived, not from statute, but from common law and custom, or convention, both 
in England and in Scotland. Thus, it can be safely stated that the idea that Parliament‘s 
legislative authority could be controlled by statute was not a commonly held notion even in 
Scotland. While the language used in certain provisions of the Act seemed to support the 
view that the framers intended them to be unalterable, this was not made unequivocal in the 
text such that Acts of the emergent Parliament would automatically be rendered void for 
being in violation of the Acts of Union.  
 
Having regard to the English principle of parliamentary sovereignty, which seems to have 
survived the Union (at least on the English side), it is quite unlikely that an English judge 
would strike down an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom for being in violation of a 
fundamental term of the Acts of Union. So far, none has. Even in Scotland, despite the 
foregoing judicial dicta sympathetic to the idea of the fundamental terms of the Acts of Union 
being ―higher law‖ beyond the reach of Parliament, it is unlikely that the judges would 
directly declare an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom null and void for having 
been made in violation of the Acts of Union. Indeed, Lord Cooper‘s later statement in 
MacCormick v Lord Advocate indicated quite clearly that he himself may not take so drastic a 
decision:  
 
―Accepting it that there are provisions in the Treaty of Union and associated 
legislation which are ‗fundamental law‘ and assuming for the moment that something 
is alleged to have been done – it matters not whether with legislative authority or not 
– in breach of that fundamental law, the question remains whether such a question is 
determinable as a justiciable issue in the Courts of either Scotland or England, in the 
same fashion as an issue of constitutional vires would be cognisable by the Supreme 
Courts of the United States, or of South Africa or Australia.‖104  
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It is worth noting that in the past, provisions which were thought to have been intended by the 
makers of the Acts of Union to be unalterable have been repealed or altered. For example, 
Article 25 of the Act of Union with Scotland 1706, which required Scottish professors to 
subscribe to the Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church, has been repealed by the 
Universities (Scotland) Acts 1853 and 1932 and this has never been invalidated by the courts. 
 
Although, as indicated above, the courts may not frontally attack an Act of the United 
Kingdom Parliament for being in violation of a fundamental term of the Acts of Union, this 
does not mean that in the event of such a violation, the courts would be totally incapable of 
doing anything. There is a case for arguing that the Acts of Union, like the European 
Communities Act 1972 and the Human Rights Act 1998 (discussed in chapters 4-7), are 
constitutional statutes having some degree of entrenchment.
105
 It may therefore be possible to 
read into every Act of Parliament an implied provision that the Act is to apply without 
prejudice to the fundamental terms of the Acts of Union unless Parliament expressly, 
deliberately, specifically and unequivocally states that it is to apply notwithstanding any 
violation of the Acts of Union. In this way, a degree of judicial protection could be afforded 
to the fundamental terms and Parliament would be constrained to consider very carefully the 
political fall-outs of any such violation before passing legislation.  
 
Dicey also pointed to the Taxation of Colonies Act 1778 as an instance of one Parliament 
appearing to restrict the power of its successor Parliament to enact legislation as it pleases.
106
 
Section 1 of the Act provided that Parliament 
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―… will not impose any duty, tax, or assessment whatever, payable in any of his 
Majesty‘s colonies, provinces, and plantations in North America or the West Indies; 
except only such duties as it may be expedient to impose for the regulation of 
commerce; the net produce of such duties to be always paid and applied to and for the 
use of the colony, province, or plantation, in which the same shall be respectively 
levied, in such manner as other duties collected by the authority of the respective 
general courts, or general assemblies, of such colonies, provinces, or plantations, are 
ordinarily paid and applied.‖  
 
The language used here is quite categorical. Parliament ―will not‖ legislate to impose tax 
except as provided by the section. What would happen if Parliament were later to legislate in 
a manner inconsistent with the terms of the statutory provisions quoted above? Dicey says, 
―There is under our constitution no legal difficulty in the way of repealing or overriding this 
Act.‖107 It is submitted that this assertion is correct. Parliament has the power, in accordance 
with the concept of parliamentary sovereignty, to alter any existing laws in any way it deems 
fit. 
 
However, it must be pointed out that it is one thing for Parliament to alter what was 
apparently intended by its predecessors to be unalterable, and another to assert that the courts 
would obey and apply the alteration. Dicey was unable to point to any judicial authority 
upholding the power of Parliament to alter supposedly unalterable statutory provisions. 
Nevertheless, his views appear to have been vindicated by modern judicial decisions. 
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Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health
108
 amply illustrates the fact that the courts 
recognise the power of Parliament to alter in any way it deems fit any existing legislation 
irrespective of any provision in that legislation purporting to restrict the power of future 
Parliaments to legislate in a manner inconsistent with its terms. 
 
The case concerned amongst others, certain provisions of the Acquisition of Land 
(Assessment of Compensation) Act of 1919 and the Housing Act of 1925. Section 2 of the 
1919 Act provided that in assessing compensation for compulsory acquisition of land, the 
compensation payable shall be the open market value of the land. Section 7(1) of the Act then 
declared that any other Act dealing with the subject of compulsory acquisition shall be 
subject to the 1919 Act and shall be rendered ineffective so far as they are inconsistent with 
the 1919 Act (including, of course, the provisions of section 2 above). 
 
However, section 46(1) of the Housing Act 1925 contained provision for compensation for 
compulsory acquisition of land that was inconsistent with, and less favourable than, that 
provided by section 2 of the 1919 Act.  
 
Counsel for the appellant had argued that in so far as the provisions for compensation 
contained in the 1925 Act were inconsistent with those contained in the 1919 Act, the 
provisions in the 1925 Act were without any legal effect. 
 
The Court of Appeal rejected this contention as being ―absolutely contrary to the 
constitutional provision that Parliament can alter an Act which it has previously passed.‖109 
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The fact that Parliament failed to clearly state in the later Act that it was repealing the earlier 
Act was immaterial. The court was bound to obey and apply the will of Parliament expressed 
in the later Act in preference to that expressed in the earlier Act in case of any inconsistency 
between the two Acts. If counsel‘s argument were to prevail, the resultant effect would be 
that the 1919 Parliament would have successfully bound the 1925 Parliament. In that case, 
the provisions of the 1919 Act dealing with assessment of compensation for compulsory 
acquisition of land would be unchangeable. 
 
This case illustrates the fact that as between competing Acts of Parliament dealing with the 
same subject matter, the courts would, as a matter of principle, rule in favour of the later in 
time. Entrenchment provisions contained in the earlier Act cannot render ineffective the 
provisions of the later Act. The courts‘ attitude is that British constitutional law abhors 
entrenched laws. In the United Kingdom, all Acts of Parliament enjoy equal status. No Act is 
imbued with a special, constitutional status higher in hierarchy to other Acts. In general 
therefore, the courts would refuse to recognise such entrenchment provisions as having any 
legal effect upon the absolute power of Parliament to legislate in any manner as it deems 
fit.
110
 
 
One remarkable thing about the decision in the Ellen Street case is the fact that the earlier 
1919 Act expressly stated that other Acts must be construed subject to its terms.
111
 This did 
not prevent the court from giving full effect to the later 1925 Act despite the inconsistency 
between the two. 
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Another remarkable thing about the decision was that the application of the principle of 
implied repeal was sufficient to displace the terms of the 1919 Act and give full effect to the 
conflicting provisions of the 1925 Act.
112
  
 
Sometimes, the political reality of a state of affairs might be so overwhelming that Parliament 
might not exercise its legislative power to enact legislation changing the status quo. For 
example, it has been suggested that due to the political realities flowing from the Statute of 
Westminster of 1931, and the various Independence Acts, for example the Nigeria 
Independence Act of 1960, the British Parliament effectively bound itself and its successors 
from enacting future legislation in violation of the terms of those Acts. 
 
The Statute of Westminster conferred virtual legislative autonomy to the Dominions listed in 
section 1 of the Act, that is, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the 
Dominion of New Zealand, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland. Section 2(1) of the Act 
declared that  
 
―No law and no provision of any law made after the commencement of this Act by 
the Parliament of a Dominion shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is 
repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of 
Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any 
such Act, and the powers of the Parliament of a Dominion shall include the power to 
repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as the same is part of 
the law of the Dominion.‖ 
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Section 4 went on to restrict the power of the British Parliament to legislate for the 
Dominions in the following terms:  
 
―No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement of this 
Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that 
Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion has 
requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof.‖ 
 
The legislative objective of these provisions is quite clear. Future Parliaments were required 
not to legislate contrary to the terms of the Act. The question is, bearing in mind the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty, how would the courts of the United Kingdom react to an Act of 
the British Parliament enacted in violation of the terms of the Statute of Westminster, for 
example, in breach of the provisions of section 4 thereof, which forbade the British 
Parliament from legislating for the Dominions except with the consent of the Dominion 
concerned? 
 
In British Coal Corporation v The King,113 Viscount Sankey, LC,114 expressed the following 
opinion: 
 
―It is doubtless true that the power of the imperial Parliament to pass on its own 
initiative any legislation that it thought fit extending to Canada remains in theory 
unimpaired: indeed, the Imperial Parliament could, as a matter of abstract law, repeal 
or disregard s. 4 of the Statute. But that is theory and has no relation to realities.‖ 
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Upon a cursory reading of Viscount Sankey‘s statement above, it would appear that he was 
of the opinion that when faced with such a situation, the courts might be inclined to give 
effect to the political reality notwithstanding the constitutional position that British courts 
must obey and apply all Acts of the British Parliament without question. Indeed, in 
Blackburn v Attorney-General,115 Lord Denning appeared to have given Viscount Sankey‘s 
statement this interpretation when he stated:  
 
―We have been brought up to believe that, in legal theory, one Parliament cannot bind 
another and that no Act is irreversible. But legal theory does not always march 
alongside political reality. Take the Statute of Westminster 1931, which takes away 
the power of Parliament to legislate for the Dominions. Can any one imagine that 
Parliament could116 or would reverse those laws and take away their independence? 
Most clearly not.117 Freedom once given cannot be taken away. Legal theory must 
give way to practical politics.‖118 
 
 
 
It is submitted however, that such an interpretation would be wrong. Politics should not 
trump basic constitutional doctrines such as the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. As 
Lord Reid stated in Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke119  
 
―It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United Kingdom Parliament 
to do certain things, meaning that the moral, political or other reasons against doing 
them are so strong that most people would regard them as highly improper if 
Parliament did these things. But that does not mean that it is beyond the power of 
Parliament to do such things. If Parliament chose to do any of them the courts could 
not hold the Act of Parliament invalid.‖ 
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The proper interpretation of Viscount Sankey‘s statement should be that Parliament has, by 
the terms of the Statute of Westminster, imposed a political self-restraint, which future 
Parliaments are unlikely to breach. However, this self-restraint is one that could not be 
legally enforced in the courts of the United Kingdom. Therefore, were Parliament to legislate 
in breach of the terms of section 4 of the Statute of Westminster, there would be no valid 
principle of law upon which to sustain the argument that British courts could ignore or refuse 
to obey the latest will of Parliament in accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
 
This issue as to whether a subsequent Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom could be 
rendered void for having been enacted in violation of the terms of section 4 of the Statute of 
Westminster was argued in the case of Manuel & Others v Attorney General.120 Sir Robert 
Megarry‘s judgment, delivered at first instance in that case, can be regarded as a classic 
illustration of the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
The Indian peoples of Canada had been granted certain constitutional rights by the British 
North America Acts of 1867 – 1930.121 By the provisions of the Statute of Westminster 
1931, the British Parliament conferred virtually autonomous legislative powers to the 
Dominion of Canada subject to the condition stipulated in section 7(1) of the Act, which was 
that nothing in the Act ―shall be deemed to apply to the repeal, amendment or alteration of 
the British North America Acts 1867 to 1930 or any order, rule or regulation made 
thereunder.‖ And as stated above, section 4 of the Statute of Westminster 1931 required that 
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for future Acts of the British Parliament to apply to Canada, such Acts must expressly state 
that Canada requested and assented to their enactment. 
 
The British Parliament enacted the Canada Act 1982. The preamble to this Act expressly 
stated that Canada requested, and consented to its enactment. Section 1 of the Canada Act 
then enacted the Constitution Act 1982, set out in Schedule B to the Canada Act, and section 
2 totally removed the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to legislate for Canada 
after the coming into force of the Constitution Act set out in the Schedule. The Constitution 
Act preserved the existing constitutional rights of the Indian peoples.122 However, it 
provided, under sections 38 to 49, a new procedure for amending the Constitution of Canada, 
including provisions protecting the rights of the Indian peoples, the effect of which was that 
the Constitution may now be amended by relevant Canadian authorities, without the British 
Parliament taking any part in the amendment process. 
 
The implication of this new process of constitutional amendment was that the Canadian 
authorities alone could now alter the safeguarded rights of the Indian peoples, which hitherto 
could only be altered by the British Parliament.  
 
Unhappy with the removal of the legislative function of the British Parliament as it 
concerned the existing constitutional rights of the Indian peoples, the plaintiffs, representing 
an Indian nation in Canada, filed an action challenging the validity of the Canada Act that 
brought the Constitution Act into force. Their argument was that ―Dominion‖ as used in 
section 4 of the Statute of Westminster meant, in relation to Canada, the people of Canada, 
and that the consent of the Dominion referred to in that section meant the consent of each of 
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the constituent entities making up Canada to wit: the Federal Parliament of Canada, each of 
the provincial legislatures of Canada and the Indian nations of Canada having a separate and 
special status within the Constitution of Canada. The plaintiffs contended that the British 
Parliament enacted the Canada Act without the consent of the Indian nations, that section 4 
of the Act required this consent, that the Act was to the detriment of the Indian nations 
because the Constitution Act scheduled to the Canada Act removed the entrenched status of 
the protected rights of the Indian nations as the British Parliament had no part to play 
anymore. Accordingly, they argued that the Canada Act was ultra vires, null and void. 
 
The Attorney General brought a motion to strike out the plaintiffs‘ statement of claim on the 
ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. 
 
Sir Robert Megarry‘s judgment123 upheld the principle of absolute judicial obedience to Acts 
of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. He held that the Canada Act, being an Act of the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom, could not be held invalid. This was an application of the 
―enrolled Act‖ rule as stated by Lord Campbell in Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co. v 
Wauchope,124 the effect being that, once a bill appears to have been passed by the Commons 
and Lords and have received the Royal Assent, that is the end of the matter. In those 
circumstances, a court of law could not embark on any enquiry aimed at determining the 
validity of the Act. 
 
One very important element of Sir Robert‘s judgment is his emphasis on the distinction 
between enforceability of an Act of Parliament on the one hand, and the legal validity of the 
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Act on the other hand. Due to political, diplomatic or other practical factors, an Act of 
Parliament may be impossible to enforce. However, the fact that the Act may, for any reason, 
be impossible to enforce, does not entitle a British court to declare it invalid, or to refuse to 
obey and apply it. Thus, in relation to a colony of the United Kingdom, ―the English courts 
will apply the Act even if the colony is in a state of revolt against the Crown and direct 
enforcement of the decision may be impossible.‖125 This had been demonstrated by the case 
of Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke.
126
  
 
The case originated from the then Southern Rhodesia. The country had been annexed by 
Britain in 1923 and had the status of a British colony. In 1961, the British Parliament granted 
the colony a constitution,
127
 which allowed the Rhodesian Government to exercise legislative 
and executive powers. The constitution provided that the law to be administered in the colony 
was the law in force in the Cape of Good Hope in June 1891, that law being Roman-Dutch 
law. On the 11
th
 of November 1965, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia and his cabinet 
made a unilateral declaration of independence and purportedly severed the colonial 
relationship the country had with Britain. Following this declaration, the Governor of the 
colony dismissed the cabinet same day. 
 
On the 16
th
 of November 1965, the Parliament of the United Kingdom enacted the Southern 
Rhodesia Act, asserting continued sovereignty of the United Kingdom and assuming direct 
legislative and executive authority over Southern Rhodesia. The Act authorised Her Majesty 
to legislate for the colony by Order in Council. Consequently, on 18
th
 November 1965, the 
Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order was made. This Order declared void anything done 
pursuant to any constitution enacted for Southern Rhodesia except as authorised by an Act of 
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the United Kingdom Parliament.
128
 The Order also suspended the legislative authority of the 
Legislative Assembly of the colony. 
 
Disregarding the 1965 Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom as well as the Order 
made under it, the Prime Minister and the Legislative Assembly passed a new constitution
129
 
and proceeded to govern the country under that constitution. 
 
The Southern Rhodesian Government, acting under the 1965 constitution, issued a detention 
order against the husband of the appellant. The question arose as to the validity of the order 
having regard to the provisions of the United Kingdom Parliament‘s Southern Rhodesia Act 
of 1965 and the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order made under the Act. 
 
Both the court of first instance (General Division) and the Appellate Division of the High 
Court of Southern Rhodesia expressed the view that the doctrine of necessity (Roman-Dutch 
law) required the courts to give effect to a detention order issued by the Rhodesian 
Government under an appropriate regulation, notwithstanding the 1965 Act of the British 
Parliament, if the detention order was necessary for the preservation of law and order. This 
view was based the ground that the ―rebel‖ Government appeared for all practical purposes to 
be the de facto Government in effective control of the country. 
  
The majority of their Lordships
130
 in the Privy Council disagreed. Lord Reid stated that  ―no 
such principle could override the legal right of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to 
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make such laws as it may think proper for territory under the sovereignty of Her Majesty in 
the Parliament of the United Kingdom.‖131  
 
The Privy Council‘s decision to obey and apply the relevant provisions of the Southern 
Rhodesia Act of 1965 was arrived at despite indications that de facto control of the country 
was effectively in the hands of the ―rebel‖ Government and that it might be impossible to 
effectively enforce the Act within the country. The Privy Council seemed therefore to have 
recognised a clear distinction between the question of the legal validity of the Act of 
Parliament on the one hand, and the question of its effectiveness within the territory of 
Southern Rhodesia on the other hand. It appears therefore, that in general, considerations of 
effectiveness of legislation would not deter the courts from giving effect to the demands of 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
In the same vein, an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom purporting to apply to a 
foreign sovereign nation may be ignored by that nation and its courts, and may well be 
impossible to enforce by the British authorities. However, those circumstances could not 
sustain a claim that the Act is by reason thereof invalid. The duty of the court is only to 
interpret the law as it is and not to bother about whether the British State could enforce the 
law. Thus, as Sir Robert states, ―legal validity is one thing, enforceability is another.‖132 The 
question whether the British State may or may not be able to enforce the provisions of an Act 
of Parliament is irrelevant to the validity of the Act.  
 
In accordance with legal theory therefore, even a transfer of sovereignty, as evidenced by the 
various Independence Acts, for example the Nigeria Independence Act of 1960, cannot affect 
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the validity of an Act of the British Parliament purporting to revoke the transfer. In Blackburn 
v Attorney General,
133
 Lord Denning had declared that such ―legal theory must give way to 
practical politics.‖ It is submitted that while it may well be unthinkable that Parliament would 
enact any such legislation revoking the transfer of sovereignty to the Nigerian authorities, 
nevertheless, that in itself cannot change the constitutional law of the United Kingdom, and in 
particular, the constitutional doctrine that the courts of the United Kingdom obey and apply 
every Act enacted by Parliament. It is therefore respectfully submitted that Lord Denning‘s 
declaration above must be seen as merely rhetorical; it cannot represent the true state of 
constitutional law in the United Kingdom, as far as the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
is concerned. 
 
When the Manuel
134
 case went on appeal to the Court of Appeal, the appellate judges avoided 
a direct determination of the question whether the British Parliament could bind itself as to 
the manner and form of future legislation, a point contended by the plaintiffs‘ counsel. It 
should be recalled that the plaintiffs had argued that section 4 of the Statute of Westminster 
had imposed a condition precedent to the validity of future Acts of the British Parliament 
purporting to extend to Canada, and that that condition required an actual request and consent 
on the part of the Dominion of Canada (including the Indian nations) as opposed to a mere 
declaration in the Act of such a request and consent. 
 
The Court of Appeal ruled that section 4 only required that the Act must expressly declare 
that Canada had requested and consented to the enactment of the Act. The condition was 
therefore one of formal declaration in the Act itself. The Court of Appeal expressed the view 
that this was the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used in section 4 and that there 
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was no ambiguity in them. However, this approach to the resolution of the constitutional 
issue raised by the plaintiffs appears to have been influenced by the principle that courts are 
not to go behind an Act of Parliament and investigate the processes leading up to the 
enactment of the Act.  
 
It is submitted that, even assuming that section 4 of the Statute of Westminster had 
purportedly required an actual consent, it is unlikely that the Court of Appeal would have 
engaged itself in investigating the fact whether Parliament indeed received the required 
consent. In accord with the principle stated above, the most likely decision would have been 
to treat the fact of enactment itself as conclusive of the presence of the required consent. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that the case law outlined above indicates that in general, United Kingdom 
courts uphold the traditional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The courts‘ reaction to 
primary legislation has almost always been predictable. The courts perceive it as their 
constitutional duty to obey and apply primary legislation without question. The courts 
recognise no legal grounds upon which an Act of the sovereign Parliament could be 
challenged. They recognise that absolute judicial obedience of primary legislation is at the 
core of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Accordingly, every new statute enacted by 
Parliament is given due recognition and applied in line with the intention of Parliament 
expressed in the statute. 
 
Essential to the traditional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is the idea that no 
Parliament can fetter the power of its successor Parliament to enact legislation in any manner 
71 
 
it deems fit. It is submitted that the case law indicates that the courts embrace this idea. 
Accordingly, they do not give effect to provisions of primary legislation that purport to 
restrict the effect of future legislation.
135
 Every Act of Parliament is obeyed and applied 
notwithstanding any inconsistency with an earlier statute. 
The case law also indicates that every Act of Parliament is equal in status to every other Act 
and could be amended or altered either expressly or by way of implied repeal by a subsequent 
Act.  
 
As has been stated earlier, while Parliament may enact whatever legislation it pleases, all 
legislation is subject to judicial interpretation. Nevertheless, it is observed that the main 
judicial purpose of interpretation of legislation is to ascertain the intention of Parliament in 
order that the will of the Sovereign Parliament may be fully applied. The next chapter will 
discuss conventional judicial approaches to statutory interpretation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONVENTIONAL JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
 
 ―It is a constitutional platitude that where Parliament makes its intention known, 
either expressly or by necessary implication, the courts must give effect to what 
Parliament has provided.‖136  
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, an attempt was made to outline the traditional concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty. As have been seen, in general, the courts have been inclined to 
give unquestioned obedience to primary legislation enacted by the sovereign Parliament. 
While it is within the purview of Parliament to enact whatever legislation it deems fit, it is the 
courts that interpret and apply the enactments of Parliament in their constitutional role as 
adjudicators in disputes between the State and individuals as well as between individuals 
themselves. 
 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, one of the aims of this study is to examine how the 
courts‘ approach to the interpretation of primary legislation pursuant to the interpretative 
obligation under section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of the 1998 Act differ 
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from the usual judicial approaches to statutory interpretation. In order to appreciate the 
difference in approach, it is necessary to consider conventional judicial approaches. 
 
The aim of this chapter therefore, is to discuss conventional judicial approaches to statutory 
interpretation, absenting the effects of section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of 
the 1998 Act respectively. Specifically, the chapter discusses the principal judicial objective 
in the interpretation of statutes, the principal as well as further methods of ascertaining the 
intention of Parliament, and the power of the court in appropriate circumstances to depart 
from what appears to be the plain meaning of statutory provisions.  
 
It is hoped that the discussions in this chapter would enable proper assessments to be made as 
to the extent to which the interpretative obligation contained in section 2(1) and (4) of the 
1972 Act and section 3(1) of the 1998 Act has led the courts to take a different approach to 
statutory interpretation in cases falling within the purview of the above enactments. 
 
II. The Main Purpose of Statutory Interpretation 
 
In accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the courts are obliged to obey 
and apply the will of Parliament as expressed in an Act of Parliament. Accordingly, when 
faced with an Act of Parliament, the primary duty of a court of law is to ascertain the 
intention of Parliament in enacting the Act, and then applying the Act in line with the 
identified intention of Parliament. 
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To put it simply therefore, the main judicial purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain 
the intention of Parliament.
137
 It would be an illegitimate judicial exercise for a court 
involved in the interpretation of a statute to seek anything other than the intention of 
Parliament in enacting the particular statute under consideration. As Lord Diplock observed 
in Duport Steel Ltd v Sirs,
138
 
 
―Parliament makes the laws, the judiciary interpret them. When Parliament legislates 
to remedy what the majority of its members at the time perceive to be a defect or a 
lacuna in the existing law (whether it be the written law enacted by existing statutes or 
the unwritten common law as it has been expounded by the judges in decided cases), 
the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words that 
Parliament has approved as expressing its intention what that intention was, and 
to giving effect to it.‖139 
 
 
When it is said that the duty of the court in statutory interpretation is one of ascertaining the 
intention of Parliament, an appropriate question that arises is, what is meant by the intention 
of Parliament? Parliament is composed of hundreds of members both of the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords. Each and every Member of Parliament may have varying 
intentions in choosing to vote for the enactment of a particular Act of Parliament, even 
though their decisions to vote for the enactment coincide. Some members may have voted 
simply because their Party whip directed them to support the Bill. Others may have voted as a 
result of pressure from their constituents or other lobbyists. Even amongst those members 
who may have genuinely considered the merits of the Bill exhaustively before voting, there 
may be differences of opinion as to the main purpose of the resulting enactment. In the light 
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of this, it would be unacceptable to equate the intention of individual Members of Parliament 
with the intention of Parliament as an entity.
140
   
 
In its constitutional function as a law-making body, Parliament acts, not as a group of 
persons, but as an entity. When Parliament decides to regulate the sale of alcohol for 
example, it does so by means of legislation. There are legislative processes through which the 
legislation is put, culminating in an Act of Parliament appearing in written form for all to see. 
What Parliament says is the law with regard to the regulation of the sale of alcohol at any 
given time is to be found in the body of the relevant enactment under consideration. It has 
generally been agreed therefore, that the ―intention of Parliament‖ in enacting a particular 
statute is to be found, not in the words or conduct of individual members of Parliament, but in 
the words that Parliament as a whole has chosen to express its legislative decision in the Act, 
that is, the formal, authoritative statutory text. Therefore, as a general rule, when ―the 
intention of Parliament‖ is mentioned, what it generally means is the intention expressed in 
the statute itself, which has been appropriately termed the enacted intention of Parliament.
141
 
 
 
 
III. Judicial Approaches to Ascertaining the Intention of Parliament 
 
The principal judicial approach to ascertaining the intention of Parliament is to give the plain 
words used by Parliament in the statute under consideration their natural and ordinary 
meaning in the context in which they have been used. The underlying rationale for this 
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approach seems to be that the words used in the statute are the best indicators of what 
Parliament intended when it enacted the statute. An Act of Parliament is meant to regulate the 
activities of all persons and authorities coming within the purview of the Act. Legal certainty 
demands that when Parliament uses a word or phrase in an Act, it intends that word or phrase 
to bear the natural and ordinary meaning ascribed to it. It would be irrational to expect the 
citizen to go in search of some special or alternative meaning of the words used by 
Parliament in place of what is clearly the natural and ordinary meaning of the words. Lord 
Diplock made this point when he stated: 
―The constitutional function performed by courts of justice as interpreters of the 
written law laid down in Acts of Parliament is often described as ascertaining ‗the 
intention of parliament‘; but what this metaphor, though convenient, omits to take into 
account is that the court, when acting in its interpretative role, as well as when it is 
engaged in reviewing the legality of administrative action, is doing so as mediator 
between the state in the exercise of its legislative power and the private citizen for 
whom the law made by Parliament constitutes a rule binding upon him and 
enforceable by the executive power of the state. Elementary justice or, to use the 
concept often cited by the European Court, the need for legal certainty demands that 
the rules by which the citizen is to be bound should be ascertainable by him (or, more 
realistically, by a competent lawyer advising him) by reference to identifiable sources 
that are publicly accessible. The source to which Parliament must have intended the 
citizen to refer is the language of the Act itself. These are the words which Parliament 
has itself approved as accurately expressing its intentions. If the meaning of those 
words is clear and unambiguous and does not lead to a result that is manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable, it would be a confidence trick by Parliament and destructive of all 
legal certainty if the private citizen could not rely upon that meaning but was required 
to search through all that had happened before and in the course of the legislative 
process in order to see whether there was anything to be found from which it could be 
inferred that Parliament's real intention had not been accurately expressed by the 
actual words that Parliament had adopted to communicate it to those affected by the 
legislation.‖142  
The caveat in Lord Diplock‘s statement above has to be noted. Although the principal judicial 
approach to interpretation of statutes is to give words used in the statute their natural and 
ordinary meaning, this approach is to be adopted only as far as the statutory words, construed 
in the context in which they are situated, are clear and unambiguous and, in the words of 
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Lord Diplock, do not ―lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.‖143 Thus, the 
courts may search for a more appropriate alternative interpretation where the words used are 
ambiguous in the sense that they are capable of bearing more than one meaning. In the search 
for an appropriate meaning, the courts may resort to certain aids to interpretation, some of 
which are discussed below. Further, even where the words used are apparently clear and 
unambiguous, a court may depart from the plain meaning ascribable to them if the plain 
meaning results in absurdity or inconsistency with other parts of the statute.  
 
In Re Lockwood (deceased); Atherton and Another v. Brooke and Another
144
 Harman J, in 
interpreting the provisions of section 47(5) of the Administration of Estates Act 1925
145
 in the 
context of the legislative history of the enactment, felt entitled to depart from what appeared 
to be the plain language of the subsection on the ground that the plain meaning of the 
provision was absurd and contradictory of section 47(3) of the same Act. The plain meaning 
of the subsection appeared to disentitle the issue of the uncles and aunts of the whole blood 
from the residuary estate of an intestate in favour of the Crown as bona vacantia, or even in 
favour of more remote relatives of the intestate. In the circumstances, the learned Judge felt 
able to ignore parts of the provision in order to eliminate the absurdity and inconsistency with 
the other provisions of the Act. 
 
The power of a court to depart from, or modify the plain language used in a statutory 
provision may also be used for the purpose of eliminating an unintelligible meaning and 
achieving an intelligible one. Thus in R. v. Oakes
146
 the Court of Appeal substituted the word 
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―and‖ as it appeared in section 7 of the Official Secrets Act 1920 with the word ―or‖ so as to 
achieve intelligibility. The section read as follows: 
 
―Any person who attempts to commit any offence under the principal Act (i.e. the 
Official Secrets Act 1911) or this Act, or solicits or incites or endeavours to persuade 
another person to commit an offence, or aids or abets and
147
 does any act preparatory 
to the commission of an offence under the principal Act or this Act, shall be guilty of 
a felony or a misdemeanour or a summary offence according as the offence in 
question is a felony, a misdemeanour or a summary offence, and on conviction shall 
be liable to the same punishment, and to be proceeded against in the same manner, as 
if he had committed the offence.‖ 
 
The appellant had been charged under section 7 above with doing an act preparatory to the 
commission of an offence under the Official Secrets Act. At the trial, appellant‘s counsel had 
moved to quash the charge on the ground that it disclosed no offence. The trial court rejected 
this submission and the appellant then pleaded guilty to the charge. On appeal, the issue was 
whether, having regard to the conjunctive word ―and‖ appearing before the phrase ―… does 
any act preparatory to the commission of an offence under the principal Act‖, doing such a 
preparatory act without more (with which the appellant was charged) would constitute an 
offence under the section? 
 
Upon a literal reading of the section, doing an act preparatory to the commission of an 
offence under the Official Secrets Act would appear not to constitute an offence on its own 
unless the accused person also commits any of the earlier offences mentioned in the section, 
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that is, attempting to commit an offence under the Official Secrets Act, soliciting another to 
commit, inciting another to commit, or aiding or abetting another to commit an offence under 
the Act. This literal meaning makes no sense because each of the preceding acts constitutes a 
complete offence on its own. To achieve intelligibility, ―and‖ had to be substituted with ―or‖ 
so that doing an act preparatory to the commission of an offence under the Act is itself a 
separate and distinct offence.  
 
The rationale for this implied power to depart from what appears to be the plain meaning of a 
statutory provision is that the court is entitled to act on the assumption that Parliament could 
not have intended its enactment to bear an absurd meaning or to bear a meaning that is 
inconsistent with other parts of the statute. On this principle, the court may be seen to be 
exercising an implied authority conferred by Parliament to clear up genuine absurdities and 
inconsistencies in order to make sense of the enactment.  
 
However, the cases appear to indicate that the identified absurdity or inconsistency must arise 
from within the four walls of the statute, rather than with reference to other enactments 
unconnected with the statute under consideration.
148
 It is submitted therefore, that where the 
plain language of a statute appears to be inconsistent with the terms of another statute, resort 
should be had, not to any perceived power of the court to depart from the clear language of 
the statute under consideration, but to the principle of implied repeal, in order to resolve the 
inconsistency. Under this principle, the plain language of a statute found to be inconsistent 
with another statute must nevertheless be given its plain meaning unless the other statute is 
later in time, in which case the later statute would be taken to have impliedly repealed the 
clear but inconsistent provisions of the earlier statute.  
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Again, since the main purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intention of 
Parliament and carry out that intention, it would be an illegitimate judicial exercise of power 
to depart from the clear and unambiguous language of a statutory provision if the meaning of 
the plain language used is consistent with the intention of Parliament in enacting the statute. 
Parliament‘s intention as expressed in a statute might be open to criticism for being 
unreasonable; however, that by itself would not justify a departure from the plain language of 
the statutory provision under consideration. This point is illustrated by the House of Lords‘ 
decision in Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.
149
 
The case involved the interpretation of paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 to the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Act 1974. The material provisions of the paragraph provided as follows: 
 
―(1) The provisions of this paragraph shall have effect in relation to an employee who 
claims that he has been unfairly dismissed by his employer, where on the date of 
dismissal he was taking part in a strike or other industrial action. 
 
―(2) If the reason or principal reason for the dismissal was that an employee took part 
in the strike or other industrial action, the dismissal shall not be regarded as unfair 
unless it is shown— 
(a) that one or more employees of the same employer (in this 
paragraph referred to as "the original employer"), who also took part in 
that action, were not dismissed for taking part in it,
150
 or  
(b)  that one or more such employees, who were dismissed for taking part 
in it, were offered re-engagement on the termination of the industrial action 
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and that the employee was not offered such re-engagement, and that the reason 
(or, if more than one, the principal reason) for which the employee was 
selected for dismissal or not offered re-engagement was an inadmissible 
reason ... '
151
 
 
The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant company. A vast majority of the workforce of 
the company had joined a trade union that was not recognised by the company. Consequently, 
the company dismissed two of its employees found to have been active in the move to join 
the trade union. In protest, the plaintiff and a number of other employees went on strike, 
demanding the re-instatement of the dismissed employees. The company then threatened to 
dismiss the striking employees unless they returned to work by a given date. Before the date, 
two of the striking employees returned to work, but the plaintiff and others continued with the 
strike and were consequently dismissed. 
 
The plaintiff instituted proceedings in the industrial tribunal for unfair dismissal relying on 
paragraph 8(1)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 set out 
above. She contended that her dismissal was unfair under sub-paragraph (a) above since the 
defendant company did not dismiss the two employees who had also taken part in the strike 
but returned to work. The tribunal dismissed her claim on the ground that sub-paragraph (a) 
did not apply since the two employees in question had stopped taking part in the strike at the 
time the plaintiff was dismissed. The plaintiff‘s appeal against the tribunal‘s decision was 
upheld. The company then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. The 
company further appealed to the House of Lords.
152
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It was argued on behalf of the company that accepting the plaintiff‘s contention would result 
in an anomaly whereby the company would be forced to dismiss those employees who had 
returned to work along with those such as the plaintiff who refused to return to work. 
Therefore, to avoid such an anomaly, it would be appropriate to read into sub-paragraph (a) 
above words which would restrict its application to cases where at the date the plaintiff was 
dismissed, others who were also taking part in the strike at that date were not dismissed along 
with the plaintiff. 
 
The House rejected this argument. Their Lordships found that the intention of Parliament in 
enacting the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 was to prevent the victimisation of 
workers who take part in industrial actions and that the plain language of the statutory 
provisions clearly conveyed this intention. According to Lord Scarman,  
 
―If the words used by Parliament are plain, there is no room for the 'anomalies' test, 
unless the consequences are so absurd that, without going outside the statute, one can 
see that Parliament must have made a drafting mistake. If words 'have been 
inadvertently used', it is legitimate for the court to substitute what is apt to avoid the 
intention of the legislature being defeated: per MacKinnon LJ in Sutherland 
Publishing Co Ltd v Caxton Publishing Co Ltd (No 2) ([1937] 4 All ER 405 at 421, 
[1938] Ch 174 at 201). This is an acceptable exception to the general rule that plain 
language excludes a consideration of 'anomalies', ie mischievous or absurd 
consequences. If a study of the statute as a whole leads inexorably to the conclusion 
that Parliament has erred in its choice of words, e g used 'and' when 'or' was clearly 
intended, the courts can, and must, eliminate the error by interpretation. But mere 
'manifest absurdity' is not enough: it must be an error (of commission or omission) 
which in its context defeats the intention of the Act.‖153   
 
 
It follows that the detection of absurdity would not by itself alone justify a departure from the 
plain language of a statutory provision. The absurdity must be one that, if allowed to stand 
unaltered, would defeat the intention of Parliament. If, taking the statute as a whole, the 
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intention of Parliament is clearly conveyed by the plain words used, the court would be 
bound to give effect to those words. As Lord Edmunds-Davies put it,  
 
―… dislike of the effect of a statute has never been an accepted reason for departing 
from its plain language. Holt CJ said nearly three centuries ago: 'An Act of Parliament 
can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd' (City of 
London v Wood ((1701) 12 Mod Rep 669 at 687)). Accordingly, even if one regarded 
the policy implicit in Sch 1, para 8(2)(a), to the 1974 Act as open to criticism, the 
statutory language is clear beyond doubt and must prevail.‖154  
 
Furthermore, the power of the court to depart from the clear and unambiguous meaning of a 
statutory provision is not to be exercised if the purpose is merely to fill a lacuna detected in 
the law. Thus in Re DWS (deceased), Re EHS (deceased), TWGS v JMG and others,
155
 the 
Court of Appeal refused an invitation to depart from the plain language of section 47(1)(i) of 
the Administration of Estates Act 1925 in order to take care of circumstances supposedly 
unanticipated by Parliament when it enacted the statute.  
 
Section 47(1)(i) read as follows: 
 
―47. (1) Where under this Part of this Act the residuary estate of an intestate or any 
part thereof, is directed to be held on the statutory trusts for the issue of the intestate, 
the same shall be held upon the following trusts, namely:- 
 
(i) In trust, in equal shares if more than one, for all or any of the children or child 
of the intestate, living at the death of the intestate, who attain the age of 
eighteen years or marry under that age, and for all or any of the issue living 
at the death of the intestate who attain the age of [eighteen] years or 
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marry under that age of any child of the intestate who predeceases the 
intestate, such issue to take through all degrees, according to their stocks, 
in equal shares if more than one, the share which their parent would have 
taken if living at the death of the intestate, and so that no issue shall take 
whose parent is living at the death of the intestate and so capable of 
taking; ….‖156 
 
The factual background to the legal issue involved in the case was that Mr R murdered his 
parents, Mr and Mrs S. Both parents died intestate and were survived by their only son Mr R 
and his own son, T.  It was agreed by all parties that the murderer son was, by reason of 
public policy, disqualified from benefiting from the estate of his parents whom he himself 
had killed. The question for determination was whether, having been so disqualified, his son, 
T (i.e. the grandson of the deceased) was entitled to the estate of the deceased under the 
provisions set out above.  
 
The plain language of section 47(1)(i) clearly indicated that for T to be entitled to the estate 
of his grandparents through his father, his own father must have predeceased the 
grandparents. Accordingly, he could not be entitled under the provision interpreted according 
to its natural and ordinary meaning.  
 
It was however argued on his behalf that the provision ought to be construed as if his father 
had predeceased his grandparents. If this were done, T would stand entitled and a situation 
where a more remote relative might benefit in preference to T would be avoided. 
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The Court of Appeal rejected this contention. The Court held that the mere fact that 
Parliament, when enacting the statute, might not have considered circumstances such as the 
instant case, where the surviving grandchild‘s parent did not predecease the grandparent but 
was disqualified, was no justification for departing from the plain meaning of the statutory 
provision. According to Aldous LJ, ―… it is not open to the Court to disregard the clear 
meaning of the section, particularly when the result cannot be said to be absurd or contrary to 
the expressed intention of Parliament.‖157  
The effect of the Court‘s decision appears to be that it is no part of the constitutional function 
of the courts, when interpreting statutes, to distort the language of a clear and unambiguous 
statutory provision that unequivocally conveys the intention of Parliament, mainly for the 
purpose of covering circumstances not contemplated by Parliament. Therefore, where a gap is 
detected in the statute, the court must leave it to Parliament to fill. This is especially so where 
alteration of the clear words would result in extending or constricting the effect of the statute 
in a manner that is contrary to the clearly expressed intention of Parliament.  
 
There is a further instance where courts may interpret statutory provisions in a manner that 
appear to deviate from the plain language of the statute under consideration. Statutes enacted 
by Parliament may remain in force for several years, even possibly, for hundreds of years. In 
the course of time, conditions such as social attitudes, scientific advances and linguistic 
usages may change. It has generally been permissible for a court to adopt an updating 
interpretation of a statutory provision to take account of changed circumstances since the Act 
was passed, even if, in the process of doing this, the court may inevitably depart from what 
appears to be the plain meaning of the statutory provision. 
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An example of this can be found in the case of Royal College of Nursing of the United 
Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security.
158
 The case concerned the 
interpretation of section 1(1) of the Abortion Act 1967, the material part of which provided 
that ―a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a 
pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner.‖159 At the time the Act was 
passed, abortions were usually carried out by surgical operations performed almost wholly by 
a registered medical practitioner. Nurses and other medical support staff took no significant 
part in the process of aborting a pregnancy. 
 
However, a few years after the Act was passed, a new method, called medical induction, had 
come into use in aborting pregnancies. This new method involved the administration of a 
chemical fluid into the pregnant woman‘s womb with the aim of inducing a discharge of the 
unborn child from the womb. The process involved two distinctive stages. A medical 
practitioner performs the first stage. He inserts a catheter into the body of the pregnant 
woman. Nurses perform the second stage. They connect a tube to the catherter, and through 
the tube, they pump the chemical fluid into the woman‘s body and this induces the labour by 
which the unborn child is discharged from the womb. The entire process takes between 18 to 
30 hours. It was appreciated that it is the administration of the chemical fluid (done by the 
nurses), and not the insertion of the catherter (done by the medical practitioner) that actually 
induces the discharge. 
 
Apparently bearing in mind that the wording of section 1(1) of the Abortion Act 1967 
excused only ―a registered medical practitioner‖, the Department of Health attempted to 
clarify the law by issuing a circular the material parts of which read as follows: 
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―However, the Secretary of State is advised that the termination can properly be said 
to have been termination by the registered medical practitioner provided it is decided 
upon by him, initiated by him, and that he remains throughout responsible for its 
overall conduct and control in the sense that any actions needed to bring it to 
conclusion are done by appropriately skilled staff acting on his specific instructions 
but not necessarily in his presence.‖160  
 
This meant that the Department of Health did not consider the role of nurses in the medical 
induction process, as indicated above, to be unlawful, provided that the entire process was 
authorised and conducted under the direction and control of a registered medical practitioner. 
 
The Royal College of Nursing challenged this view. It contended that section 1(1) of the 
Abortion Act 1967 covered only registered medical practitioners and could not be extended 
to cover the prominent role played by nurses in the medical induction process. They therefore 
sought a declaration that the Department‘s circular was wrong in law. The High Court 
determined the case in favour of the Department. The Court of Appeal, by a unanimous 
decision, overturned the High Court‘s judgment, expressing the view, (per Sir George Baker) 
that 
 
―There is no manifest absurdity; on the contrary the provision is clear and 
understandable. If the intention had been to make lawful the acts of persons 
participating in or carrying out the termination of a pregnancy on doctors' orders that 
could have been expressly stated either as the department suggest the section should 
be read, or by some other appropriate words….‖161 
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On appeal to the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal‘s judgment was in turn set aside by a 
majority of 3-2. The principal reason for the majority decision was that in passing the 
Abortion Act 1967 and requiring that permissible abortions be carried out in National Health 
Service hospitals or private clinics specially approved for the purpose by the appropriate 
minister, Parliament contemplated that the treatment resulting in the abortion would normally 
be carried out as a team effort, with a registered medical practitioner leading other doctors, 
nurses and other support staff carrying out their respective duties in accordance with accepted 
medical practice. Therefore, as far as a registered medical practitioner authorises the abortion, 
takes responsibility for the entire process and remains in control throughout the process 
leading up to the discharge of the unborn baby, the resulting termination of the pregnancy can 
properly be deemed termination by the registered medical practitioner in accordance with 
section 1(1) of the Abortion Act 1967. 
 
Although the main reason for the majority decision appeared to be that the changed 
conditions (i.e. the new medical induction) came within the contemplation of Parliament 
when it enacted the Abortion Act 1967, the cases suggest that is not the only condition that 
may justify the court in extending the clear meaning of a provision in the statute under 
consideration. Where, taking the statute as a whole, and read in appropriate context, the 
statutory provision could be extended to cover the new development without distorting the 
underlying purpose of the statute, it is permissible for the court to construe the provision so as 
to cover the new development even though this may appear to be a departure from the plain 
meaning of the statutory words. 
 
Indeed, this point was made in the minority judgment of Lord Wilberforce where he 
expressed the view that the expressed meaning of a statutory provision could be extended to 
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cover a new state of affairs if they come within the parliamentary intention or the underlying 
policy or purpose of the statute.
162
  
 
Thus, in R v Ireland; R v Burtow,
163
 where the court had to construe the meaning of ―grievous 
bodily harm‖ and ―actual bodily harm‖ in sections 20 and 47 respectively of the Offences 
against the Person Act 1861 in the light of current scientific knowledge of the link between 
psychiatric injury and the human body, the House of Lords decided that the statutory phrases 
(i.e. ―grievous bodily harm‖ and ―actual bodily harm‖) could be extended to cover psychiatric 
injury even though, as Lord Steyn put it, ―The proposition that the Victorian legislator when 
enacting ss 18, 20 and 47 of the 1861 Act would not have had in mind psychiatric illness is 
no doubt correct.‖ The important consideration is that the extended interpretation of the 
statutory phrases fit into the context of the 1861 statute and is in tune with the general 
legislative purpose of the statute.   
 
As exemplified by the above cases, while the principle, that the court may extend the 
expressed meaning of a statutory provision to accommodate changed circumstances, has been 
generally accepted, it is however difficult to decide which new development comes within the 
contemplation of Parliament, or within the underlying intention, policy or purpose behind the 
statute. It would appear that no hard and fast rule has been formulated to determine the nature 
of circumstances that could justify an extension of the clearly expressed meaning of a 
statutory provision. Each case may have to be decided on its own merits. However, it appears 
that flexible words are more susceptible to judicial extension beyond their ordinary and 
natural meanings in order to accommodate changed circumstances. 
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A good example is the term ―family‖ which meaning has been judicially extended from time 
to time in order to accommodate changing social attitudes.
164
 The term, in ordinary English 
language usage, usually referred to a person belonging to a unit consisting of a husband and 
wife and their issues, although it may sometimes include extended relatives such as aunts, 
uncles, nieces and nephews. However, in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd,
165
 a 
case decided in 1999, the House of Lords had to decide the question whether a same-sex 
partner was capable of being a member of his or her partner‘s family for the purposes of 
paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 to the Rent Act 1977. By a majority of 3-2,
166
 the House held that 
homosexual partners living and sharing their lives together in a stable relationship 
characterized by mutual inter-dependence could validly come within the term ―family‖ for 
the purposes of the Rent Act 1977. The majority was of the view that social attitudes toward 
homosexuality had changed over the years and an updating approach in the interpretation of 
the term was necessary in order to accommodate current state of affairs. According to Lord 
Clyde, 
 
―The concept of the family has undergone significant development during recent 
years, both in the United Kingdom and overseas. Whether that is a matter for concern 
or congratulation is of no relevance to the present case, but it is properly part of the 
judicial function to endeavour to reflect an understanding of such changes in the 
reality of social life. Social groupings have come to take a number of different forms. 
The form of the single parent family has been long recognised. A more open 
acceptance of differences in sexuality allows a greater recognition of the possibility of 
domestic groupings of partners of the same sex. The formal bond of marriage is now 
far from being a significant criterion for the existence of a family unit. While it 
remains as a particular formalisation of the relationship between heterosexual couples, 
family units may now be recognised to exist both where the principal members are in 
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a heterosexual relationship and where they are in a homosexual or lesbian 
relationship.‖167 
 
 
A number of factors appeared to have influenced the decision of the majority. First, the term, 
―family‖ had no precise statutory definition. It was flexible in nature and thus amenable to 
judicial modification. Secondly, there was the need for the law to keep up with changing 
social attitudes affecting the traditional family. With the term remaining statutorily 
undefined, judges must assume the responsibility to adopt an updating approach to its 
interpretation in the light of  current state of affairs. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, 
the extended interpretation appeared not to have negated the underlying purpose of the Rent 
Act 1977, which was to provide statutory protection (security of tenure) to ―those closely 
bound‖168 to the tenant to enable them continue the tenancy after the death of the tenant.169 
 
However, Lord Hutton felt that such an extension, as was sanctioned by the majority, was an 
improper usurpation of parliamentary functions.
170
 He appeared to contend that the question 
before the House involved social policy issues requiring appropriate parliamentary debates.  
 
The division in the House exemplifies the difficulty in determining how far a court could go 
in adopting an updating interpretation. It is suggested that, in addition to ensuring that any 
extended interpretation is in harmony with the underlying purpose of the statute under 
consideration, the court should also consider whether considerable public policy issues 
requiring parliamentary attention is involved. It is submitted that the thin line between 
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legitimate judicial power of adopting an updating interpretation and illegitimate judicial 
legislation is likely to be crossed if the court dabbled into matters of state policy more 
appropriate for executive and/or legislative action. 
As has been observed, the main purpose of statutory interpretation is the ascertainment of 
legislative intention. In seeking to discover the intention of Parliament in enacting a statute, it 
would appear that courts are increasingly adopting what has come to be termed a purposive 
approach to interpretation. Indeed, the Law Commission, in its report published in 1969, 
recommended this approach. The Commission advised that ―a construction which would 
promote the general legislative purpose underlying the provision in question is to be preferred 
to a construction which would not.‖171  
 
In Pepper v Hart, Lord Griffiths confirmed this contemporary approach when he said, ―The 
courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of 
legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears upon the 
background against which the legislation was enacted.‖172  
 
Essentially, the approach involves investigating the legislative history of the statutory 
provision under consideration and identifying from the available material the mischief or 
problem, which the statute sought to remedy, and the means chosen to deal with it. 
Considering the entirety of the legislative history may enable the court to identify the 
rationale behind the enactment in question.  
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Cross
173
 outlined legislative history as including legislative antecedents, pre-parliamentary 
materials and parliamentary materials. The legislative antecedents of the statutory provision 
under consideration refer to related statutory provisions in previous enactments. These may 
be extant or repealed. An examination of them may give valuable indications of the real 
purpose of the statute under consideration, and consequently the true construction of the 
statutory provision in question. 
 
As the term indicates, pre-parliamentary materials refer to relevant materials preceding the 
introduction of the Bill into Parliament. These include white papers, reports of committees 
and commissions (containing reviews of various policy matters and recommendations for 
legislative changes). Reference to pre-parliamentary material can be useful as evidence 
indicative of the mischief that the statute was meant to deal with.
174
 Identification of the 
mischief may in turn be a useful guide to identifying the purpose of the statute.    
 
Lastly, parliamentary materials include the draft Bill introduced into Parliament and the 
various amendments made to it in the course of parliamentary proceedings, reports of 
parliamentary committees as well as parliamentary debates (Hansard). As a rule, 
parliamentary debates are not to be used for the purpose of identifying the intention of 
Parliament in enacting legislation.
175
 However, in Pepper v Hart,
176
 the House of Lords 
created an exception to this exclusionary rule. In that case, Lord Browne-Wilkinson proposed 
that:  
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―…the exclusionary rule should be relaxed so as to permit reference to Parliamentary 
materials where (a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an absurdity; (b) 
the material relied upon consists of one or more statements by a Minister or other 
promoter of the Bill together if necessary with such other Parliamentary material as is 
necessary to understand such statements and their effect; (c) the statements relied 
upon are clear.‖177   
 
In the case, the House of Lords relied on a ministerial statement made in the course of 
parliamentary debates on the Bill, which became the Finance Act 1976, for the purpose of 
resolving the ambiguity thought to be present in section 63 of the Act.  
 
As has been observed, the purposive approach involves carrying out an investigation into the 
legislative history of the statutory provision under consideration in order that the intention of 
Parliament may be discovered. Therefore, it is submitted that it would be improper for courts 
to resort to legislative history unless the intention of Parliament is not manifestly clear from 
the plain words used, or the plain words lead to an absurd result. As Lord Browne Wilkinson 
stated in the above quoted passage, reference to parliamentary materials could be had where 
―legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an absurdity.‖ It is submitted that this 
statement applies with equal force to other forms of legislative history. It is submitted that 
where the plain words used in the statute in question clearly conveys the intention of 
Parliament, there should be no need for the court to delve into legislative history. Legislative 
history ought not to be used for the purpose of discrediting the unambiguous meaning of a 
statutory provision which meaning is not in any way absurd. Legislative history should be 
used as a means of confirming the most appropriate meaning (i.e. that which better fulfils the 
legislative purpose) amongst two or more possible meanings of the statutory provision.   
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In addition to the various judicial approaches discussed above, courts also resort to certain 
presumptions as aids to ascertaining the intention of Parliament or resolving doubtful 
statutory provisions.  
 
For example, when faced with the interpretation of a statute touching on the fundamental 
rights of the individual, as a general rule, the courts proceed on the presumption that 
Parliament does not intend to trample on, or in any way abridge, those rights. Therefore, as a 
general rule, where a statutory provision is ambiguous in the sense that it is capable of two or 
more meanings, that which preserves the fundamental rights of the individual is to be 
preferred.
178
 Further, it may be safely stated that even where statutory words are apparently 
clear, the courts may adopt a restrictive approach to interpretation in order to ensure that 
fundamental rights are not abrogated by the state. As Laws J (as he then was) stated in R v 
Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham, fundamental rights ―cannot be abrogated by the state save 
by specific provision in an Act of Parliament, or by regulations whose vires in the main 
legislation specifically confers the power to abrogate.‖179 In other words, in the absence of 
express words taking away the fundamental rights of the individual, there may be scope for a 
restrictive interpretation, which preserves those rights.  
 
Conversely, the presumption that Parliament does not intend to abrogate fundamental rights 
may be defeated by express words or by necessary implication. Accordingly, where 
Parliament expressly permits the abrogation of fundamental rights or authorises such 
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abrogation by necessary implication, the courts would have to bow to the terms of the 
statute.
180
  
 
Again, in interpreting legislation touching on the obligations of the United Kingdom under 
international law or an international convention, as a general rule, the courts proceed on the 
presumption that Parliament intends to fulfill its obligations. Therefore, where there is an 
ambiguity in such a statute, that meaning which best fulfills the obligations of the United 
Kingdom would be preferred. However, where the statute breaches those obligations in clear 
and unambiguous terms, there can be no recourse to the presumption. In those circumstances, 
the court may not depart from the terms of the statute under the guise of interpretation. The 
court has a constitutional duty to apply the terms of the statute.
181
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, it has been shown that the main object of statutory interpretation is the 
ascertainment of parliamentary intention. It is seen that as a general rule, plain words are 
given their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they are used. Where the 
statutory words are clear and unambiguous, and conveys the intention of Parliament in 
enacting the statute in question, there is generally no need for the court to resort to other 
means of ascertaining the intention of Parliament. In such a case, it is the duty of the court, in 
accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, to obey and apply the will of 
Parliament as manifest in the statute. 
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However, the cases show that where a statutory provision is ambiguous, or the clear words 
used lead to an absurdity, the courts may resort to the several other means (discussed above) 
of ascertaining the intention of Parliament.  
 
It is submitted that inconsistency between the plain words of the statutory provision under 
consideration and the terms of a previous statute is not to be regarded as an ambiguity 
entitling the court to depart from the plain language of the statute. In such a case, it is 
submitted that the principle of implied repeal ought to be activated in resolving the 
inconsistency. By that principle, the statute earlier in time is impliedly repealed by the statute 
later in time to the extent of the inconsistency.
182
 
 
On the whole, a departure from the plain language of a statutory provision, which is not 
ambiguous in the context of the statute, and leads to no absurd result, is, it is submitted, an 
affront to the sovereignty of Parliament. 
 
In the next chapters, judicial approaches to the interpretation and application of primary 
legislation pursuant to the provisions of section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) 
of the 1998 Act will be examined. The chapters will focus specifically on how the courts 
have used their interpretative powers in a manner that differs considerably from the 
conventional approaches that have been discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, the chapters 
will examine how the courts treat parliamentary intention in particular, and how this impacts 
on their attitude to the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty.   
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION UNDER SECTION 2(1) AND (4) OF THE 
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION UNDER SECTION 2(1) AND (4) OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ACT 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The principal aim of this chapter is to examine judicial approaches to the interpretation and 
application of primary legislation pursuant to the interpretative obligation contained in 
section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act. In particular, the chapter will examine how the courts 
react to primary legislation found to be in conflict with directly effective Community law. 
The extent to which United Kingdom courts are prepared to accord primacy to directly 
effective Community legislation over domestic primary legislation will be discussed. An 
analysis of the possible theoretical explanations for the judicial acceptance of the primacy of 
directly effective Community law will be made. Furthermore, the extent to which United 
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Kingdom courts are prepared to ensure that the demands of Community Directives are 
effectively complied with when interpreting national legislation (including national primary 
legislation) will be examined. It will be argued in this chapter that, while the courts seem to 
continue to endorse the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty, in reality the cases 
indicate that the interpretative obligation contained in section 2(4) has enabled judges to 
interpret and apply primary legislation in a manner that challenges the traditional concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty for all practical purposes.  
  
 
 
 
II. Legal and Constitutional Background to the Enactment of Section 2(1) and (4) 
 
The provisions of section 2(1), (2) and (4) of the 1972 Act (reproduced in Appendix 1) were 
an attempt by the Government and Parliament to meet the constitutional challenges posed by 
United Kingdom membership of the European Communities. The challenges concerned in 
particular the emergence of a new legal order to which the existing United Kingdom 
constitutional framework must conform. This new legal order consists mainly of three 
principles vital to the sustenance of Community law. These are the European principles of 
direct applicability, direct effect and supremacy of Community law over the national law of 
Member States of the Community. 
 
It is necessary at the outset to clarify in particular what the terms, ―direct applicability‖ and 
―direct effect‖ (as well as the related term, ―indirect effect‖) refer to in order to eliminate 
possible confusion in the usage of the terms. The clarification is also important because, as 
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will be seen later in this chapter, the approach of the United Kingdom courts in the 
interpretation of national legislation differ, depending on whether the Community measure 
involved is one that is directly applicable or otherwise.  
 
In simple terms, a Community measure must be regarded as directly applicable if it is to 
apply as law within the domestic legal order of the Member States of the Community without 
further national legislative measures on the part of the Member States. In other words, a 
directly applicable Community measure automatically becomes law within the domestic legal 
systems of the Member States simply by virtue of its nature. For its operation as law within 
the domestic system, there needs be no implementing measure on the part of a Member State.   
Under Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome
183
, Community measures take different forms, 
namely, regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. Regulations are of 
general application. They are binding in their entirety and are expressly stated by the Treaty 
to be directly applicable in all Member States of the Community. Regulations are the only 
Community measures that are expressly stated by the Treaty to be directly applicable in the 
sense that no further national legislative measures are required for them to be relied upon as 
law within the domestic legal system of the Member States. However, the European Court 
has made it quite clear that the Treaty provisions themselves may also, depending on the 
nature of the provision concerned, be directly applicable in the same way as a regulation is 
directly applicable under Article 189 mentioned above.
184
 Thus, where, for example, as was 
the case in  NV Algemene Transport- en Expedite Onderneming van Gend & Loos v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration (van Gend Case)
185
, the Treaty provision 
concerned (Article 12) is of a clearly prohibitive nature, the provision is directly applicable 
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such that no further national enactment is required for the prohibition contained in the 
provision to operate as law within the domestic legal system of the Member States. 
 
Section 2(1) of the 1972 Act adequately describes the character of Community measures that 
are directly applicable within the domestic legal order of the United Kingdom. All 
Community legislation ―as in accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to 
be given legal effect or be used in the United Kingdom shall be recognized and available in 
law….‖ 
 
A Directive is binding only as to the result to be achieved, the choice of form and methods of 
achieving the end result being left to the Member States to which it is addressed to determine.  
 
A decision is binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed, while 
recommendations and opinions have no binding force. 
 
The fact that Article 189 stipulates that a Regulation is binding in its entirety indicates that it 
is enforceable and may be relied upon in legal proceedings by individuals within the domestic 
legal order of Member States. In this sense, Regulations, which by definition under Article 
189 are directly applicable, would seem to be also, by their very nature, directly effective. 
Direct effect refers to the notion that individuals can apply to enforce in their own personal 
capacity rights and obligations derived from Community law in legal proceedings brought 
before domestic courts of Member States. Thus, while it may be the case that directly 
applicable Community legislation are usually also directly effective, the two terms are not 
synonymous. Directives are not directly applicable in the sense in which Regulations, or 
relevant provisions of the Treaty itself, are directly applicable. This is because national 
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legislative measures are generally required in order for the provisions of a Directive to 
become operational in law within the domestic legal order of Member State. Nevertheless, in 
appropriate conditions, a Directive may be directly effective in the sense that individuals may 
be able to seek judicial enforcement of rights and obligations derived from them. 
 
Despite the difference in terminology between the terms ―direct applicability‖ and ―direct 
effect‖, quite often, references to the European Court by national courts contain questions 
which misleadingly suggest the two terms to be one and the same. For example, in Pubblico 
Ministero v Tullio Ratti
186
 the first question asked was whether ―Council Directive 
73/173/EEC of 4 June 1973, in particular Article 8 thereof, constitute(s) directly 
applicable
187
 legislation conferring upon individuals personal rights which the national 
courts must protect?‖ Similar questions were referred to the European Court in Yvonne van 
Duyn v Home Office
188
, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen
189
 and Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA.
190
 In all 
of these cases, the European Court seemed to deal with the questions without a clear 
statement that the terms were essentially different in meaning. 
 
In Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office
191
, the European Court established for the first time that 
Directives, although not directly applicable in the sense of Regulations being directly 
applicable under Article 189 of the Treaty, may, in certain circumstances, have direct effect 
within the domestic legal order of Member States such that individuals could apply to 
national courts to have rights accruing from, and obligations imposed by, a Directive, to be 
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enforced. The United Kingdom had argued that since Article 189 of the Treaty differentiated 
between Regulations and Directives and ascribed different legal effects to each, a Directive 
could not have the same effect as a Regulation so as to confer on individuals, rights which 
they can enforce in national courts. In answer to this argument, the European Court stated: 
 
―If, however, by virtue of the provisions of Article 189 Regulations are directly 
applicable and, consequently, may by their very nature have direct effects, it does not 
follow from this that other categories of acts mentioned in that Article can never have 
similar effects. It would be incompatible with the binding effect attributed to a 
Directive by Article 189 to exclude, in principle, the possibility that the obligation 
which it imposes may be invoked by those concerned. In particular, where the 
Community authorities have, by Directive, imposed on Member States the obligation 
to pursue a particular course of conduct, the useful effect of such an act would be 
weakened if individuals were prevented from relying on it before their national courts 
and if the latter were prevented from taking it into consideration as an element of 
Community law. Article 177, which empowers national courts to refer to the court 
questions concerning the validity and interpretation of all acts of the Community 
institutions, without distinction, implies furthermore that these acts may be invoked 
by individuals in the national courts.‖192  
 
 
 
As can be seen, two specific reasons underlined the decision of the European Court in 
holding that a Directive may also have the capacity to be directly effective in the way 
Regulations generally are. The first is the idea that the since a Directive is binding as to the 
result to be achieved, denying it direct effect as a matter of principle would negate the 
binding nature of Directives. The second reason is what one might call the Article 177
193
 
argument. Article 177 empowered national courts to refer questions ―on the validity and 
interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community‖ to the European Court for a 
preliminary ruling. The European Court felt that since this power related to all acts of the 
Community institutions without distinction, the implication must be that all of them, 
including Directives, may be invoked by in the national courts. 
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The latter reason is, with respect, somewhat weak. It is difficult to accept that the mere fact 
that legal questions concerning a Directive can be referred to the European Court by itself 
implies that Directives may be directly effective. Reliance on the wording of Article 177 to 
buttress the argument that Directives may by implication be directly effective is unhelpful 
because the general reference to acts of the Community institutions in Article 177 would 
necessarily include recommendations and opinions which have no binding effect whatsoever.  
 
The European Court restated the principle that Directives may have direct effect in a number 
of subsequent cases.
194
 In the Ratti case
195
, the Court added a third reason for its decision. 
This was that in view of the binding nature of a Directive, at least as to its result, a Member 
State subject to the Directive is estopped, as against individuals deriving rights from the 
Directive, from relying on its own failure to perform the obligations imposed by the 
Directive.
196
 Thus, national courts are under an obligation to uphold the provisions of a 
Directive against any incompatible national law of a defaulting Member State if called upon 
to do so by individuals deriving rights therefrom.  
 
However, before a Directive can be enforced against a defaulting Member State by its 
national court, two conditions stipulated by the European Court in Ratti’s case must be met. 
The first is that the obligation contained in the Directive must be ―unconditional and 
sufficiently precise.‖197 This must mean that the result to be achieved by the Directive is clear 
and unequivocal, and the obligation to achieve the stated result itself is unconditional even 
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though the choice and forms of methods to achieve the result may be open to the 
discretionary judgment of a Member States. 
 
Secondly, the period allowed the Member State to implement the Directive must have expired 
before the obligation contained in it can become directly effective so as to confer rights on 
individuals which they could enforce in the national court of the defaulting Member State.
198
  
 
A Directive that has been adjudged to have direct effect must be upheld against all 
incompatible national law, whether made before or after the Directive. For national law made 
before the Directive, the Member State has an obligation to adapt it in compliance with the 
demands of the Directive. And for national law made in implementation of the Directive, the 
Member State has an obligation to ensure that the Directive is fully, effectively and correctly 
implemented.  Any national law that is significantly different from the Directive, either 
because it is more restrictive, disadvantageous or otherwise must give way to the Directive.
199
 
 
The principle of direct effect of Directives enunciated in van Duyn and Ratti were somewhat 
watered down in Marshall’s case200 when the European Court held that a Directive may have 
vertical direct effect only, and is incapable of having horizontal direct effect. Vertical direct 
effect refers to the notion that individuals can apply to national courts to enforce the 
provisions of a Community measure, for example, a Directive, against a Member State or its 
organs. On the other hand, horizontal direct effect refers to the capacity of an individual to 
apply in national courts to enforce rights derived from Community law not only against the 
State or emanations of the State, but also against other individuals. The reason underlying the 
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decision of the Court was based on a textual reading of Article 189.
201
 Under that Article, a 
Directive is stated to be binding upon the Member States to which it is addressed. The 
implication seemed to be that obligations arising from a Directive can only be enforced 
against Member States to whom it has been addressed, and not to individuals who have no 
direct obligation to implement the Directive.   
 
However reasonable the Court‘s decision appears to be, seen in the light of the wording of 
Article 189, there was little doubt that one of the cardinal reasons for affording direct effect 
to Directives, which was to ensure the effectiveness of the binding nature of Directives, had 
been adversely affected. The decision meant that in proceedings between individuals, no one 
could rely on the provisions of a Directive even though those provisions may be relevant to 
the dispute between the parties, and one party may indeed be entitled to rights derived from 
the Directive in question. This obvious shortcoming apparently led to the development of the 
doctrine of indirect effect of Directives, or perhaps more appropriately, indirect direct effect 
of Directives. 
 
Indirect direct effect of Directives seemed to have originated from the von Colson case
202
. In 
the case, the European Court held that the obligation under the Treaty,
203
 to ensure that 
Directives are fully and effectively implemented or observed extends to all State authorities, 
including the national courts in matters within their jurisdiction. Thus, even in cases between 
individuals, national courts are under an obligation to interpret and apply national law 
adopted in implementation of a Directive in a manner that ensures the effectiveness of the 
objectives of the Directive concerned.
204
 The result is that in a case coming within the scope 
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of a Directive, any apparently inconsistent national law must be construed in a manner that 
complies with the purpose of the Directive. In this way, national courts can be seen to give 
horizontal direct effect to Directives, albeit in an indirect manner. 
 
It is worth pointing out that in von Colson, the European Court seemed to restrict the 
obligation on the national courts to interpret national legislation in the light of the purpose of 
the Directive concerned only to national law made specifically to implement the Directive in 
question. However, in Marleasing, the Court extended this interpretative obligation on 
national courts to all national law, whether made before or after the Directive concerned. 
The interpretative obligation relating to the indirect direct effect of Directives as between 
individuals, formulated by the European Court in von Colson and Marleasing requires 
national courts to go as far as possible
205
 to interpret national law in conformity with the 
purpose of the Directive. This suggests that there may be instances where a national court, in 
seeking to enforce the Directive horizontally, may not be able to interpret national law in 
conformity with the Directive concerned, perhaps because it is linguistically impossible to 
interpret it consistently with the Directive. This is in contrast to the Court‘s approach when 
dealing with a Community measure that has vertical direct effect. In such cases, the European 
Court‘s approach is that domestic courts must, as a matter of principle, enforce the 
Community right involved irrespective of any inconsistent domestic legislation, however 
framed.  
 
However, having regard to the obligation on national courts, as mentioned earlier, to ensure 
the effectiveness of a binding Directive, it is difficult to envisage a situation where a national 
court can validly ignore relevant provisions of the Directive solely on grounds of inability to 
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interpret national law in a manner consistent with the Directive. It is submitted therefore, that 
in spite of the seeming limit the interpretative obligation which the phrase, ―so far as 
possible‖ suggests, there should in practice be no such limit on the ability of a national court 
seeking to achieve indirect direct effect of a Directive, to interpret national law consistently 
with the objective of the Directive concerned. As will be shown later in this chapter, the 
courts in the United Kingdom do not feel themselves limited by linguistic considerations in 
their capacity to interpret domestic legislation consistently with relevant Directives in cases 
arising between individuals. 
 
As mentioned earlier, and as will be seen later in this chapter, the way in which United 
Kingdom courts exercise their interpretative powers under section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 
Act depends in large measure on whether the Community measure involved is one that is 
directly applicable in the sense of it having, by its very nature, automatic direct effect, or on 
whether the Community measure is a Directive capable of having direct effect. In the former 
case, the courts simply disapply any conflicting national law by use of what may be termed 
the without prejudice rule of construction whereby a proviso is implied into every national 
law that it is to apply without prejudice to rights accruing to individuals by virtue of directly 
applicable Community law.. In the latter case, in order to nsure the effectiveness of 
Directives, United Kingdom courts feel able to judicially modify even clear and unequivocal 
provisions in national law if that were necessary to ensure compliance with the purpose of the 
Directive concerned. This is so whenever a case comes within the scope of a Directive 
adjudged to have direct effect. Thus, in the United Kingdom, the difference between vertical 
direct effect, and horizontal direct effect, of Directives, appears quite blurred because the 
courts use the doctrine of indirect direct effect to its full extent such that all Directives could 
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in practice be relied on by individuals not only against the State and its emanations, but also 
against other individuals.   
 
The van Gend case judicially established the principle of direct effect of directly applicable 
Community law. The relevant issue that arose for the determination of the European Court 
was whether Article 12 of the EEC Treaty had direct application within the territory of a 
Member State such that individual nationals of the State could rely on the provisions of the 
Article and indeed lay claim to individual rights accruing from them which the national 
courts must protect. In other words, would it be possible for a Treaty provision to give rise to 
an enforceable legal right within the domestic legal system without domestic legislative 
action? 
 
The Court held: 
 
―The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not 
only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them 
rights which become part of their legal heritage.‖206 
 
 
The effect of the above statement is that Community law adjudged to be directly applicable 
can indeed be enforced in the domestic courts of a Member State in legal proceedings 
between individuals. This is what is meant by direct effect. 
 
The van Gend case also established the principle of the supremacy or primacy of directly 
effective Community law over the national law of member States. The Court made it clear 
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that the very nature of the Community, and in particular, the provisions of Article 177 of the 
Rome Treaty made it inevitable that Community law be interpreted in a uniform manner 
throughout the territories of the Member States. This meant that national laws were not to be 
allowed to affect the validity or enforceability of directly effective Community law. 
 
The Court pointed out that it was the duty of the national courts to ensure the protection of 
enforceable rights accruing from Community law. What this entailed in effect was that the 
national courts were to place directly effective Community legislation over and above 
national laws whenever there was a conflict between the two. 
The resultant effect of all the above is that in the sphere of authority of the institutions of the 
Community, national legislatures have no power to legislate contrary to directly effective 
Community law. 
 
The principle of the supremacy of Community law over the national law of Member States 
was reaffirmed by the European Court in the case of Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L.
207
 The Court 
stressed that membership of the Community entailed a permanent surrender of sovereign 
rights by the Member States in the areas of authority of the Community. The very nature of 
the Community and its objectives inevitably call for uniformity of application of its laws in 
the territories of each and every Member State. It is inconceivable therefore, to allow 
Member States to be able to determine what Community legislation they would apply and 
what they would discard. Since the entire structure of the Community was based on mutual 
reciprocity, individual Member States could not be allowed to pick and choose which 
Community legislation they would apply within their national legal system. That would be 
the effect if national laws were to take precedence over directly effective Community law. 
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Directly effective Community legislation trumps not only existing national law, but also any 
national law enacted subsequently. 
 
 Lastly, in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide 
und Furttermittel
208
 the European Court had to decide the question whether provisions of 
Community law that were found to be inconsistent with the German Constitution must yield 
to the Constitution. In other words, could the validity of Community law be determined by 
reference to national constitutional measures? 
In a ruling that further affirmed the supremacy of Community law over national law, the 
European Court held that directly effective Community law took precedence even over 
national constitutional provisions. According to the Court,  
 
―…the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot 
be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as 
formulated by the constitution of that state or the principles of a national 
constitutional structure.‖209 
 
 
The three European cases mentioned above have shown that, from the point of view of the 
European Court, the supremacy of directly effective Community legislation is total. Directly 
effective Community law takes precedence over all forms of national law, whether 
constitutional or otherwise. It takes precedence over existing as well as subsequent national 
enactments.  
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Membership of the Community therefore entailed an acceptance of these vital Community 
principles. 
 
No doubt, there were constitutional hurdles to be overcome if the principles above mentioned 
were to be received within the existing constitutional framework of the United Kingdom. 
First, direct applicability meant that law-making powers (albeit limited) had to be surrendered 
to Community institutions. And because directly applicable Community legislation applies 
independently of national legislative enactments, it meant that Parliament would have 
virtually no direct role to play in their making. The problem was even more pronounced in 
relation to directly applicable Community legislation to be enacted from time to time in the 
future (i.e. subsequent to the United Kingdom formally joining the Community). No prior 
parliamentary approval would be required for them to take effect as law within the domestic 
legal regime. 
 
Secondly, as has been shown above, the principle of the supremacy of directly effective 
Community law meant that inconsistent Acts of Parliament (whenever enacted) must give 
way to directly effective Community legislation.  
 
Section 2(1) of the 1972 Act set out above was apparently enacted to enable directly 
applicable Community legislation to be recognised in law and enforced by United Kingdom 
courts without further parliamentary enactment. And section 2(4) of the same Act gave effect 
to the European principle of the supremacy of directly effective Community law in that it 
directed the domestic courts to construe all parliamentary enactments, already past or to be 
past in the future, subject to the terms of directly effective Community law. Thus, section 
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2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act received the principles of direct applicability, direct effect and 
supremacy of Community law into United Kingdom legal system. 
 
These principles together challenge the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
According to this concept, 
 
―Any Act of Parliament, or any part of an Act of Parliament, which makes a new law, 
or repeals or modifies an existing law, will be obeyed by the courts. The same 
principle, looked at from its negative side, may be thus stated: There is no person or 
body of persons who can, under the English constitution, make rules which override 
or derogate from an Act of Parliament, or which (to express the same thing in other 
words) will be enforced by the courts in contravention of an Act of Parliament.‖210  
There appeared to be two competing sovereignties at play – that of directly effective 
Community law on the one hand, and the sovereignty of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom on the other hand. The traditional account of parliamentary sovereignty implies that 
parliamentary supremacy is ―continuing‖ and therefore cannot be surrendered even by 
Parliament itself. The courts are therefore duty-bound to give effect to the latest will of 
Parliament as expressed in an Act of Parliament. This is necessary in order that the law-
making powers of future Parliaments are not fettered.
211
  
 
As evidenced by the cases of Vauxhall Estates Ltd v Liverpool Corporation
212
 and Ellen 
Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health
213
, it is ordinarily impossible for one Parliament to 
restrict the law-making authority of its successor Parliaments.
214
  Both cases, it should be 
recalled, concerned a provision of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) 
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Act 1919, which stipulated that the provisions of any other Act of Parliament dealing with the 
subject of land acquisition ―shall cease to have or shall not have effect‖ if inconsistent with 
the 1919 Act. It was argued that the above provision had the effect of nullifying inconsistent 
provisions appearing in a subsequent Act, the Housing Act 1925. The courts rejected this 
argument. In Vauxhall, Avory J. observed that such an argument was contrary to the 
―principle of the constitution‖ and declared, ―no Act of Parliament can effectively provide 
that no future Act shall interfere with its provisions.‖215 And in the Ellen Street case, 
Maugham L.J. made it clear that a subsequent Act of Parliament could always alter the terms 
of a previous Act by way of implied repeal, notwithstanding any parliamentary attempt to 
prevent this.
216
 
 
In view of the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty, the biggest problem would be 
how to reconcile the European principle of the supremacy of directly effective Community 
law with the apparently irreconcilable British constitutional doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. In other words, when faced with an Act of Parliament found to be irreconcilably 
inconsistent with the terms of a directly effective Community legislation, which of the two 
would the courts accept as prevailing over the other? 
 
The Government and Parliament were not unaware of the problem of competing 
sovereignties posed by the reception of the principles of direct applicability and supremacy of 
directly effective Community law at the time the 1972 Act was passed. Indeed, at the second 
reading of the European Communities Bill in the House of Lords, referring specifically to the 
reception of the concept of direct applicability, the Lord Chancellor
217
 acknowledged that it 
was a ―novel conception‖, but declared that it was ―an inescapable condition of membership.‖ 
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The Lord Chancellor also acknowledged the potential conflict between what he called ―the 
new source of law provided by the Treaty and regulations‖ on the one hand, and ―the doctrine 
of the sovereignty of Parliament and its corollary (I believe judge-made) the doctrine of the 
priority of later Acts over previous Acts; the rule of construction whereby when two Acts 
conflict the later is construed as amending or repealing the earlier one.‖218  
However, in spite of the potential tension between the two competing sovereignties, section 
2(4) of the 1972 Act did not frontally confront the issue.
219
 It did not state categorically and 
unequivocally that directly effective Community law must take priority at all times over 
national law in the way that the provisions of a rigid, written constitution supersede ordinary 
legislative enactments. On the other hand, it also did not make it categorically and 
unequivocally clear that the sovereignty of Parliament remained unaffected. This was in spite 
of a proposal for an amendment of the terms of what became section 2 of the Act, in form of 
the following proviso aimed at making it abundantly clear that an Act of Parliament would 
always prevail over inconsistent Community legislation: ―Provided that nothing in this Act 
shall be held to detract from the ultimate sovereignty or supremacy of Parliament or to 
prejudice the right of Parliament to repeal it or alter its provisions.‖220  
 
Section 2(4) was drafted in conveniently fluid terms, merely directing the courts to construe 
all legislation, past as well as future, subject to the terms of directly effective Community 
law. The fluidity of the provisions receiving the principles of direct applicability and 
supremacy of directly effective Community law is understandable given the political 
circumstances in which the Government found itself. It had two apparently conflicting 
interests to satisfy. On the one hand, as pointed out by the Lord Chancellor, acceptance of 
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these principles was ―an inescapable condition of membership.‖ On the other hand, the 
Government had to give sufficient assurances to Parliamentarians that parliamentary 
authority was not eroded, if it were to successfully get the Bill passed into law. An 
appropriate balance had to be found between the need not to upset the Community 
institutions even before the country became a full member of the Community, and the desire 
at the same time to reduce likely Parliamentary opposition over concerns pertaining to the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
The result was that both interests appear to have been satisfied in a somewhat inexplicable 
way.  And in some way, it was as if Parliament was passing the buck to the courts to 
determine the proper relationship between directly effective Community legislation and the 
traditional concept of the sovereignty of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. How have 
the courts approached the challenge? How have they exercised their interpretative power 
under section 2(4) in particular? These questions will be examined in the next section. 
 
III. Judicial Approaches to Statutory Interpretation Under Section 2(1) and (4) 
 
The early cases indicated that the provisions of section 2(1), which dealt with directly 
effective Community law, posed little problem for the courts. The courts seemed to 
understand that by that subsection, directly effective Community law was to have the force of 
law domestically and be so applied in the courts of law. 
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Thus, in Bulmer v Bollinger221, an appeal from the decision of the High Court refusing to 
refer certain questions to the European Court under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, Lord 
Denning, Master of the Rolls, made reference to section 2(1) of the 1972 Act, and said: 
 
―The statute is expressed in forthright terms which are absolute and all-embracing. 
Any rights or obligations created by the treaty are to be given legal effect in England 
without more ado. Any remedies or procedures provided by the treaty are to be made 
available here without being open to question. In future, in transactions which cross 
the frontiers, we must no longer speak or think of English law as something on its 
own. We must speak and think of Community law, of Community rights and 
obligations, and we must give effect to them.‖222 
 
The issue that appeared to be more problematic for the courts was the issue of the supremacy 
of directly effective Community law as embodied in section 2(4) of the Act. The early cases 
revealed the rather dithering manner in which the judges dealt with the supremacy of directly 
effective Community law in relation to an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. 
They contain dicta suggesting both an inclination towards upholding the European view-point 
on the issue of the supremacy of directly effective Community law, as well a desire to 
preserve the status of an Act of Parliament as the highest form of law within the United 
Kingdom. 
 
In one of the earliest cases that went before the courts, Graham, J duly acknowledged that the 
1972 Act accorded priority to directly effective Community law over the domestic law of the 
United Kingdom when he stated, ―This Act … to put it very shortly, enacted that relevant 
Common Market law should be applied in this country and should, where there is a conflict, 
override English law.‖223 
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But in Bulmer v Bollinger
224
 Lord Denning asserted that the Treaty was ―equal in force to any 
statute.‖ What did he mean? Is it the case that Treaty provisions, including those having 
direct effect, were to be treated as being of equal status with an Act of Parliament? If this was 
what Lord Denning meant, then the position would be that in case of a conflict between a 
provision of Community law having direct effect on the one hand, and an Act of Parliament 
on the other hand, the conflict would be resolved not by an application of the European 
principle of the supremacy of directly effective Community law, but by the ordinary common 
law interpretative principle of implied repeal whereby inconsistent provisions in an earlier 
statute are impliedly repealed by a later statute. 
 
Lord Denning‘s dictum in Felixtowe Dock & Ry Co. v British Transport Docks Board,225 
appeared to confirm the above interpretation of his statement in Bulmer v Bollinger,
226
 that 
Community law was in no way superior to an Act of Parliament.  
 
In the Felixtowe case, the British Transport Docks Board had entered into an agreement with 
the Plaintiff Company to buy all of its shares and subsequently take over the company. The 
agreement was subject to the approval of Parliament which approval was to be by way of an 
Act of Parliament. This was because the Board was a statutory body and lacked the capacity 
to undertake the proposed venture without an enabling Act of Parliament. 
 
While Parliament was in the process of enacting the necessary legislation for the purpose of 
enabling the Board to buy and take over the Company, the Company took out proceedings 
challenging the validity (or the continued validity) of the agreement. One of the grounds of 
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challenge was that the take over would amount to the Board abusing a dominant market 
position contrary to Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 
 
Article 86 provided that ―Any abuse by any one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the Common Market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible 
with the Common Market in so far as it may affect trade between member-States.‖ 
Following the European Court case of van Gend,
227
 there was no doubt that Article 86 of the 
Treaty had direct applicability. It was of a clearly prohibitive nature and the prohibition 
contained in it was not dependent for its enforceability, on a domestic legislative measure. 
Consequently, the provision in Article 86  had direct effect in the United Kingdom   
 
The Court of Appeal, like the court below it, ruled that the take over would not amount to an 
abuse of dominant position by the Board. However, the statement, made obiter by Lord 
Denning, on the potential relationship between Article 86 of the Treaty and a subsequent Act 
of Parliament, is relevant. On this point, Lord Denning said, ―It seems to me that once the 
Bill is passed by Parliament and becomes a Statute, that will dispose of all this discussion 
about the Treaty. These courts will then have to abide by the Statute without regard to the 
Treaty at all.‖228   
 
The implication of this is that if Parliament had passed the Act authorising the take over of 
the Plaintiff Company by the Board, it would become immaterial whether the take over put 
the Board in an abusive position contrary to Article 86 of the Treaty. 
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If this were the case, it would seem that section 2(4) of the 1972 Act had brought little or no 
change to the way in which the courts interpret primary legislation. It would mean that 
directly effective Community law has no superior force over an Act of Parliament. The status 
quo would remain unchanged.   
 
Yet, the language of section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act seems to indicate that directly 
effective Community law is to be accorded priority over the domestic law of the United 
Kingdom, including an Act of Parliament. The provisions in section 2(1) and (4) above are 
further strengthened by the provision in section 3(1), which provides as follows: 
 
―For the purposes of all legal proceedings any question as to the meaning or effect of 
any of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning and effect of any Community 
instrument, shall be treated as a question of law (and, if not referred to the European 
Court, be for determination as such in accordance with the principles laid down by 
any relevant decision of the European Court.)‖ 
 
 Thus, the combined provisions of section 2(1) and (4) and section 3(1) of the 1972 Act 
indicate not only that the courts of the United Kingdom are to give legal effect to directly 
effective Community law, but are statutorily obliged to ensure that their decisions are not 
contrary to the jurisprudence of the European Court on matters of Community law.  
 
However, more dicta on this crucial European principle of the supremacy of directly effective 
Community law were still to come from Lord Denning. These later dicta illustrate the relative 
uncertainty with which the judiciary initially approached the interpretative obligation 
contained in section 2(4) of the 1972 Act in the early days of the Act. 
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In Shields v E Coomes (Holdings) Ltd,
229
 Lord Denning acknowledged the principle of the 
supremacy of directly effective Community law. He expressed the opinion that directly 
effective Community law should prevail over inconsistent provisions of an Act of Parliament. 
For example, after referring to Article 119 as having direct effect, he said: 
  
―Suppose that the Parliament of the United Kingdom were to pass a statute 
inconsistent with art 119: as, for instance, if the Equal Pay Act 1970 gave the right to 
equal pay only to unmarried women. I should have thought that a married woman 
could bring an action in the High Court to enforce the right to equal pay given to her 
by art 119.‖230 
 
Going by the above dictum, by virtue of the 1972 Act, United Kingdom courts have the duty 
to apply directly effective Community law and to enforce them even in the face of an 
inconsistent Act of Parliament. This would mean that in the hierarchy of laws in the United 
Kingdom, directly effective Community law would be placed on a higher level than an Act of 
Parliament.  
 
Again, in Macarthys Ltd v Smith,
231
 Lord Denning reiterated the view that section 2(1) and 
(4) of the 1972 Act had the effect of conferring priority on directly effective Community law 
over Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament. Accordingly, domestic legislation must be 
interpreted bearing in mind the ―overriding force‖ of directly effective Community law.232  
 
However, it should be mentioned that the force of his Lordship‘s statement in Macarthys on 
the superiority of Community law was considerably watered down when he appeared to limit 
the application of the principle to instances where the inconsistency was occasioned ―by 
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some oversight‖233 of the draftsman. What is the position, for example, where Parliament 
enacted legislation that is unambiguously inconsistent and this was not occasioned by any 
―oversight‖ on the part of the draftsman?  
 
Perhaps, it was not until the case of Pickstone v Freemans
234
 that clear judicial approaches to 
the interpretation of legislation pursuant to the interpretative obligation contained in section 
2(4) of the 1972 Act began to emerge. The courts began at that stage to develop clear-cut 
principles of statutory interpretation in relation to the interpretative duty under section 2(1) 
and (4) of the 1972 Act.  
 
The tension between the principle of the supremacy of directly effective Community 
legislation as received through section 2(4) of the 1972 Act on the one hand, and the 
traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty on the other hand, was brought into sharp 
focus in the Factortame series of cases.  
 
In Factortame Ltd & Others v Secretary of State for Transport
235
 (No.1 in the House of 
Lords) Part II of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, and in particular, section 14
236
 had laid 
down new conditions for the registration of fishing vessels in Britain. Section 14(1) provided 
that 
 
―… a fishing vessel shall only be eligible to be registered as a British vessel if – (a) 
the vessel is British-owned; (b) the vessel is managed, and its operations are directed 
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and controlled, from within the United Kingdom; and (c) any charterer, manager or 
operator of the vessel is a qualified person or company.‖  
 
By section 14(2), a fishing vessel is to be regarded as British-owned only if it is owned by a 
British citizen or by a British company in accordance with the provisions of section 14(7). 
The applicants were companies incorporated in the United Kingdom, with directors and 
shareholders most of whom were Spanish nationals. Together, they owned a substantial 
number of fishing vessels operating as British fishing vessels under the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1894. The clear and unambiguous provisions of the new Act of 1988 had the effect of 
disqualifying them from having their fishing vessels registered, mainly because they were not 
British nationals or British companies in accordance with the provisions of Part II of the 1988 
Act. 
Being Community nationals, the applicants took out proceedings in the Divisional Court, 
arguing that the provisions of Part II of the 1988 Act violated certain directly effective 
Community rights to which they were entitled. These included amongst others, the right not 
to be discriminated against on grounds of nationality as guaranteed by Article 7, and the right 
to free movement of persons, services and capital, as well as freedom of establishment, all 
guaranteed by the Treaty of Rome. 
  
It was common ground that the relevant provisions of the 1988 Act were clear and 
unambiguous and that their effect would be to deny the applicants registration of their fishing 
vessels as British fishing vessels. The substantive issue in the case before the Divisional 
Court was whether the provisions indeed violated directly effective Community rights to 
which the applicants were entitled. While the applicants contended that they did, the 
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Secretary of State contended that they did not. The Divisional Court decided to refer the point 
to the European Court
237
 for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 177 of the Treaty. 
 
Meanwhile, the applicants applied for an interim order suspending the operation of Part II of 
the 1988 Act and restraining the Secretary of State from applying or enforcing the relevant 
provisions against the applicants and their vessels pending the determination of the 
substantive issue. 
 
The Divisional Court granted the order and suspended the relevant provisions accordingly. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal discharged the interim order. On appeal to the House of 
Lords by the applicants, the House held that under English law, no court had the power to 
suspend, or in any way disapply the provisions of an Act of Parliament pending the resolution 
of a matter in court. In the words of Lord Bridge, who delivered the lead ruling of the House, 
 
―… An order granting the applicants the interim relief which they seek will only serve 
their purpose if it declares that which Parliament has enacted to be the law from 1 
December 1988, and to take effect in relation to vessels previously registered under 
the Act of 1894 from 31 March 1989, not to be the law until some uncertain future 
date. Effective relief can only be given if it requires the Secretary of State to treat the 
applicants‘ vessels as entitled to registration under Part II of the Act in direct 
contravention of its provisions. Any such order, unlike any form of order for interim 
relief known to the law, would irreversibly determine in the applicants‘ favour for a 
period of some two years rights which are necessarily uncertain until the preliminary 
ruling of the E.C.J. has been given. If the applicants fail to establish the rights they 
claim before the E.C.J., the effect of the interim relief granted would be to have 
conferred upon them rights directly contrary to Parliament‘s sovereign will and 
correspondingly to have deprived British fishing vessels, as defined by Parliament, of 
the enjoyment of a substantial proportion of the United Kingdom quota of stocks of 
fish protected by the common fisheries policy. I am clearly of the opinion that, as a 
matter of English law, the court has no power to make an order which has these 
consequences.‖238 
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The nature of the application of the applicants also made it impossible for the House of Lords 
to grant interim relief. The applicants‘ had asked that the Secretary of State be restrained 
from enforcing the 1988 Act in respect of them and any vessels owned by them, pending the 
resolution of the substantive case. Their Lordships ruled that prior to the enactment of the 
Crown Proceedings Act 1947, injunctions could not be issued against the Crown and officers 
of the Crown. It held that the combined effect of section 21(2) and 23(2)(b) of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1947 preserved the pre-1947 position. Section 21(2) provided as follows: 
 
―The court shall not in any civil proceedings grant any injunction or make any order 
against an officer of the Crown if the effect of granting the injunction or making the 
order would be to give any relief against the Crown which could not have been 
obtained in proceedings against the Crown.‖ 
 
Section 23(2)(b) defined ―civil proceedings‖ as used in section 21(2) set out above, as 
―proceedings for the enforcement or vindication of any right or the obtaining of any relief 
which, if this Act had not been passed, might have been enforced or vindicated or obtained by 
an action against the Attorney General, any Government department, or any officer of the 
Crown as such;….‖  Their Lordships clearly saw the instant proceedings as coming within 
the purview of section 23(2)(b). Thus, they felt powerless to grant the interim injunction 
sought by the applicants.
239
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However, their Lordships decided, pursuant to Article 177 of the Treaty, to refer to the 
European Court the question whether, irrespective of the position under national law, 
Community law empowered or obliged an English court to suspend national legislation on an 
interim basis if this were necessary to protect putative rights claimed under directly effective 
Community law.
240
  
 
In Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte Factortame Ltd & Others,
241
 
(Factortame I) the European Court answered the above question in the affirmative. It ruled: 
―Community law must be interpreted as meaning that a national court which, in a case before 
it concerning Community law, considers that the sole obstacle which precludes it from 
granting interim relief is a rule of national law must set aside that rule.‖242 
 
Upon receipt of the ruling of the European Court above mentioned, the House of Lords in 
Factortame v Secretary of State for Transport (No2),
243
 granted the interim order, in effect 
suspending on an interim basis, pending the resolution of the substantive claims of the 
applicants under Community law, the operation or enforcement of Part II of the 1988 Act so 
far as it affected the applicants. 
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Meanwhile, the Divisional Court‘s reference to the European Court, concerning the 
substantive issue, (i.e. whether the relevant provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 
violated directly effective Community law), was determined by the European Court in Case 
221/89 (Factortame II). The Court held in essence, that the stipulated conditions for 
registration under the 1988 Act, concerning nationality and residency, violated directly 
effective Community law, in particular, Article 52 of the E.E.C. Treaty, as far as Community 
nationals were concerned. Following this ruling, the Divisional Court made consequential 
declarations in the substantive case, to the effect that the relevant provisions of the 1988 Act 
violated the applicants‘ directly effective Community rights.  
 
Later, the European Court further decided in Factortame III
244
 that, where a national 
legislature breaches an individual‘s directly effective Community right, such an individual 
would be entitled to claim remedies for loss or injury suffered if ―the breach is sufficiently 
serious and there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage sustained by the 
individual(s).‖245 
 
Following the above decision, the Divisional Court
246
 held, amongst others, that the United 
Kingdom‘s breaches of Community law occasioned by the enactment of Part II of the 
Merchant Shipping Act of 1988 ―were sufficiently serious to give rise to liability for any 
damage that may subsequently be shown to have been caused to the applicants.‖247 This 
decision was upheld both by the Court of Appeal
248
 and the House of Lords
249
 (Factortame 
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No.3). Their Lordships ruled that the owners of the fishing vessels whose registration was 
prevented by the deliberate enactment of Part II of the 1988 Act in clear breach of directly 
effective Community rights were entitled to claim compensation for any loss suffered as a 
result.  
 
Although the main issue that was argued in the first Factortame
250
 case that went before the 
House of Lords was whether an interim order could be granted, suspending the operation of 
the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 as it affected the applicants, pending the 
resolution of the substantive matter in the Divisional Court, the significance of the case as it 
concerns the interpretative obligation under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act should not be lost. In 
the first place, the reason the interim order issue was arguable at all was because the 
applicants had a strong point of law in section 2(4) in their argument in the substantive 
matter, that directly effective Community rights to which they were entitled had been violated 
by the 1988 Act. In other words, the application for interim relief was premised on directly 
effective Community rights accruing by virtue of section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act. By 
section 2(4) these rights enjoy supremacy over the inconsistent provisions of the 1988 Act, 
thus rendering the relevant provisions of the 1988 Act invalid or unlawful, at least in the 
context of the 1972 Act. Indeed, it is apparent in the speech of Lord Goff in the second 
Factortame
251
 case, that his Lordship was partly influenced in granting the interim relief 
sought by the applicants, by the considerable strength of their legal challenge to the validity 
of the 1988 Act as it affected them. In any case, since the House of Lords granted interim 
relief in the second Factortame case, in effect suspending the operation of the 1988 Act on 
the basis, amongst others, that it might be in violation of the directly effective Community 
rights of the applicants, it follows that their Lordships took it for granted that the Divisional 
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Court (or the House itself, if necessary) would be required to make a final order disapplying 
the 1988 Act if the applicants succeeded in their substantive claim. 
 
The point made above is implicit in Lord Bridge‘s speech in the first Factortame252 case, 
where he spelt out the interpretative approach to be adopted pursuant to the interpretative 
obligation under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act. His Lordship stated that 
 
―By virtue of section 2(4) of the Act of 1972 Part II of the Act of 1988 is to be 
construed and take effect subject to directly enforceable Community rights and those 
rights are, by section 2(1) of the Act of 1972, to be ‗recognised and available in law, 
and… enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; …‘ This has precisely the same 
effect as if a section were incorporated in Part II of the Act of 1988 which in terms 
enacted that the provisions with respect to registration of British fishing vessels were 
to be without prejudice
253
 to the directly enforceable Community rights of nationals 
of any member state of the E.E.C.‖254 
 
Two things are notable about Lord Bridge‘s adoption of the ―without prejudice‖ rule of 
construction of primary legislation touching on directly applicable Community legislation 
imbued with direct effect.. First, it has to be noted that in the Factortame cases, the meaning 
and effect of the relevant provisions of the 1988 Act were never in doubt. All parties were in 
agreement that the provisions were sufficiently clear and that they had the effect of 
preventing the applicants‘ fishing vessels from being registered as British vessels. The 
statutory words used clearly conveyed the parliamentary intention. There appeared to be no 
absurdity or inconsistency within the four walls of the statute, which would ordinarily 
warrant a search for alternative interpretations of the provisions. Further, adoption of a 
purposive approach
255
 to the interpretation of the provisions would only have confirmed the 
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same parliamentary intention apparent in the statutory words used. In short, there appeared to 
be no doubts whatsoever as to the intention of Parliament in enacting the 1988 Act. 
 
As has been shown earlier in this thesis,
256
 the primary judicial objective of statutory 
interpretation is the ascertainment of parliamentary intention. And the search for Parliament‘s 
intention is ordinarily governed by the words used in the enactment, construed in the context 
in which they have been used. Where the words are clear and unambiguous, and leads to no 
absurdity (as seems to be the case in the Factortame cases), they must be given their ordinary 
and natural meaning. In such a case, a judicial alteration of the relevant statutory provision 
under the guise of interpretation would seem to be unjustified. As has been shown earlier,
257
 
courts are duty-bound to apply the intention of Parliament in fulfillment of the requirements 
of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
Thus, Lord Bridge‘s application of the ―without prejudice‖ rule would seem to relegate 
parliamentary intention to the background. The consequence is that parliamentary intention 
plays a much less significant role in the interpretative process adopted under section 2(4) of 
the 1972 Act. The intention of Parliament in enacting the 1988 Act was given little or no 
weight at all. 
 
The second thing to note about Lord Bridge‘s approach to the interpretative obligation under 
section 2(4) of the 1972 Act is that the ―without prejudice‖ rule of construction apparently 
demanded therein is applicable both to Acts passed after the 1972 Act and to Acts passed 
before the 1972 Act. With regards to Acts of Parliament preceding the 1972 Act, little 
constitutional or interpretative difficulty seems to exist. Normally, the terms of the 1972 Act 
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would override inconsistent provisions of earlier Acts by application of the principle of 
implied repeal.
258
 However, with regards to Acts such as the 1988 Act, passed after the 1972 
Act, application of the ―without prejudice‖ rule of construction by authority of the 1972 Act 
would seem to make the 1972 Act prevail over inconsistent provisions of later Acts. This 
would have the result of breaching the constitutional principle that the courts must obey the 
latest will of Parliament, and the concomitant interpretative principle of implied repeal.  
 
Unfortunately, the judges in the Factortame cases failed to deal specifically with the issues 
raised above. In fact, Mark Elliott has criticised their Lordships for the ―paucity of discussion 
… of the constitutional underpinnings and implications of their recognition of the primacy of 
EC law.‖259 Allan has also made a similar criticism.260 However, these criticisms are 
somewhat unfair taking into consideration the nature of the issue argued before their 
Lordships. As has been noted above, the principal issue that arose for the determination of 
their Lordships, both in the first as well as in the second Factortame cases in the House, was 
the propriety of granting an interim injunction in the circumstances of the matter. The 
primacy of Community law was never an issue in both cases. As a matter of fact, both parties 
were in agreement that the 1972 Act accorded primacy to directly effective Community law. 
The issue was therefore not a subject for argument and was accordingly not argued by the 
parties. In these circumstances, their Lordships could hardly be expected to deal extensively 
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with the constitutional relationship between directly effective Community law and Acts of the 
United Kingdom Parliament.  
 
Nevertheless, Mark Elliott was right in observing that there was a ―paucity of discussions‖ of 
important constitutional issues in the Factortame cases. For instance, it is not clear from the 
speech of Lord Bridge quoted above, whether the ―without prejudice‖ rule is to be perceived 
as some form of substantive rule of law whereby every Act of Parliament, irrespective of the 
strength of Parliamentary intention revealed in it, must be construed as giving way to directly 
applicable Community law in case of a clash between the two; or whether, on the other hand, 
it should be interpreted merely as a rule of construction enabling the court to give priority to 
directly effective Community law over inconsistent provisions in an Act of Parliament unless 
the Act contains a deliberate, express and specific provision unequivocally signifying 
Parliament‘s intention to derogate from directly effective Community law, in which case the 
court would be obliged to obey and apply the Act and ignore the directly effective 
Community law.  
 
The first interpretation above would seem to equate directly effective Community law with a 
written rigid constitution to which every Act must conform if it is not to be ignored or 
disapplied by the courts. This would include Acts containing express derogations from 
directly effective Community law. So far as the United Kingdom remained a member of the 
Community, the courts would enforce directly effective Community law irrespective of 
whatever Parliament enacts. This interpretation is more radical in nature than the second one, 
which sees the ―without prejudice‖ rule in more modest terms. The second interpretation 
above would seem to emphasise the ―without prejudice‖ rule as a formal requirement only, 
whereby Parliament is required to draft legislation intended to breach directly effective 
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Community law, in a manner that leaves no doubt whatsoever as to its intention. Not 
surprisingly therefore, the legal and constitutional implications of the ―without prejudice‖ 
rule propounded by Lord Bridge have been the subject of academic debates and speculations.   
Professor H.W.R. Wade‘s interpretation of the legal and constitutional implications of the 
Factortame cases, and in particular, of Lord Bridge‘s approach to the interpretative obligation 
under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act is to be found in his article written in 1996.
261
 His analysis 
is as follows. 
 
Professor Wade began by observing that the effect of the second Factortame case in the 
House of Lords was that the House granted an injunction forbidding a minister from obeying 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, and in doing this, the House acted on the authority of 
the1972 Act. This, he argued, violated the principle of implied repeal, the rule that the court 
must apply the terms of a later Act of Parliament in preference to conflicting provisions in an 
earlier Act. Wade asserted that the effect of the decision was that the ―Parliament of 1972 had 
succeeded in binding the Parliament of 1988 and restricting its sovereignty, something that 
was supposed to be constitutionally impossible.‖ Sovereignty, he argued, belonged to the 
Parliament of the day. Accordingly, the present Parliament could not be regarded as 
sovereign if its legislative power was fettered by legislation enacted by a previous 
Parliament.
262
 
 
Wade argued that Lord Bridge‘s ―without prejudice‖ rule of construction was more than an 
exercise in construction. Being based on the interpretative obligation contained in section 
2(4) of the 1972 Act, it amounted to a restriction on the legislative power of the 1988 
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Parliament (imposed by the 1972 Parliament), thus infringing on the traditional doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Wade conceded that in theory, Parliament could repeal the 1972 Act and renounce Britain‘s 
membership of the Community. He accepted that in such a situation, the courts would be 
bound to obey the Parliamentary enactment and refuse to apply Community law any further. 
However, Wade distinguished that kind of situation from the present case. He asserted, 
―While Britain remains in the Community we are in a regime in which Parliament has bound 
its successors successfully….‖263 He characterised this as ―a constitutional revolution‖ albeit 
a ―technical‖ one.264 He perceived the 1972 Act as creating a ―higher law‖ (i.e. directly 
effective Community law) to which all Acts of Parliament were subordinated ―for as long as 
British membership continues.‖265 
 
As apparent from Wade‘s analysis of the constitutional implications of the Factortame cases, 
his view of the interpretative obligation under section 2(4) (as revealed by Factortame) is that 
the provisions therein go beyond a mere exercise in construction. The provisions constitute a 
substantive restriction on parliamentary power, applying to all legislation, irrespective of the 
statutory language used. His ―higher law‖ view of Community law in relation to Acts of the 
British Parliament would seem to indicate that British courts have chosen to transfer their 
allegiance to Community law, albeit in a limited scope. This was what Wade himself had 
argued would be constitutionally impossible except by means of a revolution.
266
 Thus, his 
characterisation of the decision in Factortame as a revolution may seem to be an attempt to 
align his argument here with that outlined in his 1955 article. 
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In his 1955 article, Wade had outlined the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty in 
the following words, 
―An orthodox English lawyer, brought up consciously or unconsciously on the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty stated by Coke and Blackstone, and enlarged 
upon by Dicey, could explain it in simple terms. He would say that it meant merely 
that no Act of the sovereign legislature (composed of the Queen, Lords and 
Commons) could be invalid in the eyes of the courts; that it was always open to the 
legislature, so constituted, to repeal any previous legislation whatever; that therefore 
no Parliament could bind its successors; that the legislature had only one process for 
enacting sovereign legislation, whereby it was declared to be the joint act of the 
Crown, Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled. He would probably add that it 
is an invaluable rule that in case of conflict between two Acts of Parliament, the later 
repeals the earlier. If he were then asked whether it would be possible to ―entrench‖ 
legislation – for example, if it should wish to adopt a Bill of Rights which would be 
repealable only by some special safe-guarded process – he would answer that under 
English law this is a legal impossibility: it is easy enough to pass such legislation, but 
since that legislation, like all other legislation, would be repealable by any ordinary 
Act of Parliament the special safeguards would be legally futile. This is merely an 
illustration of the rule that one Parliament cannot bind its successors.‖267  
 
He concluded by characterising Parliament‘s sovereignty as ―continuing,‖ asserting therefore 
that the only limit to Parliament‘s legislative power was that ―it cannot detract from its own 
sovereignty.‖268 
 
Wade accepted that it was always possible for Parliaments to enact legislation aimed at 
curtailing the legislative freedom of successor Parliaments, but he argued that the cases of 
Vauxhall Estates Ltd v Liverpool Corporation
269
 and Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of 
Health
270
 indicated that ―the law-making process was not at the mercy of Parliament for the 
time being, but was guarded by the courts in order that future Parliaments might be 
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unfettered.‖271 Thus, a vital constitutional function of the courts, required by the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, is that they must ensure that the legislative powers of future 
Parliaments remain unfettered by the enactments of previous Parliaments. This, it seems, 
could only be achieved by application of the principle of implied repeal, ensuring that the 
latest will of Parliament is obeyed in preference to any conflicting will manifested in earlier 
parliamentary enactments.  
 
Wade accepted that the rule that the court must obey and apply the latest will of Parliament 
was a rule of the common law, but argued that, unlike other common law rules, this particular 
rule was beyond the reach of statute. In other words, Parliament could not alter the rule by, 
for example, ordering the courts to disobey future parliamentary enactments inconsistent with 
a particular Act of Parliament. Wade sought to buttress his argument by quoting from 
Salmon: 
 
―All rules of law have historical sources. As a matter of fact and history they have 
their origin somewhere, though we may not know what it is. But not all of them have 
legal sources. Were this so, it would be necessary for the law to proceed ad infinitum 
in tracing the descent of its principles. It is requisite that the law should postulate one 
or more first causes, whose operation is ultimate and whose authority is underived…. 
The rule that a man may not ride a bicycle on the footpath may have its source in the 
bye-laws of a municipal council; the rule that these bye-laws have the force of law has 
its source in an Act of Parliament. But whence comes the rule that Acts of Parliament 
have the force of law? This is legally ultimate; its source is historical only, not 
legal…. It is the law because it is the law, and for no other reason that it is possible 
for the law itself to take notice of. No statute can confer this power upon Parliament, 
for this would be to assume and act on the very power that is to be conferred.”272    
 
Seizing upon the words in italics above, Wade argued, ―if no statute can establish the rule that 
the courts obey Acts of Parliament, similarly no statute can alter or abolish that rule. The rule 
is above and beyond the reach of statute….‖ The rule of absolute judicial obedience to the 
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latest will of Parliament, he argued, is the ―ultimate political fact upon which the whole legal 
system of legislation hangs.‖273  
 
It has to be made clear that Wade did not contend that the rule of judicial obedience to the 
latest will of Parliament was always constant and unchangeable. He admitted to the 
possibility of a change to the rule. However, he insisted that it could not be changed by 
statute. It is only the courts, prompted by a revolutionary change in the polity, which could 
effect a change to the rule.
274
 It would appear therefore, that Wade regards Britain‘s 
membership of the Community, with full knowledge of the implications of the new legal 
order, as such a revolutionary political change prompting the courts to alter the rule of 
judicial obedience in areas covered by Community law.  
 
Wade‘s view that the courts were prompted to alter the rule of judicial obedience to the latest 
will of Parliament as a result of the changed political atmosphere of a ―new legal order‖ may 
seem plausible if one were to compare Factortame with the earlier cases of Vauxhall Estates 
Ltd v Liverpool Corporation
275
 and Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health.
276
 In those 
cases, the courts obeyed and applied the inconsistent provisions of the later Act of 1925 
despite very clear provision in the earlier 1919 Act stipulating that all subsequent Acts were 
to be rendered ineffective in so far as they were inconsistent with the terms of the 1919 Act. 
Going by Wade‘s analysis of Factortame, it may be argued that the difference in the judicial 
treatment of Factortame on the one hand, and the two earlier cases on the other hand, is that 
while the 1919 Act was not accompanied by a change in the legal order sufficient to justify a 
                                                 
273
 Ibid. 
  
274
 Ibid, p. 189 
275
 [1932] 1 KB 733 
276
 [1934] All ER 385, [1934] 1 KB 590 
 
138 
 
judicial alteration of the rule of judicial obedience to the latest will of Parliament, the 1972 
Act was so accompanied. This analysis appears to suggest and emphasise the existence of a 
judicial power to alter the rule of judicial obedience as changing political circumstances 
demand.  
Wade‘s radical view that Factortame indicated that the courts‘ would not allow even an 
express and deliberate parliamentary enactment in breach of directly effective Community 
law (as far as the United kingdom remained a member of the Community) enjoys the support 
of writers such as John Eekelaar
277
 
 
However, there are those who criticise this interpretation of Factortame as wrong. This group 
of writers prefers to perceive section 2(4) of the 1972 Act as a rule of interpretation enabling 
the courts to accord primacy to directly effective Community law over all parliamentary 
enactments unless Parliament clearly, expressly and unequivocally states in a subsequent Act 
that that Act is to apply notwithstanding any inconsistency with directly effective Community 
law.
278
 Allan accepts the practical unreality of the possibility of an express enactment in 
breach of directly effective Community law, but insists that as a matter of legal theory, 
British judges must obey any such express breach were it to be enacted by Parliament.
279
  
 
This latter interpretation seems to accord with judicial perceptions of the interpretative 
obligation under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act. The ―without prejudice‖ rule of construction 
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propounded by Lord Bridge, pursuant to the courts‘ interpretative obligation under that 
section, appears to have been counter-balanced by what may be termed the ―notwithstanding 
rule.‖ There are indications from the case law that the courts would obey an Act of 
Parliament containing an express and deliberate provision that the Act is to apply 
notwithstanding any breach of Community law. An inference of this can be drawn from the 
statement of Lord Diplock in Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd.
280
 There, his Lordship 
questioned  
 
―… whether, having regard to the express direction as to the construction of 
enactments ‗to be passed‘ which is contained in section 2 (4), anything short of an 
express positive statement in an Act of Parliament passed after January 1, 1973, 
that a particular provision is intended to be made in breach of an obligation 
assumed by the United Kingdom under a Community treaty,
281
 would justify an 
English court in construing that provision in a manner inconsistent with a Community 
treaty obligation of the United Kingdom, however wide a departure from the prima 
facie meaning of the language of the provision might be needed in order to achieve 
consistency.‖  
 
Apparent in this statement is the notion that the courts would obey an Act of Parliament 
specifically expressed to be intended to apply notwithstanding any inconsistency with 
directly effective Community law. There is no suggestion that the courts‘ obligation to obey 
such an Act would depend upon British withdrawal of membership from the Community. The 
question of withdrawal itself may be seen as a purely political and diplomatic matter divorced 
from the legal and constitutional duty of the courts to carry out the clear and unequivocal will 
of the British Parliament. 
 
The view that the successors of the 1972 Parliament can validly legislate contrary to, and 
notwithstanding any violation of, Community law, if that is made expressly clear, appears to 
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be shared by Lord Denning as well. When considering the interpretative obligation under 
section 2(4) of the 1972 Act, in particular, its relationship with an Act of Parliament, in 
Macarthys v Smith
,282
 his Lordship stated obiter:  
 
―I pause here, however, to make one observation on a constitutional point. Thus far I 
have assumed that our Parliament, whenever it passes legislation, intends to fulfill its 
obligations under the Treaty. If the time should come when our Parliament 
deliberately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any 
provision in it or intentionally of acting inconsistently with it and says so in 
express terms then I should have thought that it would be the duty of our courts 
to follow the statute of our Parliament….283 Unless there is such an intentional and 
express repudiation of the Treaty, it is our duty to give priority to the Treaty.‖  
 
 
Here again, the perceived duty of the courts to obey an Act expressly derogating from 
directly effective Community law seems not be conditional upon United Kingdom‘s 
withdrawal of its membership of the Community. 
 
Lord Justice Laws has also expressed his inclination to the construction view, both in his 
judicial capacity
284
 as well as in his extra-judicial capacity as a writer.
285
 Writing extra-
judicially, the learned Lord Justice stated that 
 
―… section 2(4) of the European Communities Act falls to be treated as establishing a 
rule of construction for later statutes, so that any such statute has to be read (whatever 
its words) as compatible with rights accorded by European law. Sir William Wade 
regards this development as ‗revolutionary‘, because in his view it represents an 
exception to the rule that Parliament cannot bind its successors. But I do not think that 
is right. It is elementary that Parliament possesses the power to repeal the European 
Communities Act in whole or in part…286 and the most that can be said, in my view, 
is that the House of Lords‘ acknowledgement of the force of European law means that 
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the rule of construction implanted by section 2(4) cannot be abrogated by implied 
repeal. Express words would be required.‖287 
 
 
Again, it is apparent that withdrawal of United Kingdom membership is not seen as a pre-
condition for judicial obedience of an express statutory derogation from directly effective 
Community law.  
 
In Thoburn v Sunderland City Counci,l
288
 Laws sought to explain the exclusion of the 
principle of implied repeal by introducing the notion of the ―constitutional statute.‖ The issue 
in the case was whether relevant provisions of the Weights and Measures Act of 1985, which 
permitted the use of imperial measures for the purpose of trade in the United Kingdom, 
superseded the power of a Minister under section 2(2) and (4) of the 1972 Act to issue 
Regulations amending the Weights and Measures Act 1985 so as to prohibit the use of 
imperial measures and impose the use of metric measures in compliance with relevant 
Community Directives.  
 
It was argued by counsel that section 1 of the 1985 Act, which permitted the use of imperial 
measures, must be taken to have impliedly repealed section 2(2) of the 1972 Act, so far as the 
latter provision purports to authorise the adoption of subsidiary legislative measures 
prohibiting the use of imperial measures in trade. This argument seemed to be based on the 
ground that as the 1985 Act was enacted after the 1972 Act, Parliament must be presumed to 
intend that section 2(2) of the 1972 Act would not apply so as to prohibit the use of imperial 
measures permitted by the 1985 Act. 
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Laws, LJ, delivering the judgment of the Administrative Court, held that there was no 
inconsistency between section 1 of the 1985 Act and section 2(2) of the 1972 Act. He went 
further to state that even if the two Acts were inconsistent with each other, the principle of 
implied repeal would not apply to the provisions of the 1972 Act. He drew a distinction 
between what he called ―ordinary statutes‖ and ―constitutional statutes.‖ A ―constitutional 
statute is one which (a) conditions the legal relationship between citizen and state in some 
general, overarching manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now 
regard as fundamental constitutional rights.‖ According to him, while ordinary statutes may 
be impliedly repealed, constitutional statutes may not. The latter may be repealed only by 
express words or by words so specific as to infer an irresistible conclusion of Parliament‘s 
intention to repeal.
289
  
 
These judicial pronouncements indicate that while the courts are prepared to interpret primary 
legislation in a manner that accords primacy to directly effective Community law in case of 
inconsistency between the two, they do not perceive the interpretative obligation under 
section 2(4) of the 1972 Act as enabling them to defy in totality Parliament‘s power to 
deliberately and expressly legislate contrary to Community law. All that the courts require is 
that an intention to repudiate Community obligations must be made abundantly clear. This of 
course requires express words that the Act in question is to apply notwithstanding any 
violation of Community law.  
It is submitted that this approach to the interpretative obligation under section 2(4) of the 
1972 Act is deceptively modest. As Laws pointed out, requiring Parliament to state its 
intention to legislate contrary to and notwithstanding directly effective Community law in 
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express words hardly seems revolutionary.
290
 This requirement may in a sense be equated to 
conventional presumptions of law in the interpretation of statutes touching on fundamental 
rights and access to justice. For example, there is a presumption that general words are not to 
be construed as taking away fundamental rights; fundamental rights could only be abrogated 
by express words or by necessary implication.
291
 Thus, a superficial analysis of the 
construction approach would tend to see section 2(4) of the 1972 Act as merely a formal (as 
opposed to a substantive) restraint on Parliament‘s legislative power to enact laws 
inconsistent with directly effective Community law. 
 
However, it is submitted that this is a view too simplistic to accept as correct. In the first 
place, the comparison made between the interpretative presumption required by section 2(4) 
of the 1972 Act and the conventional interpretative presumptions usually resorted to by the 
courts is misconceived. Conventional presumptions of law operating, for example, in the area 
of fundamental rights, could be defeated by necessary implication of the words used in the 
statute. The same cannot be said of the presumption said to arise from section 2(4) of the 
1972 Act. For instance, the wording of the 1988 Act in the Factortame cases was quite clear 
and capable of defeating conventional presumptions by way of necessary implication. Yet, 
the relevant provisions of the Act were construed without prejudice to directly effective 
Community law. It would seem therefore, as Lord Diplock appeared to suggest,
292
 that 
nothing short of an express and unequivocal statement in an Act, derogating from directly 
effective Community law could defeat the terms of section 2(4) of the 1972 Act.    
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Secondly, the construction view seems to take undue advantage of the practical impossibility 
of Parliament deliberately and expressly enacting legislation intended to violate directly 
effective Community law. It can hardly be doubted that while the United Kingdom remains a 
member of the Community, Parliament would be very much unlikely to seek to repudiate its 
obligations under Community law. The only real probability of Parliament legislating 
contrary to directly effective Community law is by way of implied repeal such as happened in 
the Factortame cases. Since the courts have held that the principle of implied repeal is 
inapplicable to the 1972 Act, the seemingly formal restraint on Parliament‘s legislative power 
operates in reality as a substantive rule, more or less, enabling the courts to disapply 
offending primary legislation. As Craig observed, this approach merely ―serves to preserve 
the formal veneer of Diceyan orthodoxy while undermining its substance.‖293 
 
It is submitted that from whatever perspective one looks at the interpretative obligation under 
section 2(4) of the 1972 Act, it can hardly be denied that the traditional concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty has been affected in a considerable way. The debate as to whether 
the interpretative obligation has enabled the courts to impose substantive restrictions on 
Parliament‘s legislative authority (as Wade294 seems to argue) or that it merely imposes 
formal requirements that could be overcome by express statutory derogations (as Alan
295
 
contends) should not be allowed to becloud the real effect of section 2(4) on the traditional 
Diceyan concept of parliamentary sovereignty. The fact that in the Factortame cases, the 
courts indeed disapplied clear and unambiguous provisions in primary legislation on the 
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ground that they violated directly effective Community law indicates that the traditional 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty is, in the eyes of the courts, no longer as it used to be. 
 
While there appears to be a general consensus amongst the judges that section 2(4) of the 
1972 Act requires them to give priority to directly effective Community law over inconsistent 
provisions in an Act of Parliament, whether passed before or after the 1972 Act, there seems 
to be some difference in approach to the theoretical explanation for the judicial treatment of 
the interpretative obligation. Two distinctive theories can be identified. The first is what one 
may, for purposes of convenience, term the theory of voluntariness. This was formulated by 
Lord Bridge in a passage in his judgment in the second Factortame case: 
―Some public comments on the decision of the Court of Justice, affirming the 
jurisdiction of the courts of member states to override national legislation if necessary 
to enable interim relief to be granted in protection of rights under Community law, 
have suggested that this was a novel and dangerous invasion by a Community 
institution of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. But such comments 
are based on a misconception. If the supremacy within the European Community of 
Community law over the national law of member states was not always inherent in the 
EEC Treaty it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice long before the United Kingdom joined the Community. Thus, whatever 
limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European 
Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary. Under the terms of the 1972 Act it has 
always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when delivering 
final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any 
directly enforceable rule of Community law. Similarly, when decisions of the Court of 
Justice have exposed areas of United Kingdom statute law which failed to implement 
Council directives, Parliament has always loyally accepted the obligation to make 
appropriate and prompt amendments. Thus there is nothing in any way novel in 
according supremacy to rules of Community law in those areas to which they apply 
and to insist that, in the protection of rights under Community law, national courts 
must not be inhibited by rules of national law from granting interim relief in 
appropriate cases is no more than a logical recognition of that supremacy.‖296  
 
Lord Bridge‘s statement above could be interpreted in two ways. First, it could be understood 
to mean that by according priority to directly effective Community law, the courts are merely 
carrying out Parliament‘s wishes, and not in any way challenging Parliament‘s supremacy. 
                                                 
296
 [1991] 1 All ER 70, [1990] 3 WLR 818 
146 
 
The courts accord primacy to directly effective Community law simply because Parliament 
had so directed in section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act. This theoretical approach seeks to 
clothe the judicial treatment of the interpretative obligation contained in section 2(4) with 
―democratic legitimacy.‖297If this approach were to be accepted, the implication would be 
that parliamentary sovereignty could be altered at the whim of Parliament itself. This 
certainly goes against Wade‘s view that ―the law-making process was not at the mercy of 
Parliament for the time being, but was guarded by the courts in order that future Parliaments 
might be unfettered.‖298  
This interpretation of Lord Bridge‘s theory of voluntariness fails to recognise a distinction 
between the 1972 Parliament that voluntarily accepted the terms of membership of the 
Community, and its successor Parliaments. This distinction is important. An essential feature 
of the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty is that sovereignty belongs to the 
present Parliament. Therefore, whether the 1972 Parliament voluntarily accepted the terms of 
Community membership should be immaterial to the application of the rule that the courts 
must obey the latest will of Parliament. 
 
It is perhaps for these difficulties associated with this interpretation of Lord Bridge‘s theory 
of voluntariness that Alan has argued that the theory must be confined to the context in which 
it was propounded. In other words, it should not be taken as a general rule that whenever 
Parliament voluntarily accepts a limitation of its sovereignty, the courts must dutifully carry 
out its instructions. Alan argues that voluntary acceptance of limits to parliamentary authority 
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should depend on the circumstances; courts must weigh the reasons for and against such 
limits and decide accordingly.
299
 
 
Lord Bridge‘s theory of voluntariness could be interpreted in another way. Parliament‘s 
voluntary acceptance of the terms of membership of the Community, with full knowledge of 
the constitutional implications, is to be seen as constituting a binding contract from which 
Parliament could not resile while remaining a member of the Community. This interpretation 
places greater emphasis on the role of the court than the previous interpretation. By this 
interpretation, British courts appear to be enforcers of the international agreement entered 
into by the British Government and Parliament. For as long as the United Kingdom remains a 
member of the Community, the courts would be duty-bound to accord priority to directly 
effective Community law over United Kingdom Acts of Parliament in accordance with 
Community legal principles. Thus, Acts of Parliament, pre or post-European Communities 
Act, would always be interpreted in a manner that accords supremacy to directly effective 
Community law notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Act. To put it more 
bluntly, this interpretation of the theory would suggest that not even an express repudiation of 
the terms of section 2(4) of the 1972 Act would be effective to dislodge the interpretative 
obligation if the United Kingdom remained a member of the Community.
300
 It would seem 
that the only time the courts would cease to give priority to directly effective Community law 
would be when the United Kingdom formally withdraws its membership of the Community. 
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While this interpretation accords with the European view of the pre-conditions of 
membership,
301
 it is submitted that it lacks sound constitutional basis within the domestic 
constitutional framework of the United Kingdom. There is no constitutional basis for the 
court acting as an enforcer of international agreements in the manner suggested by the 
interpretation. Traditionally, Parliament‘s legislative authority extends to breaking 
international Treaties. In construing statutes, while the courts may proceed on the 
presumption that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary to the terms of an 
international Treaty, nevertheless, they must obey clear and unequivocal statutory provisions 
contravening those terms.
302
   
 
Furthermore, this interpretation conflicts with other judicial dicta suggesting that the courts 
would be bound to obey an express and deliberate repudiation of the terms of section 2(4) of 
the 1972 Act notwithstanding United Kingdom‘s continued membership of the 
Community.
303
 
 
It is observed that neither of the interpretations above is in tune with hitherto available 
judicial precedents on the sovereignty of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Both 
interpretations have the effect of altering the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
The concept seems not to be seen any more as constant and unchanging. It appears to have 
been re-conceptualised as a principle that could be altered as the changing political landscape 
demands.  
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The second theoretical explanation for the judicial treatment of section 2(4) of the 1972 Act 
is contained in the common law theory propounded by Lord Justice Laws. In Thoburn v 
Sunderland City Council,
304
 Laws contended that it was constitutionally impossible for the 
Community institutions or Parliament itself to entrench Community law and make Acts of 
Parliament subject to directly effective Community legislation. The sovereignty of the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom could not be altered by either of the above entities. He 
contended that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was rooted in the common law. 
Therefore, if the doctrine were to be altered, it would be altered, not by Parliament or the 
Community institutions, but by the common law. He asserts that the common law has now 
altered it. In his words: 
 
―Parliament cannot bind its successors by stipulating against repeal, wholly or partly, 
of the 1972 Act. It cannot stipulate as to the manner and form of any subsequent 
legislation. It cannot stipulate against implied repeal any more than it can stipulate 
against express repeal. Thus there is nothing in the 1972 Act which allows the Court 
of Justice, or any other institutions of the EU, to touch or qualify the conditions of 
Parliament's legislative supremacy in the United Kingdom. Not because the 
legislature chose not to allow it; because by our law it could not allow it. That being 
so, the legislative and judicial institutions of the EU cannot intrude upon those 
conditions. The British Parliament has not the authority to authorise any such thing. 
Being sovereign, it cannot abandon its sovereignty. Accordingly there are no 
circumstances in which the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice can elevate 
Community law to a status within the corpus of English domestic law to which it 
could not aspire by any route of English law itself. This is, of course, the traditional 
doctrine of sovereignty. If it is to be modified, it certainly cannot be done by the 
incorporation of external texts. The conditions of Parliament's legislative supremacy 
in the United Kingdom necessarily remain in the United Kingdom's hands. But the 
traditional doctrine has in my judgment been modified. It has been done by the 
common law, wholly consistently with constitutional principle.‖305 
 
According to Laws
306
, the common law has modified the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty in the following way. The common law has now created an exception to the 
concomitant principle of implied repeal, which enables and obliges the court to obey and 
                                                 
304
 [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] QB 151 
305
 Ibid. See paragraph 59 of the judgment 
306
 Ibid. See generally paragraphs 60-64 of the judgment 
150 
 
apply the latest Act of Parliament over earlier enactments found to be inconsistent with it. He 
asserts that there are now classes of statutes that cannot be repealed by implication; they can 
only be repealed by express words. These statutes he termed ―constitutional statutes.‖ 
According to him, ―a constitutional statute is one which (a) conditions the legal relationship 
between citizen and State in some general, overarching manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes 
the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental constitutional rights.‖ The European 
Communities Act is such a constitutional statute. He distinguishes these from ―ordinary 
statutes‖ which can be repealed by implication. The power to classify a statute as a 
―constitutional statute‖, thus immunising it from implied repeal, belongs to the court and the 
court only. Ultimately therefore, it falls to judges to determine whether in any given case, the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty should be modified, and to what extent it should be so 
modified. Indeed, Laws asserts that ―the scope and nature of parliamentary sovereignty are 
ultimately confided‖ in the courts.307 
 
Lord Justice Laws‘ common law theory bears some semblance with Wade‘s308 conception of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Both share the notion that although the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty is a rule of the common law, it cannot be altered by statute. The doctrine is 
beyond the reach of Parliament. Parliament cannot alter the rule that the courts must obey the 
latest Act of Parliament. The doctrine is, in the words of Wade, ―in the keeping of the 
courts.‖309 They both contend that it is the courts, and the courts only, that can ultimately 
determine the validity or otherwise of an Act of Parliament. Finally, both are agreeable to the 
notion that the courts could alter the doctrine. 
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However, their views differ as to how the alteration of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty may come about. Wade perceives the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as 
―the ultimate political fact upon which the whole system of legislation hangs.‖310 Thus, an 
alteration of the doctrine could only be brought about by a revolutionary change to the 
existing political reality. This change may either be violent and abrupt, or it may be peaceful 
and negotiated. The manner in which the change occurs is immaterial. The important thing is 
that the courts may come to recognise the emergent political fact and act upon it ―without any 
legal justification.‖311 For Wade, the Factortame cases indicated a political reaction to the 
new legal order (the emergent political fact). The judges recognised the new legal order and 
accorded supremacy to directly effective Community law over domestic legislation. In doing 
so, they acted without precedent and without any legal justification.
312
  
 
But for Lord Justice Laws, it is consistent with constitutional principle for the courts to be 
able to alter or modify the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty without the requirement of a 
revolutionary change in the political reality. The doctrine is a creature of the common law. 
Just like any other rule of common law, it is within the power of the courts to continually 
examine its applicability in light of contemporary constitutional developments. It would 
appear therefore, that for Lord Justice Laws, Factortame merely indicated that, considering 
the associated contemporary constitutional developments, it was ripe for the judges to modify 
the doctrine in the manner they did. 
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As can be seen above, Laws‘ common law theory is fundamentally different from the first 
interpretation of Lord Bridge‘s theory of voluntariness given above.313 Lord Bridge‘s theory 
places more emphasis on the role of Parliament in seeking to conform to the new legal order 
imposed by membership of the Community. It tends to portray the courts as merely acting on 
the instructions of Parliament. By this, responsibility for any resultant modification of the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty lies with Parliament, not the courts.  
 
On the other hand, Laws‘ theory places more emphasis on the role of the court in developing 
common law rules, including the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
314
 In fact, Laws 
denies Parliament any role in determining the scope and extent of its own legislative 
authority. Parliamentary sovereignty is controlled by the common law. The common law is 
itself developed and shaped by the courts over time. Modifications to the doctrine can only 
occur by a change in relevant rules of the common law as determined by the courts. Thus, for 
Laws, the determination of the scope and extent of Parliament‘s legislative authority is a 
function of the courts.  
 
The idea, put forward by Laws, that although the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a 
rule of common law, it is nevertheless beyond the reach of Parliament, is difficult to justify. 
Laws offers no explanation why Parliament could alter all other rules of common law but not 
the rule of absolute judicial obedience to the latest will of Parliament over earlier inconsistent 
enactments. Moreover, it is difficult to run away from the reality that the judicial 
modification of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, as seen in the Factortame cases, 
was prompted by the statutory directive contained in section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act. It 
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is unlikely that without such a directive contained in the Act, the courts would have accorded 
priority to directly effective Community law over Acts of Parliament. Therefore, to deny 
Parliament any role in the resultant modification of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
seems to be equivalent to closing ones eyes to reality. 
 
Laws‘ theoretical explanation for the judicial treatment of section 2(4) of the 1972 Act 
challenges the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty in one way, but at the same 
time appears to constitute an attempt to reconcile the traditional concept with the apparently 
irreconcilable European principle of the supremacy of directly effective Community law.  
 
By traditional accounts, parliamentary sovereignty is conceptualised as constant and 
unchanging. It can be changed neither by Parliament nor by the judges. However, going by 
Laws theory, parliamentary sovereignty is seen as a common law rule subject to evolutionary 
change. Indeed, Laws made this clear when he remarked (in the context of fundamental 
rights) that the evolutionary process had already gone midway.
315
 In his words, 
 
―Not very long ago, the British system was one of parliamentary supremacy pure and 
simple. Then, the very assertion of constitutional rights as such would have been 
something of a misnomer, for there was in general no hierarchy of rights, no 
distinction between ‗constitutional‘ and other rights. Every Act of Parliament had the 
same standing in law as every other, and so far as rights were given by judge-made 
law, they could offer no competition to the status of statutes. The courts evolved rules 
of interpretation which favoured the protection of certain basic freedoms, but in 
essence Parliament legislated uninhibited by claims of fundamental rights. 
 
―In its present state of evolution, the British system may be said to stand at an 
intermediate stage between parliamentary supremacy and constitutional 
supremacy….‖316  
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Thus, for Laws, a time may well come when parliamentary sovereignty may have no 
substance at all. 
 
However, viewed from another perspective, Laws theory could be seen as an attempt to 
reconcile the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty with the practical reality of the 
primacy of directly effective Community law over national law. By acknowledging that 
Parliament could in theory derogate from the terms of section 2(4) of the 1972 Act, 
parliamentary sovereignty is sustained. On the other hand, by imposing formal requirements 
on the manner in which Parliament must legislate if it intended to derogate from directly 
effective Community law (i.e. by requiring Parliament to use express words that a statutory 
provision is intended to apply notwithstanding section 2(4) of the 1972 Act), coupled with the 
practical unfeasibility of this, priority is given to directly effective Community law. As Mark 
Elliot observes, Laws‘ theory ―preserves the formal veneer of parliamentary sovereignty 
while, for all practical purposes, ascribing priority to the law of the European Union.‖317 
 
The totality of the Factortame series of cases is indicative of the fact that judges in the United 
Kingdom now perceive themselves as having the authority to disapply a provision of an Act 
of Parliament that is found to violate directly effective Community rights. The cases, in 
particular, the one concerning the award of damages, indicate that the courts in the United 
Kingdom could, as a matter of law, penalise the Government of the United Kingdom even in 
respect of acts authorised by primary legislation where such legislation is found to be in 
violation of directly effective Community rights.  
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The significance of the Factortame series of cases is that legal grounds could now exist for 
challenging the validity of an Act of Parliament. Thus, Lord Keith was able to assert in 
Regina v Secretary of State for Employment, Ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission & 
Another
318
 that in Factortame, ―provisions of United Kingdom primary legislation were held 
to be invalid in their purported application to nationals of member states of the European 
Economic Community.‖ The ―without prejudice‖ rule of interpretation of statutes touching on 
directly effective Community law has come to be well accepted by United Kingdom judges. 
The EOC case concerned provisions of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. 
The Act made provisions
319
 protecting the right of workers not to be unfairly dismissed, and 
also provided for the right to compensation for unfair dismissal and for statutory redundancy 
pay. The Act imposed conditions that must be met by various categories of employees before 
they could lay claim to the benefits of the relevant provisions. Thus, employees who work for 
16 hours or more per week could invoke the relevant provisions only if they had been in 
continuous employment for at least two years. Those who work for between 8 and 16 hours 
per week must have been in continuous employment for at least five years. Employees who 
work for less than 8 hours per week were not entitled to the rights provided by the Act. 
 
It was common ground that the vast majority of those working 16 hours or more per week 
were men, and that the vast majority of those working less than 16 hours per week were 
women.  
 
In the circumstance, the Equal Opportunities Commission
320
 contended that the provisions 
discriminated against women in that women were treated less favourably than men, contrary 
to Community law. It therefore sought a declaration that the United Kingdom was in breach 
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of its obligations under Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome and the Equal Pay Directive,
321
 
which required it to enact measures securing equal treatment between men and women in all 
aspects of employment. 
 
Lord Keith, who delivered the lead judgment of the House of Lords, with which the 
majority
322
 of their Lordships agreed, cited Factortame as precedent for the action of the 
Commission.  
 
There was no question of any ambiguity in the statutory provisions concerned. The provisions 
were clear and precise in their effect. The issue was whether the clear and unambiguous 
statutory provisions could stand in the face of directly effective Community obligations with 
which they were incompatible. The Commission was thus relying on, and asserting the 
principle that directly effective Community law takes priority, and thus overrides the 
statutory provisions in respect of which it complains.  
 
Following Factortame, the House declared that the statutory provisions in question were 
incompatible with obligations under the Treaty and the Directive mentioned above. 
The real effect of this judgment was not expressly made clear by their Lordships. The relief 
sought was for a declaration only. However, it would appear that a woman adversely affected 
by the provisions so declared by the House to be incompatible with Community law could 
invite the court, on the basis of the EOC case, to ignore so much of the provisions of the 1978 
Act as are incompatible with her rights under Community law. Effectively, this amounts to an 
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application of the ―without prejudice‖ rule of interpretation propounded by Lord Bridge in 
the first Factortame case.
323
 
 
The EOC case could therefore be seen as authority for the proposition that, in a relevant case, 
the provisions of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 are to be applied by a 
court of law without prejudice to the directly effective Community rights of women not to be 
sexually discriminated against in employment. In this way, the court would be fulfilling its 
interpretative obligation under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act. 
 
A further demonstration of the ―without prejudice‖ rule is to be found in Imperial Chemical 
Industries Plc v Colmer (Inspector of Taxes).
324
 The case involved the construction of 
provisions of section 258 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970. A company could 
claim consortium tax relief if it is a holding company within the meaning of section 
258(5)(b), which defined a holding company as ―a company the business of which consists 
wholly or mainly in the holding of shares or securities of companies which are its 90 per cent 
subsidiaries, and which are trading companies….‖ Section 258(7) then provided that 
references to ―a company‖ as used in section 258(5) and other relevant sections of the Act 
applied to companies resident in the United Kingdom. The result is that for a holding 
company to qualify for consortium tax relief under the Act, its subsidiary companies must be 
companies resident in the United Kingdom. It meant therefore that a holding company could 
not, under the Act, claim consortium tax relief in respect of its subsidiary companies resident 
in a Member State of the Community other than the United Kingdom.  
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Acknowledging that the plain interpretation of the provisions might violate the directly 
effective Community rights of companies resident within the Community, in particular, the 
rights of establishment under Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty, the House, relying on the 
dictum of Lord Bridge in Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport,
325
 held that  
 
―the effect of section 2 of the 1972 Act is the same as if a subsection were 
incorporated in section 258 of the 1970 Act which in terms enacted that the definition 
of ‗holding company‘ was to be without prejudice to the directly enforceable 
Community rights of companies established in the Community.‖326 
 
This approach meant that in spite of the clear and unambiguous provisions concerning the 
residency condition in section 258 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970, courts are 
not to apply them if doing so would violate directly effective Community rights. The 
interpretative obligation under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act enabled courts to disregard 
primary legislation for the purpose of protecting directly effective Community rights. Thus in 
Autologic Holdings Plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners,
327
 Lord Nicholls was able to say, 
with reference to the interpretative obligation under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act, that courts 
were ―obliged to give effect to all directly enforceable Community rights notwithstanding the 
terms of section 402(3A) and (3B) and 413(5) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act.‖328  
 
It is observed that in Factortame, the Community measure concerned was one that was 
directly applicable and thus imbued with automatic direct effect. In cases where Parliament 
has enacted legislation intended to implement, supplement or otherwise deal with Community 
obligations arising under a Directive, the interpretative approach adopted by the courts appear 
to be slightly different from that seen in Factortame, although ultimately, the end-result 
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remained the same; that is, according priority to directly effective Community law over 
inconsistent domestic legislation. In Factortame, the judges simply ignored the effect of the 
offending piece of primary legislation, or disapplied it as it affected the directly applicable 
Community rights of the applicants. However, in cases where the courts find that the 
domestic legislation in question was enacted for the purpose of fulfilling Community 
obligations under a Directive adjudged to have direct effect, they appear to adopt a purposive 
approach to interpretation, which enables them to judicially modify otherwise clear and 
unambiguous provisions in the legislation, in order to ensure compliance with the purpose of 
the Directive. The courts in the United Kingdom take this approach in all cases in which the 
provisions of a Directive capable of having direct effect is found relevant in legal proceedings 
before them.  
 
Pickstone v Freemans Plc
329
 appears to be the leading case on the purposive approach to 
interpretation under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act. The relevant statutory provisions in 
Pickstone were section 1(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the Equal Pay Act of 1970 as amended. Section 
1(1) of the Act inserts an ―equality clause‖ in the employment contract of every woman 
where none is included in such a contract. Section 1(2) states the effect of this statutorily 
inserted equality clause. It ensured that every woman is treated on equal terms with her male 
colleagues in the same employment. Section 1(2)(a) provided: 
―(2) An equality clause is a provision which relates to terms (whether concerned with 
pay or not) of a contract under which a woman is employed (the ―woman's contract‖), 
and has the effect that— 
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(a) where the woman is employed on like work with a man in the same 
employment—330 
(i) if (apart from the equality clause) any term of the woman's contract is or becomes 
less favourable to the woman than a term of a similar kind in the contract under which 
that man is employed, that term of the woman's contract shall be treated as so 
modified as not to be less favourable, and 
(ii) if (apart from the equality clause) at any time the woman's contract does not 
include a term corresponding to a term benefiting that man included in the contract 
under which he is employed, the woman's contract shall be treated as including such a 
term;‖ 
 
The statutory protections contained in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of paragraph (a) above 
similarly applied in any case falling under paragraph (b), that is: 
―(b) where the woman is employed on work rated as equivalent with that of a man in 
the same employment—…‖331 
 
The same protections were extended to cases falling under paragraph (c), that is 
―(c) where a woman is employed on work which, not being work in relation to 
which paragraph (a) or (b) above applies, is, in terms of the demands made on 
her (for instance under such headings as effort, skill and decision), of equal value 
to that of a man in the same employment—…‖332 
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As can be seen, there were three instances in which a woman could claim the statutory 
protection offered by the equality clause provided for by the Equal Pay Act 1970. The first 
concerned cases where the woman was employed in like work with a333 man. In such a case, 
any unfavourable discrepancy in entitlements in relation to her male colleague must be made 
good.  
 
The second instance concerned cases where the woman was employed in work that had been 
rated, in accordance with section 1(5) of the Equal Pay Act 1970, as equivalent with that of 
a334 man in the same employment. Here again, the woman was entitled to the same statutory 
protection if she were put in any disadvantaged position in relation to her male colleague. 
 
The third instance was where the woman was engaged in work of equal value to that of a man 
in the same employment. Here again, she was entitled to the same statutory protection offered 
by the equality clause.  
 
The third instance, unlike the first and second instances, contained an exclusionary 
expression. A woman could claim under paragraph (c) only if (or only when) neither of the 
instances set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) applied. The operative words were ―…not being 
work in relation to which paragraph (a) or (b) above applies….‖   
 
Freemans Plc was a mail order company. The assumed facts of the case were that the 
company had in its employment two categories of workers relevant to the case. These were 
warehouse operatives and checker warehouse operatives. There were both male and female 
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workers in each category. That is, there were male and female warehouse operatives as well 
as male and female checker warehouse operatives. 
 
The applicants were female warehouse operatives. They alleged that a Mr. Phillips who was a 
checker warehouse operative was being paid a higher wage than they were paid. They further 
alleged that their work was of equal value with the work of Mr. Phillips within the meaning 
of section 1(2)(c) of the Equal Pay Act 1970 as amended. According to them, the difference 
in pay was essentially due to sex discrimination. They therefore claimed equal pay with Mr. 
Phillips. 
 
The matter went before an Industrial Tribunal. The applicants lost. An appeal to the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal was also unsuccessful. The applicants further appealed to the 
Court of Appeal. 
 
Before the lower tribunals, the employers, Freemans Plc, contended that the applicants were 
barred from claiming under section 1(2)(c) of the Equal Pay Act 1970 because they were 
engaged in like work with a man (though not with Mr. Phillips) within the meaning of 
paragraph (a) of the same subsection. This was the case since paragraph (c) excluded any 
case to which paragraph (a) or (b) applied. 
On the other hand, the applicants contended that paragraph (c) would exclude them from 
claiming only if they were engaged in like work, not with just any man, but with Mr. Phillips 
with whom they had compared themselves. Accordingly, since they were not engaged in like 
work with Mr. Phillips, they were entitled to claim equal pay with Mr. Phillips under 
paragraph (c). 
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The main issue before the Court of Appeal therefore, was whether the exclusionary words 
contained in paragraph (c) of the relevant subsection operated to exclude a woman who 
claimed equal pay with a man doing work of equal value with her when there was in fact 
another man doing like work with her and being paid the same wages as she was being paid. 
 
The entire case depended upon the construction of the above exclusionary words. The 
question was whether the words operated to exclude the applicants from claiming under 
paragraph (c) as they were engaged in like work with a male warehouse operative even 
though that male warehouse operative was different from Mr. Phillips in respect of whom 
they made their complaint. The employers argued that paragraphs (a) and (b) referred to ―a 
man‖ and that by the ordinary principle of interpretation, this meant any man, not necessarily 
the man with whom a woman compares herself. It followed therefore, that since the 
applicants were engaged in like work with a male warehouse operative and was being paid 
the same wages as he was being paid, they were barred or excluded from claiming under 
paragraph (c) no matter the merits of their complaint in respect of their chosen comparator. 
 
As originally enacted, section 1(2) of the Equal Pay Act 1970 was without paragraph (c). 
Only paragraphs (a) and (b) were provided for. That meant that a woman could invoke the 
statutory protection offered by the equality clause provided by section 1(1) of the Act in two 
instances only. First, where she was engaged in like work with a male colleague, she could 
invoke the statutory protection. She could also do the same where she was engaged in work 
that had been rated as equivalent with that of a male colleague under a job evaluation study 
undertaken by her employer. She had no protection outside of these instances. 
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The practical effect of the law at that time was that a woman who was engaged in different 
work, but work of equal value with a man, could be paid less wages than a man so far as the 
employer undertook no job evaluation study to determine that the two jobs were of equivalent 
status in terms of demands.  
 
It must be noted that at the time the Equal Pay Act 1970 was originally enacted, no 
Community law implications existed since the United Kingdom had not been admitted into 
the Community. However, with the entry of the United Kingdom into the Community on 01 
January 1973, the country became bound to comply with the provisions of Article 119 of the 
Treaty of Rome, which guaranteed the principle of equal pay for men and women throughout 
the Community, and required the Member States to ensure its application within their 
domestic legal systems.   
 
The principle of equal pay, as embodied in Article 119, is broad and seeks to eliminate all 
forms of pay discrimination based on sex. It says: 
 
―Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the 
application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal 
work. 
For the purpose of this Article, " pay " means the ordinary basic or minimum wage or 
salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker 
receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment from his employer. 
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means: 
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the basis of the 
same unit of measurement 
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(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job.‖ 
 
In 1975, the Council of the European Communities adopted Council Directive 
75/117/E.E.C.335 The Directive disapproved of existing differences in the implementation of 
the Equal Pay Provisions of the Treaty amongst Member States and directed Member States 
to take measures to fully implement the principle. Article 1 of the Directive is of particular 
importance. It asserted that the Equal Pay Principle contained in Article 119 required the 
elimination of all forms of sexual discrimination in employment. It says: 
 
"The principle of equal pay for men and women outlined in article 119 of the Treaty, 
hereafter called 'principle of equal pay,' means, for the same work or for work to 
which equal value is attributed, the elimination of all
336
 discrimination on grounds of 
sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration.‖ 
 
One can clearly see that Article 119, as explained by the Equal Pay Directive, was meant to 
eliminate all forms of employment discrimination based on sex. Therefore, under Community 
law, no exception was to be allowed for sexual discrimination in employment. Once it is 
found that an existing discrimination is based on sex, Community law enables the aggrieved 
person to seek remedy. 
 
At this juncture, it is important to compare the rights of a woman with respect to sexual 
discrimination under the then existing United Kingdom law on the one hand, and Community 
law on the other hand. This is necessary because, as mentioned earlier, in construing the 
exclusionary words in contention, the court has to use the effect of the directly applicable 
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Community obligation as a controlling guide, and must ensure that the Community obligation 
prevails over any inconsistent provision contained in the domestic legislation.   
 
It would appear from the wording of the above paragraphs (a) and (b) that a woman would 
not be able to claim equal pay with a man whose work was different, (in the sense that it was 
not of like work with the woman‘s) but was of equal value with her work, if it was the fact 
that there was a man who did like work with the woman and received the same pay as her.  
 
Again, under the Act, a woman who was not engaged in like work with a man in accordance 
with paragraph (a) above could invoke the equality clause only if a job evaluation study 
(carried out pursuant to section 1(5) of the Act) had rated her work as equivalent to the work 
of the man with whom she compared herself. The job evaluation study could only be carried 
out with the consent of her employer. It meant therefore, that in practice, a woman could be 
effectively denied any remedy where no such job evaluation study was carried out even 
though it was quite clear that the two jobs concerned were of equivalent value. 
 
On the other hand, Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, as well as the Equal Pay Directive, 
were meant to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on sex. The prohibition was meant 
to be total. There were to be no permitted instances of discrimination based on sex. A woman 
was entitled to equal pay for like work as well as for work of equal value. She could claim 
equal pay with a man engaged in work of equal value even if some man was at the same time 
engaged in like work with her and was receiving the same pay as her. In other words, a 
woman‘s claim to equal pay was not to be restricted to that of a man doing like work as her. 
It was also not to be dependent on a job evaluation study that could only be carried out with 
the consent of the very employer against whom she would be seeking the remedy. 
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While the United Kingdom Government felt that the above provisions of the Equal Pay Act 
1970, as then amended by the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, were adequate and duly 
fulfilled her obligations under Article 119 and the Equal Pay Directive, the Commission of 
the Community had a contrary view. The Commission felt that United Kingdom legislation 
did not go far enough in ensuring the elimination of all forms of discrimination based on sex. 
In particular, it felt that a woman should be able to seek remedy even without a system of job 
evaluation, for all forms of sexual discrimination in employment.
337
  
 
Consequently, the Commission filed proceedings against the United Kingdom before the 
European Court
338
 seeking a declaration that the United Kingdom had failed to fulfill its 
obligation under the Equal Pay Directive to adopt legislation ensuring the application of the 
Principle of Equal Pay for men and women.   
 
The European Court found that under the existing domestic legislation, a woman who alleged 
that she was engaged in work of equal value with a man could not obtain remedy for sex 
discrimination in the absence of a job evaluation study that could only be carried out with the 
consent of her employer. It decided that this was unacceptable. It ruled that an independent 
Authority should be able to determine the issue of ―equal value‖ of the jobs being compared 
so as to enable an aggrieved individual to pursue equal pay claims even in the absence of a 
job evaluation scheme. 
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Accordingly, the Court declared that the United Kingdom had failed to fulfill its obligation 
under Article 119 to ensure the application of the Principle of Equal Pay, as aggrieved 
persons were unable to pursue equal pay claims under the Equal Pay Act 1970 without the 
requisite job evaluation study.  
 
One significant implication of the decision is that the scope of the Principle of Equal Pay is 
quite wide. It was meant to eliminate all forms of sexual discrimination without exceptions. 
There should be no grounds for excluding a woman from legal protection whenever it could 
be proved that she did work of equal value with a man.    
 
Following the decision of the European Court, the United Kingdom introduced an 
amendment to section 1(2) of the Equal Pay Act 1970 intended to comply with the decision. 
This was the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983.
339
 Regulation 2 introduced a new 
paragraph (c) set out earlier. This was to enable a woman who claimed that she was engaged 
in work of equal value with a man in the same employment to invoke the equality clause in 
the absence of a job evaluation study. 
 
In the Court of Appeal, the judges were unanimous that the provisions of paragraph (c) were 
clear and unambiguous.
340
They ruled that by the ordinary principles of interpretation, the 
exclusionary words contained in the paragraph operated to exclude the applicants from 
claiming under the paragraph because of the fact that they were engaged in like work with a 
man in accordance with paragraph (a). 
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All the judges acknowledged that the European Principle of Equal Pay as outlined both in the 
Treaty and the Equal Pay Directive had direct effect and could be relied upon by the 
applicants independently of the Equal Pay Act 1970. 
  
However, the judges differed on the way they approached the interpretative obligation under 
section 2(4) of the 1972 Act. Nicholls, LJ, while admitting that paragraph (c) failed to cure 
the mischief that it was intended to cure and that the paragraph did not go far enough as 
required by Community law, held nevertheless, that paragraph (c) ought to be left as it was. 
He said, 
 
―…given that the exclusionary words are unambiguous and are not reasonably 
capable of the meaning which would carry out the United Kingdom's treaty 
obligations in this field, for my part, as at present advised, I have great difficulty in 
seeing how the effect of section 2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972 in such 
a case can be to require the English court, nevertheless, to ascribe some other, 
artificial meaning to those words.‖ 
 
For Lord Justice Nicholls (as he then was), it would appear that the courts are not obliged, 
under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act, to interpret legislation compatibly with directly applicable 
Community law if the legislative provision in question is clear and unambiguous. To him, 
this is the case even if the unambiguous provision appears to fall short of the requirements of 
directly applicable Community law. The interpretative obligation under section 2(4) would 
only be activated if the legislative provision were ambiguous and perhaps capable of both a 
meaning compatible with Community law and a meaning incompatible with Community law. 
 
With utmost respect to Nicholls, LJ, this approach cannot be right. The significance of the 
interpretative obligation under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act is that it enables the court to 
interpret domestic legislation in a manner that accords priority to directly applicable 
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Community law. There is nothing in section 2(4), either expressly or by necessary 
implication, which restricts the application of the interpretative obligation contained therein 
to only situations where the domestic legislation is ambiguous. The directive to construe 
legislation compatibly with directly applicable Community law is emphatic. It says such 
legislation ―shall be construed and have effect subject to‖ directly applicable Community 
law.  
 
The directive contained in section 2(4) of the 1972 Act appears to go even further than that 
contained in section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.
341
 There, the courts are directed to 
construe legislation compatibly with the Convention rights ―so far as it is possible to do so.‖ 
There is no such qualifying clause in section 2(4) of the 1972 Act.  
 
As a matter of law, where the provisions of domestic legislation are ambiguous, the ordinary 
principles of interpretation would be sufficient to take care of the situation. In that case, the 
interpretative principle that Parliament is presumed not to legislate in breach of its 
international obligations could be relied upon to construe the legislation compatibly with the 
international obligations.
342
  
 
It is submitted therefore, that the interpretative obligation under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act 
may require a court to construe inconsistent domestic legislation compatibly with directly 
effective Community law even if the resultant interpretation may depart from the 
unambiguous provisions of the offending legislation. In short, section 2(4) authorises judicial 
amendment of inconsistent domestic legislation for the limited purpose of ensuring 
compliance with directly applicable Community law. 
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Thus, Purchas, LJ, was able to say in the instant case, that by virtue of section 2(4) of the 
1972 Act, the court could construe section 1(2) of the Equal Pay Act 1970 compatibly with 
the directly effective Community obligation by ―inserting the words necessary to achieve a 
result that is not inconsistent with Community law.‖ According to him, ―this could be 
achieved by amending the relevant part of section 1(2)(c) to read ‗… not being work which 
can more fairly be compared under paragraph (a) or (b) above.‘‖ 
 
Admittedly, ―this involves an otherwise unjustifiable qualification of what are in fact clear 
words.‖343 Nevertheless, this is authorised by section 2(4) of the 1972 Act. 
 
On appeal to the House of Lords, their Lordships
344
 endorsed the approach of Purchas on the 
section 2(4) issue. Lord Templeman expressed the opinion that words must be implied into 
the provisions of paragraph (c) to make it consistent with Community law. Lord Oliver 
observed that this involved ―departure from a number of well-established rules of 
construction‖ being that the legislative provisions under scrutiny were clear and 
unambiguous. However, he expressed the view that it was justified by section 2 of the 1972 
Act. 
 
It is submitted that the approach taken by their Lordships is a correct application of the 
interpretative obligation required by section 2(4) of the 1972 Act. Pickstone v Freemans can 
be seen as authority for the proposition that courts can judicially amend provisions in an Act 
of Parliament enacted specifically to implement Community obligations if this were 
necessary for the purpose of ensuring full compliance with directly effective Community 
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obligations. In such a case, it is immaterial that the statutory provision in question is clear and 
unambiguous in the sense that it is ordinarily capable of only one meaning.   
 
The approach adopted by the House of Lords in Pickstone v Freemans was applied in Litster 
& Others v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd & Another.
345
 The case involved the 
interpretation of provisions of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations 1981, which were designed to implement obligations under Council Directive 
77/187/E.E.C. of 14 February 1977. Article 3(1) of the Directive safeguarded the contract of 
employment between a transferor and its employees existing at the date of the transfer of the 
business of the transferor to a transferee. The intention of course, was to protect the 
employment of workers and to prevent the transferee from dismissing the workers on account 
of the transfer. 
 
Regulation 5(1) of the 1981 Regulations was made in accord with Article 3(1) of the 
Directive. It read: 
―A relevant transfer shall not operate so as to terminate the contract of employment of 
any person employed by the transferor in the undertaking or part transferred but any 
such contract which would otherwise have been terminated by the transfer shall have 
effect after the transfer as if originally made between the person so employed and the 
transferee.‖ 
 
Paragraph (3) of Regulation 5 then attempted to define the persons protected by paragraph (1) 
above in the following words: 
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―Any reference in paragraph (1)… above to a person employed in an undertaking or 
part of one transferred by a relevant transfer is a reference to a person so employed 
immediately before
346
 the transfer, including, where the transfer is effected by a 
series of two or more transactions, a person so employed immediately before any of 
those transactions.‖ 
 
In the case, the applicants were employees of the transferor company. The company became 
insolvent and went into receivership. Subsequently, the receivers agreed to transfer the 
business to the transferee. One hour before the transfer, the receivers dismissed the 
applicants. Within 48 hours after the dismissal of the applicants, the transferee began to 
employ new workers at lower pay rates. The applicants took out legal proceedings against the 
transferor (joining the transferee later), alleging unfair dismissal. 
 
The main issue that arose before the House of Lords was whether, having regard to the fact 
that the transferor dismissed the applicants, at least one hour before the transfer actually 
occurred, the protection of Regulation 5(1) was available to them. In other words, could the 
applicants be regarded as persons employed by the transferor ―immediately before‖ the 
transfer as provided by paragraph (3) of Regulation 5? 
 
Their Lordships agreed that by the ordinary principles of interpretation, the applicants could 
not be regarded as persons employed ―immediately before‖ the transfer. However, they felt 
able to construe the provision in a manner that brought the applicants within the ambit of the 
protection of Regulation 5(1) by straining the language of paragraph (3). According to Lord 
Templeman,  
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―Regulation 5(3) must be construed on the footing that it applies to a person employed 
immediately before the transfer or who would have been so employed if he had not 
been unfairly dismissed before the transfer for a reason connected with the 
transfer.‖347  
 
In adopting this approach, their Lordships were merely fulfilling the interpretative obligation 
under section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act. As already noted, the domestic Regulations were 
designed to implement the Council Directive. The European Court had in P. Bork 
International A/S v. Foreningen af Arbejdsledere I Danmark
348
 interpreted the provisions of 
Article 3(1) of the Directive (corresponding with the United Kingdom Regulation 5(1)) as 
applying to employees dismissed by the transferor before the transfer took place, if the 
dismissal was for a reason connected with the transfer. 
 
Their Lordships were thus obliged to adopt a purposive interpretation of Regulation 5(3) that 
would be consistent both with the underlying purpose of the Directive, which was to protect 
employees from unfair dismissals connected with the transfer of undertakings, and also with 
the jurisprudence of the European Court on the point. This latter point is of great significance. 
Section 3(1) of the 1972 Act obliges the courts to treat questions of Community law as 
questions of law, and to determine such questions in accordance with principles laid down by 
the European Court. 
 
Thus, in Webb v Emo Air Cargo (UK) (No.2)
349
 the House of Lords felt able to construe 
provisions of sections 1(1)(a) and 5(3)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 in a manner 
that complied with the decision of the European Court in a preliminary ruling on the point in 
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question even though the resultant interpretation was in dissonance with an earlier 
interpretation of the statutory provisions given by the House following ordinary principles of 
statutory interpretation.
350
 
 
Section 1(1)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 provided as follows: 
 
―(1) … a person discriminates against a woman if— 
(a) on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats or would treat 
a man,….‖ 
 
Section 5(3)(a) then provided that ―a comparison of the cases of persons of different sex 
under section 1(1)… must be such that the relevant circumstances in the one case are the 
same, or not materially different, in the other.‖ 
 
Mrs. Webb had been employed by the Respondent Company to provide cover for an 
employee who would be proceeding on maternity leave in a few months time. However, her 
employment was for an indeterminate period and she was therefore to continue even after the 
resumption of duty of the employee whose duties she was to cover at the beginning. She was 
asked to start immediately so that she could undergo necessary training preparatory to taking 
over from the employee going on maternity leave. 
Two weeks into her new job, Mrs. Webb discovered that she was pregnant. She informed her 
employers of the pregnancy and was immediately dismissed. She took out proceedings in an 
industrial tribunal alleging discrimination on the ground of her sex contrary to section 1(1)(a) 
of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 set out above. The industrial tribunal dismissed the claim 
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on the ground that her dismissal was not based on grounds of her sex, but on her anticipated 
inability to take over the duty of the employee due for maternal leave, the purpose for which 
she was employed in the first place. The Employment Appeal Tribunal as well as the Court 
of Appeal upheld the decision of the industrial tribunal. 
 
On Appeal to the House of Lords351, the House held that on the proper construction of 
sections 1(1)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act, read in conjunction with section 5(3)(a) set 
out above, Mrs. Webb was not discriminated against on grounds of her sex because the real 
reason of her dismissal was her inability to take on the job for medical reasons; and that 
applying the comparison required by 5(3)(a), a man in a similar situation who was unable to 
perform his duties for medical reasons would likewise have been dismissed.  This 
interpretation was without regard to Community law. 
 
In acknowledgement of their interpretative obligation under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act, the 
House made a reference to the European Court seeking a preliminary ruling on the effect of 
Article 2(1) of Council Directive (EEC) 76/207352in the circumstances of Mrs. Webb‘s case. 
The proceedings were stayed pending the ruling of the European Court. 
 
The European Court subsequently ruled that the dismissal of a female employee employed 
for an indeterminate period for inability to temporarily perform her job due to pregnancy 
would amount to discrimination based on sex contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive. The 
Court further ruled that the situation of such a female employee could not be compared to 
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that of a man because pregnancy, which was the relevant factor, could only happen to a 
woman. 
 
Upon receipt of the ruling of the European Court, the House felt obliged, and accordingly 
construed the relevant provisions of the 1975 Act set out above, in a manner that gave full 
effect to Community law and complied with the ruling of the European Court. 
 
By these decisions, it would appear that the House of Lords have taken the view that the 
courts must adopt a purposive construction of domestic legislation, primary or subsidiary, in 
order to comply with the demands of Community law even if such an approach would result 
in an interpretation that might be inconsistent with the meaning and effect of the legislation 
upon its ordinary construction.   
 
By the ordinary principles of interpretation, the power of the court to depart from the ordinary 
meaning of the words used in an Act, or to modify the provisions of the Act by judicially 
inserting words into it, is not to be exercised if the purpose is merely to fill a gap detected by 
the court.
353
 In such a case, it is for Parliament to pass legislation and fill the gap in a manner 
that it deems fit. It is not the duty of the court to fill the gap on its own initiative. 
 
The purposive approach to interpretation pursuant to the provisions of section 2(1) and (4) of 
the 1972 Act may appear to have the effect of enabling the court to fill a gap detected in 
domestic legislation. Where legislation falls short of the requirements of directly applicable 
Community law, the courts now feel able to imply words to the otherwise clear and 
unambiguous provisions of an Act for the purpose of ensuring compliance with directly 
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applicable Community law. This is a power that was unavailable to the courts under the 
ordinary common law rules of statutory interpretation.
354
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to examine the way in which the courts have approached the 
interpretative obligation contained in section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and to consider 
what impact the interpretative obligation has had on judicial attitudes to the traditional 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
As has been seen, the case law seems clear as to how the courts perceive their obligation 
under section 2(4) in particular. Since the Factortame cases were decided, it seems to have 
been generally accepted that section 2(4) requires the courts, in construing domestic primary 
legislation, to accord supremacy to directly effective Community law in case there is a 
conflict between the two.  
 
It is observed that the judges have tended to play down the resultant modification of the 
traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. For example, Lord Bridge‘s approach 
attempts to cloth the judicial function under section 2(4) as nothing more than following the 
instructions of Parliament.
355
 Also, although Lord Justice Laws‘ common law approach gave 
greater emphasis on the role of the court under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act, he attempts to 
explain the impact as merely consisting of some modest modification of the principle of 
implied repeal.
356
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It is submitted that neither approach should becloud the profound impact that the 
interpretative obligation contained in section 2(4) has had on judicial attitudes to the 
traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. One only has to compare the case law dealt 
with in chapter 2 above with the case law dealing with section 2(4) to appreciate the 
significant shift in the attitude of the courts with respect to the traditional Diceyan concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The hitherto unchanging judicial dogma of parliamentary 
sovereignty that was seen in the cases discussed in chapter 2 now appears to have given way 
to pragmatism. There seems to be a consensus that necessary modifications to the doctrine 
may occur from time to time, as constitutional developments occur. Whether this should 
occur according to the wishes of Parliament, as Lord Bridge appeared to suggest, or as a 
result of the evolutionary development of the common law by the judges, as Lord Justice 
Laws contends, is not abundantly clear at the moment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: GENERAL 
 
I. Introduction 
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This chapter explores the general scheme as well as examines the essential provisions of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The aim is to provide the necessary background upon which the 
examination of the case law in the next chapter will be done. 
 
II.General Scheme and Essential Provisions of the Act 
 
The pre-Human Rights Act position concerning the Convention was that its provisions had no 
force of law in the domestic courts of the United Kingdom, having not been incorporated into 
law by an Act of Parliament.
357
  
 
As an unincorporated international treaty, the Convention‘s domestic usefulness as a means 
of vindicating the fundamental rights guaranteed by it was quite limited. While the courts 
would approach the interpretation of legislation touching on the Convention rights on the 
presumption that Parliament does not intend to legislate in breach of the international 
obligations arising under the Convention, it had always been accepted that the Convention 
would not stand in the way of clear and unambiguous legislation found to breach its terms.  
 
In addition to the interpretative presumption, which the courts made in favour of the 
Convention rights when interpreting legislation, the courts also resorted to the use of the 
principle of legality as a means of protecting fundamental rights
358
 within the domestic legal 
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system. Laws, J,
359
 very clearly articulated the principle in R v Lord Chancellor, ex parte 
Witham:
360
 
 
―In the unwritten legal order of the British state, at a time when the common law 
continues to accord a legislative supremacy to Parliament, the notion of a 
constitutional right can in my judgment inhere only in this proposition, that the right 
in question cannot be abrogated by the state save by specific
361
 provision in an Act of 
Parliament, or by regulations whose vires in main legislation specifically confers the 
power to abrogate. General words will not suffice.‖362  
 
 
Thus, while Parliament could legislate to abrogate, or authorise the abrogation of 
fundamental rights, general words would not suffice to take away those rights; they could 
only be overridden by specific words or by necessary implication.
363
 
 
The above was the legal and constitutional status of the Convention rights before the 
enactment of the 1998 Act. It was that state of affairs that the Government sought to improve 
upon. As the long title of the Act states, it is ―an Act to give further effect to rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights.‖364 
 
Obviously, the fullest means of ―giving further effect‖ to the Convention rights would have 
been to accord the rights priority over primary legislation. However, there seemed to have 
been no intention, on the part of the Government,
365
 to abandon the traditional doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, by which Acts of Parliament take priority over every other form 
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of law. In the White Paper
366
 preceding the introduction of the Human Rights Bill into 
Parliament, the Government made it clear that, based on democratic grounds, it intended to 
preserve parliamentary sovereignty in the scheme of the 1998 Act. According to the White 
Paper: 
 
―The Government has reached the conclusion that the courts should not have the 
power to set aside primary legislation, past or future, on the ground of incompatibility 
with the Convention. This conclusion arises from the importance which the 
Government attaches to Parliamentary sovereignty. In this context, Parliamentary 
sovereignty means that Parliament is competent to make any law on any matter of its 
choosing and no court may question the validity of any Act that it passes. In enacting 
legislation, Parliament is making decisions derived from a democratic mandate. 
Members of Parliament in the House of Commons possess such a mandate because 
they are elected, accountable and representative. To make provision for the Bill for 
the courts to set aside Acts of Parliament would confer on the judiciary a general 
power over the decisions of Parliament which under our present constitutional 
arrangements they do not possess, and would be likely on occasion to draw the 
judiciary into serious conflict with Parliament. There is no evidence to suggest that 
they desire this power, nor that the public wish them to have it. Certainly, this 
Government has no mandate for any such change.‖367   
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As would be recalled, in the 1972 Act, the combined effect of section 2(1) and (4) and section 
3(1) ensured that directly effective Community law took priority over primary legislation.
368
 
In the 1997 White Paper,
369
 the Government explained that this was so only because it was ―a 
requirement of membership of the European Union that member States give priority to 
directly effective EC law in their own legal systems.‖ It argued that there was no such 
requirement concerning the Convention. Consequently, in principle, nothing stood in the way 
of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
Nevertheless, it would appear that ―giving further effect‖ to the Convention rights would 
involve a delicate balancing of respect for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty on the 
one hand, and the need to provide for an effective means of protecting the rights guaranteed 
under the Convention. This balance, it would seem, found expression in sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 10 
and 19 of the 1998 Act. 
 
Section 2(1) of the Act concerns the interpretation of the Convention rights.
370
 It reads: 
 
―(1) A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a 
Convention right must take into account any— 
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(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 
 
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of the 
Convention,  
 
(c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the 
Convention, or 
 
(d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the Convention, 
 
whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant 
to the proceedings in which that question has arisen.‖ 
 
The above provisions clearly apply in equal measure to both inferior and superior courts and 
tribunals.
371
 The use of the word ―must‖ in section 2(1) indicates that it is obligatory for the 
court to comply with the demands of the sub-section, that is, to take into account the 
decisions of the European bodies stipulated therein, as far as they are relevant to the 
proceedings before the court.  
However, the statutory obligation to take into account European decisions, including those of 
the European Court, on questions of Convention rights, does not mean that any such decision 
would be binding on the court,
372
 no matter how inferior it is. What this means is that the 
domestic courts may not treat the jurisprudence of the European Court on matters of the 
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Convention rights as strict legal precedents. This is a marked departure from the provisions of 
section 3(1) of the 1972 Act, 
373
whereby the courts were statutorily obliged to apply the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on questions of Community law, including the 
European principles of direct applicability, direct effect and the supremacy of directly 
effective Community law.
374
 Thus, under the 1972 Act, the court is obliged to apply the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in preference to clear and unambiguous 
provisions contained in primary legislation if there is a clash between the two. It would 
appear that no such obligation was intended under section 2 of the 1998 Act. The conclusion 
to be drawn from the difference between the respective provisions in the 1972 Act and the 
1998 Act noted above is that section 2 in the latter Act was meant to be part of the 
mechanism within the scheme of the 1998 Act aimed at preserving the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
Nevertheless, in practice, the domestic courts of the United Kingdom are likely to treat 
decisions of the European Court with the seriousness they deserve, as, ultimately, domestic 
disputes might go to the European Court for adjudication after exhaustion of all domestic 
avenues for remedy. Indeed, Lord Bingham has stated that ―the duty of national courts is to 
keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no 
less.‖375 And Francis Bennion has expressed the opinion that ―it would be absurd (i.e. for a 
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United Kingdom court) to arrive at a legal meaning of a Convention right different from that 
likely to be found by the European Court of Human Rights.‖376  
The Government‘s proposals for enforcing the Convention rights377 eventually materialised in 
sections 3, 4 and 10 of the 1998 Act. Section 3 of the Act concerns the interpretation of 
primary and subordinate legislation, and provides as follows:  
―3.— Interpretation of legislation. 
 
(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention 
rights. 
(2) This section— 
 
(a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever enacted; 
 
(b) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
incompatible primary legislation; and 
 
(c) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any possibility of revocation) 
primary legislation prevents removal of the incompatibility.‖ 
As is clear from the provisions of section 3(2)(a), the interpretative obligation contained in 
section 3(1) is applicable to all legislation, whether enacted before or after the 1998 Act. 
Consequently, to the extent that previous legislation affects the Convention rights, the 
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meaning and effect of such legislation as established by previous case law would not 
constitute binding precedent to be followed. Thus, all such legislation would now be re-
interpreted in the light of the interpretative obligation in section 3(1).
378
 It has been held 
however, that the directive contained in section 3(1), to interpret legislation compatibly with 
the Convention rights, would not apply if its application would have the effect of altering 
vested interests in transactions which took place before the coming into force of the 1998 
Act.
379
 
 
 
Section 3(1) is perhaps the most controversial section of the 1998 Act. The subsection, as has 
been noted, directs the courts to interpret all legislation ―so far as it is possible to do so‖ 
compatibly with the Convention rights. In the pre-Human Rights Act jurisprudence on 
questions of the Convention rights, the precise limit of interpreting domestic legislation 
compatibly with the Convention rights seemed clear enough. The courts would interpret 
domestic legislation compatibly with the Convention rights in cases where the legislation 
concerned was ambiguous and a Convention-compatible interpretation was a viable 
alternative interpretation.
380
 Where the offending legislation concerned was clear and 
unambiguous in the sense that it was capable of only one meaning, the courts would not 
strain that meaning in order to satisfy the demands of the Convention. In that case, the will of 
Parliament would be respected and the legislation would be left for Parliament to amend by 
itself if it thought fit to do so. 
The problem inherent in section 3(1) is that it contains no statutory definition of what is 
―possible‖ under the subsection. However, several judges and academic commentators have 
expressed opinion that, unlike the pre-Human Rights Act situation, no ambiguity is necessary 
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for a statutory provision to be subjected to a section 3(1) interpretation; furthermore, an 
interpretation pursuant to the interpretative obligation contained therein may permissibly lead 
to conclusions that differ from the plain meaning of the statutory provision in question.  
 
Lord Irvine,
381
 writing extra-judicially at a time the Human Rights Bill was still in 
Parliament, asserted that 
 
―… the Act will require the courts to read and give effect to [the] legislation in a way 
compatible with the Convention rights ‗so far as it is possible to do so…‘ This, as the 
White Paper makes clear, goes far beyond
382
 the present rule. It will not be necessary 
to find an ambiguity. On the contrary the courts will be required to interpret 
legislation so as to uphold the Convention rights unless the legislation itself is so 
clearly
383
 incompatible with the Convention that it is impossible to do so.‖384 
 
 
 
It seems that Lord Irvine‘s interpretation of the interpretative obligation contained in section 
3(1) was not based on any extensive analysis of section 3 as a whole,
385
 together with the 
provisions of section 4 and 10, all of which make up the Government‘s Proposals for 
enforcing the Convention rights as outlined in the White Paper to which he referred. The sole 
basis of his statement would appear to be paragraph 2.7 of the White Paper. His statement 
was in fact almost a complete repetition of that paragraph in the White Paper. It is observed 
that, contrary to Lord Irvine‘s declaration above, neither Clause 3(1) in the then Human 
Rights Bill, nor section 3(1) in the 1998 Act indicated clearly that the new rule of 
interpretation went ―far beyond‖ the subsisting rule, or that no ambiguity was necessary in 
order to activate the section 3(1) interpretation.  
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Besides, Lord Irvine‘s statement above, as quite rightly noted by Geoffrey Marshall,386 seems 
intrinsically contradictory in terms. If the new interpretative obligation went ―far beyond‖ the 
subsisting rule such that no ambiguity was required to interpret the legislation under 
consideration compatibly with the Convention right, it would mean that, absenting a 
provision that specifically states that the legislation was to apply notwithstanding any breach 
of the Convention rights,
387
 a very clear and unambiguous provision would not prevent a 
court from finding a Convention-compatible interpretation. A legislation without such a 
notwithstanding provision might yet be ―so clearly incompatible‖ and therefore 
unambiguous. Under the old rule, such unambiguous legislation would trump the Convention 
rights. Under the new rule, it was not supposed to. Yet, Lord Irvine‘s statement suggests that 
a provision ―so clearly incompatible‖ with the Convention rights could, just as it is with the 
old rule, trump the Convention rights.  
 
Unlike the above statement, his related statement written in a later article
388
 took cognisance 
of the relationship between sections 3 and 4
389
, both of which were designed to ―bring rights 
home.‖390 There, His Lordship stated: 
―The Human Rights Act is founded upon a division of functions between the different 
branches of government, which reflects the British conception of the separation of 
powers principle on which our constitution is based. Under the Act our courts have to 
interpret statutes ‗so far as possible‘ to be compatible with Convention rights; if this is 
impossible they have been given a unique power to declare legislation to be 
incompatible, but then it is for the executive to initiate, and Parliament to enact, 
remedial legislation, with a fast track process available for that purpose. This balance 
which inheres in the text of the Act can be secured in practical terms only by a 
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measured response to the challenge of seeking, so far as is possible, to interpret 
national law consistently with the Convention. 
 
―If the courts were to adopt a very narrow view of this duty of consistent construction, 
their ability interpretatively to guarantee Convention rights would be severely 
curtailed. Instead of reading municipal law in a way which gave effect to individuals‘ 
rights, the courts would tend to discover irreconcilable conflicts between United 
Kingdom law and the Convention which would then require legislative correction. In 
contrast, a judiciary which took an extremely radical view of its interpretative duty 
would be likely to stretch legislative language, beyond breaking point, if necessary, in 
order to effect judicial vindication of Convention rights. Such an approach would 
yield virtually no declarations of incompatibility: the judges would, in effect, be 
taking it upon themselves to rewrite legislation in order to render it consistent with the 
Convention, and so excluding Parliament and the executive from the human rights 
enterprise.  
 
―Both of these approaches would be wrong. The constitutional theory on which the 
Human Rights Act rests is one of balance.‖391 
 
 
It is submitted that this is a more acceptable perception of the interpretative obligation in 
section 3(1). Most writers who take a radical view of the interpretative obligation, asserting 
that it empowers the courts to ignore the intention of Parliament in enacting the offending 
legislation, appears to isolate section 3(1) from the rest of the remedial provisions of the Act, 
such as sections 4 and 10 which, together with section 3, constituted the mechanism by which 
the Government proposed to enforce the Convention rights. This is a wrong approach to 
interpreting the extent of what is possible under section 3(1).  
 
The error inherent in this approach could be seen in an article written by Lord Cooke
392
 at the 
period between the enactment of the 1998 Act and the coming into effect of its substantive 
provisions. There, His Lordship proclaimed that ―our old friend Parliamentary sovereignty 
will never be the same again.‖393 He had a radical view of the interpretative obligation in 
section 3(1), arguing that no ambiguity was required for a court to find and apply a 
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Convention-compatible interpretation.
394
 He appeared to support his argument by asserting 
that a reduction of United Kingdom cases in Strasbourg was a motivating factor in enacting 
the 1998 Act;
395
 thus, ―the Act could become a dead letter if the canon of interpretation laid 
down by section 3(1) were not followed in spirit….‖396 The necessary implication of His 
Lordship‘s argument is that section 3(1) is the only remedial provision in the Act, by which 
Convention rights were brought home. Thus, a failure to use section 3(1) is seen as equivalent 
to a failure to achieve the objective of the Act. It is submitted with respect that this is wrong. 
In the White Paper
397
 preceding the Human Rights Bill, the proposals culminating in sections 
3, 4 and 10 were all outlined under the Heading: ―The Government‘s Proposals for Enforcing 
the Convention Rights.‖ Conceivably, ―giving further effect to rights and freedoms‖398 under 
the Convention referred to the totality of remedial measures provided in the Act, and not only 
to section 3(1) interpretations. Admittedly, there are practical differences in effectiveness 
between the remedies that may accrue from sections 3 and 4. However, the fact remains that 
the work of delivering the Convention rights locally to Britain was meant to be a shared 
enterprise between the courts, the executive and Parliament, each expected to play its proper 
role. Failure to use section 3(1) interpretation in a given case is not necessarily equal to a 
negation of the objective of the 1998 Act. 
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Lord Hope, also writing in the transitional period between the enactment of the 1998 Act and 
the commencement of its substantive provisions, described the interpretative obligation 
contained in section 3(1) as ―a far-reaching one.‖399 He contended that  
 
―the requirement in s. 3(1) is to search for a ‗possible‘ reading. This may lead to 
conclusions which depart from the ordinary meaning of the words used, and would 
not be produced by the application of any of the other usual canons of construction
400
 
which were in the mind of the legislator.‖401 
 
 
Similarly, Lord Nicholls asserts that section 3 ―may require a court to depart from the 
meaning which, s. 3 apart, legislation unambiguously bears.‖402  
 
As can be seen, there seemed to be fairly broad agreement amongst the senior judiciary, in 
their extra-judicial writings, that section 3(1) would enable the courts to find a Convention-
compatible meaning even where the statutory words used in an offending statute are neither 
ambiguous nor absurd. Much of the claim that no ambiguity is required for a section 3(1) 
interpretation to be engaged seems to be based on statements made in Parliament during the 
course of parliamentary debates on the Human Rights Bill. But was this made unequivocally 
clear in the parliamentary proceedings?  
 
The Lord Chancellor had stated that the Bill was designed ―to give the courts as much space 
as possible to protect human rights, short of a power to set aside or ignore Acts of 
Parliament‖403  
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Both in the House of Lords and the House of Commons, amendments were moved to delete 
the word ―possible‖ appearing in clause 3(1) of the Bill and replacing it with the word 
―reasonable.‖404 
 
The purpose of the amendments sought was, in the words of Mr. Clappison, ―to ensure that 
the clearly expressed will of Parliament is heeded if incorporation takes place.‖405 
 
It was felt that allowing judges to interpret legislation compatibly with the Convention rights 
as far as they possibly can may ―encourage the courts to give an unduly artificial 
interpretation to statutory language.‖406 
 
Mr. Grieves and Mr. Swayne expressed similar sentiments.
407
 
 
They appeared to hold the view that clause 3(1) of the Human Rights Bill, which became 
section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, could ground a far-fetched but otherwise possible interpretation 
of primary legislation. 
 
In response to these attempts to replace the word ―possible‖ with the word ―reasonable‖, the 
then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, revealed that in drafting clause 3(1) of the Bill, the 
Canadian and New Zealand models of incorporation of Bills of Rights were particularly 
examined.
408
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Section 32 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contained in the Constitution Act 
of 1982 makes the provisions of the Charter applicable to all legislation, subject only to the 
exceptions contained in section 33 of the Charter. Section 33(1) and (2) in particular, contain 
the following provisions: 
 
―(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of 
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof 
shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of 
this Charter (i.e. the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter). 
 
―(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under this 
section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the provision of 
this Charter referred to in the declaration.‖ 
 
Properly interpreted, these provisions meant that absenting a declaration pursuant to section 
33(1) of the Charter, the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter trump any 
inconsistent primary legislation. Accordingly, the courts can validly strike down such 
legislation. 
 
The Government, for the reason that it was inimical to the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, which is the bedrock of the British constitution, rejected this model.  
  
On the other hand, section 6
409
 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990
410
 provides that 
―wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and 
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freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other 
meaning.‖ 
 
Clearly, this provision reflects the position of British jurisprudence on the status and role of 
the Convention in the interpretation and application of primary legislation pre-Human Rights 
Act. The Convention rights only came into play when the provisions of primary legislation 
were found to be ambiguous. In that case, the principle that Parliament does not intend to 
legislate in breach of the Convention rights is then activated. The result is that an 
interpretation that conforms to the Convention rights is to be preferred. 
 
Again, the Government rejected this model of incorporation. Of course, if the Human Rights 
Act were to make any difference to the existing state of the law, adopting a model such as the 
New Zealand model will prove to be superfluous. 
 
Having considered, and subsequently rejected these options, the Government had to come up 
with ―a British answer to a British problem‖411, that of delivering Convention rights in as 
effective a manner as possible while preserving parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
The result (and supposedly, the solution) was section 3(1) of the Act. ―…While…the courts 
would have clear powers to apply the European convention … ultimately Parliament‘s will 
would prevail.‖412 
 
From the above, far from giving any clear indication that under section 3(1), courts were 
empowered to change the clear and unambiguous meaning of legislation that is not even 
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absurd in its proper context, the parliamentary material indicates that the underlying concept 
adopted by the Government and Parliament in enacting the 1998 Act was that there should be 
a principled balance between effective protection of Convention rights on the one hand, and 
the need to respect the sovereignty of Parliament on the other hand. Therefore, while section 
3(1) empowers courts to interpret primary legislation in a way that is compatible with the 
Convention rights, section 4 makes it clear that where the statutory provision under 
consideration is such that a section 3(1) interpretation is impossible
413
, the court is not to alter 
the provision in question but is to make a declaration of incompatibility under section 4, 
which may then set in motion the taking of remedial action by the appropriate minister under 
section 10 of the Act. As can be seen, section 4, together with section 10 of the Act, serves as 
a reminder to the courts that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the principle of the 
separation of powers are preserved by the Act and are to be respected by the courts. 
 
As indicated earlier, several academic commentators share the view, held by their Lordships 
in their extra-judicial writings above, that under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, courts could 
depart from a clear and unambiguous statutory provision in order to render it Convention-
compatible. In fact, some have expressed the opinion that section 3(1) sanctions an 
interpretation that might be contrary to the intention of Parliament in enacting the offending 
legislation. For example, David Feldman states: 
 
―The interpretative duty of courts and tribunals under s. 3 is not based on either the 
presumed intention of the legislature or a need to resolve a textual ambiguity in the 
legislation. Encouraging courts to be creative in the interpretation and application of 
Convention rights and legislation which affects them, the 1998 Act may lead to an 
interpretation of legislation which is directly contrary to that intended by the 
promoters and drafters of other Acts. This makes it difficult to rely on legislative 
intent to justify judicial action in these cases, and changes the use which judges have 
previously made of Convention rights in interpreting or developing the law. Strictly 
speaking, it does not threaten parliamentary sovereignty, because Parliament itself has 
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decreed that judges should behave in accordance with s. 3. It simply imposes an 
additional burden on drafters of legislation intended to be incompatible with a 
Convention right to make their intention absolutely clear and unequivocal.‖414   
 
 
If section 3(1) authorised the courts to override the intention of Parliament, as has been 
suggested by Feldman above, its practical effect would be little different from what obtains in 
the United States or Nigeria, countries with rigid, written constitutions that authorise the 
courts to overrule legislative enactments on grounds of inconsistency with constitutionally 
guaranteed fundamental rights. Feldman suggests that that was what the Government and 
Parliament intended the 1998 Act to achieve. With respect, it is submitted that this is neither 
borne out by the White Paper, nor made clear from the language of section 3(1) of the Act. In 
the White Paper,
415
 it was stated that ―The Government … considered very carefully whether 
it would be right for the Bill to go further, and give to courts in the United Kingdom the 
power to set aside an Act of Parliament which they believe is incompatible with the 
Convention rights.‖ The Government concluded that courts should have no such power. A 
power to override legislative intention embodied in an Act of Parliament can reasonably be 
equated to a power enabling a court to set aside such an Act.  
 
Feldman‘s suggestion that, to avoid a section 3(1) interpretation, legislative draftsmen must 
make it ―absolutely clear and unequivocal‖ that the Convention rights are intended to be 
breached, implies that only a statute containing a provision specifically and expressly stating 
that the statute is to apply notwithstanding any breach of the Convention rights, would be 
protected from a judicial override. It is submitted that such a fundamental and innovative idea 
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would have required clearer language.
416
 Yet, all that section 3(1) of the 1998 Act states is 
that courts should interpret domestic legislation compatibly with the Convention rights ―so 
far as it is possible to do so.‖ As Gearty states: 
 
―… it is unlikely that the courts will go so far as to require that section 3 take priority 
over all law, however framed, in the absence of an express claim by Parliament to the 
opposite effect. If the judges were to construe section 3(1) in this way, then a type of 
entrenchment against implied repeal would have been smuggled into UK law 
disguised as a principle of statutory interpretation.‖417 
 
 
Similarly, writing on the role of parliamentary intention in adjudication under section 3(1) of 
the 1998 Act, Aileen Kavanagh
418
 has argued that the original intention of Parliament in 
enacting a particular piece of legislation must give way to the intention of Parliament 
expressed in section 3(1) should there be a clash between the two intentions. Although she 
admits that traditionally, by the doctrine of implied repeal, a later Act of Parliament impliedly 
repeals inconsistent terms contained in an earlier Act, she insists that this does not apply to 
the interpretative obligation contained in section 3(1) since the obligation was expressed to 
apply to legislation ―whenever enacted.‖ Thus, the courts are empowered under section 3(1) 
to change the meaning and effect of primary legislation and depart from Parliament‘s original 
intention if this were necessary to achieve compatibility with the Convention rights. 
 
Although, admittedly, the wording of section 3(1) of the 1998 Act seems to support the view 
that all legislation, pre- and post Human Rights Act, are susceptible to a section 3(1) 
interpretation, there seems to be nothing in it to suggest in any clear manner that the intention 
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expressed in section 3(1) must trump any other intention expressed in all other Acts in case of 
a clash between the two. In relation to subsequent legislation, such an interpretation of the 
interpretative obligation under section 3(1) would contradict the traditional rule that courts 
must obey and apply the latest will of Parliament in preference to inconsistent provisions in 
earlier legislation. Traditionally, all Acts are equal in status and could be repealed or altered 
by the ordinary means of legislation either expressly or by necessary implication. Thus, in 
Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health,
419
the court refused to apply a strongly worded 
provision in section 7(1) of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act of 
1919 purporting to restrict the power of future Parliaments to legislate in a manner 
inconsistent with its terms. It is submitted that the wording of section 7(1) of the 1919 Act 
appears much stronger than that contained in section 3(1) of the 1998 Act. Yet, in the Ellen 
Street case the court ruled that the intention of Parliament expressed in the Housing Act of 
1925 impliedly repealed the parliamentary intention expressed in section 7(1) of the 1919 
Act.
420
 
 
Francis Bennion‘s analysis of the role of parliamentary intention in a section 3(1) 
interpretation is somewhat less sweeping than that of David Feldman and Aileen Kavanagh. 
While Feldman appeared to contend that under section 3(1), the courts could ignore the 
parliamentary intention embodied in an offending Act altogether, Bennion only says that 
―Parliament‘s original intention is no longer the sole421 deciding factor‖ when interpreting 
primary legislation pursuant to the interpretative obligation.
422
 He argues that while the 
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original intention of Parliament ―retains its importance, it must now be reassessed in the light 
of the new rule‖ embodied in section 3(1) of the 1998 Act.423 
 
It is submitted that this is a better assessment of the interpretative obligation vis a vis the 
intention of Parliament embodied in an offending legislation. It is submitted that the resultant 
interpretation in accordance with section 3 should reasonably fit into the underlying objective 
of the offending legislation. In this way, the courts would be complementing Parliament‘s 
desire to meet the United Kingdom‘s obligations under the Convention whenever possible. 
Otherwise, it might amount to a judicial override of Parliament‘s clear intention expressed in 
the legislation. 
 
Other academic commentators have disagreed with the view that section 3(1) of the 1998 Act 
empowers the courts to disregard, or refuse to apply what they determine to be the intention 
of Parliament in an Act, on grounds of incompatibility with the Convention rights. Geoffrey 
Marshall has attacked it as lacking in coherence: 
 
―The thesis that the ‗possibility‘ referred to in s. 3 describes an array of conceivable 
Convention-compatible meanings in accordance with which the true intention of 
Parliament may (within uncertain limits) be departed from or reconstructed has defied 
coherent expression.‖424 
 
 
It is difficult not to agree with this assessment. Arguments that section 3(1) of the 1998 Act 
authorises courts to ignore the clear and unambiguous intention of Parliament embodied in an 
offending legislation when interpreting that legislation pursuant to section 3(1) are almost 
always accompanied by apparently contradictory statements that the courts are nevertheless 
required to obey and apply it if it is so clearly incompatible. 
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As mentioned above, those who hold such radical view of the interpretative obligation in 
section 3(1) often tend to support their argument with the assertion that that was what the 
Government, as promoters of the 1998 Act, intended the subsection to mean. Marshall has 
argued that while that might be the Government‘s view and preference, ―it is not the logic of 
the Act or the stated intention of Parliament.‖425  He further argues that such an interpretation 
of section 3(1) would be ―potentially damaging both to the authority of Parliament and the 
separation of the judicial and legislative functions.‖426 
 
It is observed that much of the commentary on the use of section 3(1) in the interpretation of 
primary legislation touching on the Convention rights tends to ignore completely the 
provisions of section 3(2)(b) of the Act. The paragraph states that the provision in section 
3(1) (i.e. in relation to the interpretation of primary legislation) ―does not affect the validity, 
continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible primary legislation.‖ Gearty427 
outlined two possible approaches to determining what is possible under section 3(1). While 
the first approach seeks to define the extent of the court‘s power of interpretation under 
section 3(1) by reference to section 3(2)(b), the second tends to completely ignore the effect 
of section 3(2)(b). The first approach places greater emphasis on section 3(2)(b), using it as 
some sort of saving provision, with the effect that any interpretation under section 3(1) that 
would have the practical effect of affecting the ―validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement‖ of the incompatible statute would be impossible under section 3(1). 
Considering that a judicial interpretation of an offending statute, pursuant to the interpretative 
obligation in section 3(1), would most certainly mean that that statute would henceforth 
operate, not in its original state, but as if amended by the judgment, a perception of section 
3(1) in this way would render the interpretative obligation almost totally useless. This 
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analysis of the interpretative obligation, as Gearty says, finds favour with those ―whose 
commitment to Parliamentary sovereignty exceed their devotion to human rights.‖428 This is 
hardly the principled balance between respect for parliamentary sovereignty and the 
protection of the Convention rights which seems to underlie the 1998 Act. 
 
The second approach is, according to Gearty, ―diametrically opposite‖429 the first. By this 
approach, an extremely expansive interpretation is to be given to the word ―possible‖ as used 
in section 3(1) such that unless an express repudiation of the Convention rights is contained 
in a statute, it could be judicially amended to render it compatible with the Convention rights. 
Thus, whether the resultant interpretation pursuant to section 3(1) would affect the ―validity, 
continuing operation or enforcement‖ of the statute so interpreted would be immaterial. 
Clearly, this approach would more or less constitute some form of entrenchment of the 
Convention rights, an idea strongly rejected by the Government in its White Paper.
430
 
 
Gearty suggests a mid-way approach, stating that while the limits of what is possible under 
section 3(1) should be identified by reference to section 3(2)(b), the latter provision should 
only be used as a guide. ―Thus, section 3(1) should be able to operate creatively upon a 
provision, but until such a time as a proposed reading would have the effect of so impairing 
the operation and/or effectiveness of the clause under scrutiny as to render it for all practical 
purposes a dead letter, or close to a dead letter.‖431  
 
It is submitted that this approach to determining the limit of what is possible under section 
3(1) seems to be closest to the principled balance between adhering to the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty on the one hand, and giving further effect to the Convention rights 
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on the other hand, as envisaged both in the White Paper and in the general scheme of the 
1998 Act. 
 
It is worth noting that section 3(1) of the 1998 Act bears a huge resemblance with the 
principle of legality. The principle of legality is an interpretative principle of high 
constitutional importance. It has its root in the common law. It is a presumption of general 
application applied to all enactments touching on the basic legal rights of the individual. 
Essentially, by the application of the principle of legality, powers derived under an Act of 
Parliament are required to be exercised in a manner that leaves untouched the fundamental 
rights of the individual, however wide and general those powers appear to be, unless the clear 
intention of Parliament was to take away those rights. 
 
The principle of legality was well articulated by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Regina v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Pierson.
432
 Drawing on the works of 
Cross,
433
 Bennion
434
 and Maxwell on Statutory Interpretation,
435
 his Lordship stated:  
 
―I consider first whether there is any principle of construction which requires the 
court, in certain cases, to construe general words contained in the statute as being 
impliedly limited. In my judgment there is such a principle. It is well established that 
Parliament does not legislate in a vacuum: statutes are drafted on the basis that the 
ordinary rules and principles of the common law will apply to the express statutory 
provisions....  As a result, Parliament is presumed not to have intended to change the 
common law unless it has clearly indicated such intention either expressly or by 
necessary implication....‖436 
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After reviewing a number of important decisions where the principle of legality was 
applied,
437
 his Lordship went on to state that the case law has established that  
 
―A power conferred by Parliament in general terms is not to be taken to authorise the 
doing of acts by the donee of the power which adversely affect the legal rights of the 
citizen or the basic principles on which the law of the United Kingdom is based 
unless the statute conferring the power makes it clear that such was the intention of 
Parliament.‖438  
 
 
Thus, the principle of legality can be seen as a principle that allows the courts to adopt a 
value oriented approach to interpretation, designed to incorporate ideas of the Rule of Law 
into the construction and application of statutes. Accordingly, executive decisions based on 
statutory provisions must be taken in accordance with established, even if noncodified, 
principles of law designed to guarantee fairness and justice. 
 
Traditionally, the courts have used the principle of legality as an interpretative tool by which 
the fundamental rights of the individual are protected from encroachment by executive 
bodies exercising powers conferred upon them by primary or subordinate legislation. The 
principle has two remarkable elements. First, it has been generally accepted that it is a 
constitutional principle of general application.
439
 This means that its operation is not 
dependent upon statutory authority. It operates independently of statute. It is part of what 
Cross refers to as ―long-standing principles of constitutional and administrative law ... taken 
for granted, or assumed by the courts to have been taken for granted, by Parliament.‖440 The 
principle is of fundamental, constitutional importance, and as Cross states, it is not a 
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principle that is easily displaced by a statutory text.
441
 Thus, it has been consistently held by 
the courts that only a deliberate parliamentary repudiation of fundamental rights could 
prevent the court from protecting those rights by use of the principle. As Lord Hoffman 
remarked in Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Simms,
442
  
 
―the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is 
doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by 
general or ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full 
implications of their unqualified meaning may have been passed unnoticed in the 
democratic process. In the absence of clear language or necessary implication to the 
contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were 
intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the courts of 
the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply 
principles of constitutionality little different from those which exist in countries 
where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document.‖    
 
 
The most obvious means by which the principle of legality can be displaced by Parliament is 
by use of express words in a statute abrogating fundamental words. However, as indicated in 
the above passage by Lord Hoffman, it may also be displaced by necessary implication; that 
is, where, though not expressly stated, the language used in the statute leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that Parliament intended to abrogate fundamental rights. 
Consequently, a clear limitation of the principle is that in the face of clear, contrary 
parliamentary intention, it must give way to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
The second remarkable element of the principle of legality is that there need be no ambiguity 
in a statutory provision for the principle to apply for the purpose of protecting fundamental 
rights. This is because, as stated earlier, general and wide provisions, even though 
unambiguous in language, are subject to the presumption that fundamental rights are left 
untouched. The relevant consideration is whether those rights have been specifically targeted 
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in a deliberate manner either expressly or by necessary implication. If the answer is negative, 
then the interpretative principle of legality would apply to protect fundamental rights from 
being breached.  
 
As can be seen, the resemblance between section 3(1) and the common law principle of 
legality is striking. They are both interpretative principles of general application operating, as 
Cross put it, ―at a higher level as expressions of fundamental principles governing both civil 
liberties and the relations between Parliament, the executive and the courts.‖443  No linguistic 
ambiguity is needed in either case for the interpretative principles to apply. While both must 
necessarily bow to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, only a deliberate abrogation of 
fundamental rights could stop a court from utilising them for the purpose of protecting 
fundamental rights. Unsurprisingly therefore, Lord Hoffman has described section 3(1) of the 
1998 Act as a statutory re-statement of the principle of legality.
444
 Perhaps the only 
significant difference between the two is that while the principle of legality applies in general 
to all the basic rights of the individual founded on the common law, the interpretative 
principle embodied in section 3(1) of the 1998 Act can only be applied in the context of the 
Convention rights domesticated by the Act. 
 
Nevertheless, in terms of effectiveness in the protection of basic rights, it would appear that 
United Kingdom courts seem able to go much further in protecting fundamental rights acting 
under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act than they ordinarily would when applying the principle of 
legality in the common law context. Section 3(1) can be seen not only as a mere re-statement 
of the principle of legality, but as a very strong re-enforcement of the principle. The courts 
are positively enjoined to actively strive to find a Convention-compatible interpretation. The 
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fact that this strong adjuration emanates from Parliament itself helps to cast away judicial 
inhibitions often occasioned by concerns about the need to ensure that parliamentary 
sovereignty is respected. Thus, as will be seen in the next chapter, the courts are able to 
ignore parliamentary intention in an Act of Parliament if that were necessary to protect the 
Convention rights. 
 
Be that as it may, the principle of legality continues to have relevance despite the coming 
into effect of section 3(1) of the 1998 Act. As has been pointed out earlier, the interpretative 
principle embodied in section 3(1) can be applied only in the context of the Convention 
rights domesticated by the 1998 Act. Its application is therefore subject to the requirements 
of the Act itself. Under section 7(1) of the 1998 Act, ―sufficient interest‖ is stringently 
defined such that only a victim of a breach of the Convention rights, or at least a potential 
victim thereof, can apply for judicial review under the Act. Therefore, no matter the degree 
of interest a person may have, if he is not a victim, or a potential victim, he would not be able 
to call in aid the interpretative principle embodied in section 3(1) of the Act. This situation is 
possible with bodies like the Equality and Human Rights Commission and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) who may have sufficient interest in a matter, but may 
be short of being a victim of an alleged breach of the Convention rights.  
 
On the other hand, the scope of application of the common law principle of legality is much 
wider and its application is not subject to any specific statutory limitation. The requirement 
of standing under the common law is simply ―sufficient interest‖, no more, no less. 
Therefore, a potential applicant who has sufficient interest in a matter but is unable to 
establish the victim requirement under section 7(3) of the 1998 Act, may rely the principle of 
legality in seeking to protect fundamental rights.  
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Section 4 of the Act provides for the making of a declaration of incompatibility. By section 
4(1) and (2), where a court finds that a provision of primary legislation is incompatible with 
the Convention rights, and that provision could not be interpreted compatibly with the 
Convention rights under section 3(1) of the Act, the court ―may‖ make a formal declaration 
of incompatibility. The use of the word, ―may‖, in section 4(2), indicates that the making of a 
declaration of incompatibility is discretionary and not at all mandatory. However, it is hard to 
imagine a situation where, having found that a provision in primary legislation is 
incompatible, and a section 3(1) interpretation is impossible in the circumstances of the case, 
the court also finds a declaration of incompatibility unnecessary. In other words, it would 
seem that in every case where a court finds a provision of primary legislation incompatible, 
and it could not interpret the provision compatibly with the Convention rights under section 
3(1), the only other option open to it would be to make a declaration of incompatibility under 
section 4. Section 3(1) interpretations and section 4 declarations are the two major means by 
which the Convention rights are to be enforced under the 1998 Act. The idea that a 
declaration of incompatibility should be discretionary seems to equate this statutory relief 
with an equitable one such as an injunctive relief. It is submitted that this is wrong. While 
factors such as the conduct of the applicant might influence the making of an equitable relief 
one way or the other, it is difficult to imagine how the applicant‘s conduct could be relevant 
to the decision whether to make a formal declaration of incompatibility under section 4(2), 
since, it has to be admitted, the main purpose of the declaration is to draw the attention of the 
executive and Parliament to the incompatibility so that remedial measures could be taken.  
 
The power to make a declaration of incompatibility is restricted to the superior courts listed 
in section 4(5) of the Act, namely, the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, the Courts-Martial Appeal Court, in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary sitting 
otherwise as a trial court or the Court of Session, and in England and Wales, or Northern 
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Ireland, the High Court or the Court of Appeal. A probable reason for restricting the power to 
make declarations of incompatibility to these courts only may be the desire to reduce the 
number of cases in which the Crown may be required, under section 5 of the Act, to be joined 
in legal proceedings. While this might save costs for the Crown, it could lead to more 
avoidable appeals being made from inferior courts to the superior courts, where the sole 
purpose might be to secure a formal declaration that could have been made by the inferior 
courts were they not statutorily prevented from making it.  
 
By section 4(6)(a) of the Act, a declaration of incompatibility ―does not affect the validity, 
continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given‖, and by 
section 4(6)(b), such a declaration ―is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it 
is made.‖ 
Section 4(6) is apparently intended to preserve parliamentary sovereignty. By enacting that a 
statutory provision judicially declared incompatible will continue to be in force, Parliament 
had made it clear that its sovereign will prevails over the Convention rights. A section 4 
declaration of incompatibility is meant to set in motion ministerial (and ultimately 
parliamentary) remedial action under section 10 and Schedule 2 of the Act. 
 
In terms of effectiveness as a means of enforcing the Convention rights, there is a marked 
difference between section 3(1) interpretations and section 4 declarations. A section 3(1) 
interpretation could be equivalent to a judicial amendment of the offending statutory 
provision.
445
 By it, the court could immediately remedy the breach by interpreting the 
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provision in a way that complies with the Convention rights. The practical effect would often 
be that, henceforth, the statutory provision would operate, or be enforced as if amended by 
the judgment of the court. No further legislative or executive measure would be required for 
the victor to enjoy the benefits of the judgment. And the fact that the resultant interpretation 
under section 3(1) is binding on the parties to the proceedings makes it even more effective as 
a means of enforcing the Convention rights. 
 
On the other hand, a section 4 declaration relies for its effectiveness, on the cooperation of 
the responsible minister, and ultimately, Parliament. Its value as a judicial remedy is limited 
to putting political pressure on the Government and Parliament to amend the offending 
legislation for the purpose of complying with the Convention rights. An applicant who 
succeeds in obtaining a declaration of incompatibility gets no immediate benefit in terms of 
vindicating his Convention rights; as a matter of fact, there is no legal guarantee that he 
would have his Convention rights vindicated as a result of the declaration.
446
 Thus, Ian Leigh 
and Laurence Lustgarten
447
 have stated that a declaration of incompatibility ―is 
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fundamentally inconsistent with the idea of vindicating individual rights, and it exacts a price: 
a litigant who has in a formal sense won a case is left empty-handed.‖448  
 
 
This difference in effectiveness between section 3(1) interpretations and section 4 
declarations might be responsible for many commentators holding a radical view of section 
3(1). They perceive it as the primary means by which the Convention rights are to be 
delivered. Thus, courts must make resourceful use of the interpretative obligation and strive 
to find a Convention-compatible meaning irrespective of the language used in the statutory 
provision. To such commentators, declarations of incompatibility should rarely be resorted to. 
It is submitted that this approach to the relationship between section 3(1) and section 4 is not 
borne out of the express provisions of the 1998 Act and does not take account of the fact that 
bringing rights home, as the Government put it, was meant to be a collective effort by all 
arms of Government, namely, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, each playing a 
part proportionate to its constitutional role within the framework of the unwritten British 
Constitution, which is underlined by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
As evident from the White Paper preceding the introduction of the Human Rights Bill into 
Parliament
449
, and from the 1998 Act itself,
450
 the model of rights protection which 
Parliament has chosen is one of democratic dialogue amongst the three main institutions of 
State, namely, Parliament, the executive and the judiciary. 
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Democratic dialogue is said to occur ―if judicial decision is open to legislative reversal, 
modification or avoidance.‖451 A good example of a democratic dialogue model of rights 
protection is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms mentioned earlier. As would be 
recalled, while the courts are given a general power to override legislative enactments on 
grounds of breach of the rights protected by the Charter, section 33(1) and (2) of the Charter 
reserves to the legislature power to make laws contrary to the rights if this intention is 
expressly stated in the enactment concerned. Thus, a judicial nullification of a piece of 
legislation can be overturned by the legislature simply by re-enacting the legislation with a 
provision that it is to apply notwithstanding any conflict with the rights protected under the 
Charter. 
 
The democratic dialogue model of rights protection under the Canadian Charter is not exactly 
the same as that under the British Human Rights Act 1998, but they share some similarity. 
Under the 1998 Act, unlike the Canadian Charter, courts do not have the power to strike 
down incompatible legislation. They can only interpret the legislation under section 3(1) in a 
manner compatible with the Convention rights if this is possible, otherwise a declaration of 
incompatibility is to be made under section 4 of the Act. However, the power of 
interpretation derived from section 3(1) can have the capacity, as will be seen in the next 
chapter, to substantially change the legal effect of legislative provisions such that the original 
provisions as enacted by Parliament become ineffective for all practical purposes. In 
substance, though not in language, this has similar effect as a judicial nullification of the 
original, offensive provisions.     
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In the above context, democratic dialogue models of rights protection can be seen in contra- 
distinction with constitutionally entrenched rights protection whereby the courts are 
empowered to strike down legislation for being incompatible with the constitutionally 
protected rights, and the legislature cannot reverse judicial decisions vindicating those rights. 
This is the case in the United States and Nigeria. 
 
The 1998 Act provides, as Young puts it, ―a legal mechanism for interaction between the 
judiciary and legislature.‖452 The main facilitators of this inter-institutional dialogue are 
sections 3 and 4. 
 
Section 3 of the Act, as has been explained above, appears to be the principal mechanism by 
which the Convention rights are to be protected by the domestic courts. However, as stated 
earlier, the section does not give to the courts the power to invalidate parliamentary 
enactments. The court can only use their interpretative powers as resourcefully as possible so 
that incompatible legislation could be interpreted and given effect in a way that is consistent 
with the Convention rights. As will be seen in the next chapter, the courts‘ use of their 
interpretative powers is increasingly becoming extremely resourceful such that they feel able 
to cast away concerns about breaching the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in their 
effort to effectively protect the Convention rights. Thus, in many cases, by use of section 3(1) 
of the 1998 Act, the courts are able to substantially modify the legal effect of legislation 
which they determine to be incompatible with the Convention rights. However, because 
Parliament reserves the power to reverse such judicial decisions, the resultant interpretation 
continues to have effect only as far as Parliament allows it. As Lord Steyn succinctly states in 
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Ghaidan v Mendoza
453
, a case in which the House of Lords made an extremely resourceful 
use of section 3(1), ―if Parliament disagrees with an interpretation by the courts under s. 3(1), 
it is free to override it by amending the legislation and expressly reinstating the 
incompatibility.‖ Thus, an interpretation under section 3(1), even though final and binding as 
regards the particular case in which it is given, can be reversed by Parliament in its general 
application. Section 3(1) therefore is a legal mechanism for democratic dialogue between the 
courts and Parliament. The courts are given as much latitude as possible to protect the 
Convention rights from encroachment by Parliament. On the other hand, as the 
democratically elected representatives of the citizenry, Parliament has the last say what 
values should in any particular circumstance be legally binding. 
 
Section 4 of the 1998 Act is also part of the mechanism for dialogue amongst the institutions 
of State. As stated earlier, a declaration of incompatibility under this section does not amount 
to a nullification of the offending legislative provision. Its intended purpose is to call the 
attention of the executive and Parliament to the incompatibility so that remedial action might 
be taken under section 10 of the Act. Thus, section 4 and 10 make it possible for all the 
institutions of State, the judiciary, the executive and Parliament, to partake in what is 
essentially a joint enterprise to protect the Convention rights. 
 
The principal reason for the preference for a democratic model of rights protection might be 
that it is undemocratic for the unelected judges to be given the power to strike down on 
legislation enacted by the democratically elected representatives of the people. Legally 
binding values, no matter how fundamental they are, must, ultimately, be left to the elected 
legislature. This is what one might call the democratic argument for a democratic dialogue 
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model of rights protection. It preserves democracy while at the same time protecting as much 
as possible fundamental rights of the individual. 
 
However, on analysis, the constitutionally entrenched model of rights protection may not be 
any less democratic. This is because the constitution itself, which contains both the 
entrenched rights as well as the judicial power to review and strike down offending 
legislation, can have democratic legitimacy if it emerges from a democratic process such as a 
referendum, as is usually the case. Further, even entrenched provisions in a constitution are 
usually open to amendment by legislative authorities, even if cumbersome. On the other 
hand, one important advantage which the constitutionally entrenched model of rights 
protection has over the democratic dialogue model is that the former may have a greater 
capacity to protect minority rights from being violated by the majority.  
 
It would appear therefore, that the overriding reason, at least in the United Kingdom, for the 
preference for a democratic dialogue model of rights protection is that it has no adverse 
implications for parliamentary sovereignty. In view of the constraints imposed by the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, courts could not be given the power to set aside 
offending parliamentary enactments. This much was stated in the White Paper preceding the 
introduction of the Human Rights Bill into Parliament.
 454
 Therefore, the best viable option 
seemed to be a model that enabled the courts to protect the Convention rights as much as they 
possibly can while preserving to Parliament the ultimate power to deliberately make laws 
notwithstanding any breach of the Convention rights.   
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In the context of the 1998 Act, democratic dialogue aims to balance the competing values of 
democracy and the Convention rights. Each institution of State has to take a balanced view of 
their respective duties and powers if the delicate balance between democracy and the 
Convention rights is to be achieved. The judiciary must show due deference to the legislature 
and the executive on issues where the Convention has granted to the Contracting States a 
discretionary area of judgment. This is especially required where the matter in question 
involves policy issues which can only be effectively dealt with after wide consultations and 
exhaustive parliamentary debates. 
 
On the other hand, Parliament must respect judicial decisions in areas where the courts 
traditionally have special expertise. Therefore, on issues which come within the traditional 
sphere of the courts, such as issues of fair hearing and access to court, Parliament should not 
intervene and reverse judicial vindications thereof.  
 
As Young observed
455
, a democratic dialogue model of rights protection can only be justified 
if it is capable of delineating a middle ground between rights protection and democracy so 
that the one does not overwhelm the other. The 1998 Act does not contain a clearly expressed 
delineation. Therefore, its success as a model of rights protection depends, as have been 
stated, on each institution taking a balanced view as they dialogue amongst themselves. In 
dealing with the Convention rights, each institution of State must impose a certain level of 
self-restraint in relation to the other as may be appropriate having regard to the context of 
each case.   
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It seems clear from a reading of the provisions of section 3(1) and section 4, and also from 
the case law on the 1998 Act which will be examined in the next chapter, that a section 3(1) 
interpretation affords a stronger protection of the Convention rights than a section 4 
declaration of incompatibility. This is because, as Young quite rightly stated, ―.... To interpret 
a statute in a manner compatible with a Convention right ensures that the Convention right is 
legally protected.‖456 On the other hand, as has been stated earlier, a section 4 declaration 
gives the applicant no legally enforceable victory. A declaration under that section amounts 
to no more than an advisory opinion that the statutory provision in question is incompatible 
with the Convention rights. The executive, and ultimately, Parliament, is thereby notified of 
the incompatibility. The ultimate decision to modify the offending statutory provision is 
Parliament‘s to take. And in this, it has absolute discretion because one of the main themes 
that permeate the 1998 Act is that parliamentary sovereignty is left untouched. Therefore, as 
Young observed
457, ―those preferring a model of parliamentary sovereignty advocate a more 
restrictive role for the courts,‖ preferring less use of section 3(1) interpretation and more use 
of section 4 declarations, thereby allowing Parliament, rather than the judges, to set legally 
binding norms. Conversely, those who advocate some form of constitutional sovereignty, 
where courts would be able to exercise greater authority to fully protect the Convention rights 
from parliamentary encroachment prefer more use of section 3(1) interpretation and less use 
of section 4 declarations.  
Thus, the interplay between section 3(1) interpretation and section 4 declarations has been 
described by Danny Nicol as ―the judge‘s dilemma.‖458 It is respectfully submitted that this 
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characterisation gives the wrong impression that notwithstanding the peculiar contextual 
background to a case at hand, judges are constrained to simply choose between one of the 
two ―competing‖ provisions according to their preference for parliamentary sovereignty or 
constitutional sovereignty, as the case may be. Not surprisingly, the decision in R v A 
(No.2)
459
 (examined in the next chapter), a case in which the House of Lords made an 
extremely resourceful use of section 3(1) interpretation, was seen by Nicol as a victory of 
section 3(1) over section 4; and Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan); 
Re W (Minors) (Care Order: Adequacy of Care Plan) (co-joined appeals)
460
,  R (on the 
application of Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
461
, and Bellinger v 
Bellinger
462
 cases (all examined in the next chapter) in which the House of Lords declined to 
use section 3(1) to modify seemingly incompatible legislative provisions, were interpreted in 
terms of the judiciary resiling from its previous acceptance of section 3(1) as the correct 
approach to human rights adjudication under the 1998 Act.
463
  
Aileen Kavanagh
464
 disagrees with the view indicated above, arguing that ―it is the context 
and individual circumstances of the case which explains the difference of judicial approach, 
rather than any fundamental change of mind about the possibilities of s. 3(1).‖ It is submitted 
that this is a more preferable view than that of Nicol. As will be seen in the next chapter, a 
number of factors may account for a court declining to use its power of interpretation under 
section 3(1) in a particular case even though it might have been possible in principle to 
modify the offending statutory provision concerned. For example, in Re S, it was not possible 
to identify the particular provision in the Children Act 1989 that the court could have 
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modified by way of section 3(1) interpretation. Therefore, even though the Children Act, 
taken as a whole, might have the potential of contravening the Convention rights, a court 
could not remedy any incompatibility without re-writing a substantial part of the statute with 
far-reaching practical ramifications for executive bodies in terms of new procedures and 
resources. A judicial attempt to do so would very likely cross the border between 
interpretation and legislation. On the other hand, no such circumstances arose in R v A.  
To confirm that the House of Lords, in deciding Re S and Anderson the way they did, did not 
resile, as suggested by Nicol, from further use of section 3(1) interpretation, their Lordships‘ 
decision in the subsequent cases of Ghaidan v Mendoza
465
 and Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (Respondent) v MB (FC) (Appellant); Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Respondent) v AF (FC) (Appellant); Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Appellant) v AF (FC) (Respondent) (conjoined appeals)
466
 (examined in the 
next chapter) indicated that in appropriate cases, the courts would continue to protect the 
Convention rights by use of their interpretative powers under section 3(1). As will be seen in 
the next chapter, the House, similar to what happened in R v A, made highly resourceful use 
of section 3(1) in order to bring the offending statutory provisions in line with the Convention 
rights. 
It is clear from the case law, which is dealt with in the next chapter, that while it may 
sometimes be theoretically possible to modify primary legislation by use of section 3(1) 
interpretation, the court might nevertheless find it undesirable or inappropriate to do so, 
having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case at hand.  
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Section 6 of the 1998 Act continues the notion of giving further effect to the Convention 
rights while simultaneously seeking to preserve parliamentary sovereignty. The section, while 
apparently aiming to instill a culture of respect for the Convention rights by forbidding public 
authorities to act in a way that is incompatible with the Convention rights, also preserves 
parliamentary sovereignty and the principle of parliamentary privilege.  
 
By section 6(1), ―it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible 
with a Conventional right.‖ Under section 6(3) a public authority refers to courts and 
tribunals
467
 and ―any person or authority certain of whose functions are of a public nature.‖468 
This latter provision in section 6(3)(b) is apparently intended to make it clear that apart from 
the ordinary public authorities such as Ministers, government departments and agencies, the 
police and the armed forces, etc, any person who, though not ordinarily a public officer or 
body, perform some public functions, would be subject to section 6(1) as far as those public 
functions affect the Convention rights. Thus, a private security firm, though not a public body 
in the ordinary sense of the term, would be subject to section 6(1) if it is given contractual 
duties to maintain or secure government prison facilities.  
 
The inclusion of courts and tribunals within the definition of a public authority means that in 
performing their judicial functions, judges are under an obligation, just as other public bodies 
are, to ensure that the Convention rights are complied with in the way they make their 
decisions.  
 
It is noteworthy that section 6(3) expressly excludes the Houses of Parliament ―or a person 
exercising functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament‖ from the definition of a 
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public authority. What this means is that the subsection protects the acts of either Houses of 
Parliament from judicial intervention. Apparently, this protection would extend to ministerial 
functions if they are performed ―in connection with proceedings in Parliament.‖ However, it 
must be made clear that ministerial functions derived from primary legislation can have no 
protection under the last-mentioned provision as such functions cannot generally be regarded 
as functions ―in connection with proceedings in Parliament.‖  
 
Apparently, the exclusion of the Houses of Parliament from the category of public authorities 
is a statutory recognition of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as well as the principle 
of parliamentary privilege, and an indication that courts are meant to respect parliamentary 
enactments even where they infringe on the Convention rights, if the enactments concerned 
cannot be interpreted in accordance with section 3(1) of the 1998 Act. 
 
While section 6(1) makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with the Convention rights, section 6(2)(a) and (b) provide possible defences to 
allegations of unlawfulness brought under section 6(1). First, under section 6(2)(a), section 
6(1) would not apply if ―as a result of one or more provisions of primary legislation, the 
authority could not have acted differently.‖ This defence applies if the public authority was 
required to act the way it did so that a statutory duty imposed on it is complied with. In R (on 
the application of Hooper) v Secretary of State for Works and Pensions
469
, the claimants who 
were widowers challenged the Secretary of State‘s decision not to pay them benefits which 
would have been payable to widows under sections 36 and 38 of the Social Security 
Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 as being discriminatory under Article 14 of the 
Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of the First Protocol, and therefore unlawful 
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under section 6(1) of the 1998 Act. The House of Lords held that since it was clear that the 
1992 Act required payments to be made to widows only, it meant that the Secretary of State 
was under a statutory duty not to make equivalent payments to widowers as making such 
payments would ―subvert the intention of Parliament.‖470 Thus, the Secretary of State‘s 
decision was excused by section 6(2)(a) of the 1998 Act. Similarly, where a public authority 
has no power to act otherwise than as mandated by the enabling statute, the defence under 
section 6(2)(a) would avail it because, as the section provides, the authority ―could not have 
acted differently.‖471 
 
 Secondly, by section 6(2)(b), the public authority would equally be excused if it were 
mandatory that it acted the way it did so as to give effect to, or enforce the provisions of, 
primary legislation which could not be interpreted in accordance with section 3(1) of the 
1998 Act. In other words, if a decision not to exercise the power would amount to repealing 
or making ineffective the statutory provision by which Parliament has clearly granted the 
power, then the action of the public authority would be excused.
472
 
 
Thus, the defences available under section 6(2)(a) and (b) will generally not apply if the act 
concerned was discretionary in nature such that the authority could have acted differently, or 
could have chosen not to act at all in a particular case. In other words, the combined effect of 
the provisions of section 6(1) and (2) is that a public authority cannot rely on the sole fact that 
the act complained of was taken in exercise of discretionary powers granted under primary 
legislation; this by itself does not qualify as a defence since the authority would necessarily 
be able to exercise a discretionary power, by virtue of the very nature of such a power, either 
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to act differently, or to chose not to act at all, if Convention rights are likely to be breached in 
the circumstances of the particular case.  
 
Thus, the nature of the defences in section 6(2)(a) and (b), read in conjunction with section 
6(1) and the courts‘ interpretative obligation in section 3(1), indicates quite clearly that with 
the coming into operation of the 1998 Act, discretionary powers granted to the executive are 
subject not only to the relevant enabling statutes by virtue of which those powers are 
exercised, but also to relevant provisions of the 1998 Act. This is because section 6(1) makes 
it ―unlawful‖ for a public authority to act contrary to the Convention rights. Therefore, apart 
from ensuring that discretionary powers are duly exercised within the confines of the 
enabling statute, courts must ensure that they are also exercised in a manner that leaves 
untouched the Convention rights. In this respect, the courts‘ interpretative power under 
section 3(1) of the 1998 Act can be utilized to read into the enabling statutory provision an 
implied provision that the discretionary powers granted thereby are to be exercised without 
prejudice to the Convention rights of persons affected.
473
 Therefore, discretionary powers 
exercised in a manner that contravenes the Convention rights will be regarded by the courts 
as unlawful and ultra vires.
474
 
 
Before the 1998 Act came into existence, the basis of judicial review of discretionary powers 
was the common law. Under that regime, the focus of the courts, when reviewing the exercise 
of a discretionary power, was the power itself, examined against the enabling statute under 
which the discretionary power was exercised. The court‘s duty was to ensure that 
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discretionary powers were exercised subject to a duty not to exceed the powers granted by the 
enabling statute, and that the public body concerned acted rationally and fairly.
475
 So far as 
the enabling statute was clear and unambiguous, the courts could not review the statute itself. 
Thus, subject to the principle of legality, if a public body acted within the confines of the 
enabling statute in a rational and fair manner, its actions could not be regarded as unlawful or 
ultra vires merely because fundamental rights were breached. The courts emphasized that it 
was not part of their judicial functions to review the merits of the executive discretionary 
decision being challenged.  
 
However, under the 1998 Act, when reviewing discretionary powers, the primary focus is on 
the Convention rights; the court‘s duty is to ensure that the Convention rights are left intact. 
As has been quite rightly stated, ―… an inevitable and intended effect of section 6(1) is to 
transform discretionary powers into duties to act or not to act where this is required to ensure 
compatibility with the Convention.‖476 In other words, where the exercise of a discretionary 
power would breach the Convention rights in a particular case, the 1998 Act imposes a duty 
on the public authority concerned to make an exception in that case so that the Convention 
rights are not breached. 
 
The standard of review, or the degree of scrutiny exerted on discretionary powers granted to 
the executive differ under the two regimes, i.e. the common law and the 1998 Act. The 
standard of review under the common law is Wednesbury unreasonableness developed by 
Lord Greene in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporaton.
477
 In 
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Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister of Stat for Civil Service (the GCHQ case)
478
, Lord 
Diplock characterized this as irrationality ―so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of 
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to 
be decided could have arrived at it.‖ In Smith and Grady v United Kingdom,479 a case in 
which the United Kingdom domestic courts had applied a ―heightened scrutiny‖ form of 
Wednesbury unreasonableness, (or irrationality), where the threshold by which executive 
discretionary actions may be held unreasonable was much lowered than it used to, the 
European Court nevertheless indicated clearly that the Wednesbury standard, (whether in its 
traditional form or its ―heightened scrutiny‖ form) did not afford an effective degree of 
judicial scrutiny of discretionary powers that interfered with an individual‘s Convention 
rights. The Court stated: 
 
―The threshold at which the High Court and the Court of Appeal could find the 
Ministry of Defence policy irrational was placed so high that it effectively excluded 
any consideration by the domestic courts of the question of whether the interference 
with the applicants‘ rights answered a pressing need or was proportionate to the 
national security and public order aims pursued, principles which lie at the heart of 
the court‘s analysis of complaints under article 8 of the Convention.‖480 
 
 
The implication of the above statement is that where Convention rights are involved, it would 
not be sufficient for the United Kingdom courts to review the exercise of executive 
discretionary powers on the basis of Wednesbury unreasonableness only. The courts must go 
beyond that. They must apply principles of proportionality in order to determine the 
compatibility of the discretionary action with the Convention rights.  
 
 
                                                 
478
 [1985]AC 374 
479
 [1999] 29 EHRR 493 
480
 Ibid, at p. 543, paragraph 138. 
226 
 
It seems to have now been recognised even by the domestic courts that judicial scrutiny of 
discretionary powers by Wednesbury standards may not always afford adequate protection of 
the Convention rights, for, as observed by Lord Cooke in Regina (Daly) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department
481, ―only a very extreme degree (of unreasonableness) can bring an 
administrative decision within the legitimate scope of judicial invalidation.‖ 
 
It would appear that to satisfy the requirement in Article 13 of the Convention to provide an 
effective remedy for a breach of the Convention rights, discretionary powers granted 
executive bodies have to be subjected to the proportionality test formulated by the European 
Court, if traditional Wednesbury unreasonableness would not provide an effective remedy. 
Thus, in Daly’s case482, even though the House of Lords decided the case on the ―orthodox 
domestic approach to judicial review,
483
 there were indications, particularly from the 
statement of Lord Steyn, that had it been necessary, the House would have had to review the 
executive decision concerned by considering not only the question whether the executive 
decision was authorised by its enabling statute, and that it was reasonable in the Wednesbury 
sense, but also whether the interference with the Convention right of the applicant was 
justified in the sense that it had a legitimate public objective, and that the degree of 
interference was not greater than was necessary to achieve the legitimate objective.
484
 If the 
curtailment of a Convention right has no legitimate purpose, no discretionary decision can be 
allowed to breach the Convention rights. Even if the court finds that the curtailment has a 
legitimate objective, it still has to assess whether the curtailment is greater than is necessary 
to achieve the objective. If the answer is in the negative, then the decision is liable to be 
quashed. In cases calling for a balance to be struck between competing interests, usually, the 
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interests of the State and the general public on the one hand, and the Convention rights of the 
individual on the other hand, it is for the court to determine for itself the appropriate balance. 
 
Because the application of the proportionality test involves a much more intensive scrutiny 
and may, as Lord Steyn observed, ―require the reviewing court to assess the balance which 
the decision maker has struck‖485, there are concerns as to whether this means that courts are 
thereby empowered to review the merits of the executive decision being challenged, 
something the courts have declined to do in the traditional approach to judicial review of the 
exercise of discretionary powers. However, Lord Steyn gave assurance that the application of 
the proportionality test ―does not mean a shift to merits review.‖486 This view was confirmed 
by Lord Bingham in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Abu-Qulbain v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department; Kashmiri v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (conjoined appeals)
487
  
 
It is submitted that despite these assurances, the application of the proportionality test sits 
uncomfortably with the notion that courts are not to review the merits of the decision as taken 
by the decision maker. An investigation of the question whether the decision had a legitimate 
purpose, and that the extent of encroachment on the Convention rights was no more than 
necessary to achieve the purpose, would likely require, at least to some degree, a review of 
the discretionary decision itself. This appears to be all the more so when the court has to 
determine the appropriate balance between the rights of the individual on the one hand, and 
the interests of the State and the society on the other hand, in order to determine the 
compatibility of the decision with the Convention right concerned. Probably the best 
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understanding of the above judicial assurances would be that in reviewing discretionary 
powers, courts must not totally assume the position of the decision maker. The courts must 
give due regard to the doctrine of the Separation of Powers and recognise that administrative 
decisions are traditionally within the scope of authority of the executive arm. Therefore, due 
deference must be accorded to such decisions, and any discretions allowed to domestic 
legislative and executive authorities by the Convention must be properly taken into account 
by the courts. 
 
To reiterate, the combined effect of sections 3(1) and 6(1) is that all executive discretionary 
powers granted by Parliament are now to be exercised subject to the implied provision that 
the Convention rights are left untouched.  
 
When a court makes a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the 1998 Act, in 
effect, it passes the matter to the appropriate Minister of the Crown who may, under section 
10 of the Act, proceed to amend the offending statutory provision to cure the incompatibility. 
Section 10(2) enables the Minister to amend even primary legislation by order,
488
 if this were 
necessary to remove the incompatibility. This avoids the cumbersome and often drawn-out 
process of amending the offending provision by the passage of an Act of Parliament. Section 
10(2) indicates that despite a declaration of incompatibility by a court, the Minister retains 
discretion to decide whether to proceed to amend the incompatible legislation or not. The 
provision in section 10(2) is to the effect that the Minister ―may‖489 make the amendment if 
he considers that there are ―compelling reasons‖ for doing so. A judgment of a competent 
court of law in the United Kingdom, which takes into account the jurisprudence of the 
European Court in making a declaration of incompatibility, would likely constitute a 
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―compelling reason‖ for the responsible Minister to proceed to amend the legislation in 
question. However, the Minister‘s consideration of what amounts to a compelling reason 
would not be subject to judicial review. Hence, the full effectiveness of section 4 declarations 
depends in large measure on the cooperation of the Minister and Parliament.  
 
 
While Henry VIII powers are granted to the responsible Minister enabling him to amend 
primary legislation,
490
 prior parliamentary approval
491
 would normally be required in 
accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Schedule 2 to the 1998 Act. For urgent cases coming 
under paragraph 2(b) of Schedule 2, subsequent parliamentary approval would be necessary 
for the remedial order to continue in force beyond a period of 120 days beginning from the 
day the order was made.
492
 This requirement of parliamentary approval enables Parliament to 
participate in the remedial process initiated by the court.  
 
 
To complete the notion of giving further effect to the Convention rights, section 19(1) of the 
1998 Act, which deals with ministerial statements of compatibility, requires the responsible 
Minister in charge of a Bill in either House of Parliament, when introducing the Bill, to 
 
―(a) make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of the Bill are        
compatible with the Convention rights (―a statement of compatibility‖); or 
(b) make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to make a statement of 
compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the 
Bill.‖ 
 
                                                 
490
 See section 10(2) of the 1998 Act and paragraph 1of Schedule 2 to the Act.  
491
 By way of a resolution of each House of Parliament 
492
 See paragraph 4(4) of Schedule 2 to the 1998 Act. 
230 
 
Section 19(2) requires the statement to be in writing. The statement has to be made before the 
Second Reading of every Bill in each House of Parliament. Thus, for example, where a Bill 
has been passed in the House of Commons before it is introduced in the House of Lords, the 
appropriate Minister of Government in the House of Lords would have to make another 
statement in accordance with section 19 before the Second Reading of the Bill in the House 
of Lords. The statement in the House of Lords would have to take into account any 
amendments that might have been made to the Bill during debates in the House of 
Commons.
493
 The required statement is usually made on the face of the Bill, and the 
Explanatory Notes which now accompany Bills contain a brief reference to the ministerial 
statement made pursuant to section 19(1).
494
 
 
Obviously, section 19 statements apply to all primary legislation without exception, but only 
to primary legislation and not to subsidiary legislation. This is because the section refers to 
Bills only. Consequently, there is no statutory obligation to make a section 19(1) statement in 
a draft statutory instrument or other subsidiary legislation taken before Parliament for 
approval. However, the Government has urged Ministers to make statements similar to those 
required by section 19(1). In particular, Ministers have been requested to always make such 
statements where the proposed subsidiary legislation would have the effect of amending 
primary legislation.
495
  
 
The aim of the requirement to make a statement under section 19(1) seems to be to forewarn 
Members of Parliament of probable Convention-rights implications of the Bill, thus 
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generating vigorous debates where there might be a likely infringement of the Convention 
rights.
496
  
 
It has to be noted that the requirements under section 19 apply only to ministers of the 
Government who introduce Government-sponsored Bills into Parliament. It follows therefore 
that a Member of Parliament who introduces a Private Member‘s Bill would be under no 
obligation to make compatibility statements under the section. Considering the expected 
objective of section 19, which is to draw the attention of members of Parliament to 
Convention issues that may likely arise in the Bill being introduced, there appears to be no 
reasonable grounds for not extending the requirements contained in the section to members of 
Parliament who introduce Private Member‘s Bill. Ostensibly to mitigate this apparent 
shortcoming, whenever a Private Member‘s Bill is directly assisted by the Government (i.e., 
―a Government handout‖), the Minister of the Government department responsible for the 
policy covered by the Bill is now expected, as a matter of good practice, to express the 
Government‘s views on the compatibility of the proposed legislative provisions with the 
Convention rights during the Second Reading of the Bill.
497
 
 
It would appear that a simple statement reflecting the wording of section 19(1)(a) or (b) 
would be sufficient to meet the requirements therein contained. The Minister making the 
statement is under no statutory obligation to state the reasons why he thinks the provisions of 
the Bill would be compatible with the Convention rights, or why he is unable to make a 
statement of compatibility. In practice, ministerial statements have been quite brief and 
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straight-forward. Usually, no reasons are disclosed. The standard form of the statement under 
section 19(1)(a), as provided in the Government‘s Guidance for Departments is as follows: 
―In my view the provisions of the … Bill are compatible with the Convention rights.‖ And 
under section 19(1)(b), the following statement suffices: ―I am unable to make a statement 
that in my view the provisions of the … Bill are compatible with the Convention rights but 
the Government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill.‖498 However, the 
Government has undertaken that Ministers would be ready to give a general outline of the 
arguments leading to the conclusions reflected in the statements which they have given 
pursuant to section 19(1).
499
 Thus, whenever a Convention issue arises during parliamentary 
debates, a Minister should, as much as possible, without normally compromising privileged 
information regarding specific legal advice, disclose the underlying reasons informing his 
views on issues of compatibility with the Convention rights. 
 
While the use of the word, ―must‖ in relation to ministerial statements in section 19 suggests 
that it is obligatory for the Minister to make the statement as required, it is submitted that 
failure to make the statement would not affect the validity of the eventual legislation; 
otherwise, the principle of parliamentary privilege would be breached.
500
 
 
A decision to make the required ministerial statement under section 19(1)(a) means that the 
minister is confident in his view that the Bill is compatible with the Convention rights. He 
normally should obtain legal advice which would take into account the Convention rights and 
the jurisprudence both of the domestic courts and the European Court. At the very minimum, 
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a statement under section 19(1)(a) should be made only if ―it is more likely than not that the 
provisions of the Bill will stand up to challenge on Convention grounds.‖501 Thus, where the 
chances either way are 50-50, a minister should normally make the statement under section 
19(1)(b). This is because section 19(1)(a) requires a reasonable degree of certainty 
concerning the Minister‘s view; whereas section 19(1)(b) applies both to circumstances 
where the Minister thinks that the Bill would not stand up to a Convention challenge, as well 
as to circumstances where he is ―unable‖ to come to a definite conclusion on the issue of 
compatibility, despite the presence of strong arguments in favour of the Bill being 
compatible.   
 
Ministerial statements made under section 19(1)(a) have no legal effect on the question 
whether the resultant legislation is compatible with the Convention rights. As Lord Hope 
observed in R v A, (examined in the next chapter) such statements ―are no more than 
expressions of opinion by the minister. They are not binding on the court, nor do they have 
any persuasive authority.‖502 Because of the very nature of ministerial statements under 
section 19(1)(a), sometimes situations occur where the court‘s view on compatibility seem to 
differ from the view expressed by the Minister. For example, in R v A
503
, despite the 
Minister‘s statement that in his view the Bill which became the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 was compatible with the Convention rights, the House of Lords decided 
that the total denial of judicial discretion in section 41 of the Act had the capacity to offend 
the Convention right to a fair trial in some cases. It therefore used its interpretative power 
under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act to read into section 41 of the 1999 Act a proviso that 
ensured compatibility with the Convention rights. It has been observed that where a minister 
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makes the required statement under section 19(1)(a), and the Bill is passed in substantially 
the same form as it was introduced, judicial use of section 3(1) interpretation to modify the 
resultant statutory provisions to bring them in conformity with the Convention rights can 
more easily be defended as ―permissible interpretation‖ rather than ―impermissible 
legislation.‖504 
 
It might be suggested that a statement under section 19(1)(a) might constitute a sort of 
estoppel, preventing the Government from advancing arguments inconsistent with the 
Minister‘s statement of compatibility in a case in which the Government is a party.505 Such a 
suggestion must be taken with caution. While in the interpretation of contractual documents, 
the statements of the parties to the contract might well be decisive of their legal rights; the 
same could not be said of the interpretation of statutes. Granted that a ministerial statement 
under section 19(1)(a) may support a presumption that the legislation was not intended to be 
in breach of the Convention rights, it would be inappropriate to treat it in the same way a 
contractual statement would likely be treated. Statutes are normally of general application. It 
would be inappropriate for the courts to arrive at a particular interpretation of a statutory 
provision in one case, and another interpretation of the same statutory provision in another 
case simply because the Government was a party in the first case and was not a party in the 
second case.  
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On the other hand, ministerial statements made under section 19(1)(b) are no indication that 
the Government intended the resultant legislation to apply notwithstanding any 
incompatibility with the Convention rights. As indicated earlier, a statement under section 
19(1)(b) may be made if there are reasonable doubts as to whether the provisions of the Bill 
would stand up to a Convention challenge. In R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary 
of State for Culture, Media and Sport
506
, it appears that although the Secretary of State was of 
the view, having received legal advice, that the Bill which became the Communication Act 
2003, and which contained a blanket prohibition of political advertising by bodies whose aim 
is wholly or mainly political in nature, was compatible with the Convention rights, she 
nevertheless made the required statement under section 19(1)(b) rather than section 19(1)(a). 
This seemed to have been due to an earlier decision of the European Court in VgT Verein 
gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland
507
 which raised doubts as to whether the Bill could stand up 
to legal challenge for being incompatible with Article 10 of the Convention.
508
 The House of 
Lords cleared whatever doubts that existed when it decided that the ban, as it operated, was 
not incompatible with Article 10 of the Convention.  
 
It has to be noted that the Animal Defenders case involved a qualified right rather than an 
absolute one. It was one in which Parliament was allowed a discretionary area of judgment. 
Where a qualified right is concerned, the fact that the ministerial statement was made under 
section 19(1)(b) rather than 19(1)(a) may be significant to the court‘s consideration of the 
question whether the statute is compatible with the Convention right. If the Bill was passed in 
substantially the same form as introduced by the minister, the court is likely to allow 
Parliament any discretion available to it to the fullest extent possible. This is because the 
judgment of Parliament on the issue on which it has legislated in full awareness of the 
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possibility that it might not stand up to a Convention challenge, ―should not be lightly 
overridden‖ by the court.509  
 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
It is observed that the central theme that permeates the 1998 Act is the idea that the 
Convention rights should be domestically available in law within the restrictions imposed by 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The major means of making the rights available 
domestically were section 3(1) interpretations and section 4 declarations. These, together 
with the provisions in sections 6 and 10, indicate that courts were not expected, under the 
terms of the 1998 Act, to undermine the will of Parliament under the guise of statutory 
interpretation. While the rule of interpretation contained in section 3(1) of the Act is an 
important means of delivering the Convention rights, there is nothing in the Act to suggest 
that the courts are thereby authorised to nullify what they determine to be the true effect of 
unambiguous legislative provisions solely on the ground of incompatibility with the 
Convention rights. 
 
However, as the limit of the interpretative obligation was not made expressly clear, it falls on 
the courts themselves to define the scope of the obligation. In the next chapter, judicial 
approaches to interpretation pursuant to the interpretative obligation under section 3(1) will 
be examined. 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION UNDER SECTION 3(1) HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 
 ―It is now plain that the incorporation of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms into our domestic law 
will subject the entire legal system to a fundamental process of review and, where 
necessary, reform by the judiciary‖510  
 
I. Introduction 
 
The main aim of this chapter of the thesis is to examine judicial approaches to the 
interpretation and application of primary legislation found to contravene rights guaranteed by 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
511
 
pursuant to the courts‘ interpretative obligation contained in section 3(1) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. The differing approaches adopted by the judges will be analysed, and their 
impact on the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty will be assessed. The different 
approaches adopted mirror the respective judges‘ perception of the interpretative obligation 
under section 3(1) of the Act. As will be observed in the course of the chapter, the dominant 
approach seems to indicate that the courts feel able to judicially modify offending (but 
otherwise clear and unambiguous) provisions of primary legislation if this were necessary to 
achieve compatibility with Convention rights. It will be argued that, in interpreting primary 
legislation found to be in breach of Convention rights, increasingly, the courts appear to be 
less concerned with the possibility of contradicting the traditional concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty and more concerned with the desire to protect Convention rights. Thus, except in 
cases where the courts appear to lack the institutional competence necessary to deal with an 
issue before them, they tend to take it upon themselves to rectify the legislative breach of 
                                                 
510
 Lord Hope in R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebeline and others; R v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, ex parte Rechachi [2000] 2 AC 326 [1999] 4 All ER 801; [1999] 3 WLR 972; [2000] 1 Cr App 
Rep 275 
 
511
 Ratified by the United Kingdom in March 1951. Hereafter, it will be simply called ―the Convention‖, and the 
rights guaranteed under it will be called ―the Convention rights.‖  
238 
 
Convention rights. This, it will be submitted, goes beyond the conventional ways of statutory 
interpretation discussed in chapter 3 above, and profoundly challenges the traditional concept 
of parliamentary sovereignty discussed in chapter 2.   
 
II. Judicial Approaches to Interpretation Pursuant to Section 3(1)  
 
An examination of the case law reveals two distinctive judicial approaches to the 
interpretation and application of primary legislation pursuant to section 3(1) of the 1998 Act. 
One approach, typified by Lord Steyn‘s judgment in R v A,512 appears to place the protection 
of Convention rights over and above concerns for a possible breach of the traditional concept 
of parliamentary sovereignty. For proponents of this approach, section 3(1) enables the courts 
to judicially rectify legislative breaches of the Convention rights by way of judicial 
amendments in appropriate cases. The other approach, typified by Lord Hope‘s judgment, 
also in R v A, appears to be more cautious, placing more emphasis on the need not to 
encroach on Parliament‘s authority to legislate as it pleases. As will be seen shortly, in R v A, 
the approach adopted by Lord Steyn prevailed over that adopted by Lord Hope. 
 
R v A concerned the interpretation and application of the provisions of section 41, and in 
particular, subsection (3)(c), of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
513
 The 
relevant provisions of section 41 as well as their legislative history are contained in Appendix 
4.  
 
In R v A, the defendant was charged with the offence of rape. He did not deny that he had 
sexual intercourse with the complainant. However, he claimed that the complainant 
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consented to the sexual intercourse that took place; alternatively, that he reasonably believed 
that she consented. 
 
In furtherance of his defence, the defendant, at a preliminary hearing,
514
 applied to the court 
for leave to cross-examine the complainant on an alleged sexual relationship that he had with 
her within the three weeks preceding the alleged rape.  
 
The trial court refused the application, stating that the defendant could not be allowed to give 
evidence, either directly or by way of cross-examination, of the complainant‘s prior sexual 
history.  
 
The court relied on the so-called rape shield provisions contained in section 41(3)(b) and (c) 
of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999
515, in refusing the defendant‘s 
application. 
 
The defendant‘s ability to fulfill these conditions stipulated in section 41(3)(b) and (c) was 
apparently nil. It was not being claimed that the complainant‘s alleged sexual activities with 
the defendant had taken place ―at or about the same time‖ with the event in question, as 
required by section 41(3)(b). Neither was it suggested that the previous sexual behaviour of 
the complainant was ―so similar‖ to her sexual behaviour at the event in question, as required 
by section 41(3)(c). 
 
                                                 
514
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The purpose of seeking to adduce the evidence was clearly to buttress the defendant‘s 
defence that the complainant consented to the sexual intercourse that took place; 
alternatively, that he genuinely believed that she consented to the sexual intercourse. 
 
While the trial judge refused the defendant‘s application to adduce evidence of his previous 
sexual relationship with the complainant because the proposed evidence fell short of the 
conditions imposed by section 41(3)(b) and (c), he nevertheless observed that his ruling 
might infringe the defendant‘s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. He 
subsequently granted leave to the defendant to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while evidence of the complainant‘s previous sexual 
relationship with the defendant was admissible under section 41(3)(a) of the 1999 Act in 
relation to his alternative defence of belief in the complainant‘s consent, the same evidence 
could not be admitted in support of the defence of consent itself since the conditions 
stipulated in section 41(3)(b) and (c) were absent. 
 
It was common ground that the above being so, the trial judge would in due course, have to 
direct the jury to disregard any evidence of the complainant‘s previous sexual activity with 
the defendant as far as the issue of her consent was concerned.  
 
Like the trial court below, the Court of Appeal observed that disregarding the evidence of the 
complainant‘s previous sexual relationship with the defendant might violate the defendant‘s 
right to a fair trial because such evidence may be relevant both to the issue of belief in 
consent as well as to the issue of consent itself. 
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It allowed the appeal. 
 
The prosecution appealed to the House of Lords. 
 
It was common ground amongst all their Lordships that the provisions of section 41, and 
in particular, section 41(3)(b) and (c), were clear and unambiguous.516 As can be seen in 
Appendix 4, the conditions which must be present before a trial judge could exercise his 
discretion to allow or disallow sexual history evidence are clearly stated in section 
41(3)(b) and (c). These conditions are mandatory and cannot be waived by the judge. 
 
Two specific issues arose for the determination of the House. The first issue was whether, 
giving their clear and unambiguous meaning, the effect of the exclusionary provisions 
contained in section 41(3)(c) was such that they may infringe the right of a defendant to a fair 
trial as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. 
 
If the above issue were resolved in the affirmative, the second issue was whether the House 
could judicially modify the provision to make it Convention-compatible by use of its 
interpretative power under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act.517 
 
Lord Steyn who delivered the lead judgment,518 expressed the view that the restrictions 
imposed on the admissibility of the sexual history of a complainant with third parties was 
justified in that such evidence was almost always irrelevant. However, the severe restriction 
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imposed on the admissibility of the sexual history of the complainant with the defendant 
himself ―poses an acute problem of proportionality.‖519  
 
This problem arises because there are two interests to be protected by Parliament in these 
circumstances. On the one hand, there is the interest of the complainant to be protected from 
being harassed in court by unnecessary questioning on her sexual history. On the other hand, 
there is the interest of the defendant to be afforded the opportunity of adequately defending 
himself by allowing him full presentation of all relevant evidence in support of his defence. 
 
Thus, for Lord Steyn, the question was whether Parliament struck the right balance between 
these competing interests when it enacted these restrictions in section 41(3)(b) and (c) of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
 
Counsel for the Secretary of State had argued, relying on the case of Brown v Stott520 that it 
was within the discretionary area of judgment for Parliament to make the decision as to the 
appropriate point of balance between the competing interest of the complainant and that of 
the defendant.521 Thus, it would be inappropriate for the court to impose its own views of 
what the point of balance should be. The court should, on democratic grounds, defer to the 
judgment of Parliament. 
 
While agreeing with the general principle stated above, Lord Steyn countered that ―when the 
question arises whether in the criminal statute in question Parliament adopted a legislative 
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scheme which makes an excessive inroad into the right to a fair trial the court is qualified to 
make its own judgment and must do so.‖522 
 
It is submitted that Lord Steyn‘s answer to counsel‘s contention was correct. It is certainly 
within the institutional competence of the court to investigate the question whether a 
particular piece of legislation is incompatible with the Convention. In doing so, the court is 
required, in appropriate cases, to take into account the discretionary area of judgment of the 
legislature and the executive. This will be done, for example, in cases where the Convention 
right in question is not absolute, but subject to permissible or justifiable limitations imposed 
by the State. But even in such cases, the courts retain the right to subject the statute to the test 
of proportionality. Where the statute fails the proportionality test, the result would be that the 
legislative provision in question is incompatible with the relevant Convention right. At this 
point, the court may proceed to consider whether to act under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act by 
construing the provision in a manner compatible with the Convention right(s), or to make a 
declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Act. 
 
In deciding whether Parliament struck the proper balance between the two competing 
interests stated above, Lord Steyn aligned himself with the criticism levelled against section 
41 of the 1999 Act by Professor Diane Birch: 
 
―Under section 41, the complainant's sexual behaviour (including behaviour with the 
accused) has relevance to consent only where it took place at or about the same time 
as the event of the subject-matter of the charge, or where it is strikingly similar to 
behaviour of the subject-matter of the charge or to any other sexual behaviour alleged 
to have taken place at or about that time. All that can be revealed, it would seem, is 
evidence such as that the complainant was seen in a passionate embrace with the 
accused just before (or just after) the alleged offence; bizarre and unusual conduct like 
the much-discussed propensity to re-enact the balcony scene from Romeo and Juliet, 
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and (perhaps) evidence that the complainant was picking up clients as a prostitute (if 
it is D's defence that he was so picked up). Along with all the complainant's other 
sexual doings, the remainder of the history of any sexual relationship the complainant 
has had with the accused will, it seems, have to be concealed from the jury or 
magistrates. It is not clear how this is to be done in a case where, for example the 
parties are living together: is the jury simply to be told what happened in the bedroom 
without any idea of whether D was a trespasser or an invitee? Presumably there will 
have to be some concept of background evidence that it is necessary for the jury to 
know in order to make sense of the evidence in the case.  
 
Section 41 is well-intentioned, but the constraints laid on relevance go too far.‖523  
 
Lord Steyn stressed the point that the previous sexual history of the complainant with the 
defendant himself may be relevant to the issue of consent depending on the facts of a 
particular case. He concluded that to exclude such relevant evidence merely on the ground 
that it falls short of the conditions imposed by section 41(3) would infringe on the 
defendant‘s Convention right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6. 
 
The provisions fail the proportionality test. ―Whilst the statute pursued desirable goals, the 
methods adopted amounted to legislative overkill.‖524 
 
It was common ground that ordinary methods of statutory interpretation could not be used to 
bring the evidence that the defendant sought to elicit by way of cross-examination within the 
requirements of section 41(3) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. The 
language of the provision was quite clear and unambiguous. By conventional methods of 
interpretation, a court may depart from the plain language of a statutory provision where it is 
necessary to avoid absurdity in meaning.525 However, the plain language of section 41(3) of 
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the 1999 Act led to no absurdity. Therefore, as it stood, it was likely that the evidence would 
have to be excluded. Consequently, the trial might be rendered unfair. 
 
This scenario had the potential of being replicated in a considerable number of cases. 
Therefore the potential for the exclusionary provision generating a large number of unfair 
trials could not be ignored. In the circumstances, the court had to either modify the provision 
pursuant to section 3(1) of the 1998 Act (if possible), or make a declaration of incompatibility 
under section 4 thereof. 
 
Lord Steyn expressed the view that it was possible in the circumstances to apply the 
interpretative obligation under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act to the provisions of section 
41(3)(c) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 to render the latter compatible 
with the Convention rights: 
 
―In my view s 3 of the 1998 Act requires the court to subordinate the niceties of the 
language of s 41(3)(c) of the 1999 Act, and in particular the touchstone of 
coincidence, to broader considerations of relevance judged by logical and 
commonsense criteria of time and circumstances…. It is therefore possible under s 3 
of the 1998 Act to read s 41 of the 1999 Act, and in particular s 41(3)(c), as subject to 
the implied provision that evidence or questioning which is required to ensure a fair 
trial under art 6 of the convention should not be treated as inadmissible.‖526 
 
The effect of this judicially inserted proviso to section 41(3)(c) of the 1999 Act is that trial 
judges are thereby enabled to admit sexual history evidence that falls short of the statutory 
conditions stipulated in the section if they determine that excluding such evidence in 
accordance with the section might result in a breach of the Convention right to a fair trial. In 
other words, trial judges are being directed to ignore the statutory effect of section 41(3)(c) of 
the 1999 Act if this were necessary to ensure compliance with the Convention rights. 
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The reasoning behind Lord Steyn‘s decision to apply the interpretative obligation under 
section 3(1) of the 1998 Act is that no ambiguity is needed to be present in a statutory 
provision before it could be subjected to a section 3(1) interpretation. To his Lordship, the 
predominant consideration of the court, pursuant to the interpretative obligation under section 
3(1), is ―to strive to find a possible interpretation compatible with Convention rights.‖527 It 
matters not that the resultant effect of the application of section 3(1) is that the meaning and 
effect of the statutory provision appears different from its original state, or is in some way 
modified.  
 
Noting Lord Hoffmann‘s dictum in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte 
Simms,
528
 that where a clear limitation of Convention rights is stated in terms in a statute, it 
would be impossible to utilise the interpretative obligation under section 3(1) of the 1998 
Act, Lord Steyn decided that since no such limitation was present in the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999, application of a section 3(1) interpretation was justified. 
 
Lord Steyn‘s approach to the use of section 3(1) in the interpretation and application of 
primary legislation found to contravene Convention rights appears to puts the need to protect 
Convention rights over and above concerns for a possible breach of the traditional doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the principle of the separation of powers. The legislative 
history of section 41(3)(c) of the 1999 Act as outlined in Appendix 4 seems to suggest that 
the intention of Parliament was to restrict the admission of the sexual history of a rape 
victim/complainant as much as possible. However, Lord Steyn found the extent of this 
legislative restriction excessive. While this may be correct, it is submitted that lessening the 
restrictions should be a function for Parliament, after extensive deliberations, taking into 
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account the possible effects of any proposed amendments on the position of rape victims, the 
protection of which section 41 of the Act was specifically enacted.  It is submitted that his 
insertion of a proviso to the section amounted to a judicial amendment of the section, 
substantially restoring the discretionary powers of trial judges in admitting such evidence. 
Empowering trial judges to admit sexual history evidence contrary to the clear and 
unambiguous provisions of section 41(3)(c) seems to amount to a negation of the traditional 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty, whereby courts are required to obey and apply the 
clear and unambiguous provisions of primary legislation. It appears to have crossed the 
boundary between legitimate interpretation under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act into 
unacceptable interference with legislative power. 
 
A number of commentators have criticised the approach adopted by Lord Steyn in R v A as 
involving an override of clear parliamentary intention. David Sandy has stated that the 
judicial insertion of ―implied provisions‖ into legislation interpreted under section 3(1) of the 
1998 Act would have the effect of empowering judges to ―reverse the effect of legislation;‖ 
consequently, this would lead to uncertainty and inconsistency in principles of 
interpretation.
529
 One would agree with this criticism. It could hardly be doubted that the 
effect of the judgment in R v A was to restore substantial judicial discretion to trial judges on 
the question of admissibility of sexual history evidence, a discretion that was severely 
restricted by Parliament in clear and unambiguous terms in section 41 of the 1999 Act.
530
 It is 
certainly not clear from the language of section 3(1) of the 1998 Act that Parliament intended 
that its clear and unambiguous legislative intention could be overridden by the court if that 
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were necessary to make the legislation compatible with the Convention rights. The provisions 
in sections 4 and 10 of the 1998 Act seemed to have envisaged that legislative intent would 
continue to play a part in the interpretation and application of statutes. Thus, where the clear 
legislative intent embodied in the statute is held to breach the Convention rights, the 
appropriate judicial decision should be to make a declaration of incompatibility so that 
legislative remedial action could be considered and taken. This would be more in line with 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. As Richard Ekins states, ―the entire point of 
having a non-supreme Bill of Rights is to enable greater consideration of the rights-
implications of law, while preserving to Parliament the authority to make legally 
determinative moral choices.‖531 Thus, if Parliament had intended that its clear legislative 
will could be overridden, stronger language such as was used to achieve priority of directly 
effective Community law over inconsistent primary legislation in the 1972 Act
532
 could have 
been used in the 1998 Act. 
 
Lord Steyn‘s judgment in R v A appears to have been partly influenced by certain ministerial 
statements made in Parliament in the course of debates on the Human Rights Bill. In the 
House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor had commented, ―in 99% of the cases that will arise, 
there will be no need for judicial declarations of incompatibility.‖533 In the House of 
Commons, the Home Secretary stated ―We expect that, in almost all cases, the courts will be 
able to interpret the legislation compatibly with the Convention.‖534 In his judgment, Lord 
Steyn seized upon these statements and held them to be equivalent to the Government (as 
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promoters of the Bill) holding out that the courts were intended to make maximal use of 
section 3(1) interpretations and minimal use of section 4 declarations.
535
  
 
It is submitted with respect that it was wrong to so hold. In the first place, a cardinal 
condition laid down in Pepper v Hart,
536
 which must be fulfilled before ministerial statements 
could be used by judges as an aid to interpretation, was not present. The ministerial 
statements concerning the then proposed section 3(1), seized upon by Lord Steyn, were not so 
clear as to come within Pepper v Hart exceptions. The statements were ambiguous and open 
to alternative interpretations. The ministers might well have been expressing their belief that 
a vast majority of existing United Kingdom legislation was either wholly consistent with 
Convention rights, or just slightly inconsistent as to be easily amenable to judicial 
rectification under section 3(1); therefore, not so much of section 4 declarations might be 
needed. Secondly, there is the danger in not recognising that the statements might have been 
influenced by political considerations, and that they were made in a bid to allay fears 
concerning possible judicial activism and criticism of legislative actions.  
 
The introduction of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Bill into the House of 
Commons was accompanied by a statement made by the Home Secretary pursuant to the 
provisions of section 19(1)(a) of the 1998 Act,
537
 expressing his view that the provisions of 
the bill were compatible with the Convention rights. It may be argued that the fact that the 
statement required by section 19(1) was made under section 19(1)(a) rather than under 
section 19(1)(b), makes a strong case for the decision of Lord Steyn in using section 3(1) of 
the 1998 Act to interpret section 41(3)(c) of the 1999 Act compatibly with the Convention 
rights. As indicated in the preceding chapter, a statement under section 19(1)(a) would appear 
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to carry a strong presumption that no breach of Convention rights was intended. On the other 
hand, a statement under section 19(1)(b) would seem to suggest that the legislation (enacted 
without substantial alterations) was intended to apply in its enacted form even if it happened 
to breach Convention rights. Seen in this light, Lord Steyn‘s judicial modification of the 
provisions of section 41(3)(c) of the 1999 Act could be seen as a mere rectification of 
executive oversight. 
 
It is submitted however, that too much emphasis should not be placed in compatibility 
statements made pursuant to section 19(1) of the 1998 Act when determining the propriety of 
applying section 3(1) interpretation to an incompatible statutory provision. This is because 
the views of the Minister concerned may not always coincide with the enacted intention of 
Parliament as a whole. It would be more reasonable, it is submitted, for the court to focus 
more on the final Act passed by Parliament (after extensive deliberations on the bill might 
have been held), rather than on such ministerial statements. In any case, it is doubtful whether 
Parliament ever intended that section 19(1) of the 1998 Act should substantially influence 
courts in coming to a decision whether or not to apply the interpretative obligation under 
section 3(1) thereof.   
 
Lord Steyn appeared to give the impression that his approach to section 3(1) of the 1998 Act 
was more in line with obeying the will of Parliament than in challenging it. In fact, his 
Lordship claimed that his decision to insert a proviso to section 41(3)(c) of the 1999 Act was 
―in accordance with the will of Parliament reflected in section 3 of the 1998 Act.‖538 Is he 
thereby saying that Parliament intended that all legislative provisions must be read as if they 
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incorporated the Convention rights, and be given effect subject to the relevant Convention 
right irrespective of any contrary intention contained therein? 
 
One cannot gainsay the fact that the combined effect of section 2(1) and 3(1) of the 1998 Act 
was intended to strengthen the capacity of the courts to deliver the Convention rights 
domestically whenever it is possible to do so. As has been stated in the preceding chapter, in 
interpreting the Convention rights, including issues as to whether primary legislation 
breaches a Convention right, Parliament has by section 2(1) of the 1998 Act, directed the 
courts to take into consideration the decisions of the European institutions, including the 
European Court, whenever such a decision is relevant to the proceedings before the domestic 
courts. The implication of section 2(1) is that the compatibility of primary legislation, 
whenever enacted, is intended to be determined by the domestic courts against the 
background of the current jurisprudence of the European Court on the Convention rights. 
This would mean that in any given case, the courts would likely use European standards of 
scrutiny as the minimum standards by which domestic legislation is scrutinised for 
compliance with the Convention rights. 
 
However, it must be stated that section 2(1) of the 1998 Act clearly has no implications for 
parliamentary sovereignty. This is because its primary utility is to enable the domestic courts 
to determine the compatibility of the Convention rights against minimum standards set by the 
European Court; and a finding of incompatibility does not by itself affect the legal effect of 
the legislation concerned.  
 
Similarly, Parliament has, by section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, directed the courts to modify, by 
way of interpretation, incompatible legislation, so as to achieve compatibility with the 
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Convention rights. This provision is no doubt the most effective and immediate means by 
which the judiciary could deliver the Convention rights domestically. This is because an 
interpretation under section 3(1) has the capacity to change the legal effect of the statutory 
provision so modified. What is more, the interpretative power derived from section 3(1) can 
be applied to any legislation whenever enacted.  
 
Be that as it may, the question remains, how far did Parliament intend its legislation to be 
read and given effect compatibly with the Convention rights? Lord Steyn‘s view on this point 
seems to suggest that the court‘s obligation under section 3(1) to interpret legislation 
compatibly with the Convention rights overrides any intention to the contrary contained in an 
Act of Parliament, whether passed before or after the 1998 Act. Thus, short of an express 
repudiation of the Convention rights, Lord Steyn‘s approach in R v A would amount to taking 
section 3(1) as authorising courts to totally ignore clear parliamentary intention embodied in 
a statutory provision if found to be incompatible with the Convention rights.  
 
It is respectfully submitted that this analysis is not borne out of the provisions of sections 2(1) 
and 3(1) of the 1998 Act. As has been observed above, these provisions strengthened the 
capacity of the courts to deliver the Convention rights domestically. However, the use of the 
phrase, ―so far as it is possible to do so‖ introduces a limit, albeit undefined,  to the extent to 
which Parliament intended its legislation to be read and given effect in accordance with 
sections 2(1) and 3(1) of the Act. Further, the markedly different way in which the provisions 
in section 2(1) and 3(1) of the 1998 Act on the one hand, and those in sections 2(1) and (4) 
and 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972
539
 on the other hand, are couched is 
indicative of Parliament‘s desire to give as effective a protection as possible to the 
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Convention rights without endangering the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore, 
the idea that under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act the courts could totally discard parliamentary 
intention, as they could possibly do under the 1972 Act, seems to be a creation of the courts 
themselves, and not Parliament. What is apparent from the 1998 Act, taken as a whole, is that 
the courts should take an even-handed view, protecting the Convention rights as much as they 
possibly could, until it becomes clear that going any further would endanger parliamentary 
sovereignty. This balanced approach cannot be achieved if parliamentary intention were to be 
discarded altogether. 
 
Furthermore, even if it were to be accepted that the decision in R v A were ―in accordance 
with the will of Parliament reflected in section 3 of the 1998 Act‖, the problem with this is 
that Lord Steyn appears to be obeying the will of Parliament expressed in the 1998 Act in 
preference to the will expressed in the 1999 Act. This seems to be contrary to the traditional 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty, which requires the court to obey and apply the latest 
intention of Parliament in preference to any contrary intention expressed in previous 
legislation. This is amply exemplified in the judicial treatment of section 7(1) of the 
Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919 in Ellen Street Estates Ltd v 
Minister of Health. 
540
  
 
The difference in the judicial treatment of the 1919 Act and the 1998 Act appears to lie in the 
new concept, which seems to have been generally accepted by the judges, that statutes such 
as the Human Rights Act, are to be considered ―constitutional statutes‖ invulnerable to the 
principle of implied repeal.
541
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As indicated earlier, Lord Hope‘s approach to the interpretative obligation under section 3(1) 
of the 1998 Act is different from that adopted by Lord Steyn. For Lord Hope, section 3(1) 
interpretation is not to be utilised if the legislation under consideration ―contains provisions 
which expressly contradicts the meaning which the enactment would have to be given to 
make it compatible.‖542 His Lordship went further to contend that ―the same result must 
follow if they do so by necessary implication,
543
 as this too is a means of identifying the 
plain intention of Parliament.‖544 
  
In other words, for Lord Hope, section 3(1) does not authorise the contradiction of the plain 
intention of Parliament in enacting legislation. The intention need not be stated expressly. It 
could be implied from a contextual examination of the statute. Thus, in R v A, his Lordship 
stated,  
 
―In the present case it seems to me that the entire structure of s 41 of the 1999 Act 
contradicts the idea that it is possible to read into it a new provision which would 
entitle the court to give leave whenever it was of the opinion that this was required to 
ensure a fair trial. The whole point of the section, as was made clear during the 
debates in Parliament, was to address the mischief which was thought to have arisen 
due to the width of the discretion which had previously been given to the trial judge. 
A deliberate decision was taken not to follow the examples which were to be found 
elsewhere, such as in s 275 of the 1995 Act, of provisions which give an overriding 
discretion to the trial judge to allow the evidence or questioning where it would be 
contrary to the interests of justice to exclude it. Section 41(2) of the 1999 Act forbids 
the exercise of such a discretion unless the court is satisfied as to the matters which 
that subsection identifies. It seems to me that it would not be possible, without 
contradicting the plain intention of Parliament, to read in a provision which would 
enable the court to exercise a wider discretion than that permitted by s 41(2).‖ 545 
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As can be seen, while Lord Steyn‘s approach is more radical in nature in that it places more 
emphasis on the role of the interpretative obligation in section 3(1) and less emphasis on the 
plain parliamentary intention contained in the enactment under consideration, Lord Hope‘s 
approach is more cautious.  
 
It is submitted that Lord Hope‘s approach to the interpretation and application of primary 
legislation under section 3(1) accords greater respect to the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty than Lord Steyn‘s approach. In the approach adopted by Lord Hope, 
parliamentary intention in legislation continues to play a central role in the interpretative 
process. Thus, where a court determines that there is a direct clash between the parliamentary 
intention contained in section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, and that contained in a later enactment 
such as the 1999 Act considered in R v A, the court ought to make a declaration of 
incompatibility under section 4, thereby drawing the attention of the executive and 
Parliament to the incompatibility. In line with the traditional doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the principle of the separation of powers, it should be for Parliament to 
decide whether to persist in the breach of the Convention rights or to make the necessary 
amendments to achieve compatibility with the Convention rights.
546
  
 
While in R v A, Lord Steyn‘s approach to the use of section 3(1) of the 1998 Act appeared to 
indicate that the absence of a clearly expressed parliamentary intention in the statutory 
provision under consideration, to depart from the terms of section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, is 
sufficient reason to justify a section 3(1) interpretation, in Ghaidan v Mendoza, 547 Lord 
Nicholls opted for a slightly different, albeit equally creative approach. Lord Nicholl‘s 
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analysis of the interpretative obligation under section 3(1) calls for the recognition of a 
distinction between the actual language used in the statutory provision under consideration on 
the one hand, and the underlying concept behind the legislation on the other hand. His 
approach focuses more on the concept behind the legislation and less on the language used in 
it. He contends that section 3(1) of the 1998 Act authorises the court to change the meaning 
and effect of primary legislation if this were required to achieve compatibility with the 
Convention rights. In other words, pursuant to the interpretative obligation under section 
3(1), the court may depart from the unambiguous parliamentary intention indicated by the 
language used in the provision. However, Lord Nicholls declares that the resultant meaning 
must not be inconsistent with the underlying concept behind the legislation. The new 
meaning must not depart from the fundamental features of the enactment under consideration. 
It must be compatible with the underlying thrust of the enactment. Therefore, as far as the 
resultant meaning could come within the underlying concept of the legislation, the fact that it 
contradicts the actual language used in the provision under consideration becomes irrelevant.  
 
Ghaidan v Mendoza concerned the interpretation of ―spouse‖ as contained in paragraph 2(1) 
and (2) of Schedule 1 to the Rent Act 1977, the provisions were as follows: 
 
―2. – (1) The surviving spouse (if any) of the original tenant, if residing in the 
dwelling-house immediately before the death of the original tenant, shall after the 
death be the statutory tenant if and so long as he or she occupies the dwelling-house 
as his or her residence. 
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   (2) For the purpose of this paragraph, a person who was living with the original 
tenant as his or her wife or husband shall be treated as the spouse of the original 
tenant.‖548 
 
The defendant, Mr. Godin-Mendoza, was a homosexual who had ―a stable and monogamous 
homosexual relationship‖549 with a Mr. Hugh Wallwyn-James. The couple lived together 
from April 1983 to 05 January 2001 (when Mr. Wallwyn-James died) at a flat in which Mr. 
Wallwyn-James was the statutory tenant by virtue of the provisions of the 1977 Act.  
 
After the death of Mr. Wallwyn-James the statutory tenant, his landlord, Mr. Ahmad 
Ghaidan, instituted proceedings at the County Court for recovery of possession of the flat. 
 
At the trial, the County Court judge held that the defendant could not succeed to the statutory 
tenancy of the flat as the ―spouse‖ of the original tenant pursuant to paragraphs 2(1) and (2) 
of Schedule 1 to the 1977 Act set out above.  
 
However, the County Court held that the defendant was entitled to an assured tenancy of the 
flat as ―a member of the original tenant‘s family‖ in accordance with paragraph 3(1) of the 
Schedule. The paragraph provided as follows: 
 
―Where paragraph 2 above does not apply, but a person who was a member of the 
original tenant's family was residing with him in the dwelling-house at the time of and 
for the period of 2 years immediately before his death then, after his death, that person 
or if there is more than one such person such one of them as may be decided by 
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agreement, or in default of agreement by the county court, shall be entitled to an 
assured tenancy of the dwelling-house by succession.‖ 
 
This decision was in obedience to the decision of the House of Lords in Fitzpatrick v Sterling 
Housing Association Ltd,550 a case decided before the 1998 Act came into operation. There, 
the House had held that the extended meaning given to the word ―spouse‖ in paragraph 2(2) 
of the Schedule set out above did not include same-sex partners. This was because by 
paragraph 2(1), the word, ―spouse‖ referred to legally married couples. Marriage could 
legally occur only between a man and a woman. The word was therefore gender-specific. 
Accordingly, the expression, ―as his or her wife or husband‖ as used in paragraph 2(2) could 
only refer to a person who was living together with a person of the opposite sex as if legally 
married.  
 
However, by a majority, their Lordships also held in Fitzpatrick that the word, ―family‖ as 
used in paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule set out above could be extended to include same-sex 
partners who could show ―a degree of mutual inter-dependence, of the sharing of lives, of 
caring and love, of commitment and support.‖551 The basis of this decision was that the term 
―family‖ had been applied in a flexible manner in the case law and that it was appropriate to 
give it an up-dating interpretation to accommodate changing social attitudes.552 
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In the instant case, on Mr Mendoza‘s appeal to the Court of Appeal, it was decided that Mr. 
Mendoza could succeed to the statutory tenancy of the flat as the surviving ―spouse‖ of the 
deceased tenant in accordance with paragraph 2(2) of the Schedule.  
 
The claimant then appealed to the House of Lords. 
 
It was common ground amongst their Lordships that by the ordinary principles of 
interpretation, the extended meaning of the term ―spouse‖ in paragraph 2(2) of the Schedule 
to the 1977 Act unambiguously referred to heterosexual couples and not to homosexual 
couples. Their Lordships were also in agreement that the differential treatment between 
unmarried heterosexual couples and homosexual couples was discriminatory and 
incompatible with the Convention rights. The point of disagreement amongst them was on the 
question whether it was possible, given the facts and circumstances of the case, to act 
pursuant to the interpretative obligation in section 3(1) of the 1998 Act and interpret ―spouse‖ 
so as to bring homosexual partners within the provisions of paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 of the 
1977 Act, or to merely make a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the 1998 Act, 
thereby leaving it to the appropriate minister of the Crown, and ultimately Parliament, to 
make the necessary amendment (if they so wished) under section 10 and Schedule 2 to the 
1998 Act. A majority of their Lordships553 decided that it was possible to do so. However, 
Lord Millett disagreed. 
 
As indicated above, Lord Nicholl‘s554 approach was to identify the underlying concept 
behind the legislative protection afforded unmarried couples under paragraph 2(2) of 
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Schedule 1 to the 1977 Act, and then determine whether the resultant interpretation under 
section 3(1) of the 1998 Act would conflict with the identified underlying concept. An 
interpretation that is consistent with the underlying concept would be justified, irrespective of 
a resulting departure from the plain meaning of the term ―spouse‖ as used in the provision. 
On the other hand, an interpretation that is contrary to the identified underlying concept will 
not be possible under section 3(1). 
 
His Lordship found that the reason for enacting paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 1 to the Rent Act 
1977 to extend security of tenure to the survivor of unmarried couples who had lived together 
as if married was that there was no practical difference in circumstances between, on the one 
hand, legally married couples, and on the other hand, couples who for all practical purposes 
lived as if married. In each case, the couples lived together and presumably made their home 
together. Absenting irrelevant religious morals, there was no point in securing the tenure of 
surviving married couples who had been living with their deceased husbands or wives, while 
denying the same right to surviving unmarried couples who had also been living with their 
deceased partners. This is because the legislative objective was to give security to the home 
of the couple and to prevent it from being disrupted simply because one of the couple had 
died. 
Therefore, to qualify under the provisions, a surviving heterosexual partner only had to 
establish that for all practical purposes, he or she had been living together with the deceased 
as if married. In this respect, it would be sufficient if it was proved that the couple had been 
living together in a close, stable and long-term sexual relationship, sharing their lives and 
making their home together.   
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Thus, the underlying concept behind paragraph 2(2) was to give security of tenure to the 
home of the couple, and for the benefit of the surviving couple. It did not matter whether the 
couple was married or unmarried. Seen in this light, extending security of tenure to 
homosexual couples who, like their unmarried heterosexual counterparts, had been living 
together in a close, stable and long-term relationship will be consistent with the underlying 
thrust of the legislation. Except for their sexual orientation, there is no rational basis for 
treating them differently. The critical factor, which is the sharing of lives and the making of a 
home together, is common to either set of couples. Accordingly, it was possible, acting 
pursuant to the interpretative obligation under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, to extend the 
meaning of ―spouse‖ as used in paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 1 to the Rent Act 1977, to include 
the surviving homosexual partner of a deceased tenant with whom he/she had lived together 
in a close and stable relationship.  
 
Although Lord Nicholl‘s methodology on section 3(1) interpretations seems slightly different 
from that of Lord Steyn, their perception of the interpretative obligation contained in section 
3(1) of the 1998 Act is largely similar. In interpreting legislation under section 3(1), both of 
them appear to de-emphasise the intention of Parliament in enacting the legislative provision 
under consideration, as apparent from the plain language used. Instead, they seem to focus 
more on the desire to fulfill the parliamentary intention expressed in section 3(1), which is 
construing legislation so far as it is possible to do so, compatibly with the Convention rights. 
The principled balance between on the one hand, the effective protection of Convention 
rights and on the other hand, respect for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the 
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separation of powers, advocated by Lord Irvine,555 appears to have no place in their 
Lordships‘ perception of the interpretative obligation.  
 
However, Lord Steyn‘s approach appears somewhat more far-reaching than that of Lord 
Nicholls‘. Lord Steyn has expressed the view that section 3(1) is the ―principal remedial 
measure‖ under the 1998 Act and that a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 should 
be seen as ―a measure of last resort.‖ 556 Lord Steyn asserts 
 
―In enacting the 1998 Act Parliament legislated ‗to bring rights home‘ from the 
European Court of Human Rights to be determined in the courts of the United 
Kingdom. That is what the White Paper said…. That is what Parliament was told. The 
mischief to be addressed was the fact that convention rights as set out in the European 
Convention, which Britain ratified in 1951, could not be vindicated in our courts. 
Critical to this purpose was the enactment of effective remedial provisions.‖557 
 
He then went on to state that ―If Parliament disagrees with an interpretation by the courts 
under s. 3(1), it is free to override it by amending the legislation and expressly reinstating the 
incompatibility.‖558 
This seems to suggest that for Lord Steyn, parliamentary intention expressed in an Act of 
Parliament found to be incompatible with the Convention rights plays such an insignificant 
role that it could more often than not be discarded in order to protect the Convention rights 
from legislative encroachment. It is submitted that this approach over-stresses the role of the 
court in the scheme of the 1998 Act, tends very much towards judicial activism and is 
inherently inimical to the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
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On the other hand, Lord Nicholl‘s proposition that the resultant interpretation under section 
3(1) should be consistent with the underlying concept behind the legislation under 
consideration has the advantage of downplaying the creative role of the court in construing 
legislation compatibly with the Convention rights and seemingly according more prominence 
to the legislative function. This approach tends to create the impression that the courts are 
merely assisting Parliament to fulfill to the fullest extent possible the unexpressed purpose of 
the legislation under consideration and at the same time meeting the obligations of the United 
Kingdom under the Convention as envisaged by the 1998 Act 
 
It is submitted however, that Lord Nicholl‘s seemingly less far-reaching approach in fact 
disguises a high degree of judicial activism. Granting substantive legal rights to homosexual 
partners in the manner done by Lord Nicholls in Ghaidan v Mendoza seems to amount to an 
usurpation of legislative functions beyond the scope of what is possible under section 3(1), 
especially taking account of the legislative history of paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 1 to the 
Rent Act 1977, which was the subject of his Lordship‘s interpretation pursuant to section 3(1) 
of the 1998 Act.559  
 
It is submitted that Lord Millett‘s dissenting opinion on the propriety of using section 3(1) in 
the circumstances of the case is preferable to that of the majority. As indicated earlier, Lord 
Millett was of the view that it was impossible to use section 3(1) of the 1998 Act to construe 
paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 1 to the 1977 Act so as to include homosexual partners in the 
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statutory definition of a ―spouse‖.  In coming to this conclusion, his Lordship relied on the 
legislative history of paragraph 2(2)
560. As he stated, ―the limit on the application of s 3… 
may also be derived from a consideration of the legislative history of the offending statute‖561  
From the legislative history of paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 1 to the 1977 Act (see Appendix 
5), one cannot escape the gender-specific nature of the statutory scheme. As Lord Millett 
states, paragraph 2(2) as amended does not expressly refer to ―a person of the opposite sex‖ 
but the phrase is implicit in the provision. At a time when Parliament had not legislated to 
grant marital rights to same-sex partners, it would appear absurd to further strain the extended 
meaning of ―spouse‖ to cover same-sex partners.  
 
Accordingly, Lord Millett concluded that an interpretation of paragraph 2(2) to include same-
sex partners would be manifestly inconsistent with an essential feature of the kind of 
relationship which Parliament had in mind when it enacted the 1977 Act, that is an open 
relationship between persons of the opposite sex. To him, this would be impermissible under 
section 3(1) of the 1998 Act. Furthermore, extending substantive rights to same-sex partners 
in the manner done by the majority seems to involve ―questions of social policy which should 
be left to Parliament.‖562 
 
It is submitted that Lord Millett‘s judgment exhibits a better appreciation of the place of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the role of the judge in the scheme of the 1998 Act. Although 
the wording of section 3(1) of the 1998 Act is so imprecise as to make any interpretation 
seemingly possible, the combined effects of the provisions of section 3(2)(b) and (c), section 
                                                 
560
 See Appendix 5. 
561
 Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30; [2004] 2 AC 557; [2004] 3 All ER 411 at paragraph 72 of the 
judgment 
 
562
 Paragraph 101 of the judgment 
265 
 
4, section 10 and Schedule 2 of the Act indicate limits to the use of section 3(1) in construing 
legislation compatibly with the Convention rights. These provisions are an indication that 
courts were expected to respect parliamentary sovereignty and were to refrain from 
interpretations that may offend the concept. Thus, where there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that a section 3(1) interpretation may lead to a breach of parliamentary sovereignty, 
the appropriate thing for a court to do should be to make a declaration of incompatibility and 
leave it to the Government and ultimately Parliament to decide whether to amend the law or 
not. It is submitted that an interpretation under section 3(1) that, for all practical purposes, 
grants substantive rights to same-sex partners in a bid to fill a perceived gap in the statute 
breaches the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. This seems to be the case with 
the majority decision in Ghaidan v Mendoza. 
 
The majority‘s decision appeared to have been influenced by a number of factors. In July 
2003, the European Court had delivered a decision that effectively condemned differences in 
legal treatment between unmarried heterosexual couples and their homosexual counterparts 
(such as that found in paragraph 2(2) of the Schedule above) as discriminatory and contrary 
to the Convention right under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8563. That case was 
Karner v Austria.564 
 
The case was quite similar to Ghaidan v Mendoza. The applicant had survived his 
homosexual partner with whom he had been living together for several years in a flat 
originally rented by his partner. When the partner died, the landlord took legal proceedings to 
recover possession of the flat. Both the trial court and the appeal court accepted the view that 
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the applicant could succeed to the tenancy by virtue of section 14(3) of the Austrian Tenancy 
Act which provided that family members could so succeed. But on appeal by the landlord to 
the Supreme Court, it was held that the notion of ―life companion‖ which could have enabled 
the applicant to succeed under section 14(3) of the Act did not include persons in same-sex 
relationships. 
 
The applicant then applied to the European Court, arguing that denying him the right to 
succeed to his deceased partner‘s tenancy on the basis of his sexual orientation violated his 
rights under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8. 
 
The European Court held that for such differential treatment to be upheld, not only is it 
required of the state to show that there was a reasonable and justifiable legislative aim, but 
also that the difference in treatment was necessary to achieve the legislative aim. The Court 
declared that the Austrian Government had failed to show any justification for the differential 
treatment between homosexual partners on the one hand and heterosexual partners on the 
other hand. 
 
At the time Karner’s case was decided by the European Court, the Civil Partnership Bill565 
was then before Parliament. In acknowledgment of the decision, Parliament introduced 
provisions into the Bill for the purpose of amending paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the Rent 
Act 1977 to eliminate the discrimination inherent in it. The amendment was contained in 
what became paragraph 13 of Schedule 8 to the Civil Partnership Act 2004. A new provision 
was added to paragraph 2(2): 
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―(2) For the purposes of this paragraph– 
(a) a person who was living with the original tenant as his or her wife or husband shall be 
treated as the spouse of the original tenant, and 
 
(b)  a person who was living with the original tenant as if they were civil partners shall 
be treated as the civil partner of the original tenant.‖566 
 
Sub-paragraph 3 was also amended accordingly. These amendments thus removed the 
discrimination against homosexual partners and rendered the Rent Act 1977 compatible with 
the Convention rights. Thus, the decision in Ghaidan was in a way an adoption of the 
parliamentary decision apparent in the amendments set out above. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that at the time the House of Lords decided 
Ghaidan, the above amendments were only provisions contained in a Bill before Parliament. 
Consequently, the majority decision seemed to have had the effect of fast-tracking the 
operation of the then proposed amendments. It is submitted that this, at least in principle, was 
wrong. It should be left to Parliament to determine if and when such substantive legal rights 
would be granted to same-sex partners. The granting of such substantive legal rights should 
be by deliberate legislative action rather than the consequence of judicial activism as is the 
case in Ghaidan.  
 
The way in which the judges have dealt with legislative encroachments of the right to a fair 
trial guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention further indicate the extent to which they seem 
prepared to ignore clear and unambiguous parliamentary intention in order to protect the 
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Convention rights. In addition to R v A discussed above, two other cases in particular appear 
to indicate that where the right to a fair trial is concerned (an area in which the courts feel 
particularly competent to make decisions), judges could, acting pursuant to the interpretative 
obligation under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, nullify the legislative violation by modifying 
the legal effect of the statutory provisions concerned. As would be seen shortly, in so 
applying the section 3(1) interpretation for the purpose of protecting the right to a fair trial, 
the judges appear to give little or no consideration to legislative choices made by Parliament 
in enacting the statute under consideration. On the contrary, the judges have felt able to 
replace parliamentary choices with their own judicial choices if this were necessary to protect 
the Convention right to a fair trial. 
The decisions of the House of Lords in Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions; Attorney 
General’s Reference (No. 4 of 2002) (conjoined appeals)567 and Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (Respondent) v MB (FC) (Appellant); Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Respondent) v AF (FC) (Appellant); Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Appellant) v AF (FC) (Respondent) (conjoined appeals)
568
 support the remarks 
made above. 
 
The issues common to the two cases in the first of the co-joined appeals mentioned above
569
 
was whether the statutory provisions under consideration violated the presumption of 
innocence provided for by Article 6(2) of the Convention and, if so, whether it would be 
possible to construe them in a manner that preserved the broader right to a fair trial. 
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It has been widely recognised, since Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions,
570
 that 
the presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle of the common law. In that case, 
Viscount Sankey stated: 
 
―Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be 
seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject to what I 
have already said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory 
exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, 
created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether 
the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not 
made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the 
charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the 
prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can 
be entertained.‖571  
 
As indicated above, the general principle is that the burden is on the prosecution to prove its 
allegations against the accused; conversely, the accused is not required to prove his 
innocence.  
 
Article 6(2) of the Convention embodies the same principle. It says: ―Everyone charged with 
a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.‖ 
 
However, as could be seen from Viscount Sankey‘s statement above, the courts have always 
recognised that the common law principle of the presumption of innocence was subject to 
statutory exceptions. Thus, Parliament could breach the principle by imposing a legal burden 
of proof on accused persons whenever it thought fit to do so. This it continued to do even 
after the ratification of the Convention. Ashworth and Blake have provided several examples 
of such statutes in their article written in 1996.
572
 The courts were bound to apply them. It did 
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not matter that they infringed on Convention rights. A combination of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the principle that the Convention had no force of law except to 
the extent incorporated in domestic law ensured that the courts obeyed and applied them in 
accordance with the intention of Parliament. As Lord Hope observed in R v Director of 
Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebeline and others; R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex 
parte Rechachi, a case decided before the coming into effect of the 1998 Act, ―under the 
doctrine of sovereignty, the only check on Parliament‘s freedom to legislate in this area has 
been political.‖573 His Lordship nevertheless indicated, ―that will now change with the 
coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998.‖574 
  
The relevant statutory provision in Sheldrake’s case was contained in section 5(2) of the 
Road Traffic Act 1988. The sub-section provided that  
 
―It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1)(b) above to 
prove
575
 that at the time he is alleged to have committed the offence the 
circumstances were such that there was no likelihood of his driving the vehicle whilst 
the proportion of alcohol in his breath, blood or urine remained likely to exceed the 
prescribed limit.‖ 
 
In Attorney General’s Reference, the relevant provisions are contained in section 11(1) and 
(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000, which provided as follows:  
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―(1) A person commits an offence if he belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed 
organisation. 
 
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to 
prove576– 
 
(a) that the organisation was not proscribed on the last (or only) occasion on 
which he became a member or began to profess to be a member, and 
(b)  that he has not taken part in the activities of the organisation at any time while 
it was proscribed.‖ 
 
It was common ground amongst their Lordships that both provisions set out above were clear 
and unambiguous and that the parliamentary intention was to impose a legal burden of proof 
on the defendant. Thus, absenting the 1998 Act, the courts would have had to apply the 
provisions without further considerations. Indeed, Lord Bingham, who delivered the lead 
judgement, alluded to this when he stated: 
 
―Until the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, the issue now before the 
House could scarcely have arisen. The two statutory provisions, which it is necessary 
to consider, are not obscure or ambiguous. They afford the defendant (Mr Sheldrake) 
and the acquitted person a ground of exoneration, but in each case the provision, 
interpreted in accordance with the canons of construction ordinarily applied in the 
courts, would (as already noted) be understood to impose on the defendant a legal 
burden to establish that ground of exoneration on the balance of probabilities. Until 
October 2000 the courts would have been bound to interpret the provisions 
conventionally. Even if minded to do so, they could not have struck down or amended 
the provisions as repugnant to any statutory or common law rule. Domestic law would 
have required effect to be given to them according to their accepted meaning. Thus 
the crucial question is whether the European Convention and the Strasbourg 
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jurisprudence interpreting it have modified in any relevant respect our domestic 
regime and, if so, to what extent.‖577 
 
Thus, with the enactment of the 1998 Act, courts now have not only a duty to determine 
whether legislative provisions such as the ones set out above contravene the Convention right 
to a fair trial, but also to consider whether it would be possible to interpret them compatibly 
with the Convention rights pursuant to section 3(1) of the Act.  
 
As observed in chapter 5 above, section 2 of the 1998 Act contains a direction to the courts 
that they must take into account the jurisprudence of the European Court when determining a 
question concerning a Convention right. Although under that section, decisions of the 
European Court do not constitute binding precedent for the domestic courts, considerable 
weight is likely to be given to them since ultimately, domestic disputes may go to the 
European Court for adjudication after exhaustion of all domestic avenues. 
 
Unsurprisingly therefore, in determining whether the provisions set out above breached the 
right to a fair trial under Article 6, the House of Lords adopted the principles stated by the 
European Court in Salabiaku v France.
578
    
 
In that case, the European Court had held that Article 6(2) of the Convention did not 
constitute an absolute bar on legislation that required the accused to prove particular facts. 
According to it: 
 
―Presumptions of fact or of law operate in every legal system. Clearly, the Convention 
does not prohibit such presumptions in principle. It does, however, require the 
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Contracting States to remain within certain limits in this respect as regards criminal 
law.‖579 
 
 
The margin allowed states to make in-roads into the presumption of innocence was not to be 
considered by exclusive reference to domestic law. The Convention required that states must 
not go beyond the point where the right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) is endangered. The 
European Court held:  
 
―Article 6(2) does not therefore regard presumptions of fact or of law provided for in 
the criminal law with indifference. It requires States to confine them within 
reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what is at stake and 
maintain the rights of the defence.‖580 
 
 
The most notable thing about the judgment in Salabiaku is that the enactment of a reverse 
burden in itself is no sufficient ground to declare the statutory provision as incompatible with 
the Convention. This is because, as stated above, the presumption of innocence is not an 
absolute right, but only an aspect of the broader right to a fair trial set out in Article 6(1) of 
the Convention. 
 
Therefore, to found incompatibility, the question whether the state has exceeded reasonable 
limits has to be answered first. This would involve considerations of proportionality. The 
court would have to balance competing interests. The importance of what is at stake would be 
considered. More serious problems might require drastic legislative solutions that might 
necessitate or justify making an in-road into the presumption of innocence. 
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On the other hand, the rights of the defence and any protection that the legislation offered the 
accused must also be taken into consideration. The greater the protection offered the accused, 
the more unlikely that the legislation will be held in violation of the Convention. 
 
In Sheldrake, their Lordships were unanimous in holding that the legal burden of proof 
imposed on the defendant by section 5(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 was within reasonable 
and permissible limits and was consequently justifiable and compatible with the right to a fair 
trial. As a result no question of a section 3(1) interpretation arose. 
 
However, in Attorney General’s Reference, a 3-2 majority of the House of Lords held the 
legal burden of proof imposed on the defendant by section 11(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 to 
have exceeded permissible limits and therefore incompatible with the right to a fair trial.581 
Their Lordships went further to hold that it was possible under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act to 
eliminate the incompatibility by substituting the legal burden of proof imposed by Parliament 
with an evidential burden only, which requires the defendant only to raise an issue sufficient 
to create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 
 
In coming to the conclusion that it was possible to judicially eliminate the incompatibility by 
use of section 3(1) interpretation, the approach adopted by Lord Bingham was quite similar to 
that of Lord Steyn discussed earlier. His perception of the interpretative obligation seems to 
be that it takes priority over the intention of Parliament expressed in other Acts, pre- or post-
Human Rights Act. His Lordship conceded that the clear and unambiguous intention of 
Parliament in enacting section 11(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 was to impose a legal burden 
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of proof on the defendant.582 However, he rejected counsel‘s submission that should the 
House find the statutory provision to be incompatible with the right to a fair trial, it should 
make a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the 1998 Act and allow Parliament 
to choose between amending it on the one hand, and leaving it untouched on the other hand. 
His Lordship states: 
 
―I cannot accept this submission…. In my opinion, reading down section 11(2) so as 
to impose an evidential instead of a legal burden falls well within the interpretative 
principles discussed above. The subsection should be treated as if section 118(2) 
applied to it.
583
 Such was not the intention of Parliament when enacting the 2000 Act, 
but it was the intention of Parliament when enacting section 3 of the 1998 Act.‖584 
 
 
In response to dicta in Kebeline,
585
 Parliament had in Section 118 of the Terrorism Act 2000 
watered down the legal burden of proof imposed on an accused person under relevant 
sections of the Act, and had in effect made such burdens evidential only. The section 
provided as follows: 
 
―118. — Defences. 
 
(1) Subsection (2) applies where in accordance with a provision mentioned in 
subsection (5) it is a defence for a person charged with an offence to prove a 
particular matter. 
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(2) If the person adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to 
the matter the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the 
prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not. 
 
(3) Subsection (4) applies where in accordance with a provision mentioned in 
subsection (5) a court– 
 
(a) may make an assumption in relation to a person charged with an offence 
unless a particular matter is proved, or 
(b) may accept a fact as sufficient evidence unless a particular matter is proved. 
 
(1) If evidence is adduced which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter 
mentioned in subsection (3)(a) or (b) the court shall treat it as proved unless the 
prosecution disproves it beyond reasonable doubt.‖ 
 
However, while several sections586 similar to section 11(2) of the Act of 2000 were subjected 
to the general provision in section 118 set out above, section 11(2) was not so subjected. The 
clear implication of this is that the legislative choice of imposing a legal burden of proof on 
the accused on questions of membership of a proscribed organisation, as provided in the Act 
of 2000, was deliberate. As indicated above, Lord Bingham accepted this.  However, to his 
Lordship, the intention of the 1998 Parliament as expressed in section 3(1) of the 1998 Act 
supersedes the clear intention of the year 2000 Parliament in enacting section 11(2) of the Act 
of 2000. Thus, in spite of the clear Parliamentary choice of a legal burden of proof, the 
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majority, acting pursuant to the interpretative power under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, felt 
able to replace that choice with the judicial choice of an evidential burden.  
 
It is submitted that this approach is contrary to the principle of implied repeal, a corollary to 
the traditional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. To hold that the terms of the 1998 Act 
prevail over the clear terms of the Terrorism Act 2000 appears to be a negation of the 
traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty as discussed in chapter two below.  
 
Furthermore, in provisions dealing with burdens of proof, there could be hardly more than 
two obvious choices to be made. It is either a legal burden is imposed on the defendant 
requiring him to prove his defence, or an evidential burden is imposed requiring him to 
proffer evidence sufficient to raise reasonable doubts as to his guilt. Thus, the choice of a 
legal burden of proof seems by implication, to amount to a deliberate exclusion of the other 
choice of an evidential burden. In other words, in choosing to impose a legal burden, it is 
reasonable to accept that Parliament had deliberately rejected the choice of an evidential 
burden. This contention is even more forceful in Attorney General’s Reference where, as 
indicated above, Parliament chose not to subject section 11(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 to 
the general provisions of section 118 of the same Act. It is respectfully submitted that the 
decision in Attorney General’s Reference amounted to overruling the clear parliamentary 
choice expressed in section 11(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000. As reportedly argued by counsel 
for the Attorney General, ―section 3 of the 1998 Act cannot be used to overrule decisions 
which the language of the statute shows have been taken by the legislature on the very point 
at issue. Nor may section 3 be used to produce a fundamental change in the nature and 
character of the statutory scheme.‖587 
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It is submitted that the difference between the legal effect of the imposition of a legal burden 
of proof on the defendant, and that of the requirement of an evidential burden only, is one 
that is substantial and not merely slight. In the first case, the defendant is required to prove 
particular facts on a balance of probabilities, failing which he may be convicted. In the 
second case, all that is required is for the defendant to adduce evidence sufficient to create a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt, whereupon the onus would revert to the prosecution to 
eliminate the doubt. The choice of one in preference to the other is most likely to require 
legislative debates, taking account of competing public policy issues. It is submitted that in 
such circumstances, a judicial overrule of the legislative choice of a legal burden of proof 
amounts to an encroachment of Parliament‘s legislative authority contrary to the traditional 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
In using section 3(1) the way they did in Attorney General’s Reference, their Lordships have 
once again relegated parliamentary intention in the Act of 2000 in favour of achieving a 
Convention-compatible interpretation.  
 
As noted above, the Attorney General urged the House to make a declaration of 
incompatibility under section 4 of the 1998 Act if it found the statutory provision to be 
incompatible, rather than take judicial remedial action under section 3(1) of the Act. 
 
Why would the Attorney General prefer a declaration? The answer lies in the fact that there is 
a significant difference between the two remedies. While a declaration of incompatibility is 
not binding and does not change the law in the statute book, the practical effect of a section 
3(1) judicial remedial action is that thenceforth the statutory provision takes effect as if 
amended by the judgment. So the law is no longer merely what appears on the statute book; 
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the law is as modified by the judgment. For this reason, it is submitted that where the use of 
section 3(1) interpretation would result in a substantial modification of the existing law, 
judges should refrain from utilising it; instead, they should consider making a declaration of 
incompatibility under section 4 and leave it to the Government and Parliament to take 
remedial action pursuant to section 10 and Schedule 2 to the Act 
 
The decision in Attorney General’s Reference apparently followed dicta pronounced in two 
previous decisions of the House of Lords, namely, R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex 
parte Kebeline and others; R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Rechach
588
 and   
Regina v Lambert,
589
 which together indicated that short of an express statement in a 
statutory provision to the effect that a legal burden of proof imposed on a defendant therein is 
to apply notwithstanding Convention rights, the courts would be prepared to judicially amend 
any such provision if found to be in breach of the Convention right to a fair trial, by 
substituting the legal burden with the requirement of an evidential burden only. The 
indication from the cases was that in doing so, courts would be less concerned with the 
intention of Parliament in enacting the offending provision and more concerned with the need 
to comply with the requirements of a fair trial as provided for by Article 6 of the Convention. 
 
In Kebeline,
590
 the accused persons were charged in the Crown Court in connection with 
terrorism offences under section 16A of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 
Act 1989. Section 16A(1) provided as follows: 
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―A person is guilty of an offence if he has any article in his possession in 
circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the article is in his possession 
for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism to which this section applies….‖  
 
Section 16A(3) and (4) provided legal defences for an accused person. However, to avail 
himself of those defences, the accused person was required to prove the relevant facts on a 
balance of probabilities. In other words, a legal burden of proof was imposed on the accused 
person. 
 
Section 16A(3) states: ―It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section 
to prove
591
 that at the time of the alleged offence the article in question was not in his 
possession for such a purpose as is mentioned in subsection (1) above.‖ 
And section 16A(4) was in the following words: 
 
―Where a person is charged with an offence under this section and it is proved that at 
the time of the alleged offence – (a) he and that article were both present in any 
premises; or (b) the article was in premises of which he was the occupier or which he 
habitually used otherwise than as a member of the public, the court may accept the 
fact proved as sufficient evidence of his possessing that article at that time unless it is 
further proved that he did not at that time know of its presence in the premises in 
question, or, if he did know, that he had no control over it.‖ 
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At the close of the prosecution‘s case, instead of opening the defence, counsel addressed 
court, submitting that the legal burden of proof imposed on the accused by section 16A was 
incompatible with the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6(2) of the 
Convention. The trial Crown Court judge accepted this submission. 
 
Consequently, the accused persons‘ counsel asked the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) 
to reconsider his decision to prosecute. The DPP sought and received legal advice to the 
effect that section 16A did not breach the presumption of innocence. He therefore attempted 
to persuade the trial judge to reverse his ruling that the section was incompatible with Article 
6(2) of the Convention. But the trial judge rejected the submission and sustained the earlier 
ruling. Nevertheless, the DPP decided to press on with the prosecution. 
 
Following the DPP‘s decision to continue with the prosecution, the accused persons instituted 
judicial review proceedings in the High Court, challenging the lawfulness of the decision. 
The High Court upheld the argument that section 16A of the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 breached the presumption of innocence guaranteed by 
Article 6(2) of the Convention and that a conviction under that section would probably be set 
aside under the 1998 Act. Consequently, it declared that the DPP had acted unlawfully in 
continuing the prosecutions. The DPP appealed to the House of Lords.  
 
The Lords decided the appeal against the accused persons on grounds not directly relevant to 
the present discussion. Their Lordships also held that the 1998 Act was not applicable, having 
not come into force at the relevant time. However, Lord Cooke was inclined to the view that 
on the natural and ordinary interpretation, section 16A was repugnant to the presumption of 
innocence guaranteed by Article 6(2) of the Convention. Nevertheless, his Lordship opined 
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that the repugnancy or incompatibility could be eliminated, pursuant to the interpretative 
obligation under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, by construing section 16A ―as imposing on the 
defendant an evidential, but not a persuasive (or ultimate), burden of proof.‖592  
 
Lord Cooke‘s main reason for so holding appeared to be his perception of the interpretative 
obligation as representing a strong command from Parliament directing the courts to construe 
legislation compatibly with the Convention rights.
593
 Thus, even though the 1989 Parliament 
intended to impose a legal burden of proof on the defendant under section 16A, the court 
could substitute it with an evidential burden only, if this were necessary to make the 
provision compatible with the right to a fair trial. It is submitted that this would be legal 
reform by judicial means. Indeed, Lord Hope expressly affirmed the role of the judiciary as 
reformers of the legal system, presumably acting pursuant to their interpretative power under 
section 3(1) of the 1998 Act.
594
  
 
Lord Cooke‘s dictum in Kebeline was affirmed in Lambert.595  
 
In Lambert’s case, the appellant was charged with possession of a controlled drug with intent 
to supply contrary to section 5(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 which provided: ―Subject 
to section 28 of this Act, it is an offence for a person to have a controlled drug in his 
possession, whether lawfully or not, with intent to supply it to another in contravention of 
section 4(1) of this Act.‖ 
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At the trial, the appellant raised the defence under section 28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971 to the effect that he neither knew nor suspected nor had reason to suspect the nature of 
the content of the bag that was found on him. The relevant provisions of section 28 were: 
 
―(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, in any proceedings for an offence to which this 
section applies it shall be a defence for the accused to prove that he neither knew of nor 
suspected nor had reason to suspect the existence of some fact alleged by the 
prosecution which it is necessary for the prosecution to prove if he is to be convicted of 
the offence charged. 
 
―(3) Where in any proceedings for an offence to which this section applies it is 
necessary, if the accused is to be convicted of the offence charged, for the prosecution 
to prove that some substance or product involved in the alleged offence was the 
controlled drug which the prosecution alleges it to have been, and it is proved that the 
substance or product in question was that controlled drug, the accused— 
(a)     shall not be acquitted of the offence charged by reason only of proving that 
he neither knew nor suspected nor had reason to suspect that the substance or 
product in question was the particular controlled drug alleged; but 
(b)     shall be acquitted thereof— 
(i)     if he proves that he neither believed nor suspected nor had reason to 
suspect that the substance or product in question was a controlled drug; or 
(ii)     if he proves that he believed the substance or product in question to 
be a controlled drug, or a controlled drug of a description, such that, if it 
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had in fact been that controlled drug or a controlled drug of that 
description, he would not at the material time have been committing any 
offence to which this section applies." 
 
The appellant was convicted of the offence. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, he contended 
that section 28 imposed a legal burden of proof on him in that it required him to prove his 
defence on a balance of probabilities, that the requirement was contrary to the presumption of 
innocence guaranteed by Article 6(2) of the Convention, and that the conviction was 
consequently wrong in law. His appeal was dismissed and he further appealed to the House of 
Lords. 
 
As in Kebeline’s case, the House held that the 1998 Act was inapplicable to the facts of the 
case because the conviction occurred before the coming into force of the relevant provisions 
of the 1998 Act. However, their Lordships made pronouncements (obiter) on the 
compatibility of the provisions of section 28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 set out above 
and the role of section 3(1) of 1998 Act in the interpretation and application of the former. 
 
Their Lordships all agreed that on the ordinary interpretation of section 28 of the 1971 Act, 
what was imposed on an accused person was a legal burden of proof and not an evidential 
burden.  
 
A majority of the House
596
 was inclined to the view that although an objective justification 
for some interference with the presumption of innocence existed, the burden of proof 
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imposed on an accused person by section 28 of the 1971 Act was disproportionate and 
therefore incompatible with Article 6(2) of the Convention.
597
 
 
However, their Lordships were also of the view that it would be possible to activate the 
court‘s interpretative power under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act to judicially modify the 
offensive provision in section 28 of the 1971 Act by substituting the legal burden of proof on 
the accused with an evidential burden only. 
 
An examination of Lambert’s case indicates that certain factors might have influenced the 
majority‘s dicta on the use of section 3(1) to remedy the incompatibility.  
 
In 1972, the Criminal Law Revision Committee produced a report
598
 where they 
recommended that no legal burden should be placed on an accused person. Burdens on an 
accused person should be evidential only. Accordingly, they proposed legislation, which 
would have the following effect: 
 
―…in any case where by virtue of any rule of the common law or of any existing 
enactment the defence have the burden of proving any matter, the effect will be that, 
instead of their having to prove it on a balance of probabilities…, they will have only 
to adduce or elicit some evidence sufficient to raise an issue on the matter and, if they 
do so, the court or jury will decide by reference to the whole of the evidence whether 
the prosecution have proved the matter against the accused. If there is no sufficient 
evidence to raise the issue, the matter will be taken as proved against the accused; but 
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if there is sufficient evidence, the prosecution will have the ordinary burden of 
proving it beyond reasonable doubt. It will be for the court to decide, in accordance 
with the ordinary principles, whether there is sufficient evidence to raise the issue.‖599 
 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there was, as indicated earlier, Parliament‘s 
legislative response to the judicial pronouncements in Kebeline’s case.600 Section 118 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 had watered down the legal burden of proof imposed on an accused 
person under relevant sections of the Act, and had in effect made all such burdens evidential 
only.  
  
Parliament had made similar provisions in section 53(2) and (3) of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ensuring that burdens placed on accused persons under that 
section were evidential rather than legal or persuasive. 
 
It is submitted that, although the issues involved in Kebeline and Lambert are quite similar to 
those in Attorney General’s Reference as far as the use of section 3(1) was concerned, the 
dicta in those cases are easier to justify than the decision in the latter case. First, the statutory 
provisions under consideration in Kebeline and Lambert pre-dated the enactment of section 
3(1) of the 1998 Act. Consequently, it could be argued that in the clash of parliamentary 
intentions expressed in those provisions and that expressed in section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, 
the latter would have to prevail by application of the principle of implied repeal. Therefore, 
the question of a possible judicial challenge to Parliament‘s power to legislate as it pleases 
could not arise. But in Attorney General’s Reference, the statutory provision under 
consideration post-dated section 3(1) of the 1998 Act having been enacted in the year 2000. 
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In the circumstance, to hold that the intention expressed in the 1998 Act should prevail over 
that enacted subsequently seems for all purposes to go against the traditional concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty.601 
 
Secondly, as indicated earlier, in Attorney General’s Reference, a contextual reading of the 
relevant provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000 suggests quite strongly that the imposition of a 
legal burden of proof in section 11(2) thereof was deliberate in that, (1) that particular 
provision was not made subject to section 118 of the Terrorism Act 2000 as other similar 
provisions in the same Act were made, and (2) since the Terrorism Act 2000 itself came after 
Kebeline, it could reasonably be accepted that Parliament made a deliberate choice of a legal 
burden rather than an evidential one.  
 
For these reasons, it could be argued that the use of section 3(1) of the 1998 Act in Attorney 
General’s Reference amounted to judicial interference in the legislative function of 
Parliament. It is submitted that given the circumstances, the appropriate decision should have 
been to make a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the 1998 Act. 
 
As stated earlier, a similar approach to the use of section 3(1) in ensuring compliance with 
the right to a fair trial was adopted in Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Respondent) v MB (FC) (Appellant); Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Respondent) v AF (FC) (Appellant); Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) 
v AF (FC) (Respondent),602 co-joined appeals. 
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Acting pursuant to sections 2 and 3(1)(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department had issued a non-derogating control order 
against MB. At a hearing under section 3 of the 2005 Act relating to the control order, the 
trial judge sustained the order but made a declaration that the procedures under section 3 
were incompatible with MB‘s rights to a fair trial under Article 6(1) of the Convention. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the declaration of incompatibility. 
 
Similarly, the Secretary of State imposed a non-derogating order against AF. At a hearing 
under section 3(10) of the 2005 Act, the trial judge quashed the control order but dismissed 
an application by AF for a declaration that the procedures under section 3 were incompatible 
with Article 6(1) of the Convention. The parties were granted leave to appeal directly to the 
House of Lords. 
 
In each of these cases, the Secretary of State‘s application for permission to make the non-
derogating orders against the controlled persons under section 3(1)(a) of the 2005 Act was 
supported by open materials and also by closed materials which were never shown to the 
controlled persons. In both cases, the material evidence against the controlled persons and 
upon which the Secretary of State relied for the imposition of the control orders were 
contained in the non-disclosed materials only.  
 
For example, in MB‘s case, the trial judge reportedly remarked: 
 
―The basis for the Security Service‘s confidence is wholly contained within the closed 
material. Without access to that material it is difficult to see how, in reality MB could 
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make any effective challenge to what is, on the open case before him, no more than a 
bare assertion.‖603 
 
 
This non-disclosure of evidence were authorised by statute. The key provisions authorising it 
were contained in section 3(5) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, paragraph 4 of the 
Schedule to the Act, and relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules made pursuant to 
the Schedule to the Act. 
 
Section 3(5) of the Act authorises the court to consider an application for permission to 
impose a control order ―in the absence‖604 of the person against whom the order is sought, 
―without his having been notified of the application‖605, and ―without his having been given 
an opportunity … of making any representations to the court.‖606 
 
Paragraph 4 of the Schedule to the 2005 Act authorises rules of court to be made in relation to 
control order proceedings. Paragraph 4(2)(a) of the Schedule provides that the rules may 
permit the non-disclosure of full particulars of the reason for any decision made in relation to 
the proceedings to the controlled person or his legal representative. 
 
Paragraph 4(2)(b) of the Schedule provides that rules may allow the proceedings to be 
conducted in the absence of the controlled person. 
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Paragraph 4(3)(b) and (c) direct that the rules must secure607 that the Secretary of State is 
allowed to apply to court ―for permission not to disclose relevant evidence‖ to the controlled 
person, and that such an application is allowed to be made in the absence of the controlled 
person. 
 
Paragraph 4(3)(d) stipulates that the rules must require the court to grant permission to the 
Secretary of State for him not to disclose relevant material to the controlled person whenever 
the court considers that the disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. 
 
In fulfilment of these statutory directives, rule 76.2(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules directs the 
court to ―ensure that information is not disclosed contrary to the public interest.‖ 
 
Rule 76.29(8) further directs the court to ―give permission to the Secretary of State to 
withhold closed material where it considers that the disclosure of that material would be 
contrary to the public interest.‖  
 
It seems clear from the above, that non-disclosure of relevant evidence is authorised by 
primary legislation. The provisions were to the effect that whenever the court determined that 
the disclosure of relevant material would be inimical to the public interest, the court was 
bound to allow the Secretary of State not only to withhold the evidence from the controlled 
person, but also to rely on it in support of his case against the controlled person. The granting 
of the Secretary of State‘s application to withhold relevant evidence was therefore mandatory 
where disclosure would harm the public interest. Reliance on the closed material, if relevant 
and credible, was also mandatory. 
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In the light of all the above, the questions that arose for determination by the House of Lords 
were, first, whether the non-disclosure of material evidence from the controlled persons as 
authorised by primary legislation, and reliance on same in sustaining the case against them, 
was incompatible with the right to a fair hearing as guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the 
Convention, and secondly, whether the court‘s interpretative power under section 3(1) of the 
1998 Act could be used to modify the statutory provisions in a manner that conforms with the 
right to a fair hearing. 
 
With respect to the first question, the House noted that it involved a balancing of the 
individual‘s Convention right to a fair hearing under Article 6 and the interests of national 
security. While national security is a legitimate aim of legislation, such legislation must be 
balanced against the rights of the individual to a fair hearing. Accordingly, to be justified and 
permissible, the inroads made into the right to a fair hearing must be proportionate and must 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the legislative aim. The legislation must contain 
adequate provisions for the protection of the individual‘s Convention rights. 
 
It is pertinent to state here that the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 made attempts to 
provide safeguards for the protection of the interests of the controlled person. Paragraph 
4(3)(b) of the Schedule to the Act provided that closed material could be shown to a Special 
Representative appointed for the controlled person under paragraph 7(1) of the Schedule. 
Paragraph 7(1) further allows the Special Representative to attend and defend the interests of 
the controlled person in any proceedings in which the controlled person is excluded by law. 
However, paragraph 7(5) curiously provided that the Special Representative ―is not to be 
responsible to the person whose interests he is appointed to represent.‖  
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By a majority of 4-1,608 the House decided that the safeguards provided by the 2005 Act and 
the rules made pursuant to it were inadequate to satisfy the Convention right to a fair hearing. 
In other words, the House was not satisfied with the balancing act conducted by Parliament. 
By the legislative scheme, ―the judge is precluded from ordering disclosure even where he 
considers that this is essential in order to give the controlled person a fair hearing.‖609 
 
The legislative scheme, and in particular, paragraph 4(2)(a) and (3)(d) of the Schedule to the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, and rule 76.29(8) of the Civil Procedure Rules, were 
therefore incompatible with the right to a fair hearing under Article 6(1) of the Convention. 
This would be the case in circumstances where the open material was grossly insufficient to 
support the case against the controlled person, and all the material evidence against him were 
contained in the closed material only.  
 
With respect to the second question, the majority decided that is was possible to judicially 
modify the offending provisions of the legislative scheme by use of the court‘s interpretative 
power under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act. Allowing the judge to refuse the application to 
withhold evidence in any case where non-disclosure would breach the controlled person‘s 
rights to a fair hearing would satisfy Article 6(1) of the Convention. In that case, if the judge 
determined that disclosure was inimical to the public interest, he would not order disclosure 
but he would be able to exclude the material and direct that the Secretary of State should not 
rely on it in support of the case against the controlled person. 
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This seems to nullify the mandatory provisions in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
requiring the judge to allow the use of non-disclosed evidence in circumstances where 
disclosure would harm the public interest. The effect of the decision is that the judge has been 
given considerable discretionary powers to decide on the admissibility of non-disclosed 
evidence. In particular, he has been empowered to refuse reliance on non-disclosed evidence 
where such reliance might lead to a breach of the right to a fair trial. It is submitted that this 
goes contrary to the mandatory language used in the 2005 Act  
 
Indeed, Lord Bingham seriously questioned the propriety of using section 3(1) of the 1998 
Act in the circumstances of these appeals. His reason was that modifying the legislative 
scheme in the manner stated above would amount to a ―weakening of the mandatory 
language used by Parliament‖ and that such modification ―would very clearly fly in the face 
of Parliament‘s intention.‖610 In the end however, his Lordship declined to press the point 
and instead, joined the majority in judicially modifying the offending provisions. 
 
Both the Terrorism Bill and the Prevention of Terrorism Bill611 contained statements of 
compatibility made pursuant to section 19(1)(a) of the 1998 Act, expressing the Home 
Secretary‘s view that the provisions therein were compatible with the Convention rights. 
While it may be argued that such statements could support a strong presumption that no 
breach of Convention rights was intended by the Government, it is submitted that they should 
not enjoy a better standing than the clear and unequivocal language used in the statute. It is 
the language used in the statute that best conveys the intention of Parliament in enacting the 
statute under consideration.  
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These appeals612 are a classic example of the way in which the House of Lords now views its 
obligations under the 1998 Act to protect the Convention rights. The cases tend to indicate 
that the clear intention of Parliament in enacting the legislation under consideration is 
accorded a relatively insignificant role in the interpretative process under section 3(1) of the 
1998 Act. As could be seen in chapter 3 above, traditionally, the main aim of statutory 
interpretation is the ascertainment of the intention of Parliament in enacting the legislation 
under consideration. If the ascertained intention is unambiguous and does not lead to an 
absurd result, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty demands that the court obey and 
apply that intention irrespective of any breach of the Convention rights. However, it would 
appear that section 3(1) of the 1998 Act has enabled judges to pay less attention to 
parliamentary sovereignty and more attention to the need to protect the Convention rights. 613    
 
It has to be noted at this juncture that the judges do recognise that there are limits to the 
extent to which they may utilise their interpretative power under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act 
in construing legislation compatibly with the Convention rights. However, as will be 
demonstrated shortly, it would appear that refusal in some cases to use section 3(1) in 
judicially rectifying primary legislation found to be incompatible with the Convention rights 
is motivated more by factors other than a real concern that the doctrine of parliamentary 
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sovereignty may be breached in the process.  For example, a contextual examination of such 
cases indicate that factors such as the apparent lack of institutional competence on the part of 
the judiciary to deal with the issue at hand, or even the character of the legal challenge itself, 
may be a reason for declining to use section 3(1) to achieve compatibility with the 
Convention rights. It would be argued that, despite numerous judicial statements (in decisions 
in which the courts decline to use section 3(1) of the 1998 Act) tending to indicate an avowed 
reverence for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the real reason is often the factors 
mentioned above. 
 
A good example of such a case is International Transport Roth GmbH and others v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department614 where the principle was stated that it would be 
inappropriate to use section 3(1) if doing so would involve the court in substantially re-
writing the entirety of a legislative scheme.  
 
The issue was whether a penalty scheme created under section 32 of the Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999 was incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention, and if incompatible, 
whether the court could activate its interpretative power under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act to 
modify the offending provisions to make them compatible with the Convention right. 
 
The Secretary of State was empowered under the scheme to impose a fixed penalty of £2,000 
on the owner, hirer and driver of any transport carrier in whose carrier a clandestine entrant 
defined in section 32(1) of the 1999 Act was found. They were to be liable to pay the fixed 
sum unless they could avail themselves with a relevant defence under section 34 of the Act. 
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The defences included duress, lack of actual or constructive knowledge, and the operation of 
an effective system for preventing the carriage of clandestine entrants. 
 
Groups of claimants who were affected by the scheme took out proceedings challenging the 
lawfulness of the scheme. In some of the cases, the clandestine entrants were discovered by 
the drivers only when they were already on the highway; and they would not have been made 
to pay the fixed penalty if not for the fact that they themselves reported the matter to the 
authorities. 
 
The trial judge held inter alia, that the penalty scheme was incompatible with Article 6 of the 
Convention. The Home Secretary appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
 
On the Convention point, the majority
615
 judged the scheme to be incompatible with Article 6 
of the Convention on the ground that the fixed penalty was inflexible and took no account of 
mitigating circumstances, and more importantly, the scheme made no provision for the 
penalty to be determined by an independent tribunal. 
 
However, upon the defendants‘ invitation to utilise its interpretative power under section 3(1) 
of the 1998 Act to construe the scheme in a manner that would eliminate any unfairness and 
thus bring it in conformity with Article 6 of the Convention, the Court of Appeal stated that 
the circumstances made this option impossible. According to Lord Justice Brown: 
 
―…it appears to me quite impossible to recreate this scheme by any interpretative 
process as one compatible with Convention rights. As I have more than once 
endeavoured to explain, the troubling features of the scheme are all inter-linked: to 
achieve fairness would require a radically different approach. Mr. Barling, of course, 
invokes section 3 only as his final fall-back position. But in asking us to apply it he is, 
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in my judgment, necessarily inviting us to turn the scheme inside out, something we 
cannot do. As the authorities clearly dictate, the court's task is to distinguish between 
legislation and interpretation, and confine itself to the latter. We cannot create a 
wholly different scheme (perhaps of the sort envisaged by Sullivan J below) so as to 
provide an acceptable alternative means of immigration control. That must be for 
Parliament itself. As Lord Lester of Herne Hill pointed out, were we ourselves to 
create a fresh scheme purportedly under section 3, then indeed we should be failing to 
show the judicial deference owed to Parliament as legislators.‖616 
 
It is clear from the above that the so-called impossibility arose because of the peculiar 
circumstances of the case. The features that were adjudged incompatible were not one, but 
several. These features were all ―inter-linked‖ and presumably inseparable. To judicially 
modify them in bits would not have been appropriate. To achieve compatibility, the ―whole‖ 
of the scheme would have had to be re-written. That is not a job for the judiciary. That is the 
job of the draftsman and ultimately Parliament. Re-writing substantial parts of a statute goes 
beyond construing the statute in accordance with section 3(1). Clearly, in these 
circumstances, it can hardly be denied that it is inappropriate to judicially modify the scheme 
by use of section 3(1).  
 
Thus, the impossibility did not arise primarily because of a concern for parliamentary 
sovereignty. It arose because the circumstances made it inappropriate for judicial remedial 
action to be taken. The appropriate remedial action in the circumstances was a legislative one. 
 
This case is authority for the proposition that where a section 3(1) interpretation would 
involve re-writing an entire legislative scheme or a substantial part of it, it would be 
inappropriate to remedy the incompatibility by judicial means. In such circumstances, the 
right option is a legislative one. Parliament should be allowed to make the necessary 
amendments. It is not a case of parliamentary sovereignty trumping Convention rights. The 
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case in no way detracts from the immense power available to the court under section 3(1) to 
modify primary legislation for the purpose of making it Convention-compliant. 
 
There was no suggestion that the court could not change the meaning and effect of primary 
legislation pursuant to the interpretative obligation under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act. What 
the case indicated was that the court was ill-equipped to re-write the entirety of the legislative 
scheme. No such wholesale re-writing was necessary in cases such as R v A, Ghaidan v 
Mendoza, Attorney General’s Reference (N0. 4 of 2002) and MB. The decision indicated that 
section 3(1) does not empower the courts to embark on an exercise of wholesale revision and 
amendment of statutes. Such an exercise would certainly require extensive legislative 
debates.  
 
Similar reasons accounted for the refusal of the House of Lords to utilise the interpretative 
power under section 3(1) in Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan); In Re 
W (Minors)(co-joined appeals),
617
 even though pronouncements in the case tended to indicate 
that their Lordships were concerned to avoid an interpretation that would be contrary to the 
parliamentary intention expressed in the statute under consideration in the appeals. 
 
The appeals arose from two cases where the trial judges respectively made final care orders 
in respect of certain minors pursuant to the provisions of the Children‘s Act 1989. In the first 
case, the local authority concerned failed to implement the care plan prepared pursuant to the 
care order. Amongst others, the plan required the local authority to work with the mother of 
the children with a view to reuniting her with the children. The mother appealed, contending 
that the trial judge should have made an interim order only, instead of a final order. In the 
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second case, the final care order was made despite the fact that vital aspects of the care plan 
remained uncertain. The parents appealed contending that the judge should not have made a 
final care order in the circumstances. 
 
In the course of the appeals, the Court of Appeal observed and criticised certain elements of 
the Children‘s Act 1989. While the Act allowed courts to make final care orders in respect of 
children in need of care and consequently remove these children from their parents and into 
the parental care of local authorities, it provided no adequate remedies to both the children 
and their parents in a situation where the local authority concerned failed to discharge or 
properly discharge its parental responsibilities in accordance with the approved care plan. 
The Court of Appeal found that such a situation could result in an infringement of the 
Convention rights of the children and their parents under Article 8.
618
 Courts had no way of 
monitoring the care plan in order to ensure that the local authority properly discharged its 
parental responsibilities. The Court of Appeal felt that this was not right. According to Hale, 
LJ:
619
 
 
―Where elements of the care plan are so fundamental that there is a real risk of a 
breach of Convention rights if they are not fulfilled, and where there is some reason to 
fear that they may not be fulfilled, it must be justifiable to read into the Children Act 
1989 a power in the court to require a report on progress . . . the court would require a 
report, either to the court or to the guardian ad litem (in future to CAFCASS) who 
could then decide whether it was appropriate to return the case to court . . . (When) 
making a care order, the court is being asked to interfere in family life. If it perceives 
that the consequence of doing so will be to put at risk the Convention rights of either 
the parents or the child, the court should be able to impose this very limited 
requirement as a condition of its own interference.‖620   
 
To remedy this perceived shortcoming in the Children‘s Act 1989, the Court of Appeal, 
purportedly acting under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, introduced a new procedure into the 
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working of the 1989 Act. This new procedure involved ―starring‖ essential milestones in an 
approved care plan when a care order is to be issued by the court. After a care order had been 
issued, if the local authority concerned failed to achieve a ―starred‖ milestone within a given 
time, the local authority would be obliged to inform the guardian of the child. Following this, 
the guardian or the local authority could then apply to the court for further directions. The 
Court of Appeal also formulated guidance enabling judges to exercise wider discretions in 
making interim orders and in deferring the making of final care orders. 
 
Essentially, what the Court of Appeal did by the introduction of this new procedure was to 
give to the courts supervisory powers enabling them to monitor the implementation of an 
approved care plan. 
 
The local authority in the first case, as well as the Secretary of State for Health felt that the 
Court of Appeal erred in introducing the procedure in that the supervisory jurisdiction now 
conferred on the courts is inconsistent with fundamental features of the Children‘s Act 1989. 
They therefore appealed to the House of Lords. 
 
In delivering its judgment, the House identified what it termed ―a cardinal principle‖ of the 
Children‘s Act. This is that there is a clear division of responsibility between local authorities 
and courts in the implementation of the Children‘s Act. Under the Act, the court has the 
power to make a care order. However, once the care order has been made, it becomes the 
duty of the designated local authority to take the child into care and implement the care plan. 
Once the care order has been made, the court has no powers to interfere with the 
implementation of the care plan or in the way the local authority goes about its parental 
responsibility towards the child. 
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The House observed that this principle was quite deliberate as it represented a change in the 
law. Previously, courts had power to exercise some supervision over local authorities with 
respect to children being cared for by those local authorities. This was done by virtue of the 
court‘s wardship jurisdiction. For various reasons, it was felt that court supervision was 
undesirable and that it was better to leave all matters of care of children entirely to local 
authorities who were more suited to manage and cater to the day-to-day needs of children 
under care. Thus, section 100(2) of the Children‘s Act 1989 provided: 
 
―(2)     No court shall exercise the High Court's inherent jurisdiction with respect to 
children— 
 
(a)     so as to require a child to be placed in the care, or put under the supervision, of 
a local authority; 
 
(b)     so as to require a child to be accommodated by or on behalf of a local authority; 
 
(c)     so as to make a child who is the subject of a care order a ward of court; or 
 
(d)     for the purpose of conferring on any local authority power to determine any 
question which has arisen, or which may arise, in connection with any aspect of 
parental responsibility for a child.‖ 
 
The principle that courts should not interfere with the way in which local authorities carry out 
their parental responsibilies pursuant to a care order is therefore of vital importance. 
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Bearing this priciple in mind, the House of Lords overruled the Court of Appeal‘s 
introduction of the ―starring‖ system. The House held that the system departed from the 
cardinal principle of the Act as stated above. It was therefore an unacceptable use of the 
court‘s interpretative power under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act. As Lord Nicholls stated: 
 
―…a meaning which departs substantially from a fundamental feature of an Act of 
Parliament is likely to have crossed the boundary between interpretation and 
amendment. This is especially so where the departure has important practical 
repercussions which the court is not equipped to evaluate.‖621  
 
Lord Nicholls further expressed the view that whenever a court considers making use of 
section 3(1) of the 1998 Act in the interpretation and application of legislation, it should be 
able to identify the particular provision in the legislation that offends the Convention rights. 
This makes sense because it is in relation to a specific provision that the court is often called 
upon to construe legislation pursuant to section 3(1) of the 1998 Act. The isolation of the 
offending provision helps to ensure that ―the court does not inadvertently stray outside its 
interpretative jurisdiction.‖622 
 
Neither the appellants before the Court of Appeal, nor the Court of Appeal itself, was able to 
identify and isolate the provisions that they percieved to be capable of contravening the 
Convention rights. Indeed, Hale, LJ, (as she then was) stated that ―the problem is more with 
what the Act does not say than what it does.‖623  
 
Clearly, the decision of the House of Lords stands on four major pillars. The first is that the 
supervisory scheme introduced by the Court of Appeal was not sanctioned by Parliament. 
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Secondly, the scheme departed from a fundamental feature of the Children‘s Act. Thirdly, no 
specific provisions of the Children‘s Act could be isolated for the purpose of subjecting it a 
section 3(1) interpretation. The last but by no means the least is that the scheme had 
imporrtant practical repercussions for which the courts were not equipped to evalute and deal 
with. 
 
The strongest of these four pillars would appear to be the third, and, even more importantly, 
the fourth. As has been shown in earlier parts of this chapter, the courts have in certain 
instances been able to read into primary legislation provisions that were not sanctioned by 
Parliament.
624
 Similarly, they have also been able to depart from important features of 
primary legislation if that were necessary to make the legislation Convention-compatible. For 
example, in MB, the delibrateness on the part of Parliament, indicated by the mandatory 
language of paragraph 4(3)(d) of the Schedule to the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, to 
allow the use of non-disclosed evidence as provided in the Act, did not prevent the House of 
Lords from using section 3(1) of the 1998 Act in a manner that resulted in a substantial 
departure from the legislative intent expressed in the 2005 Act, in order to achieve 
compatibility with the Convention right to a fair hearing.
625
 
 
However, the available case law on the use of section 3(1) has shown that in each case where 
the courts have utilised their interpretative power, they were able to identify the particular 
statutory provisions that they held to be incompatible with the Convention rights. And it is 
those identified provisions that were construed pursuant to section 3(1).Thus, the decision in 
the instant case might have been different if it were possible for the court to isolate an 
offending provision and construe it compatibly with the Convention rights. In a majority of 
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the cases discussed above, compatibility was achieved by inserting rectifying provisos into 
identified offending sections of the relevant statute.    
 
Nevertheless, what appears to have weighed most heavily on the minds of their Lordships is 
the fact that the scheme had serious practical implications both in terms of administrative 
work and departmental expenditure. The implications are ones that would require policy 
issues to be considered, deliberated upon and decided. These are things for which the courts 
are not equipped.  
 
The case therefore had more to do with the appropriateness of judicial amendment in light of 
its peculiar circumstances. The fall-out of such judicial amendment is something that the 
courts were not well-placed to deal with. The case was not a departure from previous 
decisions such as R v A where the courts have been able to depart from the enacted intention 
of Parliament. 
 
The same principle was adopted in Bellinger v Bellinger.
626
 Similar to Re S, Re W
627
 the 
House held that section 3(1) of the 1998 Act was not to be used to effect a major change in 
the law which may have far-reaching ramifications for which the courts were not equipped. 
 
In that case, Mrs. Bellinger, the appellant, was a transsexual who was originally classified 
and registered correctly as a male at birth in 1946. In 1981, she completed gender-
reassignment treatment and effectively had her sex changed from male to female. In the same 
year, now living as a woman, she married a man named Bellinger. The marriage was 
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purportedly conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
Following the marriage, the couple lived together as husband and wife. 
 
Mrs. Bellinger‘s sex change was known to, and indeed had the support of, her husband. There 
was therefore no deceit involved in the case. 
 
Presumably, Mrs. Bellinger knew of the provisions of section 11(c) of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 and was understandably concerned about the validity of the marriage. 
Section 11(c) declared a marriage to be void if ―the parties are not respectively male and 
female.‖ 
 
In order to save her marriage, Mrs. Bellinger filed legal proceedings seeking a declaration 
that the marriage was valid from inception on the ground that at the time of the marriage, she 
had become a ―female‖ within the meaning of section 11(c) of the 1973 Act. 
 
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeal rejected Mrs. Bellinger‘s contention. Following 
previous decisions,
628
 both courts had held that the sex of a person as determined by the 
chromosonal, gonadal and genital tests at birth could not be changed for purposes of marriage 
under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. In the result, Mrs. Bellinger‘s sex change was 
legally unrecognisable for purposes of marriage under the 1973 Act. 
 
Mrs. Bellinger appealed to the House of Lords. In the House, she added an alternative remedy 
to the declaration sought in the courts below. Should the Lords agree with the courts below 
that the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 did not recognise sex change for purposes of marriage 
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under the Act, a declaration should be made that the non-recognition infringed her 
Convention rights to respect for family life under Article 8 as well as the right to marry under 
Article 12. 
 
After reviewing the available case law on the issue of transsexuals in the context of marriage, 
the House accepted the decision of Ormrod, J in Corbett v Corbett
629
 as representing the 
present state of the law. In that case, Ormrod, J had held that for purposes of marriage, the 
sex of a party to the marriage should be determined by the chromosomal, gonadal and genital 
tests carried out at birth. For this purpose, any intervening factor, for instance, sex change, 
should not be taken into account. In other words, for purposes of marriage, the sex 
determined at birth in accordance with the three tests mentioned above, remained constant 
and unchangeable throughout a person‘s lifetime. Accordingly, the House held that Mrs. 
Bellinger could not be regarded as a ―female‖ under section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973.  
 
The House then proceeded to consider the European viewpoint on the issue whether the non-
recognition of Mrs. Bellinger‘s sex-change for the purposes of marriage amounted to a 
violation of her Convention rights as stated above. 
 
Initially, the view of the European Court has been that the application of the Corbett tests
630
 
did not amount to a violation of the rights under Articles 8 or 12 of the Convention.
631
 This 
was mainly on the ground that the issue came within the purview of a State‘s margin of 
appreciation. But with the increased social acceptance of transsexuality, the European Court 
became critical of the continued failure of the United Kingdom to give legal recognition to 
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transsexuals in relation to marriage.
632
 Then, in the case of Goodwin v United Kingdom,
633
 
the European Court finally decided that the failure to give legal recognition to the new status 
aquired by persons who had undergone sex change was no more acceptable. It ruled that such 
non-recognition was a violation of relevant Convention rights.  
 
Goodwin was a post operative male-to-female transsexual. She applied to be treated as a 
female for national insurance purposes. She also intended to marry her male partner. 
However, the domestic law of the United Kingdom permitted neither of these because 
Goodwin was originally correctly registered as a male at birth and it was immaterial that she 
had undergone sex change. She therefore applied to the European Court for remedy, 
contending that United Kingdom‘s failure to give her sex change legal recognition infringed 
her Convention rights under Articles 8 and 12.
634
 
 
Presumably acting pursuant to section 2(1)(a) of the 1998 Act, the House of Lords accepted 
the Goodwin decision and accordingly held that the non-recognition of Mrs. Bellinger as a 
female for purposes of marriage amounted to an infringment of her Convention rights. This 
point was even expressly conceded on behalf of the Lord Chancellor and was not in 
dispute.
635
 
 
The next issue that the House had to determine was whether, acting under section 3(1) of the 
1998 Act, the word, ―female‖ as it appeared in section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 could be given an extended meaning to the effect that a person correctly registered at 
birth as a man could later acquire the female sex and become regarded as a female for the 
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purpose of marriage to a male partner. In that way, the repugnant aspect of section 11 (c) of 
the 1973 Act would have been eliminated. 
 
Their Lordships unanimously decided that it would be inappropriate to use section 3(1) of the 
1998 Act to judicially modify the offending provision. According to Lord Nicholls, doing so  
 
―…would represent a major change in the law, having far-reaching ramifications. It 
raises issues whose solution calls for extensive inquiry and the widest public 
consultation and discussion. Questions of social policy and administrative feasibility 
arise at several points, and their interaction has to be evaluated and balanced. The 
issues are altogether ill-suited for determination by courts and court procedures. They 
are pre-eminently a matter for Parliament, the more especially when the government, 
in unequivocal terms, has already announced its intention to introduce comprehensive 
primary legislation on this difficult and sensitive subject.‖636 
 
 
Several reasons appear to account for the refusal of the House of Lords to judicially modify 
the offending provision. First, their Lordships seemed to feel that the case was too Bellinger-
specific to give a ruling of general application. ―Much uncertainty surrounds the 
circumstances in which gender reassignment should be recognised for the purposes of 
marriage.‖637 Gender reassignment is a long process and involves a variety of treatments and 
operations. The difficult question would always be at which point could a person be regarded 
as having fully changed from one sex to the other in order to save the marriage from 
invalidity under section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
 
Secondly, as Lord Nicholls stated, ―the recognition of gender reassignment for the purposes 
of marriage is part of a wider problem which should be considered as a whole and not dealt 
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with in a piecemeal fashion.‖638 The issue affects virtually every aspect of legal regulation; 
from family law, criminal law, and employment law to housing law. The appropriate thing to 
do therefore would be to enact legislation that would take into consideration all the 
implications just mentioned. 
 
Thirdly, it should be recalled that in Goodwin’s case, even though the European Court 
denounced the failure of the United Kingdom to provide for the legal recognition of post-
operative transsexuals, it conceded a margin of appreciation to the Contracting States as to 
the means of achieving the necessary legal recognition. This factor must have played a 
prominent part in the House‘s decision to leave it to Parliament to devise the appropriate 
means by which legal recognition can be accorded to transsexuals. 
 
Lastly, in reaction to the decision in Goodwin’s case, the Government had openly 
acknowledged that the failure to give legal recognition to transsexuals was incompatible with 
the Convention rights. Accordingly, it had announced its intention to introduce legislation 
that would provide for the legal recognition of transsexuals and also deal with concomitant 
matters.
639
 This fact, taken together with all the other factors mentioned above, made it 
absolutely inappropriate for the courts to dabble into this complex matter for which they were 
not well suited. In the circumstances, it was better to leave it to the Government, and 
ultimately to Parliament, to deal with the problem in the best manner they thought fit. 
 
In Bellinger, the inability of the House to utilise the interpretative power under section 3(1) of 
the 1998 Act was not due to the language used in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Neither 
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were their Lordships concerned that the resultant interpretation would be contrary to the 
parliamentary intention expressed in the 1973 Act. The major reason appeared to be a lack of 
institutional competence on the part of the judiciary to deal with the complex issues that 
would arise from a section 3(1) interpretation. Thus, in Ghaidan v Mendoza, the House
640
 
was able to utilise section 3(1) the way it did because no such ramifications (as pointed out 
by Lord Nicholls in Bellinger) arose. 
 
Bellinger indicates that circumstances peculiar to a given case might make it inappropriate to 
exercise the interpretative power contained in section 3(1) of the 1998 Act even though it 
might be quite possible in principle to use it to achieve compatibility. 
 
As indicated above, it would appear that the nature of the legal challenge in a case might well 
be a reason for declining to use section 3(1) of the 1998 Act to judicially modify 
incompatible legislation. The case of R (on the application of Anderson) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department
641
 illustrates this. 
 
Anderson concerned the role played by the Secretary of State in the fixing of the tariff
642
 that 
a mandatory life prisoner must serve before he qualified to be considered for parole under 
section 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.
643
  
 
In practice, life imprisonment does not necessarily mean imprisonment for the rest of the 
prisoner‘s life. Persons who are sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment are entitled, like 
all other categories of prisoners, to be considered for parole some time in the course of their 
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imprisonment. To this end, section 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 provided as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                                     
―(1) If recommended to do so by the Parole Board, the Secretary of State may, after 
consultation with the Lord Chief Justice together with the trial judge if available, 
release on licence a life prisoner who is not a discretionary life prisoner. 
 
(2) The Parole Board shall not make a recommendation under subsection (1) above 
unless the Secretary of State has referred the particular case, or the class of case to 
which that case belongs, to the Board for its advice.‖ 
 
In essence, what these provisions mean is that the prisoner cannot be considered for parole 
except with the consent of the Secretary of State. This is so since the Parole Board has no 
power to make any recommendation for the release of the prisoner unless the Secretary of 
State has referred the case to it. 
 
In practice, before the Secretary of State refers a case to the Parole Board, he satisfies himself 
that the prisoner had served an appropriate term in prison to satisfy the requirements of 
deterrence and retribution. In determining the appropriate minimum term to be served, before 
the prisoner‘s case is referred to the Parole Board, the Home Secretary takes a number of 
factors into consideration. These factors may include the gravity of the offence, the interests 
of the victim, public confidence in the criminal justice system as well as the criminal record 
of the prisoner. 
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No doubt, these are matters that the courts ordinarily deal with when considering imposing a 
sentence after conviction. It was not surprising therefore that the practice was adopted 
whereby, the trial judge who imposes the life sentence recommends the minimum term that 
must be served by the life prisoner before he qualifies to be considered for parole. The judge 
did that taking into consideration all relevant factors mitigating or aggravating the offence. 
 
The recommendation of the trial judge is then passed on to the Lord Chief Justice who adds 
his own recommendation and then forwards the case to the Secretary of State for his decision. 
As section 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 makes clear, the decision to refer the case to 
the Parole Board for their consideration is his to make. Therefore, the Secretary is free either 
to accept the recommendation of the trial judge or to reject it and fix a different minimum 
term to be served by the prisoner before his case is referred to the Parole Board.  
 
In substance therefore, the provisions of section 29 of the 1997 Act allows the Secretary of 
State (rather than the courts) to determine the minimum term that a mandatory life prisoner 
must serve before he qualifies for consideration for parole. 
 
Mr. Anderson was a mandatory life prisoner. Both the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice 
recommended that the minimum term he should serve in prison be 15 years. However, the 
Secretary of State rejected this recommendation and fixed a term of 20 years. That meant that 
irrespective of any mitigating factors that might have been found by the trial judge, Anderson 
could not be considered for parole until he had served at least 20 years in prison. 
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When the judicially recommended tariff of 15 years was nearing completion, Anderson 
applied for judicial review of the Home Secretary‘s decision of increasing the tariff by 5 
years. He lost both at the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal. 
 
Before the House of Lords, the issue arose as to whether section 29 of the Crime (Sentences) 
Act 1997, which in substance enabled the Secretary of State to fix the minimum term, was 
incompatible with the prisoner‘s right under Article 6(1) of the Convention to have his 
sentence imposed by an independent and impartial tribunal. If incompatible, a further issue 
for determination was whether section 3(1) of the 1998 Act could be used to modify the 
offending provision in a manner that removed the incompatibility. 
On the first issue above, the House of Lords had no difficulty in holding that the Home 
Secretary‘s role in fixing the tariff was incompatible with the right of the prisoner to have his 
sentence imposed by an independent and impartial tribunal. This decision was in line with the 
decision of the European Court in Benjamin v United Kingdom
644
 where the Home 
Secretary‘s role was criticised.  
 
On the question whether section 3(1) of the 1998 Act could be used to remedy the 
incompatibility, the House ruled that it was not possible. Their Lordships decided that 
Section 29 of the 1997 Act clearly conferred on the Secretary of State the power to refer a 
mandatory life sentence prisoner‘s case to the Parole Board. By that section, whether and 
when the Secretary decides to refer the case to the Parole Board is entirely up to him. He may 
decide not to refer the case to the Parole Board for the rest of the life of the prisoner. He may 
decide to refer it just after conviction. He may do either of these and he would be perfectly 
within the law. 
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Furthermore, even where the Home Secretary decided to refer the case to the Parole Board, 
he was not bound by law to accept the recommendation of the Board even if the 
recommendation were in favour of releasing the prisoner on licence.  
 
On the whole, it is clear that as far as mandatory life prisoners were concerned, Parliament 
intended that the length of time they should serve in prison must be left in the final analysis to 
the Secretary of State to determine for himself. This position becomes even clearer when 
section 28 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 is contrasted with section 29 of the same Act. 
Section 28 provided for the release of discretionary life prisoners and the powers exercisable 
by the Secretary of State therein are distinctively less absolute than those exercisable by him 
under section 29. This, according to the House, was deliberate on the part of Parliament. 
 
The role of the Secretary of State under section 29 was held to be too pervasive to be ignored. 
Therefore,  
 
―to read s 29 as precluding participation by the Home Secretary, if it were possible to 
do so, would be judicial vandalism: it would give the section an effect quite different 
from that which Parliament intended and would go well beyond any interpretative 
process sanctioned by s 3 of the 1998 Act.‖645 
 
 
For Lord Steyn, following such a course ―would not be interpretation but interpolation 
inconsistent with the plain legislative intent to entrust the decision to the Home Secretary, 
who was intended to be free to follow or reject judicial advice.‖646  
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And for Lord Hutton, the House would be engaging ―in the amendment of a statute‖ if it were 
to transfer the right to decide on the length of the tariff period from the Home Secretary to the 
judiciary.
647
  
 
The decision in Anderson appears to contradict the decision in R v A. The House seemed to 
have based its refusal to use section 3(1) of the 1998 Act mainly on the ground that the 
resulting interpretation would be contrary to the intention of Parliament in enacting section 
29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. The perceived difference in approach in the two cases 
is even more illuminated by the similarity of the legal issues involved in them. One argument 
has been that in R v A, the House of Lords felt able to utilise section 3(1) of the 1998 Act 
because the issue of fair trial was a subject-matter ―within the traditional decision-making 
expertise of the courts.‖648 However, it is observed that the issue of sentencing involved in 
Anderson also fell within the same class. Traditionally, sentencing has been a judicial 
function. Thus, Danny Nicol has argued that the decision represents a retreat from R v A.
649
   
 
However, subsequent House of Lords decisions seem to indicate that the House has not 
retreated (and would probably not retreat) from the maximal utilisation of its interpretative 
power under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act in appropriate cases.
650
 
 
The explanation for Anderson lies perhaps in the very nature of the appeal itself. The case 
was essentially a challenge to the executive action of the Secretary of State in fixing the tariff 
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of Mr. Anderson. By section 6(3)(b) of the 1998 Act the Secretary of State is a public 
authority subject to the provisions of section 6(1) of the same Act. Section 6(1) provides that 
―it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention 
right.‖ The real issue was therefore the lawfulness of the Home Secretary‘s action in fixing 
the tariff. 
 
However, section 6(2)(a) excused the Home Secretary‘s action since it was authorised by 
primary legislation, that is, by section 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. In the 
circumstances, using section 3(1) of the 1998 Act would have had the effect of making the 
Home Secretary‘s action unlawful contrary to the clear provisions of section 6(2)(a) which 
protects him as well as the action itself.  
 
It is submitted that the principles that made it possible to modify the relevant legislative 
provisions in R v A applies with equal force to this case. Since it is the Convention right of 
the mandatory life prisoner that is to be protected, it would have been possible, in principle, 
to construe section 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 in a manner that required the 
Secretary of State to accept the judicial recommendation in all cases. This, no doubt, would 
seem to have departed from the intention of Parliament when it enacted the legislation. But 
then, the case law has shown that that could be done if it were necessary to achieve 
compatibility with the Convention rights.   
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In the light of all the above, Anderson is indicative of the fact that while it may be possible in 
principle to judicially modify primary legislation by use of section 3(1) interpretation, it may 
nevertheless be inappropriate to do so in the light of the character of the legal challenge.
651
 
 
In a considerable number of cases, the judges have constantly emphasised that the obligation 
in section 3(1) of the 1998 Act was one of interpretation and not legislation.
652
 The judges 
stress this point almost to a level of emphasis that makes one wonder whether any usefulness 
is left of section 3(1). Because these judicial statements appear to suggest a general 
inclination to section 4 of the Act, the view taken by this writer, that the judges tend to be 
using section 3(1) in a manner that profoundly challenges the traditional concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty, seems at first glance to be misconceived. However, it is submitted 
that such statements could be misleading. While in principle, they may be correct to say that 
section 3(1) requires them to interpret and not legislate, the reality disclosed by the case law 
is that they have in appropriate cases felt able to judicially amend primary legislation found 
to be incompatible with the Convention rights.  
 
What happened in cases such as R v A, Attorney General’s Reference (No. 4 of 2002), 
Ghaidan v Mendoza, MB and others in that line was nothing less than judicial amendment of 
the relevant offending provisions. It would be impossible to arrive at those decisions without 
the court exercising some legislative powers.  
                                                 
651
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In the light of the totality of the case law on section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, these statements 
could be rationally explained if they were taken only as a warning that the interpretative 
power under section 3(1) is not without limits. ―As far a possible‖ as it appears in section 3(1) 
no doubt suggests that in some cases it may not be possible to interpret legislation compatibly 
with the Convention rights. Accordingly, section 4 empowers the court to make a declaration 
of incompatibility in cases where it is not possible to remove the incompatibility by use of 
section 3(1). 
 
The reality is that the judges perceive section 3(1) as permitting judicial legislation. What has 
not been made certain is the precise extent to which the courts could go in taking judicial 
legislative action. Since the limit is not precisely defined, the courts themselves have been 
developing principles that would guide and help them in ensuring that they do not go beyond 
what is permissible in the exercise of their power under section 3(1). 
 
The statements should therefore not shroud the immense judicial power that section 3(1) of 
the 1998 Act seems to have given the courts. It has enabled them to protect Convention rights 
in a way that was impossible before the advent of the 1998 Act. By virtue of section 3(1), the 
courts now feel able to judicially change the meaning and effect of primary legislation 
irrespective of the fact that no ambiguity exists, or of the fact that the resultant meaning is 
inconsistent with the intention of Parliament in enacting the legislation under scrutiny. 
 
III– Conclusion  
 
As can be seen in the preceding chapter, the legislative background to the enactment of the 
1998 Act disclosed a clear and strong desire to preserve the traditional concept of 
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parliamentary sovereignty.
653
 This desire found expression in section 3(2)(b) and (c) and 
section 4(6)(a) and (b) of the 1998 Act respectively. Apparently, the provisions therein were 
meant to preserve parliamentary sovereignty. 
The study found that the senior judiciary was in general agreeable to the idea that 
parliamentary sovereignty should be preserved in the scheme of the 1998 Act.
654
  
 
However, as mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, various dicta in Jackson
655
 
suggested that the courts no longer accorded unqualified respect to the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Specifically, Lord Hope suggested that the interpretative 
obligation under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act had substantially qualified parliamentary 
sovereignty.
656
 
 
In the light of these suggestions, it was indicated that this chapter would investigate the role 
that section 3(1) of the 1998 Act plays in the interpretation and application of primary 
legislation touching on the Convention rights.  
 
It was also indicated that there would be a discussion of how the courts have utilised their 
interpretative power under section 3(1) and how and to what extent this has impacted on their 
attitude to the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Central to the inquiry was the resolution of certain basic questions. First, when acting 
pursuant to the interpretative obligation under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, do the courts feel 
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able to ignore the clear and unambiguous intention of parliament as reflected in an offending 
provision if this were necessary to protect Convention rights? 
 
Secondly, do they feel inhibited by concerns about parliamentary sovereignty and therefore 
feel constrained to leave offensive primary legislation untouched in spite of a violation of the 
Convention rights? 
 
Lastly, on the whole, has section 3(1) impacted on judicial attitudes to the traditional concept 
of parliamentary sovereignty? 
 
The analysis of the relevant case law has revealed interesting evidence. While on the one 
hand, the judges have repeatedly stressed that their duty under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act 
remained one of interpretation and not legislation, the evidence disclosed by the case law 
suggests that in many cases their use of the interpretative obligation go much further than the 
conventional ways of statutory interpretation and amount in effect to nullifying legislative 
provisions held to be in breach of the Convention rights. 
 
By the conventional methods of statutory interpretation, the focus is generally on ascertaining 
the intention of Parliament in enacting the legislation under consideration. Once that intention 
has been ascertained, it is generally expected that the court would obey and apply it in line 
with the rule of absolute judicial obedience to Acts of the sovereign Parliament as demanded 
by the traditional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
657
  
However, it would appear that in interpreting primary legislation pursuant to the 
interpretative obligation contained in section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, the judges accord a 
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relatively insignificant role to the intention of Parliament in enacting the statute being 
construed, and a much greater role to the intention of Parliament expressed in section 3(1). 
The result is that in the absence of specific and unequivocal provisions to the contrary, the 
parliamentary intention expressed in section 3(1) could override that expressed in the 
legislation under consideration even if it was enacted after the 1998 Act. 
 
As has been mentioned earlier, Parliament seemed to have intended a fair balance between on 
the one hand, the effective protection of the Convention rights in the domestic courts, and on 
the other hand, judicial respect for parliamentary sovereignty.
658
 Thus, Lord Irvine advocated 
a principled balance between judicial activism and judicial restraint in statutory interpretation 
under the 1998 Act.
659
 However, this has not been widely reflected in the case law. On the 
contrary, it seems that Lord Steyn‘s perception of the section 3(1) interpretation as the 
primary remedial mechanism provided by the Act for the effective protection of the 
Convention rights
660
 has gained wide appeal amongst the judges. This approach to section 
3(1) requires a high degree of creativity in the interpretative process. The result is that 
increasingly, the judges appear to be taking it upon themselves to judicially rectify primary 
legislation determined to be incompatible with the Convention rights. This appears to be the 
case even in cases where the resultant interpretation under section 3(1) departs from the clear 
and unambiguous intention of Parliament in enacting the legislation under consideration. 
 
The judges‘ creative use of section 3(1) in the interpretation and application of primary 
legislation seems to have ignored the essence of the combined provisions in sections 3(2), 
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4(6) and 10 of the 1998 Act as well as the procedures spelt out in Schedule 2 to the Act.
661
 
The provisions therein were apparently intended to make the protection of the Convention 
rights a joint effort by the executive, Parliament and the courts. They call for a dialogue 
between the judges on the one hand, and the executive and ultimately Parliament on the other 
hand. Thus, where the clear and unambiguous intention of Parliament in enacting legislation 
is determined by the courts to be in breach of the Convention rights, this should be made 
clear to the appropriate Minister of the Crown who may then take remedial action pursuant to 
section 10 and Schedule 2 of the Act. This procedure has the advantage of affording a high 
degree of protection for the Convention rights while simultaneously preserving the traditional 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Ekins has criticised the current judicial approach to section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, which 
seems to indicate that the judges perceive the interpretative obligation therein as authorising 
them to disregard the clear and unambiguous intention of Parliament in enacting the statute 
under consideration for the purpose of ensuring compatibility with the Convention rights. For 
him, the interpretative obligation contained in section 3(1) should not be seen as enabling 
judges to ignore legislative intent. He argues that section 3(1) should be used only where 
there is a genuine confusion as to what Parliament intended when enacting the statute under 
consideration.
662
 
While this writer may not completely agree with Ekins that section 3(1) may be used only to 
resolve ambiguities detected in the statute under consideration, it is submitted that the way 
the judges have generally approached the interpretative process undermines the restrictive 
provisions contained in section 3(2) of the 1998 Act. The sub-section protects the validity, 
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continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible primary legislation, or of any 
incompatible subordinate legislation authorised by primary legislation. However, where 
judges ignore parliamentary intention and alter the meaning and effect of primary legislation 
by use of section 3(1), the practical effect is that thenceforth the statute concerned would 
operate as if amended by the court.
663
 Thus, Gearty
664
 argues that an interpretation under 
section 3(1) must take account of section 3(2).
665
 He is of the view that if the resultant 
interpretation renders the guarantee in section 3(2) useless, then it is not an interpretation 
authorised by section 3(1).
666
 
 
In contrast to the case law discussed in chapter 2 and 3 above, in interpreting primary 
legislation pursuant to section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, in general, the judges appear to be far 
less concerned about the possibility that their decisions might be offensive to the traditional 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty, and more concerned with finding a Convention-
compatible interpretation. Indeed, even before the 1998 Act came into operation, Lord 
Hope
667
 had stated that ―the judges need be under no inhibition, on the grounds of 
parliamentary sovereignty, about departing from what might be thought to have been the 
intention of Parliament in their search for a possible meaning of the words used.‖  
 
The evidence from the case law suggests that in many cases, judges are prepared to accord 
priority to the intention of Parliament expressed in section 3(1) of the 1998 Act over the clear 
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and unambiguous intention of Parliament expressed in a later enactment.
668
 It is submitted 
that this goes against the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty, which demands 
that the court obey and apply the latest will of Parliament in preference to an inconsistent 
provision contained in an earlier enactment. 
 
It is observed that in many of the cases where the courts have declined to use section 3(1) to 
modify primary legislation, factors other than any real concern for a possible breach of the 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty appear to account for them. As has been discussed 
earlier, these factors include a lack of institutional competence on the part of the court to deal 
with the issue at hand, as well as the character of the legal challenge involved in the case. 
 
The more Parliament concedes (even if passively) to judicial modifications of statutes 
determined to constitute a violation of the Convention rights, the more likely that judges 
would in future gradually elevate the Convention rights to a status little different from what 
obtains in an entrenched Bill of Rights.  
 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
―… neither the Act of Union with Scotland nor the Dentist Act, 1878, has more 
claim than the other to be considered a supreme law. Each embodies the will of 
the sovereign legislative power; each can be legally altered or repealed by 
Parliament; neither tests the validity of the other. Should the Dentists Act, 1878, 
unfortunately contravene the terms of the Act of Union, the Act of Union would 
be pro tanto repealed, but no judge would dream of maintaining that the Dentist 
Act, 1878, was thereby rendered invalid or unconstitutional. The one 
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fundamental dogma of English (sic) constitutional law is the absolute legislative 
sovereignty or despotism of the King in Parliament.‖669   
 
 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
At the beginning of this thesis,
670
 it was indicated that the principal aim in the thesis would be 
to examine, through an analysis of relevant case law, how the courts have approached the 
interpretative obligation contained in section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of 
the 1998 Act in the interpretation and application of primary legislation. The objective has 
been to assess the case law and determine whether the interpretative approaches adopted 
under the above-mentioned provisions differ from conventional methods of statutory 
interpretation, and whether, and to what extent these provisions have impacted on judicial 
attitudes to the traditional, Diceyan concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
It is observed that the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty demanded absolute 
judicial obedience to the latest will of Parliament.
671
 By this concept, Parliament could enact 
whatever laws it deemed fit and the constitutional duty of the courts was simply to obey and 
apply the will of Parliament as manifested in a statute. No legal grounds could exist for 
challenging the validity or operation of an Act of Parliament.  
 
Three essential elements of the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty were 
identified in chapter 1 of the thesis. The first was that no court could disobey or render 
ineffective the provisions of an Act of Parliament on any grounds whatsoever. Once an Act 
has been passed in the traditional way, that is, by both Houses of Parliament, and has 
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received the royal assent, the fact that irregularities were committed in the legislative process 
by which the Act came into being could not enable a court to disobey or refuse to apply the 
Act in accordance with the will of Parliament. 
 
Secondly, by the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty, an Act of Parliament is the 
highest form of law in the United Kingdom. Thus, no other form of law could override it. An 
Act of Parliament could not be applied subject to the terms of any other form of law, whether 
common law, previous statute law, fundamental rights, international treaty provisions or 
principles of international law. 
 
Lastly, by the traditional concept, no Parliament could prevent its successor Parliament from 
legislating in breach of restrictions imposed in an existing Act of Parliament. Thus, 
Parliament could always alter existing legislation in any manner it deemed fit, and this could 
be done either expressly or by necessary implication. Therefore, the principle of implied 
repeal could be seen as concomitant to the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
As noted in chapter 1, some writers have argued that one Parliament could legally bind its 
successor Parliaments as to the manner and form of legislating.
672
 Also, in Jackson v Her 
Majesty’s Attorney General673 Lord Hope appeared to doubt if parliamentary sovereignty was 
ever absolute. 
 
However, the case law discussed in chapter 2 seems to have demonstrated that as a legal 
principle, the courts have on the whole perceived parliamentary sovereignty as absolute, 
requiring them to give unqualified judicial obedience to the latest will of Parliament. 
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While Parliament possesses the power to make primary legislation, all statutes enacted by it 
fall to be interpreted by the courts. However, it has been observed that the main judicial 
objective, when interpreting legislation, is to ascertain the intention of Parliament in enacting 
the legislation, and to apply that intention.
674
 In fact, Bennion has stated this to be the ―sole 
object in statutory interpretation.‖675 This, it is submitted, is in line with the traditional 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty.   
 
It was indicated that the principal method of ascertaining the intention of Parliament 
expressed in a statute was to give the words used in the statute their natural and ordinary 
meaning as that was the best indication of Parliament‘s intention.676 However, there may be 
instances where the words used may be ambiguous in the sense that they are capable of 
bearing more than one meaning. In such cases, courts have been able to call in aid, relevant 
rules of construction of statutes and presumptions of law, in order to arrive at the most 
appropriate legislative intention. For example, there is a presumption that Parliament does not 
intend to legislate in breach of its international obligations. Therefore, whenever a statutory 
provision is capable of both a meaning that breaches United Kingdom‘s international 
obligations and one that fulfils those obligations, the latter interpretation is to be preferred. 
However, as has been observed, the relevant rules of construction and presumptions of law 
come into play only when there is genuine ambiguity as to the intention of Parliament 
expressed in the statute. If the words used adequately and unambiguously convey the 
intention of Parliament, it would be an illegitimate exercise of judicial power to seek 
alternative interpretations.  
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It has been shown in chapter 3 that in certain circumstances, courts have exercised a power 
under the common law, to modify what appears to be the plain and unambiguous language of 
a statutory provision. However, the case law shows that this power is limited to instances 
where the plain words lead to an absurd result. Thus, in the absence of absurdity, the courts 
would be bound to give the plain language its natural and ordinary meaning. 
 
As a whole, chapter 3 seems to have demonstrated that the need to identify and carry out the 
latest intention of Parliament as expressed in primary legislation has been the guiding 
principle in the interpretation and application of primary legislation. 
 
With respect to the interpretative obligation under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act, two judicial 
approaches to the interpretation and application of primary legislation touching on directly 
applicable Community law has been identified.
677
 First, it is observed that by virtue of the 
interpretative obligation contained in section 2(4) of the 1972 Act, the judges now apply the 
―without prejudice‖ rule of construction, thus ensuring that the terms of the 1972 Act prevail 
over clear and unambiguous provisions in later Acts of Parliament.  
Secondly, the purposive approach adopted by the courts in the interpretation of legislation 
enacted for the purpose of fulfilling United Kingdom obligations under Community law 
seems to have enabled judges to modify clear and unambiguous statutory provisions even 
where such clear and unambiguous provisions lead to no absurdity. 
 
The judicial approach to the interpretative obligation contained in section 2(4) of the 1972 
Act seems to be without any precedents prior to the coming into effect of the Act. As a matter 
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of fact, it could be argued that the approach went against existing precedent as indicated in 
Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health.
678
  
 
Two theoretical explanations for the judicial approach to the interpretation of statutes under 
section 2(4) of the 1972 Act were identified in chapter 4 above. The first was Lord Bridge‘s 
doctrine of voluntariness,
679
 which, in one way, could be interpreted as indicating that the 
judicial treatment of section 2(4) of the 1972 Act has been based on Parliament‘s voluntary 
acceptance of the terms of membership of the Community, part of which was the acceptance 
of the European principles of direct applicability and supremacy of Community law. 
 
The second theoretical explanation identified in chapter 4 was Lord Justice Laws‘ common 
law theory, which seemed to explain the judicial treatment of the interpretative obligation 
under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act by asserting an existing judicial power under the common 
law to modify the concept of parliamentary sovereignty in light of contemporary 
constitutional developments. As he stated: ―the scope and nature of parliamentary sovereignty 
are ultimately confided‖ in the courts.680 
 
While there are marked differences between Lord Bridge‘s explanation for the judicial 
treatment of section 2(4) of the 1972 Act and that of Lord Justice Laws, they are both 
remarkable for indicating that the seemingly unchangeable concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty, as shown by the case law discussed in chapter 2 above, is now seen as 
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susceptible to change in accordance with contemporary constitutional developments. The 
question whether this is good or bad for the constitutional well-being of the country is outside 
the scope of this thesis. What is important is that there seems to be evidence in the case law 
that judicial attitudes to the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty outlined in 
chapter 2 above have been significantly impacted by the interpretative obligation in section 
2(4) of the 1972 Act. 
Chapter 6 has demonstrated that in interpreting primary legislation pursuant to the 
interpretative obligation under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, the dominant judicial approach 
seems to be to accord less role to the parliamentary intention expressed in the statute under 
consideration, and more role to the judicial duty to ensure a Convention-compatible 
interpretation. Thus, section 3(1) appears to have been regarded as the primary means by 
which the courts ensure that the United Kingdom fulfils its obligations under the Convention. 
The principled balance between rights-oriented interpretation on the one hand, and respect for 
parliamentary sovereignty on the other hand, a notion which seems to be at the heart of the 
1998 Act, and which was indeed advocated by Lord Irvine,
681
 seems not to have been 
reflected in the case law. The result is that the judges have felt able to modify the meaning 
and effect of clear and unambiguous legislative provisions found to offend the Convention 
rights in order to make them Convention-compatible. 
 
Chapter 6 has also demonstrated that in many cases where the courts have declined to use 
section 3(1) of the 1998 Act to remedy legislative breaches of the Convention rights, the real 
reason for the decision not to use section 3(1) might have more to do with a lack of 
institutional competence on the part of the judiciary to deal effectively with the matter at 
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hand, or even the character of the legal challenge in the case, and less to do with a judicial 
desire to respect parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
 
II. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The case law has demonstrated that the interpretative approaches adopted by the judges 
pursuant to the interpretative obligations contained in section 2(4) of the 1972 Act and 
section 3(1) of the 1998 Act are different from conventional approaches to statutory 
interpretation. As has been noted in chapter 3 above, conventionally, the emphasis seemed to 
have been on the need to ascertain the intention of Parliament in enacting the legislation 
under consideration, and on applying that intention. However, the interpretative approaches 
adopted by the judges, both under section 2(4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of the 1998 
Act, seems to indicate that the parliamentary intention expressed in the legislation under 
consideration plays a less significant role in that the judicial focus under these provisions is to 
ensure compliance with the demands of directly effective Community law and the 
Convention rights respectively. Thus, the judges have felt able to alter clear and unambiguous 
statutory provisions for the purpose of making them compatible with directly effective 
Community law, or the Convention rights. In other words, the intention of Parliament 
expressed in section 2(4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of the 1998 Act have been held in 
appropriate cases to override the clear intention of Parliament expressed in subsequent 
enactments. 
 
As appears clear from the foregoing, the idea that the courts have a duty to obey the last will 
of Parliament seems to have been seriously challenged by the courts‘ use of their 
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interpretative powers under the 1972 and 1998 Acts; this is particularly so in the courts‘ 
acceptance that directly effective Community law prevails over any inconsistent domestic 
legislation, (whether primary or subsidiary) whenever enacted. This raises questions about 
the very nature of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty and the concomitant question of 
who has the final authority to determine the legislative capacity of Parliament to legislate for 
the country.  
 
It may be recalled that in the second Factortame case, the only attempt to explain this 
seemingly ground-breaking decision to give priority to directly effective Community law 
over primary legislation duly enacted by Parliament was contained in Lord Bridge‘s 
statement.
682
 There, his Lordship seemed to have indicated that the basis of the judicial 
enforcement of the principle of the supremacy of directly effective Community law over 
domestic primary legislation was the voluntary acceptance of the principle by Parliament 
itself, which was embodied in the 1972 Act. It would seem that the implication of this is that 
one Parliament may bind its successor Parliament by enacting legislation in a manner that 
requires the courts to ignore future legislation found to be inconsistent with it. In this way, 
unless the power granted the judiciary is withdrawn by a deliberate and specific provision in 
a future Act of Parliament expressed in unequivocal terms, the judiciary would presume, and 
act on the presumption that the successor Parliament approves of the judicial power to ignore 
or ―disapply‖ the legislation under consideration for being inconsistent with the earlier 
legislation.  
 
The above view, even though inconsistent with the main idea of the traditionalists, that 
Parliament‘s sovereignty is ―continuing‖ and its clear intention embodied in an Act could 
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therefore not be disobeyed under the guise of interpretation, is quite mild (as far as the 
traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty is concerned) when compared to other 
notions about the nature of parliamentary sovereignty. At least, Lord Bridge appears to accept 
the main idea that Parliament‘s legislative capacity is to be determined by no other authority 
but Parliament itself. Thus, judicial enforcement of the principle of the supremacy of directly 
effective Community law over primary legislation could not have been done on the basis of 
an inherent judicial power; it could be done only on the presumption that the continuing 
existence of section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act in the statute book is a reflection of the 
present Parliament‘s approval, albeit constructive, that all legislation must be construed in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the 1972 Act. It would appear that the main 
challenge which Lord Bridge‘s idea poses to the traditional concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty is the judicial assertion that the interpretative power derived under the 1972 Act 
cannot be withdrawn impliedly.  
 
But for Lord Justice Laws, ―the scope and nature of parliamentary sovereignty are ultimately 
confided‖ in the courts, not Parliament.683 This is because parliamentary sovereignty is not a 
creation of statute; it is a product of the common law. And as a common law principle, the 
scope and nature of Parliament‘s legislative authority falls to be determined by the courts in 
the context of prevailing fundamental constitutional norms. As seen in Thoburn’s case, Lord 
Justice Laws has put forward the notion that the common law has now recognised certain 
statutes as ―constitutional statutes‖, distinct from ―ordinary statutes‖.684 While the principle 
of implied repeal applies to ordinary statutes, it does not apply to constitutional statutes. 
Thus, where a constitutional statute is concerned, the courts would obey a future Act of 
Parliament found to be inconsistent with the constitutional statute only if there is a deliberate 
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and specific repeal of the constitutional statute. Again, this challenges the traditional view 
that all statutes have equal status and could be repealed expressly or by implication. It 
introduces the concept of a ―hierarchy of laws‖ as part of the British legal system, an idea that 
does not sit comfortably with the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
It is observed that on analysis, at least at the present moment, neither Lord Bridge nor Lord 
Justice Laws claims any judicial power enabling judges to impose substantive legal 
constraints on the legislative capacity of Parliament to enact laws for the country. The 
constraints on Parliament‘s legislative power to legislate are seemingly formal in character, 
and can be overcome by the form of expression used in a statutory provision.  
 
However, both Lord Bridge and Lord Justice Laws seem to suggest that it may be 
inappropriate to regard the principle of implied repeal as a fixed element of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The application of the principle of implied repeal would depend 
on the nature of the legislation concerned. While the courts would always obey Parliament‘s 
will, it would nevertheless insist that that will be made much clearer and in unmistakable 
terms when it is inconsistent with what the court determines to be a constitutional statute.  
 
Be that as it may, there are indications that Lord Justice Laws is of the view that limits on 
Parliament‘s legislative authority may move from the seemingly formal limitations presently 
imposed by the courts through interpretative methods adopted under the 1972 and 1998 Acts, 
to substantive limitations whereby Parliament may not be allowed to legislate in breach of 
fundamental constitutional norms such as judicial review and basic electoral rights necessary 
for the sustenance of democracy itself. In fact, according to him, such a move has already 
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begun: ―in its present state of evolution, the British system may be said to stand at an 
intermediate stage between parliamentary supremacy and constitutional supremacy....‖685 
 
The idea that there could be substantive limits to the legislative capacity of Parliament has 
been strongly put forward by T.R.S. Allan.
686
 An important element of the traditional 
conception of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as put forward by Dicey is the strict 
separation of law and morality. While morality may have a role to play in the interpretation 
of statutory provisions, judges are nevertheless duty-bound to apply the clear and 
unambiguous will of Parliament irrespective of the judges‘ notion of morality. According to 
Dicey, 
 
―There is no legal basis for the theory that judges, as exponents of morality, may 
overrule Acts of Parliament. Language which might seem to imply this amounts in 
reality to nothing more than the assertion that the judges, when attempting to ascertain 
what is the meaning to be affixed to an Act of Parliament, will assume that Parliament 
did not intend to violate the ordinary rules of morality, or the principles of 
international law, and will therefore, whenever possible, give such an interpretation to 
a statutory enactment as may be consistent with the doctrines both of private and of 
international morality.‖687 
 
 
 
Allan asserts that this strict division between law and morality is wrong.
688
 According to 
Allan, legal principle cannot be divorced from political morality. The source of judicial 
obedience to Acts of Parliament, which is the foundation of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, cannot be found in statute. The courts‘ acceptance of parliamentary sovereignty 
is but a reflection only of the courts‘ commitment to parliamentary democracy. Acts of 
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Parliament have legal authority only because they have democratic legitimacy. It follows that 
the rule that judges obey Acts of Parliament is necessarily subject to the condition that 
minimum standards of democratic principles are left untouched. If they are undermined in a 
fundamental way by an Act of Parliament, then there can be a basis for the courts to refuse to 
apply the Act. 
 
Allan agrees that judicial perceptions of general notions of justice and fairness cannot 
override parliamentary enactments. However, he sought to distinguish these from what he 
called ―the central core‖ of the country‘s political morality – those irreducible minimum 
standards without which democracy itself would be seriously threatened. He argues that ―if 
Parliament ceased to be a representative assembly, in any plausible sense of the idea, or if it 
proceeded to enact legislation undermining the democratic basis of our institutions, political 
morality might direct judicial resistance rather than obedience.‖689  
 
To Allan, parliamentary sovereignty is nothing but a convention, albeit the most fundamental 
constitutional convention of the United Kingdom. As a constitutional convention, it is 
constituted, or justified by the political morality which underlies the legal order within which 
all institutions of State operate. The core political morality is representative democracy, as 
that is the basis of all the institutions of State, including Parliament and the courts. Therefore, 
parliamentary authority depends on the existence of representative democracy. It follows that 
parliamentary enactments would lose their legal validity if parliamentary democracy, the 
basis of Parliament‘s authority to legislate for the country, is undermined in a fundamental 
way. 
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The issue of minimum standards of political morality, which is central to Allan‘s theory, 
raises a number of questions. In the absence of a written constitution where the scope of 
authority of the main institutions of State are clearly defined, who should determine 
minimum standards of democracy? Should it be the electorate? If yes, how would those 
standards be spelt out with precision? It would be practically impossible for the electorate as 
a body to determine in any useful manner what the minimum standards of democracy should 
be. It presumes a consensual image of society, which is practically unrealistic. Should it be 
Parliament itself, being the representatives of the people? It could be argued that as a matter 
of principle, it would be inappropriate for Parliament to determine the minimum standards of 
democracy when the question is whether its own enactment has failed to satisfy those 
minimum standards. Should it be the courts who should determine both the minimum 
standards as well as the question whether those standards have been met by Parliament in any 
given case? The main argument against the courts would be that they have no democratic 
credentials to determine the minimum standards of democracy, being unelected. However, it 
could be argued in favour of the courts that certain norms are basic and universal, and could 
be objectively defined in reasonably precise terms. For example, periodic elections are a core 
element of representative democracy; therefore, it is clear that any Act of Parliament which 
totally abolishes regular elections would have failed to reach the minimum standards of 
representative democracy.  
 
It is observed that the limits to parliamentary sovereignty suggested by Allan are almost 
unrealistic. It is virtually unthinkable that Parliament would abolish representative 
democracy. Were it to do that, a revolution would have occurred and it would be 
inappropriate to speak of the body as Parliament in the usual sense. The question would then 
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be whether the courts would invoke the doctrine of necessity and transfer judicial allegiance 
to the new legislative body. That would be a different matter altogether.  
 
The suggested minimum standards of democracy have been set so high that it is highly 
unlikely that any parliamentary enactment would fall below them. For example, Allan wrote 
of ―a parliamentary enactment whose effect would be the destruction of any recognizable 
form of democracy (for example, a measure purporting to deprive a substantial section of the 
population of the vote on the grounds of their hostility to Government policies).‖690 As Simon 
Lee commented, ―… it would take something as ludicrous as Parliament attempting to take us 
back to an all-male franchise before Trevor Allan‘s ‗judicial resistance‘ would come into 
play.‖691 If it is accepted that in the real world, Parliament would not do the unthinkable, then 
Dicey‘s concept of parliamentary sovereignty, as a legal principle, would mean that the last 
word on legally enforceable norms remain with Parliament, and not the courts, or the 
electorate. 
 
Furthermore, Allan‘s theory have the capacity to lead to serious conflicts between Parliament 
and the courts, something which both institutions have strived to avoid since Stockdale v 
Hansard,
692
 and the Sheriff of Middlesex’s Case693 which arose from the former. Although 
those cases arose in the context of parliamentary privilege, there is no reason to think that 
such a clash would not be likely if the courts were to directly challenge Parliament‘s 
legislative capacity on substantive grounds as suggested by Allan. As Simon Lee quite rightly 
observed,
694
 judicial invalidation might well attract parliamentary reaction. The present state, 
where the courts feel able to use their interpretative powers as extensively as possible to 
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ensure that primary legislation is interpreted and applied subject to the terms of the 1972 and 
1998 Acts while acknowledging their duty to obey the ultimate power of Parliament to enact 
contrary legislation if this is done in deliberate and specifically expressed form, seems a 
better option which serves to keep the polity unheated.   
 
It has to be noted that Dicey himself accepted the sort of limits suggested by Allan as real, 
albeit political and moral, constraints on the authority of Parliament to legislate. However, 
those constraints are not relevant to the legal validity of parliamentary enactments.   
 
What has the case law covered in this study revealed? There is no evidence from the case 
law, both as it relates to the 1972 Act and the 1998 Act, that the judges are as yet ready to 
place substantive restrictions on Parliament‘s legislative capacity.  In theory, the courts 
continue to recognise parliamentary sovereignty as absolute. Thus, they accept that 
Parliament could legislate in breach of the terms of section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act and 
section 3(1) of the 1998 Act.  
 
However, it is submitted that this theoretical acceptance of Parliament‘s supreme legislative 
power tends to becloud what the case law appears to have indicated, which is that, in practice, 
the traditional concept of parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of unquestioned judicial 
obedience to the clear and unambiguous intention of Parliament expressed in its latest 
enactment,
695
 has been modified to a significant extent. 
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The judicial assertion that the 1972 Act and the 1998 Act are ―constitutional statutes‖696 
immune to the application of the principle of implied repeal suggests that a hierarchy of laws 
now exists in British constitutional law. Certain laws are ordinary and susceptible to implied 
repeal; others are constitutional and not subject to implied repeal.  
 
Furthermore, so far, Parliament seems not to have nullified any of the judicial amendments 
made to statutory provisions pursuant to section 2(4) of the 1972 Act and section 3(1) of the 
1998 Act. The reason is not far-fetched. As far as the United Kingdom remains a member of 
the Community, and a signatory of the Convention, it would make no political or diplomatic 
sense for Parliament to expressly and categorically legislate to nullify decisions of the courts 
which have rectified legislative breaches of Community law or the Convention rights as the 
case may be. In practice therefore, as the judges make more use of rights-consistent 
interpretation under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act, and Community law-compatible 
interpretations under section 2(1) and (4) of the 1972 Act, it is likely that the body of case 
law would in time grow and strengthen into something akin to a constitutional code against 
which inconsistent parliamentary enactments might not stand. Seen in this light, there might 
well be some weight in Lord Justice Laws‘ statement that ―in its present state of evolution, 
the British system may be said to stand at an intermediate stage between parliamentary 
supremacy and constitutional supremacy….‖697      
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APPENDIX 1 
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ACT 1972 
(PART I – GENERAL PROVISIONS) 
 
 
1.— Short title and interpretation. 
 
(1) This Act may be cited as the European Communities Act 1972. 
(2) In this Act […] 1 — 
 
―the Communities‖ means the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community; 
―the Treaties‖ or ―the Community Treaties‖ means, subject to subsection (3) below, the pre-
accession treaties, that is to say, those described in Part I of Schedule 1 to this Act, taken 
with— 
 
(a) the treaty relating to the accession of the United Kingdom to the European 
Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, signed at 
Brussels on the 22nd January 1972; and 
 
(b) the decision, of the same date, of the Council of the European Communities 
relating to the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Coal and Steel 
Community; [and ]2 
 
[ (c) the treaty relating to the accession of the Hellenic Republic to the European 
Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, signed at 
Athens on 28th May 1979; and 
 
(d) the decision, of 24th May 1979, of the Council relating to the accession of the 
Hellenic Republic to the European Coal and Steel Community; [and]3 ]4 
 
[ (e) the decisions of the Council of 7th May 1985, 24th June 1988, 31st October 
1994, 29th September 2000 and 7th June 2007 on the Communities' system of own 
resources; ]5 
 
 
[ (g) the treaty relating to the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese 
Republic to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy 
Community, signed at Lisbon and Madrid on 12th June 1985; and 
 
(h) the decision, of 11th June 1985, of the Council relating to the accession of the 
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European Coal and Steel 
Community; [and ]6 ]7 
 
[ (j) the following provisions of the Single European Act signed at Luxembourg 
and The Hague on 17th and 28th February 1986, namely Title II (amendment of the 
treaties establishing the Communities) and, so far as they relate to any of the 
Communities or any Community institution, the preamble and Titles I (common 
provisions) and IV (general and final provisions);[ and]8 ]9 
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[ (k) Titles II, III and IV of the Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht on 7th 
February 1992, together with the other provisions of the Treaty so far as they relate to those 
Titles, and the Protocols adopted at Maastricht on that date and annexed to the Treaty 
establishing the European Community with the exception of the Protocol on Social Policy on 
page 117 of Cm 1934;[ and]10 ]8 
 
[ (l) the decision, of 1st February 1993, of the Council amending the Act concerning the 
election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage 
annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20
th
 September 1976;[ and]11 
]10 
 
[ (m) the Agreement on the European Economic Area signed at Oporto on 2
nd
 May 1992 
together with the Protocol adjusting that Agreement signed at Brussels on 17th March 1993;[ 
and]12 ]11 
 
[ (n) the treaty concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, 
the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to the European Union, signed at Corfu 
on 24th June 1994;[ and]13 ]12 
 
[ (o) the following provisions of the Treaty signed at Amsterdam on 2nd October 1997 
amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related Acts— 
 
(i) Articles 2 to 9, 
 
(ii) Article 12, and 
 
(iii) the other provisions of the Treaty so far as they relate to those Articles, and the Protocols 
adopted on that occasion other than the Protocol on Article J.7 of the Treaty on European 
Union;[ and]14 ]13 
 
[ (p) the following provisions of the Treaty signed at Nice on 26th February 2001 amending 
the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and 
certain related Acts— 
 
(i) Articles 2 to 10, and 
 
(ii) the other provisions of the Treaty so far as they relate to those Articles, and the Protocol 
adopted on that occasion; […] 15 
]14 
 
[ (q) the treaty concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the 
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of 
Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the 
Slovak Republic to the European Union, signed at Athens on 16th April 2003;[ and]15 ]16 
 
[ (r) the treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the 
European Union, signed at Luxembourg on 25th April 2005; ]15 
 
[ (s) the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community signed at Lisbon on 13th December 2007 (together 
with its Annex and protocol), excluding any provision that relates to, or in so far as it relates 
to or could be applied in relation to, the Common Foreign and Security Policy; ]17 and any 
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other treaty entered into by any of the Communities, with or without any of the member 
States, or entered into, as a treaty ancillary to any of the Treaties, by the United Kingdom; and 
any expression defined in Schedule 1 to this Act has the meaning there given to it. 
 
(3) If Her Majesty by Order in Council declares that a treaty specified in the Order is to be 
regarded as one of the Community Treaties as herein defined, the Order shall be conclusive 
that it is to be so regarded; but a treaty entered into by the United Kingdom after the 22nd 
January 1972, other than a pre-accession treaty to which the United Kingdom accedes on 
terms settled on or before that date, shall not be so regarded unless it is so specified, nor be so 
specified unless a draft of the Order in Council has been approved by resolution of each 
House of Parliament. 
 
(4) For purposes of subsections (2) and (3) above, ―treaty‖ includes any international 
agreement, and any protocol or annex to a treaty or international agreement. 
 
2.— General implementation of Treaties. 
 
(1) All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created 
or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time 
provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further 
enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and 
available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression 
―enforceable Community right‖ and similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to 
which this subsection applies. 
 
(2) Subject to Schedule 2 to this Act, at any time after its passing Her Majesty may by Order 
in Council, and any designated Minister or department may [by order, rules, regulations or 
scheme]18, make provision— 
 
(a) for the purpose of implementing any Community obligation of the United Kingdom, or 
enabling any such obligation to be implemented, or of enabling any rights enjoyed or to be 
enjoyed by the United Kingdom under or by virtue of the Treaties to be exercised; or 
 
(b) for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of or related to any such obligation or 
rights or the coming into force, or the operation from time to time, of subsection (1) above; 
and in the exercise of any statutory power or duty, including any power to give directions or 
to legislate by means of orders, rules, regulations or other subordinate instrument, the person 
entrusted with the power or duty may have regard to the objects of the Communities and to 
any such obligation or rights as aforesaid. 
 
In this subsection ―designated Minister or department‖ means such Minister of the Crown or 
government department as may from time to time be designated by Order in Council in 
relation to any matter or for any purpose, but subject to such restrictions or conditions (if any) 
as may be specified by the Order in Council. 
 
(3) There shall be charged on and issued out of the Consolidated Fund or, if so determined by 
the Treasury, the National Loans Fund the amounts required to meet any Community 
obligation to make payments to any of the Communities or member States, or any 
Community obligation in respect of contributions to the capital or reserves of the European 
Investment Bank or in respect of loans to the Bank, or to redeem any notes or obligations 
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issued or created in respect of any such Community obligation; and, except as otherwise 
provided by or under any enactment,— 
 
(a) any other expenses incurred under or by virtue of the Treaties or this Act by any Minister 
of the Crown or government department may be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament; 
and 
 
(b) any sums received under or by virtue of the Treaties or this Act by any Minister of the 
Crown or government department, save for such sums as may be required for disbursements 
permitted by any other enactment, shall be paid into the Consolidated Fund or, if so 
determined by the Treasury, the National Loans Fund. 
 
(4) The provision that may be made under subsection (2) above includes, subject to Schedule 
2 to this Act, any such provision (of any such extent) as might be made by Act of Parliament, 
and any enactment passed or to be passed, other than one contained in this part of this Act, 
shall be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this section; but, 
except as may be provided by any Act passed after this Act, Schedule 2 shall have effect in 
connection with the powers conferred by this and the following sections of this Act to make 
Orders in Council [or orders, rules, regulations or schemes]19 . 
 
 (5) […] 20 and the references in that subsection to a Minister of the Crown or government 
department and to a statutory power or duty shall include a Minister or department of the 
Government of Northern Ireland and a power or duty arising under or by virtue of an Act of 
the Parliament of Northern Ireland. 
 
(6) A law passed by the legislature of any of the Channel Islands or of the Isle of Man, or a 
colonial Law (within the meaning of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865) passed or made 
for Gibraltar, if expressed to be passed or made in the implementation of the Treaties and of 
the obligations of the United Kingdom thereunder, shall not be void or inoperative by reason 
of any inconsistency with or repugnancy to an Act of Parliament, passed or to be passed, that 
extends to the Island or Gibraltar or any provision having the force and effect of an Act there 
(but not including this section), nor by reason of its having some operation outside the Island 
or Gibraltar; and any such Act or provision that extends to the Island or Gibraltar shall be 
construed and have effect subject to the provisions of any such law. 
 
3.— Decisions on, and proof of, Treaties and Community instruments etc. 
 
(1) For the purposes of all legal proceedings any question as to the meaning or effect of any 
of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning or effect of any Community instrument, shall be 
treated as a question of law (and, if not referred to the European Court, be for determination 
as such in accordance with the principles laid down by and any relevant [decision of the 
European Court or any court attached thereto)]21 . 
 
(2) Judicial notice shall be taken of the Treaties, of the Official Journal of the Communities 
and of any decision of, or expression of opinion by, the European Court [or any court 
attached thereto]22 on any such question as aforesaid; and the Official Journal shall be 
admissible as evidence of any instrument or other act thereby communicated of any of the 
Communities or of any Community institution. 
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(3) Evidence of any instrument issued by a Community institution, including any judgment or 
order of the European Court [or any court attached thereto ] 22 , or of any document in the 
custody of a Community institution, or any entry in or extract from such a document, may be 
given in any legal proceedings by production of a copy certified as a true copy by an official 
of that institution; and any document purporting to be such a copy shall be received in 
evidence without proof of the official position or handwriting of the person signing the 
certificate. 
 
(4) Evidence of any Community instrument may also be given in any legal proceedings— 
 
(a) by production of a copy purporting to be printed by the Queen's Printer; 
 
(b) where the instrument is in the custody of a government department (including a 
department of the Government of Northern Ireland), by production of a copy certified on 
behalf of the department to be a true copy by an officer of the department generally or 
specially authorised so to do; and any document purporting to be such a copy as is mentioned 
in paragraph (b) above of an instrument in the custody of a department shall be received in 
evidence without proof of the official position or handwriting of the person signing the 
certificate, or of his authority to do so, or of the document being in the custody of the 
department. 
 
(5) In any legal proceedings in Scotland evidence of any matter given in a manner authorised 
by this section shall be sufficient evidence of it. 
 
NOTES 
 
1 Words repealed by Interpretation Act 1978 (c. 30), s. 25, Sch. 3 
 
2 Word inserted by European Communities (Greek Accession) Act 1979 (c. 57), s. 1 
 
3 Substituted by European Communities (Finance) Act 2001 c. 22 s.1 (December 4, 2001) 
 
4 S. 1(2)(c)(d) inserted by European Communities (Greek Accession) Act 1979 (c. 57), s. 1 
 
5 Substituted by European Communities (Finance) Act 2008 c. 1 s.1 (February 19, 2008) 
 
6 Word inserted by European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986 (c. 58), s. 1 
 
7 S. 1(2)(g)(h) inserted by European Communities (Spanish and Portuguese Accession) Act 1985 (c. 75), s. 1 
 
8 Added by European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993 c. 32 s.1(1) (July 23, 1993) 
 
9 S. 1(2)(j) inserted by European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986 (c. 58), s. 1 
 
10 Added by European Parliamentary Elections Act 1993 c. 41 s.3(2) (November 5, 1993) 
 
11 Added by European Economic Area Act 1993 c. 51 s.1 (November 5, 1993) 
 
12 Added by European Union (Accessions) Act 1994 c. 38 s.1 (November 3, 1994) 
 
13 Added by European Communities (Amendment) Act 1998 c. 21 s.1 (June 11, 1998) 
 
14 Added by European Communities (Amendment) Act 2002 c. 3 s.1(1) (February 26, 2002) 
 
15 Added by European Union (Accessions) Act 2006 c. 2 s.1(1) (February 16, 2006) 
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16 Added by European Union (Accessions) Act 2003 c. 35 s.1(1) (November 13, 2003) 
 
17 Added by European Union (Amendment) Act 2008 c. 7 s.2 (June 19, 2008) 
 
18 Words substituted by Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 c. 51 Pt 3 s.27(1)(a) (January 8, 2007) 
 
19 Words substituted by Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 c. 51 Pt 3 s.27(1)(b) (January 8, 2007) 
 
20 Words repealed by Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 (c. 36), Sch. 6 Pt. I 
 
21 Words substituted by European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986 (c. 58), s. 2(a) 
 
22 Words inserted by European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986 (c. 58), s. 2(b) 
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APPENDIX 2 
SELECTED PORTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S WHITE PAPER 
RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL 
 
Chapter 1 - The Case for Change 
The European Convention on Human Rights  
1.1 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms is a treaty of the Council of Europe. This institution was established at the 
end of the Second World War, as part of the Allies' programme to reconstruct 
durable civilisation on the mainland of Europe. The Council was established before 
the European Union and, although many nations are members of both, the two 
bodies are quite separate.  
1.2 The United Kingdom played a major part in drafting the Convention, and there 
was a broad agreement between the major political parties about the need for it (one 
of its draftsmen later became, as Lord Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor in the Conservative 
Administration from 1954 to 1962). The United Kingdom was among the first 
group of countries to sign the Convention. It was the very first country to ratify it, in 
March 1951. In 1966 the United Kingdom accepted that an individual person, and 
not merely another State, could bring a case against the United Kingdom in 
Strasbourg (the home of the European Commission of Human Rights and Court of 
Human Rights, which were established by the Convention). Successive 
administrations in the United Kingdom have maintained these arrangements.  
1.3 The European Convention is not the only international human rights agreement 
to which the United Kingdom and other like- minded countries are party, but over 
the years it has become one of the premier agreements defining standards of 
behaviour across Europe. It was also for many years unique because of the system 
which it put in place for people from signatory countries to take complaints to 
Strasbourg and for those complaints to be judicially determined. These 
arrangements are by now well tried and tested. The rights and freedoms which are 
guaranteed under the Convention are ones with which the people of this country are 
plainly comfortable. They therefore afford an excellent basis for the Human Rights 
Bill which we are now introducing.  
1.4 The constitutional arrangements in most continental European countries have 
meant that their acceptance of the Convention went hand in hand with its 
incorporation into their domestic law. In this country it was long believed that the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention could be delivered under our 
common law. In the last two decades, however, there has been a growing awareness 
that it is not sufficient to rely on the common law and that incorporation is 
necessary.  
1.5 The Liberal Democrat Peer, Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC, recently introduced 
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two Bills on incorporation into the House of Lords (in 1994 and 1996). Before that, 
the then Conservative MP Sir Edward Gardner QC introduced a Private Member's 
Bill on incorporation into the House of Commons in 1987. At the time of 
introducing his Bill he commented on the language of the Articles in the 
Convention, saying: "It is language which echoes right down the corridors of 
history. It goes deep into our history and as far back as Magna Carta." (Hansard, 6 
February 1987, col.1224). In preparing this White Paper the Government has paid 
close attention to earlier debates and proposals for incorporation.  
The Convention rights  
1.6 The Convention contains Articles which guarantee a number of basic human 
rights. They deal with the right to life (Article 2); torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (Article 3); slavery and forced labour (Article 4); liberty 
and security of person (Article 5); fair trial (Article 6); retrospective criminal laws 
(Article 7); respect for private and family life, home and correspondence (Article 8); 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9); freedom of expression 
(Article 10); freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including 
the right to join a trade union (Article 11); the right to marry and to found a family 
(Article 12); and discrimination in the enjoyment of these rights and freedoms 
(Article 14).  
1.7 The United Kingdom is also a party to the First Protocol to the Convention, 
which guarantees the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions (Article 1), the 
right to education (Article 2) and the right to free elections (Article 3).  
1.8 The rights in the Convention are set out in general terms, and they are subject in 
the Convention to a number of qualifications which are also of a general character. 
Some of these qualifications are set out in the substantive Articles themselves (see, 
for example, Article 10, concerning freedom of expression); others are set out in 
Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention. Sometimes too the rights guaranteed under the 
Convention need to be balanced against each other (for example, those guaranteed 
by Article 8 and Article 10).  
Applications under the Convention  
1.9 Anyone within the United Kingdom jurisdiction who is aggrieved by an action 
of the executive or by the effect of the existing law and who believes it is contrary 
to the European Convention can submit a petition to the European Commission of 
Human Rights. The Commission will first consider whether the petition is 
admissible. One of the conditions of admissibility is that the applicant must have 
gone through all the steps available to him or her at home for challenging the 
decision which he or she is complaining about. If the Commission decides that a 
complaint is admissible, and if a friendly settlement cannot be secured, it will send a 
confidential report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, stating 
its opinion on whether there has been a violation. The matter may end there, with a 
decision by the Committee (which in practice always adopts the opinion of the 
Commission), or the case may be referred on to the European Court of Human 
Rights for consideration. If the Court finds that there has been a violation it may 
itself "afford just satisfaction" to the injured party by an award of damages or an 
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award of costs and expenses. The court may also find that a formal finding of a 
violation is sufficient. There is no appeal from the Court.  
Effect of a Court judgment  
1.10 A finding by the European Court of Human Rights of a violation of a 
Convention right does not have the effect of automatically changing United 
Kingdom law and practice: that is a matter for the United Kingdom Government 
and Parliament. But the United Kingdom, like all other States who are parties to the 
Convention, has agreed to abide by the decisions of the Court or (where the case has 
not been referred to the Court) the Committee of Ministers. It follows that, in cases 
where a violation has been found, the State concerned must ensure that any 
deficiency in its internal laws is rectified so as to bring them into line with the 
Convention. The State is responsible for deciding what changes are needed, but it 
must satisfy the Committee of Ministers that the steps taken are sufficient. 
Successive United Kingdom administrations have accepted these obligations in full.  
Relationship to current law in the United Kingdom  
1.11 When the United Kingdom ratified the Convention the view was taken that the 
rights and freedoms which the Convention guarantees were already, in substance, 
fully protected in British law. It was not considered necessary to write the 
Convention itself into British law, or to introduce any new laws in the United 
Kingdom in order to be sure of being able to comply with the Convention.  
1.12 From the point of view of the international obligation which the United 
Kingdom was undertaking when it signed and ratified the Convention, this was 
understandable. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights explicitly 
confirmed that it was not a necessary part of proper observance of the Convention 
that it should be incorporated into the laws of the States concerned.  
1.13 However, since its drafting nearly 50 years ago, almost all the States which are 
party to the European Convention on Human Rights have gradually incorporated it 
into their domestic law in one way or another. Ireland and Norway have not done 
so, but Ireland has a Bill of Rights which guarantees rights similar to those 
guaranteed by the Convention and Norway is also in the process of incorporating 
the Convention. Several other countries with which we have close links and which 
share the common law tradition, such as Canada and New Zealand, have provided 
similar protection for human rights in their own legal systems.  
The case for incorporation  
1.14 The effect of non-incorporation on the British people is a very practical one. 
The rights, originally developed with major help from the United Kingdom 
Government, are no longer actually seen as British rights. And enforcing them takes 
too long and costs too much. It takes on average five years to get an action into the 
European Court of Human Rights once all domestic remedies have been exhausted; 
and it costs an average of £30,000. Bringing these rights home will mean that the 
British people will be able to argue for their rights in the British courts - without 
this inordinate delay and cost. It will also mean that the rights will be brought much 
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more fully into the jurisprudence of the courts throughout the United Kingdom, and 
their interpretation will thus be far more subtly and powerfully woven into our law. 
And there will be another distinct benefit. British judges will be enabled to make a 
distinctively British contribution to the development of the jurisprudence of human 
rights in Europe.  
1.15 Moreover, in the Government's view, the approach which the United Kingdom 
has so far adopted towards the Convention does not sufficiently reflect its 
importance and has not stood the test of time.  
1.16  The most obvious proof of this lies in the number of cases in which the 
European Commission and Court have found that there have been violations of the 
Convention rights in the United Kingdom. The causes vary. The Government 
recognises that interpretations of the rights guaranteed under the Convention have 
developed over the years, reflecting changes in society and attitudes. Sometimes 
United Kingdom laws have proved to be inherently at odds with the Convention 
rights. On other occasions, although the law has been satisfactory, something has 
been done which our courts have held to be lawful by United Kingdom standards 
but which breaches the Convention. In other cases again, there has simply been no 
framework within which the compatibility with the Convention rights of an 
executive act or decision can be tested in the British courts: these courts can of 
course review the exercise of executive discretion, but they can do so only on the 
basis of what is lawful or unlawful according to the law in the United Kingdom as it 
stands. It is plainly unsatisfactory that someone should be the victim of a breach of 
the Convention standards by the State yet cannot bring any case at all in the British 
courts, simply because British law does not recognise the right in the same terms as 
one contained in the Convention.  
1.17 For individuals, and for those advising them, the road to Strasbourg is long and 
hard. Even when they get there, the Convention enforcement machinery is subject 
to long delays. This might be convenient for a government which was half-hearted 
about the Convention and the right of individuals to apply under it, since it 
postpones the moment at which changes in domestic law or practice must be made. 
But it is not in keeping with the importance which this Government attaches to the 
observance of basic human rights.  
Bringing Rights Home  
1.18 We therefore believe that the time has come to enable people to enforce their 
Convention rights against the State in the British courts, rather than having to incur 
the delays and expense which are involved in taking a case to the European Human 
Rights Commission and Court in Strasbourg and which may altogether deter some 
people from pursuing their rights. Enabling courts in the United Kingdom to rule on 
the application of the Convention will also help to influence the development of 
case law on the Convention by the European Court of Human Rights on the basis of 
familiarity with our laws and customs and of sensitivity to practices and procedures 
in the United Kingdom. Our courts' decisions will provide the European Court with 
a useful source of information and reasoning for its own decisions. United Kingdom 
judges have a very high reputation internationally, but the fact that they do not deal 
in the same concepts as the European Court of Human Rights limits the extent to 
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which their judgments can be drawn upon and followed. Enabling the Convention 
rights to be judged by British courts will also lead to closer scrutiny of the human 
rights implications of new legislation and new policies. If legislation is enacted 
which is incompatible with the Convention, a ruling by the domestic courts to that 
effect will be much more direct and immediate than a ruling from the European 
Court of Human Rights. The Government of the day, and Parliament, will want to 
minimise the risk of that happening.  
1.19 Our aim is a straightforward one. It is to make more directly accessible the 
rights which the British people already enjoy under the Convention. In other words, 
to bring those rights home.  
 
Chapter 2 - The Government's Proposals for Enforcing the 
Convention Rights 
 
 
2.1 The essential feature of the Human Rights Bill is that the United 
Kingdom will not be bound to give effect to the Convention rights merely 
as a matter of international law, but will also give them further effect 
directly in our domestic law. But there is more than one way of achieving 
this. This Chapter explains the choices which the Government has made 
for the Bill.  
A new requirement on public authorities  
2.2 Although the United Kingdom has an international obligation to 
comply with the Convention, there at present is no requirement in our 
domestic law on central and local government, or others exercising 
similar executive powers, to exercise those powers in a way which is 
compatible with the Convention. This Bill will change that by making it 
unlawful for public authorities to act in a way which is incompatible with 
the Convention rights. The definition of what constitutes a public 
authority is in wide terms. Examples of persons or organisations whose 
acts or omissions it is intended should be able to be challenged include 
central government (including executive agencies); local government; the 
police; immigration officers; prisons; courts and tribunals themselves; 
and, to the extent that they are exercising public functions, companies 
responsible for areas of activity which were previously within the public 
sector, such as the privatised utilities. The actions of Parliament, 
however, are excluded. 
 2.3 A person who is aggrieved by an act or omission on the part of a 
public authority which is incompatible with the Convention rights will be 
able to challenge the act or omission in the courts. The effects will be 
wide-ranging. They will extend both to legal actions which a public 
authority pursues against individuals (for example, where a criminal 
prosecution is brought or where an administrative decision is being 
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enforced through legal proceedings) and to cases which individuals 
pursue against a public authority (for example, for judicial review of an 
executive decision). Convention points will normally be taken in the 
context of proceedings instituted against individuals or already open to 
them, but, if none is available, it will be possible for people to bring cases 
on Convention grounds alone. Individuals or organisations seeking 
judicial review of decisions by public authorities on Convention grounds 
will need to show that they have been directly affected, as they must if 
they take a case to Strasbourg.  
2.4 It is our intention that people or organisations should be able to argue 
that their Convention rights have been infringed by a public authority in 
our courts at any level. This will enable the Convention rights to be 
applied from the outset against the facts and background of a particular 
case, and the people concerned to obtain their remedy at the earliest 
possible moment. We think this is preferable to allowing cases to run 
their ordinary course but then referring them to some kind of separate 
constitutional court which, like the European Court of Human Rights, 
would simply review cases which had already passed through the regular 
legal machinery. In considering Convention points, our courts will be 
required to take account of relevant decisions of the European 
Commission and Court of Human Rights (although these will not be 
binding).  
2.5 The Convention is often described as a "living instrument" because it 
is interpreted by the European Court in the light of present day conditions 
and therefore reflects changing social attitudes and the changes in the 
circumstances of society. In future our judges will be able to contribute to 
this dynamic and evolving interpretation of the Convention. In particular, 
our courts will be required to balance the protection of individuals' 
fundamental rights against the demands of the general interest of the 
community, particularly in relation to Articles 8-11 where a State may 
restrict the protected right to the extent that this is "necessary in a 
democratic society".  
Remedies for a failure to comply with the Convention  
2.6 A public authority which is found to have acted unlawfully by failing 
to comply with the Convention will not be exposed to criminal penalties. 
But the court or tribunal will be able to grant the injured person any 
remedy which is within its normal powers to grant and which it considers 
appropriate and just in the circumstances. What remedy is appropriate 
will of course depend both on the facts of the case and on a proper 
balance between the rights of the individual and the public interest. In 
some cases, the right course may be for the decision of the public 
authority in the particular case to be quashed. In other cases, the only 
appropriate remedy may be an award of damages. The Bill provides that, 
in considering an award of damages on Convention grounds, the courts 
are to take into account the principles applied by the European Court of 
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Human Rights in awarding compensation, so that people will be able to 
receive compensation from a domestic court equivalent to what they 
would have received in Strasbourg.  
Interpretation of legislation  
2.7 The Bill provides for legislation - both Acts of Parliament and 
secondary legislation - to be interpreted so far as possible so as to be 
compatible with the Convention. This goes far beyond the present rule 
which enables the courts to take the Convention into account in resolving 
any ambiguity in a legislative provision. The courts will be required to 
interpret legislation so as to uphold the Convention rights unless the 
legislation itself is so clearly incompatible with the Convention that it is 
impossible to do so.  
2.8 This "rule of construction" is to apply to past as well as to future 
legislation. To the extent that it affects the meaning of a legislative 
provision, the courts will not be bound by previous interpretations. They 
will be able to build a new body of case law, taking into account the 
Convention rights.  
A declaration of incompatibility with the Convention rights  
2.9 If the courts decide in any case that it is impossible to interpret an Act 
of Parliament in a way which is compatible with the Convention, the Bill 
enables a formal declaration to be made that its provisions are 
incompatible with the Convention. A declaration of incompatibility will 
be an important statement to make, and the power to make it will be 
reserved to the higher courts. They will be able to make a declaration in 
any proceedings before them, whether the case originated with them (as, 
in the High Court, on judicial review of an executive act) or in 
considering an appeal from a lower court or tribunal. The Government 
will have the right to intervene in any proceedings where such a 
declaration is a possible outcome. A decision by the High Court or Court 
of Appeal, determining whether or not such a declaration should be made, 
will itself be appealable.  
Effect of court decisions on legislation  
2.10 A declaration that legislation is incompatible with the Convention 
rights will not of itself have the effect of changing the law, which will 
continue to apply. But it will almost certainly prompt the Government 
and Parliament to change the law.  
2.11 The Government has considered very carefully whether it would be 
right for the Bill to go further, and give to courts in the United Kingdom 
the power to set aside an Act of Parliament which they believe is 
incompatible with the Convention rights. In considering this question, we 
have looked at a number of models. The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
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Freedoms 1982 enables the courts to strike down any legislation which is 
inconsistent with the Charter, unless the legislation contains an explicit 
statement that it is to apply "notwithstanding" the provisions of the 
Charter. But legislation which has been struck down may be re-enacted 
with a "notwithstanding" clause. In New Zealand, on the other hand, 
although there was an earlier proposal for legislation on lines similar to 
the Canadian Charter, the human rights legislation which was eventually 
enacted after wide consultation took a different form. The New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 is an "interpretative" statute which requires past 
and future legislation to be interpreted consistently with the rights 
contained in the Act as far as possible but provides that legislation stands 
if that is impossible. In Hong Kong, a middle course was adopted. The 
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance 1991 distinguishes between 
legislation enacted before and after the Ordinance took effect: previous 
legislation is subordinated to the provisions of the Ordinance, but 
subsequent legislation takes precedence over it.  
2.12 The Government has also considered the European Communities 
Act 1972 which provides for European law, in cases where that law has 
"direct effect", to take precedence over domestic law. There is, however, 
an essential difference between European Community law and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, because it is a requirement of 
membership of the European Union that member States give priority to 
directly effective EC law in their own legal systems. There is no such 
requirement in the Convention.  
2.13 The Government has reached the conclusion that courts should not 
have the power to set aside primary legislation, past or future, on the 
ground of incompatibility with the Convention. This conclusion arises 
from the importance which the Government attaches to Parliamentary 
sovereignty. In this context, Parliamentary sovereignty means that 
Parliament is competent to make any law on any matter of its choosing 
and no court may question the validity of any Act that it passes. In 
enacting legislation, Parliament is making decisions about important 
matters of public policy. The authority to make those decisions derives 
from a democratic mandate. Members of Parliament in the House of 
Commons possess such a mandate because they are elected, accountable 
and representative. To make provision in the Bill for the courts to set 
aside Acts of Parliament would confer on the judiciary a general power 
over the decisions of Parliament which under our present constitutional 
arrangements they do not possess, and would be likely on occasions to 
draw the judiciary into serious conflict with Parliament. There is no 
evidence to suggest that they desire this power, nor that the public wish 
them to have it. Certainly, this Government has no mandate for any such 
change.  
2.14 It has been suggested that the courts should be able to uphold the 
rights in the Human Rights Bill in preference to any provisions of earlier 
legislation which are incompatible with those rights. This is on the basis 
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that a later Act of Parliament takes precedence over an earlier Act if there 
is a conflict. But the Human Rights Bill is intended to provide a new basis 
for judicial interpretation of all legislation, not a basis for striking down 
any part of it.  
2.15 The courts will, however, be able to strike down or set aside 
secondary legislation which is incompatible with the Convention, unless 
the terms of the parent statute make this impossible. The courts can 
already strike down or set aside secondary legislation when they consider 
it to be outside the powers conferred by the statute under which it is 
made, and it is right that they should be able to do so when it is 
incompatible with the Convention rights and could have been framed 
differently.  
Entrenchment  
2.16 On one view, human rights legislation is so important that it should 
be given added protection from subsequent amendment or repeal. The 
Constitution of the United States of America, for example, guarantees 
rights which can be amended or repealed only by securing qualified 
majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and 
among the States themselves. But an arrangement of this kind could not 
be reconciled with our own constitutional traditions, which allow any Act 
of Parliament to be amended or repealed by a subsequent Act of 
Parliament. We do not believe that it is necessary or would be desirable to 
attempt to devise such a special arrangement for this Bill.  
Amending legislation  
2.17 Although the Bill does not allow the courts to set aside Acts of 
Parliament, it will nevertheless have a profound impact on the way that 
legislation is interpreted and applied, and it will have the effect of putting 
the issues squarely to the Government and Parliament for further 
consideration. It is important to ensure that the Government and 
Parliament, for their part, can respond quickly. In the normal way, 
primary legislation can be amended only by further primary legislation, 
and this can take a long time. Given the volume of Government business, 
an early opportunity to legislate may not arise; and the process of 
legislating is itself protracted. Emergency legislation can be enacted very 
quickly indeed, but it is introduced only in the most exceptional 
circumstances.  
2.18 The Bill provides for a fast-track procedure for changing legislation 
in response either to a declaration of incompatibility by our own higher 
courts or to a finding of a violation of the Convention in Strasbourg. The 
appropriate Government Minister will be able to amend the legislation by 
Order so as to make it compatible with the Convention. The Order will be 
subject to approval by both Houses of Parliament before taking effect, 
except where the need to amend the legislation is particularly urgent, 
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when the Order will take effect immediately but will expire after a short 
period if not approved by Parliament.  
2.19 There are already precedents for using secondary legislation to 
amend primary legislation in some circumstances, and we think the use of 
such a procedure is acceptable in this context and would be welcome as a 
means of improving the observance of human rights. Plainly the Minister 
would have to exercise this power only in relation to the provisions which 
contravene the Convention, together with any necessary consequential 
amendments. In other words, Ministers would not have carte blanche to 
amend unrelated parts of the Act in which the breach is discovered.  
Scotland  
2.20 In Scotland, the position with regard to Acts of the Westminster 
Parliament will be the same as in England and Wales. All courts will be 
required to interpret the legislation in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention so far as possible. If a provision is found to be incompatible 
with the Convention, the Court of Session or the High Court will be able 
to make a declarator to that effect, but this will not affect the validity or 
continuing operation of the provision.  
2.21 The position will be different, however, in relation to Acts of the 
Scottish Parliament when it is established. The Government has decided 
that the Scottish Parliament will have no power to legislate in a way 
which is incompatible with the Convention; and similarly that the 
Scottish Executive will have no power to make subordinate legislation or 
to take executive action which is incompatible with the Convention. It 
will accordingly be possible to challenge such legislation and actions in 
the Scottish courts on the ground that the Scottish Parliament or 
Executive has incorrectly applied its powers. If the challenge is successful 
then the legislation or action would be held to be unlawful. As with other 
issues concerning the powers of the Scottish Parliament, there will be a 
procedure for inferior courts to refer such issues to the superior Scottish 
courts; and those courts in turn will be able to refer the matter to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. If such issues are decided by the 
superior Scottish courts, an appeal from their decision will be to the 
Judicial Committee. These arrangements are in line with the 
Government's general approach to devolution.  
Wales  
2.22 Similarly, the Welsh Assembly will not have power to make 
subordinate legislation or take executive action which is incompatible 
with the Convention. It will be possible to challenge such legislation and 
action in the courts, and for them to be quashed, on the ground that the 
Assembly has exceeded its powers.  
Northern Ireland  
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2.23 Acts of the Westminster Parliament will be treated in the same way 
in Northern Ireland as in the rest of the United Kingdom. But Orders in 
Council and other related legislation will be treated as subordinate 
legislation. In other words, they will be struck down by the courts if they 
are incompatible with the Convention. Most such legislation is a 
temporary means of enacting legislation which would otherwise be done 
by measures of a devolved Northern Ireland legislature.  
Chapter 3 - Improving Compliance with the Convention Rights 
 
 
3.1 The enforcement of Convention rights will be a matter for the 
courts, whilst the Government and Parliament will have the 
different but equally important responsibility of revising legislation 
where necessary. But it is also highly desirable for the Government 
to ensure as far as possible that legislation which it places before 
Parliament in the normal way is compatible with the Convention 
rights, and for Parliament to ensure that the human rights 
implications of legislation are subject to proper consideration 
before the legislation is enacted.  
Government legislation  
3.2 The Human Rights Bill introduces a new procedure to make the 
human rights implications of proposed Government legislation more 
transparent. The responsible Minister will be required to provide a 
statement that in his or her view the proposed Bill is compatible with 
the Convention. The Government intends to include this statement 
alongside the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum which 
accompanies a Bill when it is introduced into each House of 
Parliament.  
3.3  There may be occasions where such a statement cannot be 
provided, for example because it is essential to legislate on a particular 
issue but the policy in question requires a risk to be taken in relation to 
the Convention, or because the arguments in relation to the 
Convention issues raised are not clear-cut. In such cases, the Minister 
will indicate that he or she cannot provide a positive statement but that 
the Government nevertheless wishes Parliament to proceed to consider 
the Bill. Parliament would expect the Minister to explain his or her 
reasons during the normal course of the proceedings on the Bill. This 
will ensure that the human rights implications are debated at the 
earliest opportunity.  
Consideration of draft legislation within Government  
3.4 The new requirement to make a statement about the compliance of 
draft legislation with the Convention will have a significant and 
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beneficial impact on the preparation of draft legislation within 
Government before its introduction into Parliament. It will ensure that 
all Ministers, their departments and officials are fully seized of the 
gravity of the Convention's obligations in respect of human rights. But 
we also intend to strengthen collective Government procedures so as 
to ensure that a proper assessment is made of the human rights 
implications when collective approval is sought for a new policy, as 
well as when any draft Bill is considered by Ministers. Revised 
guidance to Departments on these procedures will, like the existing 
guidance, be publicly available.  
3.5 Some central co-ordination will also be extremely desirable in 
considering the approach to be taken to Convention points in criminal 
or civil proceedings, or in proceedings for judicial review, to which a 
Government department is a party. This is likely to require an inter- 
departmental group of lawyers and administrators meeting on a 
regular basis to ensure that a consistent approach is taken and to 
ensure that developments in case law are well understood by all those 
in Government who are involved in proceedings on Convention 
points. We do not, however, see any need to make a particular 
Minister responsible for promoting human rights across Government, 
or to set up a separate new Unit for this purpose. The responsibility for 
complying with human rights requirements rests on the Government 
as a whole.  
A Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights  
3.6 Bringing Rights Home suggested that "Parliament itself should 
play a leading role in protecting the rights which are at the heart of a 
parliamentary democracy". How this is achieved is a matter for 
Parliament to decide, but in the Government's view the best course 
would be to establish a new Parliamentary Committee with functions 
relating to human rights. This would not require legislation or any 
change in Parliamentary procedure. There could be a Joint Committee 
of both Houses of Parliament or each House could have its own 
Committee; or there could be a Committee which met jointly for some 
purposes and separately for others.  
3.7 The new Committee might conduct enquiries on a range of human 
rights issues relating to the Convention, and produce reports so as to 
assist the Government and Parliament in deciding what action to take. 
It might also want to range more widely, and examine issues relating 
to the other international obligations of the United Kingdom such as 
proposals to accept new rights under other human rights treaties.  
Should there be a Human Rights Commission?  
3.8   Bringing Rights Home canvassed views on the establishment of a 
Human Rights Commission, and this possibility has received a good 
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deal of attention. No commitment to establish a Commission was, 
however, made in the Manifesto on which the Government was 
elected. The Government's priority is implementation of its Manifesto 
commitment to give further effect to the Convention rights in 
domestic law so that people can enforce those rights in United 
Kingdom courts. Establishment of a new Human Rights Commission 
is not central to that objective and does not need to form part of the 
current Bill.  
3.9 Moreover, the idea of setting up a new human rights body is not 
universally acclaimed. Some reservations have been expressed, 
particularly from the point of view of the impact on existing bodies 
concerned with particular aspects of human rights, such as the 
Commission for Racial Equality and the Equal Opportunities 
Commission, whose primary concern is to protect the rights for which 
they were established. A quinquennial review is currently being 
conducted of the Equal Opportunities Commission, and the 
Government has also decided to establish a new Disability Rights 
Commission.  
3.10  The Government's conclusion is that, before a Human Rights 
Commission could be established by legislation, more consideration 
needs to be given to how it would work in relation to such bodies, and 
to the new arrangements to be established for Parliamentary and 
Government scrutiny of human rights issues. This is necessary not 
only for the purposes of framing the legislation but also to justify the 
additional public expenditure needed to establish and run a new 
Commission. A range of organisational issues need more detailed 
consideration before the legislative and financial case for a new 
Commission is made, and there needs to be a greater degree of 
consensus on an appropriate model among existing human rights 
bodies.  
3.11 However, the Government has not closed its mind to the idea of a 
new Human Rights Commission at some stage in the future in the 
light of practical experience of the working of the new legislation. If 
Parliament establishes a Committee on Human Rights, one of its main 
tasks might be to conduct an inquiry into whether a Human Rights 
Commission is needed and how it should operate. The Government 
would want to give full weight to the Committee's report in 
considering whether to create a statutory Human Rights Commission 
in future.  
3.12 It has been suggested that a new Commission might be funded 
from non- Government sources. The Government would not wish to 
deter a move towards a non- statutory, privately- financed body if its 
role was limited to functions such as public education and advice to 
individuals. However, a non-statutory body could not absorb any of 
the functions of the existing statutory bodies concerned with aspects 
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of human rights.  
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APPENDIX 3 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 
(WITHOUT THE SCHEDULES) 
 
An Act to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under 
the European Convention on Human Rights; to make provision with 
respect to holders of certain judicial offices who become judges of the 
European Court of Human Rights; and for connected purposes. 
 
[9th November 1998] 
 
Introduction 
 
1.— The Convention Rights. 
(1) In this Act ―the Convention rights‖ means the rights and 
fundamental freedoms set out in— 
 
(a) Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention, 
 
(b) Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and 
 
(c) [Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol]1 , as read with Articles 16 to 
18 of the Convention. 
 
(2) Those Articles are to have effect for the purposes of this Act 
subject to any designated derogation or reservation (as to which see 
sections 14 and 15). 
 
(3) The Articles are set out in Schedule 1. 
 
(4) The [Secretary of State ] 2 may by order make such amendments to 
this Act as he considers appropriate to reflect the effect, in relation to 
the United Kingdom, of a protocol. 
 
(5) In subsection (4) ―protocol‖ means a protocol to the Convention— 
 
(a) which the United Kingdom has ratified; or 
 
(b) which the United Kingdom has signed with a view to ratification. 
 
(6) No amendment may be made by an order under subsection (4) so 
as to come into force before the protocol concerned is in force in 
relation to the United Kingdom. 
 
2.— Interpretation of Convention rights. 
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(1) A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in 
connection with a Convention right must take into account any— 
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 
 
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 
31 of the Convention, 
 
(c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) 
of the Convention, or 
 
(d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of 
the Convention, whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of 
the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which that 
question has arisen. 
 
(2) Evidence of any judgment, decision, declaration or opinion of 
which account may have to be taken under this section is to be given 
in proceedings before any court or tribunal in such manner as may be 
provided by rules. 
 
(3) In this section ―rules‖ means rules of court or, in the case of 
proceedings before a tribunal, rules made for the purposes of this 
section— 
 
(a) by [ the Lord Chancellor or ] 3 […] 4 the Secretary of State, in 
relation to any proceedings outside Scotland; 
 
(b) by the Secretary of State, in relation to proceedings in Scotland; or 
 
(c) by a Northern Ireland department, in relation to proceedings before 
a tribunal in Northern Ireland— 
 
(i) which deals with transferred matters; and 
 
(ii) for which no rules made under paragraph (a) are in force. 
 
Legislation 
 
3.— Interpretation of legislation. 
(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate 
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible 
with the Convention rights. 
 
(2) This section— 
(a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever 
enacted; 
 
(b) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of 
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any incompatible primary legislation; and 
 
(c) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of 
any incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any 
possibility of revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of the 
incompatibility. 
 
4.— Declaration of incompatibility. 
 
(1) Subsection (2) applies in any proceedings in which a court 
determines whether a provision of primary legislation is compatible 
with a Convention right. 
 
(2) If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a 
Convention right, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility. 
 
(3) Subsection (4) applies in any proceedings in which a court 
determines whether a provision of subordinate legislation, made in the 
exercise of a power conferred by primary legislation, is compatible 
with a Convention right. 
 
(4) If the court is satisfied— 
 
(a) that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, and 
 
(b) that (disregarding any possibility of revocation) the primary 
legislation concerned prevents removal of the incompatibility, it may 
make a declaration of that incompatibility. 
 
(5) In this section ―court‖ means — 
 
[ (a) the Supreme Court; ]5 
 
(b) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; 
 
(c) the [Court Martial Appeal Court]6 ; 
 
(d) in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary sitting otherwise than as a 
trial court or the Court of Session; 
(e) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the High Court or the 
Court of Appeal [;]7 
 
[ (f) the Court of Protection, in any matter being dealt with by the 
President of the Family Division, the Vice-Chancellor or a puisne 
judge of the High Court. ]7 
 
(6) A declaration under this section (―a declaration of 
incompatibility‖)— 
 
(a) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of 
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the provision in respect of which it is given; and 
 
(b) is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made. 
 
 
5.— Right of Crown to intervene. 
 
(1) Where a court is considering whether to make a declaration of 
incompatibility, the Crown is entitled to notice in accordance with 
rules of court. 
 
(2) In any case to which subsection (1) applies— 
 
(a) a Minister of the Crown (or a person nominated by him), 
 
(b) a member of the Scottish Executive, 
 
(c) a Northern Ireland Minister, 
 
(d) a Northern Ireland department, 
 
is entitled, on giving notice in accordance with rules of court, to be 
joined as a party to the proceedings. 
 
(3) Notice under subsection (2) may be given at any time during the 
proceedings. 
 
(4) A person who has been made a party to criminal proceedings 
(other than in Scotland) as the result of a notice under subsection (2) 
may, with leave, appeal to the [Supreme Court ] 8 against any 
declaration of incompatibility made in the proceedings. 
 
(5) In subsection (4)— 
 
―criminal proceedings‖ includes all proceedings before the [Court 
Martial Appeal Court]9; and 
―leave‖ means leave granted by the court making the declaration of 
incompatibility or by the [Supreme Court]8 . 
 
Public authorities 
 
6.— Acts of public authorities. 
 
(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to an act if— 
 
(a) as the result of one or more provisions of primary legislation, the 
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authority could not have acted differently; or 
 
(b) in the case of one or more provisions of, or made under, primary 
legislation which cannot be read or given effect in a way which is 
compatible with the Convention rights, the authority was acting so as 
to give effect to or enforce those provisions. 
 
(3) In this section ―public authority‖ includes— 
 
(a) a court or tribunal, and 
 
(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public 
nature, but does not include either House of Parliament or a person 
exercising functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament. 
 
(4) […]10 
 
(5) In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by 
virtue only of subsection (3)(b) if the nature of the act is private. 
(6) ―An act‖ includes a failure to act but does not include a failure 
to— 
 
(a) introduce in, or lay before, Parliament a proposal for legislation; or 
 
(b) make any primary legislation or remedial order. 
 
7.— Proceedings. 
 
(1) A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes 
to act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may— 
 
(a) bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the 
appropriate court or tribunal, or 
 
(b) rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal 
proceedings, but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful 
act. 
 
(2) In subsection (1)(a) ―appropriate court or tribunal‖ means such 
court or tribunal as may be determined in accordance with rules; and 
proceedings against an authority include a counterclaim or similar 
proceedings. 
 
(3) If the proceedings are brought on an application for judicial 
review, the applicant is to be taken to have a sufficient interest in 
relation to the unlawful act only if he is, or would be, a victim of that 
act. 
 
(4) If the proceedings are made by way of a petition for judicial 
review in Scotland, the applicant shall be taken to have title and 
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interest to sue in relation to the unlawful act only if he is, or would 
be, a victim of that act. 
 
(5) Proceedings under subsection (1)(a) must be brought before the 
end of— 
 
(a) the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act 
complained of took place; or 
 
(b) such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable 
having regard to all the circumstances, but that is subject to any rule 
imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the procedure in question. 
 
(6) In subsection (1)(b) ―legal proceedings‖ includes— 
 
(a) proceedings brought by or at the instigation of a public authority; 
and 
 
(b) an appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal. 
 
(7) For the purposes of this section, a person is a victim of an unlawful 
act only if he would be a victim for the purposes of Article 34 of the 
Convention if proceedings were brought in the European Court of 
Human Rights in respect of that act. 
 
(8) Nothing in this Act creates a criminal offence. 
 
 
 (9) In this section ―rules‖ means — 
 
(a) in relation to proceedings before a court or tribunal outside 
Scotland, rules made by […] 11 the [the Lord Chancellor or ]12 
Secretary of State for the purposes of this section 
or rules of court, 
 
(b) in relation to proceedings before a court or tribunal in Scotland, 
rules made by the Secretary of State for those purposes, 
 
(c) in relation to proceedings before a tribunal in Northern Ireland— 
 
(i) which deals with transferred matters; and 
 
(ii) for which no rules made under paragraph (a) are in force, rules 
made by a Northern Ireland department for those purposes, and 
includes provision made by order under section 1 of the Courts and 
Legal Services Act 1990. 
 
(10) In making rules, regard must be had to section 9. 
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(11) The Minister who has power to make rules in relation to a 
particular tribunal may, to the extent he considers it necessary to 
ensure that the tribunal can provide an appropriate remedy in relation 
to an act (or proposed act) of a public authority which is (or would be) 
unlawful as a result of section 6(1), by order add to— 
 
(a) the relief or remedies which the tribunal may grant; or 
 
(b) the grounds on which it may grant any of them. 
 
(12) An order made under subsection (11) may contain such 
incidental, supplemental, consequential or transitional provision as the 
Minister making it considers appropriate. 
 
(13) ―The Minister‖ includes the Northern Ireland department 
concerned. 
 
8.— Judicial remedies. 
 
(1) In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which 
the court finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or 
remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and 
appropriate. 
 
(2) But damages may be awarded only by a court which has power to 
award damages, or to order the payment of compensation, in civil 
proceedings. 
 
(3) No award of damages is to be made unless, taking account of all 
the circumstances of the case, including— 
 
(a) any other relief or remedy granted, or order made, in relation to the 
act in question (by that or any other court), and 
 
(b) the consequences of any decision (of that or any other court) in 
respect of that act, the court is satisfied that the award is necessary to 
afford just satisfaction to the person in whose favour it is made. 
 
 
(4) In determining— 
 
(a) whether to award damages, or 
 
(b) the amount of an award, 
 
the court must take into account the principles applied by the 
European Court of Human Rights in relation to the award of 
compensation under Article 41 of the Convention. 
 
(5) A public authority against which damages are awarded is to be 
398 
 
treated— 
 
(a) in Scotland, for the purposes of section 3 of the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 as if the award were 
made in an action of damages in which the authority has been found 
liable in respect of loss or damage to the person to whom the award is 
made; 
 
(b) for the purposes of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 as 
liable in respect of damage suffered by the person to whom the award 
is made. 
 
(6) In this section— 
 
―court‖ includes a tribunal; 
 
―damages‖ means damages for an unlawful act of a public authority; 
and 
―unlawful‖ means unlawful under section 6(1). 
 
9.— Judicial acts. 
(1) Proceedings under section 7(1)(a) in respect of a judicial act may 
be brought only— 
 
(a) by exercising a right of appeal; 
 
(b) on an application (in Scotland a petition) for judicial review; or 
(c) in such other forum as may be prescribed by rules. 
 
(2) That does not affect any rule of law which prevents a court from 
being the subject of judicial review. 
 
(3) In proceedings under this Act in respect of a judicial act done in 
good faith, damages may not be awarded otherwise than to 
compensate a person to the extent required by Article 5(5) of the 
Convention. 
 
(4) An award of damages permitted by subsection (3) is to be made 
against the Crown; but no award may be made unless the appropriate 
person, if not a party to the proceedings, is joined. 
 
(5) In this section— 
 
―appropriate person‖ means the Minister responsible for the court 
concerned, or a person or government department nominated by him; 
 
―court‖ includes a tribunal; 
 
―judge‖ includes a member of a tribunal, a justice of the peace and a 
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clerk or other officer entitled to exercise the jurisdiction of a court; 
 
―judicial act‖ means a judicial act of a court and includes an act done 
on the instructions, or on behalf, of a judge; and 
 
―rules‖ has the same meaning as in section 7(9). 
 
Remedial action 
 
10.— Power to take remedial action. 
 
(1) This section applies if— 
 
(a) a provision of legislation has been declared under section 4 to be 
incompatible with a Convention right and, if an appeal lies— 
 
(i) all persons who may appeal have stated in writing that they do not 
intend to do so; 
 
(ii) the time for bringing an appeal has expired and no appeal has been 
brought within that time; or 
 
(iii) an appeal brought within that time has been determined or 
abandoned; or 
 
(b) it appears to a Minister of the Crown or Her Majesty in Council 
that, having regard to 
a finding of the European Court of Human Rights made after the 
coming into force of this section in proceedings against the United 
Kingdom, a provision of legislation is incompatible with an obligation 
of the United Kingdom arising from the Convention. 
 
(2) If a Minister of the Crown considers that there are compelling 
reasons for proceeding under this section, he may by order make such 
amendments to the legislation as he considers necessary to remove the 
incompatibility. 
 
(3) If, in the case of subordinate legislation, a Minister of the Crown 
considers— 
 
(a) that it is necessary to amend the primary legislation under which 
the subordinate legislation in question was made, in order to enable 
the incompatibility to be removed, and 
 
(b) that there are compelling reasons for proceeding under this section, 
he may by order make such amendments to the primary legislation as 
he considers necessary. 
 
(4) This section also applies where the provision in question is in 
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subordinate legislation and has been quashed, or declared invalid, by 
reason of incompatibility with a Convention right and the 
Minister proposes to proceed under paragraph 2(b) of Schedule 2. 
 
(5) If the legislation is an Order in Council, the power conferred by 
subsection (2) or (3) is exercisable by Her Majesty in Council. 
 
(6) In this section ―legislation‖ does not include a Measure of the 
Church Assembly or of the General Synod of the Church of England. 
 
(7) Schedule 2 makes further provision about remedial orders. 
 
Other rights and proceedings 
 
11. Safeguard for existing human rights. 
 
A person's reliance on a Convention right does not restrict— 
 
(a) any other right or freedom conferred on him by or under any law 
having effect in any part of the United Kingdom; or 
 
(b) his right to make any claim or bring any proceedings which he 
could make or bring apart from sections 7 to 9. 
 
12.— Freedom of expression. 
 
(1) This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any 
relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention 
right to freedom of expression. 
 
2) If the person against whom the application for relief is made (―the 
respondent‖) is neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be 
granted unless the court is satisfied— 
 
(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the 
respondent; or 
 
(b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not 
be notified. 
 
(3) No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before 
trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish 
that publication should not be allowed. 
 
(4) The court must have particular regard to the importance of the 
Convention right to freedom of expression and, where the proceedings 
relate to material which the respondent claims, or which appears to the 
court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to conduct 
connected with such material), to— 
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(a) the extent to which— 
 
(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or 
 
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be 
published; 
 
(b) any relevant privacy code. 
 
(5) In this section— 
 
―court‖ includes a tribunal; and 
 
―relief‖ includes any remedy or order (other than in criminal 
proceedings). 
 
13.— Freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
 
(1) If a court's determination of any question arising under this Act 
might affect the exercise by a religious organisation (itself or its 
members collectively) of the Convention right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, it must have particular regard to the 
importance of that right. 
 
(2) In this section ―court‖ includes a tribunal. 
 
Derogations and reservations 
 
14.— Derogations. 
 
[ (1) In this Act ―designated derogation‖ means any derogation by the 
United Kingdom from an Article of the Convention, or of any protocol 
to the Convention, which is designated for the purposes of this Act in 
an order made by the [Secretary of State]13 . ]14 
 
(2) […]15 
 
(3) If a designated derogation is amended or replaced it ceases to be a 
designated derogation. 
 
(4) But subsection (3) does not prevent the [Secretary of State]13 from 
exercising his power under subsection (1) […] 16 to make a fresh 
designation order in respect of the Article concerned. 
 
(5) The [Secretary of State]13 must by order make such amendments to 
Schedule 3 as he considers appropriate to reflect— 
 
(a) any designation order; or 
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(b) the effect of subsection (3). 
 
(6) A designation order may be made in anticipation of the making by 
the United Kingdom of a proposed derogation. 
 
15.— Reservations. 
 
(1) In this Act ―designated reservation‖ means— 
 
(a) the United Kingdom's reservation to Article 2 of the First Protocol 
to the Convention; and 
 
(b) any other reservation by the United Kingdom to an Article of the 
Convention, or of any protocol to the Convention, which is designated 
for the purposes of this Act in an order made by the [Secretary of 
State]17 . 
 
(2) The text of the reservation referred to in subsection (1)(a) is set out 
in Part II of Schedule 3. 
 
 
(3) If a designated reservation is withdrawn wholly or in part it ceases 
to be a designated reservation. 
 
(4) But subsection (3) does not prevent the [Secretary of State]17 from 
exercising his power under subsection (1)(b) to make a fresh 
designation order in respect of the Article concerned. 
 
(5) The [Secretary of State ] 17 must by order make such amendments 
to this Act as he considers appropriate to reflect— 
 
(a) any designation order; or 
 
(b) the effect of subsection (3). 
 
16.— Period for which designated derogations have effect. 
 
[ (1) If it has not already been withdrawn by the United Kingdom, a 
designated derogation ceases to have effect for the purposes of this 
Act, at the end of the period of five years beginning with the date on 
which the order designating it was made. ]18 
 
(2) At any time before the period— 
 
(a) fixed by subsection (1) […] 19 , or 
 
(b) extended by an order under this subsection, 
 
comes to an end, the [Secretary of State]20 may by order extend it by a 
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further period of five years. 
 
(3) An order under [section 14(1)]21 ceases to have effect at the end of 
the period for consideration, unless a resolution has been passed by 
each House approving the order. 
 
(4) Subsection (3) does not affect— 
 
(a) anything done in reliance on the order; or 
 
(b) the power to make a fresh order under section 14(1) […] 22 . 
 
(5) In subsection (3) ―period for consideration‖ means the period of 
forty days beginning with the day on which the order was made. 
 
(6) In calculating the period for consideration, no account is to be 
taken of any time during which— 
(a) Parliament is dissolved or prorogued; or 
 
(b) both Houses are adjourned for more than four days. 
 
(7) If a designated derogation is withdrawn by the United Kingdom, 
the [Secretary of State ] 20 must by order make such amendments to 
this Act as he considers are required to reflect that withdrawal. 
 
 
17.— Periodic review of designated reservations. 
 
(1) The appropriate Minister must review the designated reservation 
referred to in section 15(1)(a)— 
 
(a) before the end of the period of five years beginning with the date 
on which section 1(2) came into force; and 
 
(b) if that designation is still in force, before the end of the period of 
five years beginning with the date on which the last report relating to 
it was laid under subsection (3). 
 
(2) The appropriate Minister must review each of the other designated 
reservations (if any)— 
 
(a) before the end of the period of five years beginning with the date 
on which the order designating the reservation first came into force; 
and 
 
(b) if the designation is still in force, before the end of the period of 
five years beginning with the date on which the last report relating to 
it was laid under subsection (3). 
 
(3) The Minister conducting a review under this section must prepare 
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a report on the result of the review and lay a copy of it before each 
House of Parliament. 
 
Judges of the European Court of Human Rights 
 
18.— Appointment to European Court of Human Rights. 
(1) In this section ―judicial office‖ means the office of— 
(a) Lord Justice of Appeal, Justice of the High Court or Circuit judge, 
in England and Wales; 
(b) judge of the Court of Session or sheriff, in Scotland; 
 
(c) Lord Justice of Appeal, judge of the High Court or county court 
judge, in Northern Ireland. 
 
(2) The holder of a judicial office may become a judge of the 
European Court of Human Rights (―the Court‖) without being 
required to relinquish his office. 
 
(3) But he is not required to perform the duties of his judicial office 
while he is a judge of the Court. 
 
(4) In respect of any period during which he is a judge of the Court— 
 
(a) a Lord Justice of Appeal or Justice of the High Court is not to 
count as a judge of the relevant court for the purposes of [section 2(1) 
or 4(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 ] 23 (maximum number of 
judges) nor as a judge of the [Senior Courts] 24 for the purposes of 
section 12(1) to (6) of that Act (salaries etc.); 
 
 
 
(b) a judge of the Court of Session is not to count as a judge of that 
court for the purposes of section 1(1) of the Court of Session Act 1988 
(maximum number of judges) or of section 9(1)(c) of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1973 (―the 1973 Act‖) (salaries etc.); 
 
(c) a Lord Justice of Appeal or judge of the High Court in Northern 
Ireland is not to count as a judge of the relevant court for the purposes 
of section 2(1) or 3(1) of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 
(maximum number of judges) nor as a judge of the [Court of 
Judicature]25 of Northern Ireland for the purposes of section 9(1)(d) of 
the 1973 Act (salaries etc.); 
 
(d) a Circuit judge is not to count as such for the purposes of section 
18 of the Courts Act 1971 (salaries etc.); 
 
(e) a sheriff is not to count as such for the purposes of section 14 of 
the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1907 (salaries etc.); 
 
(f) a county court judge of Northern Ireland is not to count as such for 
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the purposes of section 106 of the County Courts Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1959 (salaries etc.). 
 
(5) If a sheriff principal is appointed a judge of the Court, section 
11(1) of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 (temporary 
appointment of sheriff principal) applies, while he holds that 
appointment, as if his office is vacant. 
(6) Schedule 4 makes provision about judicial pensions in relation to 
the holder of a judicial office who serves as a judge of the Court. 
 
(7) The Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State may by order make 
such transitional provision (including, in particular, provision for a 
temporary increase in the maximum number of judges) as he considers 
appropriate in relation to any holder of a judicial office who has 
completed his service as a judge of the Court. 
 
[ (7A) The following paragraphs apply to the making of an order 
under subsection (7) in relation to any holder of a judicial office listed 
in subsection (1)(a)– 
 
(a) before deciding what transitional provision it is appropriate to 
make, the person making the order must consult the Lord Chief Justice 
of England and Wales; 
 
(b) before making the order, that person must consult the Lord Chief 
Justice of England and Wales. 
 
(7B) The following paragraphs apply to the making of an order under 
subsection (7) in relation to any holder of a judicial office listed in 
subsection (1)(c)– 
 
(a) before deciding what transitional provision it is appropriate to 
make, the person making the order must consult the Lord Chief Justice 
of Northern Ireland; 
 
(b) before making the order, that person must consult the Lord Chief 
Justice of Northern Ireland. 
 
(7C) The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales may nominate a 
judicial office holder (within the meaning of section 109(4) of the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005) to exercise his functions under this 
section. 
 
 
(7D) The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland may nominate any of 
the following to exercise his functions under this section– 
 
(a) the holder of one of the offices listed in Schedule 1 to the Justice 
(Northern Ireland) Act 2002; 
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(b) a Lord Justice of Appeal (as defined in section 88 of that Act). 
]26 
 
Parliamentary procedure 
 
19.— Statements of compatibility. 
 
(1) A Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in either House of 
Parliament must, before Second Reading of the Bill— 
 
(a) make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of the 
Bill are compatible with the Convention rights (―a statement of 
compatibility‖); or 
 
(b) make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to make a 
statement of compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the 
House to proceed with the Bill. 
 
(2) The statement must be in writing and be published in such manner 
as the Minister making it considers appropriate. 
 
Supplemental 
 
20.— Orders etc. under this Act. 
 
(1) Any power of a Minister of the Crown to make an order under this 
Act is exercisable by statutory instrument. 
 
(2) The power of [the Lord Chancellor or ]27 […] 28 the Secretary of 
State to make rules (other than rules of court) under section 2(3) or 
7(9) is exercisable by statutory instrument. 
 
(3) Any statutory instrument made under section 14, 15 or 16(7) must 
be laid before Parliament. 
 
 
 (4) No order may be made by [the Lord Chancellor or ] 27 […] 28 the 
Secretary of State under section 1(4), 7(11) or 16(2) unless a draft of 
the order has been laid before, and approved by, each House of 
Parliament. 
 
(5) Any statutory instrument made under section 18(7) or Schedule 4, 
or to which subsection (2) applies, shall be subject to annulment in 
pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament. 
 
(6) The power of a Northern Ireland department to make— 
 
(a) rules under section 2(3)(c) or 7(9)(c), or 
 
(b) an order under section 7(11), 
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is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1979. 
(7) Any rules made under section 2(3)(c) or 7(9)(c) shall be subject to 
negative resolution; and section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act 
(Northern Ireland) 1954 (meaning of ―subject to negative resolution‖) 
shall apply as if the power to make the rules were conferred by an Act 
of the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
 
(8) No order may be made by a Northern Ireland department under 
section 7(11) unless a draft of the order has been laid before, and 
approved by, the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
 
21.— Interpretation, etc. 
 
(1) In this Act— 
 
―amend‖ includes repeal and apply (with or without modifications); 
 
―the appropriate Minister‖ means the Minister of the Crown having 
charge of the appropriate authorised government department (within 
the meaning of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947); 
 
―the Commission‖ means the European Commission of Human 
Rights; 
 
―the Convention‖ means the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, agreed by the Council of Europe 
at Rome on 4th November 1950 as it has effect for the time being in 
relation to the United Kingdom; 
 
―declaration of incompatibility‖ means a declaration under section 4; 
 
―Minister of the Crown‖ has the same meaning as in the Ministers of 
the Crown Act 1975; 
 
―Northern Ireland Minister‖ includes the First Minister and the deputy 
First Minister in Northern Ireland; 
 
―primary legislation‖ means any— 
 
(a) public general Act; 
 
(b) local and personal Act; 
 
(c) private Act; 
 
(d) Measure of the Church Assembly; 
 
(e) Measure of the General Synod of the Church of England; 
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(f) Order in Council— 
 
(i) made in exercise of Her Majesty's Royal Prerogative; 
 
(ii) made under section 38(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland Constitution 
Act 1973 or the corresponding provision of the Northern Ireland Act 
1998; or 
 
(iii) amending an Act of a kind mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); 
and includes an order or other instrument made under primary 
legislation (otherwise than by the [Welsh Ministers, the First Minister 
for Wales, the Counsel General to the Welsh Assembly Government ] 
29 , a member of the Scottish Executive, a Northern Ireland Minister or 
a Northern Ireland department) to the extent to which it operates to 
bring one or more provisions of that legislation into force or amends 
any primary legislation; 
 
―the First Protocol‖ means the protocol to the Convention agreed at 
Paris on 20th March 1952; […] 30 
 
―the Eleventh Protocol‖ means the protocol to the Convention 
(restructuring the control machinery established by the Convention) 
agreed at Strasbourg on 11th May 1994; 
 
[ ―the Thirteenth Protocol‖ means the protocol to the Convention 
(concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances) 
agreed at Vilnius on 3rd May 2002;]31 
 
―remedial order‖ means an order under section 10; 
 
―subordinate legislation‖ means any— 
 
(a) Order in Council other than one— 
 
(i) made in exercise of Her Majesty's Royal Prerogative; 
 
(ii) made under section 38(1)(a) of the Northern Ireland Constitution 
Act 1973 or the corresponding provision of the Northern Ireland Act 
1998; or 
 
(iii) amending an Act of a kind mentioned in the definition of primary 
legislation; 
 
(b) Act of the Scottish Parliament; 
 
[ (ba) Measure of the National Assembly for Wales; 
 
(bb) Act of the National Assembly for Wales; ]32 
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(c) Act of the Parliament of Northern Ireland; 
 
(d) Measure of the Assembly established under section 1 of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly Act 1973; 
 
(e) Act of the Northern Ireland Assembly; 
 
(f) order, rules, regulations, scheme, warrant, byelaw or other 
instrument made under primary legislation (except to the extent to 
which it operates to bring one or more provisions of that legislation 
into force or amends any primary legislation); 
 
(g) order, rules, regulations, scheme, warrant, byelaw or other 
instrument made under legislation mentioned in paragraph (b), (c), (d) 
or (e) or made under an Order in Council applying only to Northern 
Ireland; 
 
 
 (h) order, rules, regulations, scheme, warrant, byelaw or other 
instrument made by a member of the Scottish Executive, [ Welsh 
Ministers, the First Minister for Wales, the Counsel General to the 
Welsh Assembly Government, ] 33 a Northern Ireland Minister or a 
Northern Ireland department in exercise of prerogative or other 
executive functions of Her Majesty which are exercisable by such a 
person on behalf of Her Majesty; 
 
―transferred matters‖ has the same meaning as in the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998; and 
 
―tribunal‖ means any tribunal in which legal proceedings may be 
brought. 
 
(2) The references in paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 2(1) to Articles 
are to Articles of the Convention as they had effect immediately 
before the coming into force of the Eleventh Protocol. 
 
(3) The reference in paragraph (d) of section 2(1) to Article 46 
includes a reference to Articles 32 and 54 of the Convention as they 
had effect immediately before the coming into force of the Eleventh 
Protocol. 
 
(4) The references in section 2(1) to a report or decision of the 
Commission or a decision of the Committee of Ministers include 
references to a report or decision made as provided by paragraphs 
3, 4 and 6 of Article 5 of the Eleventh Protocol (transitional 
provisions). 
 
(5) […]34 
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22.— Short title, commencement, application and extent. 
 
(1) This Act may be cited as the Human Rights Act 1998. 
 
(2) Sections 18, 20 and 21(5) and this section come into force on the 
passing of this Act. 
 
(3) The other provisions of this Act come into force on such days as 
the Secretary of State may by order appoint; and different days may be 
appointed for different purposes. 
 
(4) Paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section 7 applies to proceedings 
brought by or at the instigation of a public authority whenever the act 
in question took place; but otherwise that subsection does not apply to 
an act taking place before the coming into force of that section. 
 
(5) This Act binds the Crown. 
 
(6) This Act extends to Northern Ireland. 
 
(7) […]35 
 
 
  
  
NOTES  
 
 
1 Words substituted by Human Rights Act 1998 (Amendment) Order 2004/1574 
art.2(1) (June 22, 2004) 
 
2 Words substituted by Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs Order 2003/1887 
Sch.2 para.10(1) (August 19, 2003) 
 
3 Words inserted by Transfer of Functions (Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State) 
Order 2005/3429 Sch.1 para.3 (January 12, 2006) 
 
4 Words repealed by Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs Order 2003/1887 
Sch.2 para.10(2) (August 19, 2003) 
 
5 Substituted by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 c. 4 Sch.9(1) para.66(2) (October 1, 
2009) 
 
6 Words substituted by Armed Forces Act 2006 c. 52 Sch.16 para.156 (October 31, 
2009) 
 
7 Added by Mental Capacity Act 2005 c. 9 Sch.6 para.43 (October 1, 2007) 
 
8 Words substituted by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 c. 4 Sch.9(1) para.66(3) 
(October 1, 2009) 
 
9 Words substituted by Armed Forces Act 2006 c. 52 Sch.16 para.157 (October 31, 
2009) 
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10 Repealed by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 c. 4 Sch.18(5) para.1 (October 1, 
2009) 
 
11 Words repealed by Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs Order 2003/1887 
Sch.2 para.10(2) (August 19, 2003) 
 
12 Words inserted by Transfer of Functions (Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State) 
Order 2005/3429 Sch.1 para.3 (January 12, 2006) 
 
13 Words substituted by Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs Order 
2003/1887 Sch.2 para.10(1) (August 19, 2003) 
 
14 Existing s.14(1)(a) is repealed and s.14(1)(b) is restructured by Human Rights Act 
(Amendment) Order 2001/1216 art.2(a) (April 1, 2001) 
 
15 Repealed by Human Rights Act (Amendment) Order 2001/1216 art.2(b) (April 1, 
2001) 
 
16 Reference to "(b)" repealed by Human Rights Act (Amendment) Order 2001/1216 
art.2(c) (April 1, 2001) 
 
17 Words substituted by Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs Order 
2003/1887 Sch.2 para.10(1) (August 19, 2003) 
 
18 Existing s.16(1)(a)-(b) repealed and remaining text is restructured by Human 
Rights Act (Amendment) Order 2001/1216 art.3(a) (April 1, 2001) 
 
19 Reference to "(a)" and "(b)" repealed by Human Rights Act (Amendment) Order 
2001/1216 art.3(b) (April 1, 2001) 
 
20 Words substituted by Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs Order 
2003/1887 Sch.2 para.10(1) (August 19, 2003) 
 
21 Reference to "(b)" repealed by Human Rights Act (Amendment) Order 2001/1216 
art.3(c) (April 1, 2001) 
 
22 Reference to "(b)" repealed by Human Rights Act (Amendment) Order 2001/1216 
art.3(d) (April 1, 2001) 
 
23 Words substituted by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 c. 4 Sch.11(1) para.1(2) 
(October 1, 2009) 
 
24 Words substituted by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 c. 4 Sch.11(2) para.4(1) 
(October 1, 2009) 
 
25 Words substituted by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 c. 4 Sch.11(3) para.6(1) 
  
26 Added by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 c. 4 Sch.4(1) para.278 (April 3, 2006) 
 
27 Words inserted by Transfer of Functions (Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State) 
Order 2005/3429 Sch.1 para.3 (January 12, 2006) 
 
28 Words repealed by Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs Order 2003/1887 
Sch.2 para.10(2) (August 19, 2003) 
 
29 Words substituted by Government of Wales Act 2006 c. 32 Sch.10 para.56(2) 
(May 3, 2007 immediately after the ordinary election as specified in 2006 c.32 
s.161(1); May 25, 2007 immediately after the end of the initial period for purposes 
of functions of the Welsh Ministers, the First Minister, the Counsel General and the 
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Assembly Commission and in relation to the Auditor General and the Comptroller 
and Auditor General as specified in 2006 c.32 s.161(4)-(5)) 
 
30 Definition repealed by Human Rights Act 1998 (Amendment) Order 2004/1574 
art.2(2) (June 22, 2004) 
 
31 Definition inserted by Human Rights Act 1998 (Amendment) Order 2004/1574 
art.2(2) (June 22, 2004) 
 
32 Added by Government of Wales Act 2006 c. 32 Sch.10 para.56(3) (May 3, 2007 
immediately after the ordinary election as specified in 2006 c.32 s.161(1); May 25, 
2007 immediately after the end of the initial period for purposes of functions of the 
Welsh Ministers, the First Minister, the Counsel General and the Assembly 
Commission and in relation to the Auditor General and the Comptroller and Auditor 
General as specified in 2006 c.32 s.161(4)-(5)) 
 
33 Words inserted by Government of Wales Act 2006 c. 32 Sch.10 para.56(4) (May 
3, 2007 immediately after the ordinary election as specified in 2006 c.32 s.161(1); 
May 25, 2007 immediately after the end of the initial period for purposes of 
functions of the Welsh Ministers, the First Minister, the Counsel General and the 
Assembly Commission and in relation to the Auditor General and the Comptroller 
and Auditor General as specified in 2006 c.32 s.161(4)-(5)) 
 
34 Repealed by Armed Forces Act 2006 c. 52 Sch.17 para.1 (October 31, 2009 as SI 
2009/1167) 
 
35 Repealed by Armed Forces Act 2006 c. 52 Sch.17 para.1 (October 31, 2009 as SI 
2009/1167) 
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APPENDIX 4 
SECTION 41, YOUTH JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 
ACT 1999 
 
―41. — Restriction on evidence or questions about complainant's 
sexual history. 
 
(2) If at a trial a person is charged with a sexual offence, then, 
except with the leave of the court— 
(a) no evidence may be adduced, and 
(b) no question may be asked in cross-examination, by or 
on behalf of any accused at the trial, about any sexual 
behaviour of the complainant. 
 
(3) The court may give leave in relation to any evidence or 
question only on an application made by or on behalf of an 
accused, and may not give such leave unless it is satisfied— 
 
(a) that subsection (3) or (5) applies, and 
 
(b) that a refusal of leave might have the result of 
rendering unsafe a conclusion of the jury or (as the 
case may be) the court on any relevant issue in the 
case. 
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(4) This subsection applies if the evidence or question relates to 
a relevant issue in the case and either 
 
(a) that issue is not an issue of consent; or 
 
(b) it is an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the 
complainant to which the evidence or question relates 
is alleged to have taken place at or about the same time 
as the event which is the subject matter of the charge 
against the accused; or 
 
(c) it is an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the 
complainant to which the evidence or question relates 
is alleged to have been, in any respect, so similar— 
 
(i) to any sexual behaviour of the complainant which 
(according to evidence adduced or to be adduced by or on 
behalf of the accused) took place as part of the event 
which is the subject matter of the charge against the 
accused, or 
 
(ii) to any other sexual behaviour of the complainant which 
(according to such evidence) took place at or about the 
same time as that event, that the similarity cannot 
reasonably be explained as a coincidence. 
415 
 
 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3) no evidence or question shall be 
regarded as relating to a relevant issue in the case if it appears to the 
court to be reasonable to assume that the purpose (or main purpose) 
for which it would be adduced or asked is to establish or elicit 
material for impugning the credibility of the complainant as a witness. 
 
(5) This subsection applies if the evidence or question— 
 
(a) relates to any evidence adduced by the prosecution about 
any sexual behaviour of the complainant; and 
 
(b) in the opinion of the court, would go no further than is 
necessary to enable the evidence adduced by the prosecution 
to be rebutted or explained by or on behalf of the accused. 
 
(6) For the purposes of subsections (3) and (5) the evidence or 
question must relate to a specific instance (or specific instances) of 
alleged sexual behaviour on the part of the complainant (and 
accordingly nothing in those subsections is capable of applying in 
relation to the evidence or question to the extent that it does not so 
relate). 
 
(7) Where this section applies in relation to a trial by virtue of the fact 
that one or more of a number of persons charged in the proceedings is 
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or are charged with a sexual offence— 
 
(a) it shall cease to apply in relation to the trial if the prosecutor 
decides not to proceed with the case against that person or 
those persons in respect of that charge; but 
(b) it shall not cease to do so in the event of that person or those 
persons pleading guilty to, or being convicted of, that charge. 
 
(8) Nothing in this section authorises any evidence to be adduced or 
any question to be asked which cannot be adduced or asked apart 
from this section.‖ 
 
 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
 
Before 1976, there was no statutory regulation of evidence of a 
complainant‘s sexual history in rape trials.  
 
However, at common law, in a rape trial, evidence that the complainant 
had had sexual relations with either the defendant or other men was 
regarded as relevant to the issue of the credibility of the complainant. 
Accordingly, the complainant could be cross-examined as to her sexual 
history.
698
  
 
                                                 
698
 However, her answers were final and could not be rebutted by contrary evidence. 
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Those who sought to adduce evidence of the sexual history of rape 
victims appeared to play on what has been described as the twin myths, 
―that unchaste women were more likely to consent to intercourse and in 
any event, were less worthy of belief.‖699 
 
The situation of the rape complainant became more precarious with the 
House of Lords‘ decision in the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Morgan.
700
 In that case, the House held that a subjective honest (even if 
unreasonable) belief on the part of the defendant that the complainant did 
consent to the sexual intercourse could be a viable defence.  
 
With this decision, it appeared that the sexual history of rape 
complainants would become something of a sought-after object of value 
for bolstering the defence of belief in the consent of the complainant. The 
risk that women who had suffered rape could go through a second agony 
of harassment in the course of the rape trial by having their sexual history 
unnecessarily probed by defence lawyers appeared inevitable. 
 
Following the Morgan case, the Government set up the Advisory Group 
on the Law of Rape headed by Rose Heilbron. The Group produced the 
so-called Heilbron Report.
701
 It criticised the frequent use of evidence of 
the complainant‘s sexual history in rape trials. It advised that while 
                                                 
699
 See R v Seaboyer (1991) 83 DLR (4
th
) 193, 258, 278C, per McLachlin, J., cited by Lord Steyn in R v A 
(No.2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2001] 2 WLR 1546; [2002], at paragraph 27 of the judgment. 
700
 [1976] AC 182  
701
 The Heilbron Committee (1975). Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape. Comnd 6352. 
  
418 
 
evidence of the sexual history of the complainant with the defendant 
himself might be potentially relevant, that with respect to persons other 
than the defendant was generally irrelevant and should not be allowed 
save in certain circumstances.  
 
The only exception to the admissibility of the complainant‘s sexual 
history with third parties should be where the sexual history related to an 
alleged sexual behaviour of the complainant which was so ―strikingly 
similar‖ to the sexual behaviour of the complainant at the event which 
was the subject of the subsisting charge, and the court was of the opinion 
that the evidence was so relevant to the defence of the defendant that 
excluding it might render the trial unfair. 
 
In addition to the above, the Advisory Group also recommended that 
evidence of the complainant‘s sexual history should also be allowed for 
the purpose of rebutting evidence of sexual behaviour put forward by the 
prosecution.  
 
Following this Report, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976
702
 
was enacted.  
 
It is noteworthy that evidence of the sexual history of the complainant 
with the defendant himself remained statutorily unregulated even under 
                                                 
702
 Repealed in SI 2000/3075 art 3 by the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, schedule 6, para. 1 
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the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976.
703
 What was brought under 
regulation by the 1976 Act was evidence of the sexual history of the 
complainant with persons other than the defendant. And even in this 
respect, the recommendations of the Advisory Group were not fully 
implemented. For example, the condition that the evidence of sexual 
history of the complainant must relate to an alleged sexual behaviour of 
the complainant, which is so strikingly similar to her sexual behaviour at 
the event under inquiry before such evidence may be admitted, was 
omitted by the Act. 
 
Section 2(2) of the 1976 Act permitted the judge to give leave to adduce 
evidence of, or to cross-examine on, the complainant‘s sexual history 
with third parties ―if and only if he is satisfied that it would be unfair to 
that defendant to refuse to allow the evidence to be adduced or the 
question to be asked.‖ 
 
Thus, during the operation of the 1976 Act, the common law principles 
relating to the admission of evidence of the sexual history of a rape 
complainant with the defendant remained unchanged. Defence lawyers 
were still free to probe such sexual history for the purpose of attacking 
the credibility of the complainant. And as regards sexual history with 
third parties, judges were given a considerably wide discretion to either 
refuse or accept the admission of such evidence. 
 
                                                 
703
 See section 2(1) of the Act. 
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This state of affairs was generally criticised as unsatisfactory.
704
 Critics 
argued that the failure to statutorily regulate the admission of sexual 
history evidence of the complainant with the defendant (no matter how 
remote in time and context) continued to create problems of harassment 
of rape complainants. The prejudicial effect of such evidence could not be 
ignored.  
 
Further, Temkin had argued that the discretion given to the judges to 
admit sexual history evidence in respect of third parties was too wide. It 
enabled the courts to ―attribute undue significance to the sexual past of 
complainants in rape trials.‖705  
 
Apparently, Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999 set out above was enacted to rectify these observed flaws. 
According to Mr. Paul Boateng:
706
 
 
―Women – it normally is women although it might be a man – 
who are considering making an allegation of rape are all too often 
deterred from so doing, or from going through with the process of 
prosecution, because they are terrified of having their sexual 
history trawled through in a gratuitous way …. 
 
―The intention of the Bill is to keep as much evidence of 
                                                 
704
 See Temkin, J. (1993). "Sexual History Evidence - the Ravishment of Section Two." Criminal Law Review: 
3-20. 
 , McColgan, A. (1996). "Common Law and the Relevance of Sexual History Evidence." Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 16: 275, and  
 Birch, D. (2000). "A Better Deal for Vulnerable Witnesses?" Criminal Law Review: 223. 
  
705
 Temkin, J. (1993). "Sexual History Evidence - the Ravishment of Section Two." Criminal Law Review: 3-
20. 
  
706
 Then Minister of State at the Home Office, speaking in the House of Commons on 24 June 1999. See HC 
Official Report, Standing Committee E (Human Rights Bill), 24 June 1999, Column 203. 
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complainant‘s sexual behaviour out of trials as possible. That is 
vital if complainants are to pursue their complaints through to trial 
and not to feel that their privacy is being invaded to discredit and 
humiliate them. We must ensure that victims have faith in the 
criminal justice system and believe that their attacker will be on 
trial, not them and their history. Sexual history should be 
permitted only in very limited
707
 circumstances where it is really 
relevant to an issue at trial.‖ 
 
Similarly, Lord Williams
708
 expressed the intention of the promoters of 
the Bill especially as it related to the severe restrictions proposed on 
evidence of sexual history of the complainant on an issue of consent: 
 
―I have to make it plain that as a matter of government policy we 
have concluded that evidence of a complainant's past attitude to or 
experience of sexual relations is not material upon which a jury 
should reasonably rely to conclude that the complainant might 
indeed have consented on the occasion that is the subject of the 
complaint. Consensual sex does not mean consent to sex in 
general - it does not even mean consent to sex with a particular 
person - it means consent to sex with a particular individual on a 
particular occasion . . .. 
 
―The fact that a complainant has consented previously does not 
mean that she will consent again. A woman exercises - and is 
entitled to exercise - her consent independently on each occasion. 
The defendant's accumulated knowledge and experience of the 
complainant may affect his belief in consent at the time of the 
alleged offence, even though, if he reflects on it later, he may 
recognise and concede that that belief was mistaken.‖ 
 
By section 41(1) of the 1999 Act above, as a general rule, no evidence is 
to be adduced about the sexual history of the complainant in a rape case. 
Further, no question is also to be allowed in cross-examination in respect 
of such sexual history. This general rule applies equally to a 
complainant‘s sexual history with third parties as well as with the 
                                                 
707
 Bold type supplied for emphasis. 
708
 Of Mostyn, QC, Minister of State at the Home Office, speaking in the House of Lords on 23 March 1999. 
See Hansard (HL Debates) of 23 March 1999,Columns 1216-1217, 1218. 
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defendant himself. 
 
Section 41(2) grants power to the court to allow the sexual history 
evidence of the complainant if, first, section 41(3) or 41(5) applies in the 
particular case and, secondly, the court determines that excluding the 
evidence might render the trial unfair. 
 
It is clear that the only difference, which the 1999 Act has brought to the 
existing law, is the conditions imposed in section 41(3). This is because 
absenting this sub-section, the court is left with the wide discretion which 
it had under the old dispensation. Under section 2 of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1976, as under the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 (absenting section 41(3) above-mentioned), the 
admission of the sexual history evidence of the complainant was subject 
only to the discretionary power of the court and to nothing else. 
 
However, section 41(3) of the 1999 Act now imposed severe restrictions 
on the admissibility of the complainant‘s sexual history that even the 
court could not waive. Its effect is that once the issue before the court or 
jury is one of consent, the conditions stipulated in section 41(3)(b)709 
must be present before the court can even consider exercising its 
discretion to allow (or disallow) the evidence to be given or the question 
to be asked in cross-examination.  
 
                                                 
709
 Or any one of the alternative conditions stipulated in section 41(3)(a) and (c) 
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Section 41(3)(b) stipulates that the sexual history evidence sought to be 
adduced or elicited must relate to an alleged sexual behaviour of the 
complainant which took place ―at or about the same time710 as the event 
which is the subject matter of the charge against the accused.‖ 
 
Unless the specific condition relating to time, as indicated above, is 
present, or section 41(3)(c) applies in any case, section 41(3)(b) rules out 
the possibility of admitting evidence with the slightest degree of 
remoteness. For example, in a case where the issue is one of consent, it 
would be doubtful if evidence that the complainant had consensual sexual 
intercourse with the defendant at about 6 O‘clock in the morning would 
be admissible when the allegation was that the rape took place at about 6 
O‘clock in the evening of the same day.711 
 
However, the important thing about this provision is that once the court 
determines that the previous sexual behaviour of the complainant sought 
to be given in evidence did not take place ―at or about the same time‖ as 
the event in the charge, the court cannot go on to consider its 
admissibility. This is so even if the context is such that it may well be 
possible that the evidence strongly supports the defence of consent by the 
defendant. 
                                                 
710
 Bold type supplied for emphasis. 
711
 On the other hand, one must not forget that context matters also. For e.g., if the evidence shows that the 
parties had sex in the morning, and had been enjoying the entire day indoors, each totally naked all the time, it 
would be unreasonable in those circumstances to exclude the evidence about the morning‘s sex session to 
buttress the claim of the defendant that the sexual intercourse that took place in the evening was consensual. 
However, the provision appears not to have taken into account the matter of context, although it may well be 
possible for the court to strain the language a bit to accommodate this kind of scenario.  
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The second (alternative) condition that must be present before the court 
can activate its discretionary power to admit sexual history evidence on 
an issue of consent is contained in section 41(3)((c). This paragraph 
requires that the previous sexual behaviour of the complainant which is 
sought to be admitted in evidence must be ―so similar‖ to her behaviour 
in the instant charge ―that the similarity cannot be explained as a 
coincidence.‖ 
 
Again, in the absence of such a striking similarity,712 the court is deprived 
of the power to even begin to consider exercising its discretionary power 
to admit (or refuse to admit) the evidence.  
 
As stated above, the main purpose of section 41(3) is to limit as far as 
possible the circumstances under which the sexual history of the 
complainant will be relevant to the issue of consent in a rape case, and 
thus admissible in evidence. The intention is quite clear. It is manifest in 
the provision. Whether Parliament was right or wrong to go that far in 
restricting such evidence is another matter. What is important for our 
present purpose is that the intention of Parliament appears unequivocally 
clear in section 41(3)(b) and (c). It deliberately imposed those restrictions 
contained in the relevant paragraphs and did so in such a way that the 
courts could not waive them.  
 
 
                                                 
712
 Or other requirements, as, for example provided in section 41(3)(a) and (b) 
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APPENDIX 5 
PARAGRAPH 2(1) AND (2), SCHEDULE 1 – RENT ACT 1977 
 
 
 
 
  
 
2. –  
(1) The surviving spouse (if any) of the original tenant, if residing in the dwelling-house 
immediately before the death of the original tenant, shall after the death be the statutory 
tenant if and so long as he or she occupies the dwelling-house as his or her residence. 
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 (2) For the purpose of this paragraph, a person who was living with the original tenant as his 
or her wife or husband shall be treated as the spouse of the original tenant. 
 
Legislative History 
 
As originally enacted, paragraph 2(2) protected not the ―surviving spouse‖, but only the 
―widow‖ of the deceased tenant. It meant that only women whose husbands had been 
deceased could succeed to the statutory tenancy hitherto held by their husbands. This was a 
reflection of the social conditions of the time. What was common then was that women were 
viewed, and were in fact usually the dependent half, of the husband-wife relationship. Men 
were most often the breadwinners and providers of accommodation for the family. 
 
During that dispensation, a widower could not succeed to the statutory tenancy of his 
deceased wife. With the passage of time, it was felt that this was not good law. There was a 
need to rectify the situation. Surviving husbands who had been living with their deceased 
statutory-tenant wives should be able to succeed to the statutory tenancy. 
Parliament apparently responded to these concerns. In 1980, it amended paragraph 2(2) by 
replacing ―widow‖ with ―surviving spouse,‖ thus bringing widowers into the purview of the 
paragraph.  
 
It is necessary to bear in mind that so far, only legally married couples could qualify as a 
―surviving spouse‖ pursuant to paragraph 2(2). To be able to succeed under the paragraph, 
the survivor had to prove that he or she was legally married to the deceased. Of course, if not 
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admitted by the opposing party, only the tendering in evidence of the marriage certificate713 
could prove this.  
 
In 1988, Parliament made two further amendments. First, it decided to phase out statutory 
tenancies. It did so by providing in paragraph 3 to the Schedule to the 1977 Act that 
qualifying members of the deceased statutory tenant were to be entitled to an assured tenancy 
upon the death of the statutory tenant. They were not to continue the statutory tenancy, which 
was more advantageous. 
 
However, spouses of statutory tenants were not affected by this amendment. Upon the death 
of their husbands or wives as the case may be, they were to succeed to the statutory tenancy 
previously held by their spouses. Paragraph 2(1) in its present form reflected Parliament‘s 
intention not to alter the rights of surviving spouses of deceased statutory tenants. 
 
The second amendment related to the position of unmarried couples. By 1988, social attitudes 
had changed so much that it became quite acceptable for a man and a woman to co-habit and 
live as if they were husband and wife without actually going through the formalities of 
marriage. It was felt that it was ripe and appropriate to extend the protection offered to 
married couples under paragraph 2 to unmarried couples as well if they could prove de facto 
marriage. Accordingly, Parliament added sub-paragraph 2(2) and brought unmarried couples 
under the protection offered by paragraph 2(1). 
 
                                                 
713
 Or such other admissible evidence of marriage 
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The legislative history indicates that entitlement to succeed to a statutory tenancy was given 
first to a widow, then extended to a widower, and finally to unmarried couples of the opposite 
sex co-habiting as husband and wife but without being legally married.  
 
 
 
 
 
